Heritage diplomacy and soft power competition between Iran and Turkey: competing claims over Rumi and Nowruz

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we examine the use of intangible cultural heritage as a vehicle for soft power in the service of geostrategic competitions between Iran and Turkey, two regional powers in West Asia. We focus on two significant trans-regional instances of intangible cultural heritage relevant to both countries: the mystic poet Rumi and the New Year’s celebration of Nowruz. We draw on theories in political science and cultrual heritage as well as a host of sources in Persian, Turkish, and Azerbaijani, to demonstrate how heritage is mobilised concurrently as a nation-building device and a tool for soft power in international relations. We conclude by suggesting that, despite strong grounds for its claims, Iran’s response in this competition has been reactive rather than proactive. Overall, the paper contributes to the scholarship on soft power and heritage diplomacy by presenting the first comparative analysis of cases of shared intangible heritage in West Asia.

KEYWORDS:

• Heritage diplomacy
• Iran
• Turkey
• Nowruz
• Rumi

Introduction

This paper explains the use of heritage in geostrategic competition between regional powers, Iran and Turkey, in West Asia. It focuses on their use of, and competing claims over, two cases of shared intangible heritage, namely, the New Year celebrations of the poet Rumi and Nowruz¹ in national and international arenas. The contribution of the paper to the existing body of literature is threefold.

Firstly, it is a comparative study of the use of heritage in geostrategic competitions between Iran and Turkey. The use of heritage in international relations and diplomacy has been discussed in the extant literature, under the rubric of heritage diplomacy.² The focus of these discussions, in most cases, is oriented around how individual states seek to advance their interests in international arenas by promoting heritage. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is one such example, as analysed in several sources (including Qian 2021; Sigley 2022; Winter 2019; Zou and Qiu 2018). While many scholars recognise the use of heritage for soft power objectives (e.g. Nakano and Zhu 2020), this is often explored in relation to one country’s ambitions (e.g. Winter 2019). Referring to geospatial aspects of heritage diplomacy and its dialogic relations of power, this paper focuses on heritage as an arena for diplomatic rivalries between two countries, Iran and Turkey, with competing geostrategic agendas.

Secondly, the paper shows how shared heritage is imagined, invented, and mobilised by rival regional powers in the international arena while simultaneously benefitting their nation-building programs. In the case of Turkey, especially, it illustrates that effective heritage diplomacy relies on continuity between heritage claims in domestic and international arenas. The paper thus takes a more holistic view, positing a continuum between domestic and international identity formation, and on that basis, argues for a similar continuum in the use of heritage between domestic and international arenas. Examining Turkey, Hintz (2018, 5–6) speaks of an inside-out identity contestation theory, which ‘seeks to explain the timing of and motivations behind the spillovers of identity’, and also discusses how foreign policy is used as an ‘alternative arena for identity politics’. In our case studies, identity contests in the international arena have geostrategic corollaries. From this perspective, this article affirms Nakano and Zhu’s (2020) observation that the relationship between heritage and power should be examined on an international scale.

Thirdly, the paper reflects on the notion of heritage diplomacy itself, teasing out the contours of this elusive concept at the crossroads of heritage studies and international relations. Specifically, the paper focuses on the use of intangible heritage in diplomacy and its intersection with soft power. We thus shine a light on an under-examined area in the existing literature on heritage diplomacy (Lähdesmäki and Čeginskas 2022, 645).

Our approach is primarily informed by theory and existing sources, many of which are in primary language. In constructing the Iranian and Turkish narratives of Rumi and Nowruz, and the diplomatic rivalry between the two countries over them, we have drawn on existing academic literature, newspaper articles, and official websites in English, Persian, and Turkish. Most of these resources reflect the ideas of key Iranian and Turkish policymakers concerning their narratives of Rumi and Nowruz. This benefits our argument as, throughout the article, we are concerned with the official statements rather than their critique, which would be more appropriately achieved using critical content analysis. Thus, for a comparative analysis, we have selected official statements and texts to confirm the main themes and core arguments on the Iranian and Turkish sides. From Turkish official websites, we have focused on outlets such as Daily Sabah, TURKSOY, and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism that reflect government positions. Similarly, for Iran, we have considered official statements made online and in news outlets such as IRNA, ISNA, Khabar Online, and the Sa’di Foundation Website. We have also reviewed both partisan and critical articles published in Iran and Turkey, as listed in the bibliography. Having read these sources, we also take into account the contemporary historical and political context in which they are conceived. Our conclusions are derived from this interpretative contextual comparison in relation to the four theoretical observations listed below.

Below, we outline our theoretical observations, which position heritage in the context of geostrategic competition. We will then provide a brief overview of the relations between Iran and Turkey as two key regional powers in West Asia. Then, focusing on Rumi and Nowruz and their heritage, we explore how Iran and Turkey have used them to their advantage in the international arena.

Theoretical observations

Our first theoretical observation, in line with Hintz (2018), is that foreign policy and domestic politics are complementary spaces for identity politics and political legitimacy. This suggests that, for Iran and Turkey, domestic power and legitimation are complemented by international power projections to the extent that, at times, it becomes difficult to separate the two or determine their order of precedence. Here, heritage attains a dual significance as being central to nation-building projects as well as a carrier of symbolic content (including core national values) in circulation in international arenas.³ For Turkey or Iran, shared heritages such as Nowruz and Rumi, are the symbolic elements that convey shared values of a cultural system.

Our second observation is that, at times, the symbolic elements forming the basis of the aforementioned identity continuum consist of invented traditions. Hobsbawm (1983, 3–7) points out that invented traditions are characterised by invariance, formalisation, ritualisation, distinctive paraphernalia, and reference to and claiming descent from an unbroken immemorial past. Invented traditions also perform ideological functions by propagating forms of collective memory and identity and promoting group or social cohesion. As we shall see, they are particularly evident in Turkey’s use of Nowruz.

A third observation is that, in our context, the use of heritage has spatial corollaries. Heritage forms the basis for a geoculture, which is ‘a set of ideas, values, and norms that were widely accepted throughout the [world-]system and that constrained social action thereafter’ (Wallerstein 2011, xvi). In other words, geoculture is a cultural structure across geographical space, revealed through the analysis of largely unconscious symbolic exchanges of ideas, practices and their associated things (Gelis-Filho 2019, 168, 74). Unlike a mere cultural system (such as a religion), geoculture is associated, but not coterminous, with an economic system. Geoculture affirms the continuum of identity politics, and ultimately heritage, between domestic and international scales and has geoeconomic and geopolitical implications as well.⁴ As an example, Turkey highlights the idea of the Turkic World in its foreign policy approach, as will be discussed, and has used the concept of ‘Turkishness’ to further its relationship with and influence on the Turkic World, which we discuss in relation to Nowruz.

Our fourth observation is that heritage diplomacy, characterised by the active use of heritage in support of foreign policy, constitutes a viable framework for understanding the geocultural dimensions of the Iran-Turkey competition over heritage. The difficulty with this concept is twofold: first, the definition remains rather vague, and second, its relationship to basic concepts such as public and cultural diplomacy and soft power need clarification.

Winter (2015, 1007) defines heritage diplomacy as a ‘set of processes whereby cultural and natural pasts shared between and across nations become subject to exchanges, collaborations and forms of cooperative governance’, and made a distinction between heritage in and as diplomacy (2015, 1011). In cases where a country engages in supporting heritage governance and other practices within another country, we are speaking of heritage in diplomacy. Examples include supporting funds, exchange of knowledge and expertise and backroom negotiations for heritage recognition in another country. However, cases where diplomatic activities focus on a genuine or imagined shared heritage constitute heritage as diplomacy or heritage-driven diplomacy (Vandesande 2019). Here heritage is used to form the common ground between the countries in question to extend dialogue at various scales as well as forming diplomatic blocs (Lähdesmäki and Čeginskas 2022; Luke and Kersel 2013; Todorović 2022; Winter 2016). Heritage as diplomacy is more common because it draws on a shared context. However, Winter’s definition neglects diplomatic and heritage competition in the international arena. Furthermore, the distinction between heritage in and heritage as diplomacy is ambiguous and has limited analytical merit because heritage as diplomacy can also be considered heritage in diplomacy, depending on which country takes the lead and what power dynamics exist between the countries involved. Both instances are likely to involve overlapping if not identical state structures (Vandesande 2019, 72).

In this article, we note that heritage diplomacy also pertains to soft power. Soft power is the ability to influence others through co-optive power and framing the agenda, mainly through increasing a country’s attractiveness in target countries. Sources of soft power include culture, values, and foreign policy. These have the potential to generate admiration from the target populace (Nye 2004). Different forms of internationally recognised heritage, such as intangible and world heritage, are also of significance to the foreign policy apparatus of various countries in terms of advancing their image abroad (Harrison 2012, 88–94).

Indeed, soft power refers to a desired effect while heritage diplomacy provides the operational framework, or means, for realising that effect. Nation-states draw on a variety of symbols and practices, including national days, cultural events, and significant historical figures, to promote cohesion internally and project prestige on the world stage (Billig 1995; Kolstø 2006, cited in Blakkisrud and Kuziev 2019). In fact, emphasis on such symbols, cultural norms, and events help states articulate their country’s positive vision of itself. Through this cultural repertoire, their proclaimed uniqueness is highlighted and defined. In this process, the past is ‘articulated, framed, or co-opted as a precursor of what it will have become in the religious, national, social, or political order of things which constitute our present time’ (Preziosi 2011, 58). In McPherson and McCrone’s terms (cited in Kashfi 2021, 861), ‘history is never simply over, but is remembered and reinvented to do work in and for the present.’ This approach closely resembles Harvey’s (2001) definition of heritage as the selective use of the past for the purposes of the present. This process of re-imagining and remembrance is inherently political and is utilised for soft power projection. Therefore, heritage is an important source and tool of soft power that can be activated by diplomacy (Chitty 2017, 23) or be commodified and ‘shape meanings of shared pasts’ at national and international scales (Nakano and Zhu 2020).

The narrative that presents and conceives a particular form of heritage, endows it with soft power potential (Nakano and Zhu 2020; Winter 2022a). The way the past is narrated and imagined in the service of foreign policy determines whether heritage carries soft power or not. For example, a national museum or a national event and the ceremonies associated with it, as well as national heroes, may be used as key sources of soft power. These sources of soft power may be claimed by different countries, and they may arrive in competition with each other over such sources, as is the case with Rumi and Nowruz.

While heritage can be deployed as an element of soft power, heritage diplomacy is closely related to, but distinct from, cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is ‘a particular area of foreign policy’ that falls under a state’s broader public diplomacy that assists a country to increase its attractiveness in the international arena. Cultural diplomacy is ‘a policy field in which states seek to mobilize their cultural resources to achieve foreign policy goals’ (Clarke 2020). Heritage is a cultural resource that states use (Graham, Ashworth, and Tunbridge 2016).

Lähdesmäki and Čeginskas (2022) propose that heritage diplomacy is recognised as a distinct field of diplomacy. Heritage diplomacy is distinguished by the nature of practices and activities involved in the diplomatic process (Lähdesmäki and Čeginskas 2022; Todorović 2022, 860), whether it is culture at large or more specifically cultural heritage (although Todorović (2022, 853) is careful to note limitations of such a division). Another suggested distinction is that heritage diplomacy is more concerned with shared values as well as the promotion of cultural flows and exchanges, while cultural diplomacy is about promoting one country’s culture and values in other places (Todorović 2022, after; Winter 2015). However, such a distinction cannot be generalised given that it is impossible to draw a line between the promotion of those flows and state interests, a fact Winter recognises in his subsequent work (Winter 2019, 2022a, 2022b, 2022c). In short, while the boundaries between cultural diplomacy and heritage diplomacy remain somewhat fuzzy (Todorović 2022), for the purposes of this paper, we consider heritage diplomacy as the active use of forms of cultural heritage in advancing geocultural, geopolitical, or geoeconomic objectives in collaboration or competition with other countries.

Iran and Turkey, geopolitical, geoeconomic and geocultural cooperation and competition

The Iran – Turkey relationship should be viewed in the context of their long-standing historical competition. Their historical confrontation was ignited in the sixteenth century when the Sunni Ottoman Empire and the Shiite Safavid Empire competed for regional leadership, which resulted in a series of wars between 1514 and 1823. Turkey and Iran embarked on a modernisation process culminating in a fully-fledged secular modernisation and Westernisation program in the early twentieth century under Kamal Ataturk and Reza Shah Pahlavi, respectively. Under the Pahlavi regime, both countries signed several treaties including an economic agreement, the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), and joined the US-led Baghdad Pact with Pakistan, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) (Elik 2013, 2).

With the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979, the two countries maintained their political, economic, trade, energy, and security relationship. However, they have continued to compete over regional influence and leadership (Akbarzadeh and Barry 2016, 984). The policy of neo-Ottomanism that has escalated under the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) Recep Tayyip Erdogan, especially during the past decade, has highlighted civilizational differences between Iran and Turkey. As Ibrahim Kalin (2011, 10) notes, the current Turkish government ‘represents the pivotal point of Ottoman heritage’. Ankara’s emphasis on this ‘Neo-Ottoman paradigm’ (MacGillivray 2020, 1052) has allowed Turkey to increase its influence in ‘formerly Ottoman territories such as the Middle East, North Africa, and the Balkans, as well as in other regions where Turkey has strategic and national interests’ (Demirtas-Bagdonas 2014, 142). Iran’s official press and political elites have recognised this neo-Ottoman discourse as a significant driver of Turkey’s foreign policy ambitions in the Middle East and beyond (MacGillivray 2020, 1052). Iran’s official news agencies have accused Erdogan of having an ‘Ottoman delusion’ (Khabar Online 2021) and pursuing adventurous foreign policy objectives as a distraction from Turkey’s economic problems and his own dwindling legitimacy (Khadiv 2021).

Beyond this civilizational outlook, there are several sources of contention between Iran and Turkey. Firstly, Tehran has well-founded concerns over Turkey’s promotion of separatism among Iran’s Azerbaijani population who speak a Turkic language.⁵ Secondly, Tehran has concerns about Turkey’s strategic relationship with the West especially the United States, its growing links with Israel (Akbarzadeh and Barry 2016), and Turkey’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Finally, Tehran and Ankara are in geopolitical dispute, particularly concerning their positions over the Syrian civil war and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Iran has supported the Assad regime since the beginning of the civil war in 2011. This stands in contrast to Turkey’s support for the Free Syrian Army (Manna 2012).⁶ In the South Caucasus, Turkey has promoted a pan-Turkic agenda relying chiefly on Azerbaijan, while Iran’s relationship with Azerbaijan has been at times contentious (Mozaffari and Akbar 2022).

Culture is another significant area of competition between Iran and Turkey. Both countries use culture and heritage as a platform for expanding their soft power in the Middle East, the Balkans, Central and Southeast Asia, and the Caucasus. To this end, Iran and Turkey established cultural institutions to promote their regional cultural policy and soft power. For example, the Turkish Culture and Arts Joint Administration (TURKSOY, literally meaning Turkishness) was established in July 1993. Since then it ‘has been working to strengthen the unity and brotherhood of the Turkish peoples, to transfer the common Turkish culture to future generations and to introduce it to the world’ (TURKSOY 2022).⁷ Yunus Emre Cultural Institute is another state-affiliated Turkish institution playing a key role in furthering Turkey’s soft power. Established in 2007, Yunus Emre declared its purpose ‘to introduce Turkey, its cultural heritage, the Turkish language, culture and art’ to other countries (Kaya and Tecmen 2011, 10).

Iran has similarly established a variety of institutions to project soft power. The Sa’di Foundation (bonyad-i Sa’di) aims to enhance Iranian soft power related to Persian language and literature. The Islamic Culture and Communication Organization (ICRO) advocates for Iranian cultural norms including, but not limited to, Shia norms and beliefs beyond the country’s borders (Mozaffari and Akbar 2022). Iran has also created cultural centres (khaneye farhang) in different countries, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Iran’s embassies often include a cultural attaché who actively engages in cultural activities such as the promotion of Iranian cultural norms and Persian language events, such as the Persian New Year (Nowruz).⁸

The two case studies discussed in this paper, Rumi and Nowruz, demonstrate the complicated exploitation and contestation of shared heritages by Iran and Turkey in expanding their soft power in national and international arenas. In these cases, heritage diplomacy with a view to geocultural influence, is carried out through various programs as well as administrative and institutional structures closely associated with the state.

Rumi, more than a transnational figure

Jalal al-Din Muhammad Rumi Balkhi, best known in the West as Rumi, is a thirteenth century Persian poet, theologian, and mystic whose literary works include Masnavi Ma`navi and the Diwan of Shams. He was born in Balkh (Afghanistan) and migrated west through Iran, settling in Konya, Turkey. After his death, his son and other followers founded the Sufi Order Mevleviyyeh (Sağlam 2017, 417)⁹ and the location of his residence in Konya later became the Mevlana Museum. As a historic figure, Rumi has multiple connotations – a Sufi master, a literary figure, and spiritual father for both the Ottomans and modern Turkey, as well as a commodified assemblage of heritage and tourism elements. Multiple countries, including Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan, claim Rumi as their own, often exclusively, based on language, nationality (albeit anachronistically), ethnicity, cultural and literary pedigree. This ownership is seen as a means of national branding, soft power projection, and ultimately, a geocultural marker for both Iran and Turkey. He thus represents a transnational case of heritage being used in international power politics.

Rumi is incontrovertibly (Halman 2015, 126) affiliated with the Iranian world because he wrote his poetry and prose in Persian. Certain Turkish commentators deny his Persian affiliation, designating him a ‘Khurasani Turk’ (Halman 2015, 128). Afghanistan’s claim on Rumi is based on birthright as his family hailed from Balkh. In 2016, Iran’s intention to register the Masnavi for the Memory of the World Program (UNESCO 26 September 2019) was met with Turkish objection, forcing an official statement from Iran clarifying that registration was not a claim on Rumi’s nationality (IRNA 2016). The proposal went through jointly, angering Afghanistan, who claimed that they were left out (Hasrat-Nazimi 2016).

The contest over Rumi’s nationality and ethnic attributes has been ongoing for decades, as evidenced through publications, the media, public cultural events, and academic conferences, many of which rely on state backing. Many Turkish state-affiliated institutions, scholars, and policymakers have emphasised Rumi’s Turkish characteristics. For example, in a statement in December 2014 in central Konya to commemorate the anniversary of Rumi’s death, the Turkish President Erdogan praised Rumi’s heritage by stating (Anadolu Agency 2014), ‘If we have a homeland and a flag today, and if we live in an independent country … this is thanks to believers like Mevlana [Rumi], Ahmed Yesevi, as well as our generals such as Saladin […] and Alparslan.’

Tehran has reacted to such statements, initially through Iranian state-affiliated media. For example, an article published in the official Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA) criticised Turkey for its claim over Rumi’s Turkish origins, asserting that ‘Rumi’s migration to Turkey and the fact that he is buried [in Konya] should not lead us to distort his nationality’. Emphasising Rumi’s Persian origin, the article states that, ‘Turkey hopes to boost its international image by capitalising on the fame of this Iranian poet and mystic,’ and has ‘turned Konya into one of its most touristic cities, and organises ceremonies which have nothing to do with Rumi’s mystical visions’ (Bahrami 2019).

Iranian state-affiliated news agencies often emphasised Rumi’s cultural pedigree and his belonging to the Persian literary tradition. A Khabaronline article emphasised Rumi’s Iranian character, directly criticising Turkish thinker Oguz Duzgun who once stated, ‘If we believe that Rumi is from Iran, we should also accept that Konya is an Iranian city.’ The Khabaronline article’s author reasoned that Rumi inherited the legacy of other Iranian poets such as Rudaki, Attar, Sa’di and Hafez. The author argued that the many similarities between Rumi’s poems and these Iranian literary traditions demonstrate the latter’s influence on Rumi. Without a strong understanding of the poems and ideas of those poets, Rumi’s mystical messages cannot be understood. The author also reasoned that since Rumi’s poems were composed in Persian, he should be considered a Persian poet as his works are in the national language of Iran: ‘Even if Rumi had been born [or died] in Berlin or Paris, let alone in Balkh and Konya, he should be considered an Iranian poet’ (Khabar Online 2012). The author warns that, unless read in the original language, some of the mystical messages of Rumi’s poems risk being lost in translation (Khabar Online 2012).

Iranian officials also emphasised Rumi’s Persian character at international conferences and seminars. For example, Iran’s Cultural Heritage and Tourism Organization convened international seminars in 2007 in countries such as Tajikistan, Pakistan, India as well as Germany and France. Ali Asghar Sherdoost, Secretary of the Supreme Council of Iranians Abroad, described their objective as introducing ‘this poet and mystic [Rumi] to the world, convincing people that he was an Iranian [poet]’ (IBNA 2007). Similarly, Iran’s cultural attaché in Turkey once stated:

In Turkey, there are people who are trying to introduce Rumi as a Turkish figure, but in my opinion, this constrains Rumi’s importance […] There are also people in Turkey who are trying to make use of Rumi’s name for financial benefit. They seek to use Rumi’s name as a tool to make money, and they mainly work in tourist institutions […] Such institutions intend to introduce Rumi to the world as a Turkish figure and I am terribly sorry to witness such cases. (Khalaj Monfared 2007, 9)

The head of Iran’s Sa’di Foundation has also emphasised the Iranian character of Rumi. The Foundation’s office in Turkey hosts ceremonies for Persian-language graduates (FOMER 2021). Turkish students are invited to Iran to attend advanced Persian-language courses that include official graduation ceremonies. At one such ceremony, the Foundation head Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, described the significance of Persian language, making references to Rumi in his speech. Although he did not directly criticise the views of the Turkish figures who highlight Rumi’s Turkish character, his emphasis on the language in which Rumi’s poems are composed was a direct rebuttal of Turkish claims. Haddad-Adel began his speech by stating, ‘In the past, three great Islamic powers ruled the region; the Safavids in Iran, the Ottomans in Turkey and the Gurkani in India. The Persian language was prevalent in three empires to such an extent that the Ottoman sultans wrote poetry in Persian’ (Mehr News 2016). He then linked the importance of the Persian language to the figure of Rumi noting that a reference to Rumi and his popularity in Turkey is in fact a reference to the heritage of Persian, which has been influential and widespread in the Ottoman Empire.

Iran and Turkey compete over Rumi as a resource for national branding, tourism, and ultimately, soft power. They use Rumi to expand their geocultural influence via forms of cultural diplomacy, heritage conservation, and through working with various state and inter-state bureaucratic structures such as UNESCO. For Turkey, the Rumi phenomenon functions at both national and international scales. With the assistance of Turkish institutions, such as the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Turkey uses images of Rumi and whirling dervishes to enhance its prestige, and devotes considerable state investment to maintain this imagery as a key soft power resource (Pacalioglu 2019, 8).¹⁰ Rumi is a central figure in Turkey’s national branding efforts too (Daily Sabah 2021). The Ministry of Culture and Tourism has staged whirling dervish dance performances in various Konya venues (Daru’l Masnavi, n.d.) and collaborates with Turkey’s embassies to organise whirling dervish performances abroad,¹¹ including a series of free events in Australia in 2015 (Daily Sabah 2015).

Domestically, tourism plays a significant role in heritage diplomacy, turning Konya and the Mevlana Museum into a key space for this practice. The Mevlana Museum attracts many visitors from all over the world, including Europe, North America, Australia and Muslim-majority countries (Nilay and Birsen 2010, 203). Indeed, it has become ‘an economic resource’ and ‘an important place for advertising Turkey’ (Nilay and Birsen 2010, 207). Tourists see whirling dervishes’ pictures on boat tour advertisements, cafe billboards, and even beside menu items (Pacalioglu 2019, 2).

Turkey and Iran also compete over Rumi’s heritage in the Balkan region, particularly in Bosnia. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) carries out various restoration projects repairing historical buildings in the Sarajevo region, which was part of the Ottoman Empire for 550 years. Regarding Rumi’s heritage, TIKA has restored the Mevlevi (Rumi) lodge in Sarajevo, an important historical building dating from the Ottoman era. The restoration of the lodge, which contributed to maintaining the heritage of Rumi and his Sufi order, began in late 2012. Seeking to maintain the ‘Masnavi-reading tradition’, the project was launched in the presence of TIKA’s Bosnia coordinator and Stari Grad’s (Croatia) Mayor Ibrahim Hacibayric. The latter highlighted the importance of Konya as the place from where Rumi’s legacy began to spread, stating that the ‘Masnavi tradition came over here from Konya and it contributed a lot to Muslims here. It has such importance for us to have an Islamic dervish lodge in Sarajevo. We will continue maintaining the Masnavi-reading tradition in Sarajevo’ (Zorlak 2012). The Rumi lodge, known as Sarajevo’s last Mevlevi lodge, serves as a ‘Balkans Mevlana research centre’ today (Daily Sabah 2017). The lodge hosts artistic and cultural events, supported by the TIKA, to keep Rumi’s heritage and order alive (Buyukeken 2022).

The Balkan region is also important for Iran, and, since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Tehran has been gradually increasing its influence there. In Bosnia, for instance, it has invested heavily in various cultural activities (Sa`adi Foundation 2021), including events relevant to Rumi’s legacy. For example, in 2019, the representative of the Sa’di Foundation and the Iranian Cultural Centre in Bosnia held a ceremony on the commemoration day of Rumi. The event highlighted Rumi’s Persian character, with the Iranian cultural attaché in Sarajevo stating:

Throughout history, poetry and literature have always had a special place among Iranians and Persian speakers in general. Some of the most famous Persian-speaking poets have been more successful among the Persian-speaking public or among the people of the world, of whom Maulana [Rumi] has had the most global fame’. (Sa`adi Foundation 2019)

That Rumi’s poems were recited in Persian in Bosnia during the reign of the Ottoman Empire, and that the heritage of Rumi can be used to strengthen the Iran – Bosnia relationship, is highlighted in articles from several Iranian official news outlets as well. According to a report entitled Masnavi: The shared language of the Iranian and Bosnian peoples, ‘ Maulana and his spiritual Masnavi have been among the most important elements contributing to the spread of the Persian language in Bosnia […] He [Rumi] connected the two nations [Iran and Bosnia] whose political borders are far from each other’ (Fars News 2008).

In Central and South Asia, Turkey also uses the figure of Rumi to increase its soft power, especially in Afghanistan where Turkey’s soft power is significant. Ankara has opened several Turkish schools in Afghanistan and granted Afghan students, especially those with Uzbek ethnicity, scholarships to undertake their tertiary education in Turkey (Salehi 2018). With regards to Rumi, TIKA committed to repair and restore Rumi’s birthplace complex in the Afghan city of Balkh, transforming it to the Rumi Cultural Centre, which includes a monastery and a museum. TIKA assigned a special team to the restoration process, although the Turkish government has not yet funded the project at the time of writing (TRT World 2021). Furthermore, Turkey has committed to open a university in Kabul named Mowlana Jalal al-Din Muhammad Balkhi University (Kavoosi-Nezhad 2016). As mentioned Afghanistan’s government objected to Iran and Turkey’s joint proposal that the Masnavi be registered with UNESCO as their shared heritage (Bezhan 2016), with Afghan state media suggesting Rumi should be considered Afghan (Nateghi 2016). Of particular importance, as demonstrated below, is the Afghan government’s interest in collaborating with Turkey rather than with Iran when it comes to registering Rumi heritage at the international level.

Similar to Turkey, Iran also wields a significant level of soft power in Afghanistan, at least before the Taliban returned to power (Ahmed Shahab and Akbar 2023). Despite Iran’s relative success in promoting Rumi’s poems and his Iranian character in Bosnia, Tehran has displayed less capacity to collaborate with Afghanistan on projects related to Rumi. During periods of tension between Tehran and Kabul over matters such as refugees or water sharing, especially under the presidency of Ashraf Ghani, the Afghan government sought to collaborate more with Turkey on Rumi-related projects. For example, in 2016, Ghani declared in a meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Mouloud Chavosh Oglu that, ‘We are ready to register Rumi’s Masnavi and his other works as the common heritage of Afghanistan and Turkey at the international level’ (AVA 2016). The cultural attaché of the Afghan Embassy in Tehran defended this statement a few days later, stating that Afghanistan is the birthplace of both the Persian language and Rumi, and that Rumi’s tomb is located in Turkey, thus the Masnavi should be considered the common heritage of Afghanistan and Turkey (Sputnik 2016). Later, Iran sought to decrease tensions with the Afghan government over the UNESCO registration of Rumi, with the head of the National Library of Iran considering the possibility of Afghanistan joining an application for Masnavi to be registered internationally (Sputnik 2016). This, however, did not necessarily enable Tehran to increase its soft power or achieve stronger ties with the Afghan government over Rumi’s heritage.

Nowruz: from ancient origins to modern identity politics

The case of the Nowruz celebrations is more complicated, perhaps because it also relies heavily on invented tradition to establish an identity continuum and a Turkic geoculture using heritage diplomacy. Nowruz (lit. a Persian term meaning ‘new day’) is the traditional Iranian New Year, the country’s most significant national holiday, which is celebrated at the moment of vernal equinox usually on the 21^st of March. In 2016, it was jointly inscribed by 12 countries, including Iran and Turkey, on the Representative List of Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity (UNESCO 2016).¹²

Nowruz has been traced back to ancient times (between 1000–800 BCE) in Iran as a significant event dedicated to the celebration of early spring. One of its origins is claimed to be a set of religious practices associated with Zoroastrianism (Boyce 2016). By the early decades of the Sassanian period (224–651 CE), Nowruz was codified as the first day of spring and established as a symbol of imperial institutions (Shahbazi 2016). In Persian literature, folklore and mythology, Nowruz is particularly significant in its association with mythic kings originating with Jamshid and is thus also noted in Book of Kings (Shahnameh) of Ferdowsi, the Iranian poet of the eleventh century (Shahbazi 2016). Nowruz has since remained a significant event in Iran. Nevertheless, after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, certain government officials and religious leaders attempted to downplay pre-Islamic symbols and cultural practices, including Nowruz, but such efforts were gradually abandoned (Rouhana et al. 2021, 262). Iran currently uses Nowruz to further its soft power in various ways.

Nowruz/Nevruz as ideology: domestic contestation in Turkey

Nowruz (or Nevruz in Turkish pronunciation) in Turkey has had a different trajectory. It has transformed from an apolitical tradition to a heavily-loaded form of invented tradition and a tool of heritage diplomacy serving geocultural purposes. Despite its Persian origins (Aydin 2013, 71), it was celebrated in the Ottoman period (1299–1922 CE) (Miller 1988, 234). The earliest record of the practice is found in Ottoman calendars dating to 1444 (Yücel 2014, 9), marking both the start of the new year and the beginning of the financial year. Early in the twentieth century and the formation of Turkey as a modern nation-state, Nowruz was re-conceived in the Turkish context. At the dawn of World War I, Nowruz appeared in Turkey’s public discourse in the service of nationalism (Yücel 2014, 8). However, since it was adopted into the Kurdish identity narrative, Nowruz was gradually removed from the official state calendar (Yücel 2014, 2).

From 1919, Kurdish activists and intellectuals began to gradually construct a repertoire of symbols of identity. Nowruz and a mythic Persian hero, Kaveh (pronounced Kawa in Kurdish), which they borrowed from Iranian traditions and their Iraqi brethren, were at the centre of this identity construction (van Bruinessen 2016, 23–4). Denying the very existence of Kurds as a distinctive ethnicity, the Turkish state began suppressing their movement and their associated cultural symbols, including Nowruz (Aydin 2013, 75). By the mid-1960s, clandestine celebrations of Nowruz sprung up in Turkey (van Bruinessen 2016, 24) and by the 1980s, both Nowruz and the emancipatory figure of Kaveh were co-opted for mass mobilisation by the militant leftist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (van Bruinessen 2016, 25). However, the 1980 Turkish coup d’état once again suppressed Kurdish movement and prevented the full popularisation of Nowruz and Kaveh as a Kurdish identity narrative (Aydin 2013, 77). Nevertheless, by the 1990s, Nowruz was associated with the PKK and became an occasion for protest and clashes with the state security.

It was around this time that the Turkish state, decided to ‘reclaim’ Nowruz as a Turkish tradition (Wakamatsu 2015, 43).¹³ The Turkish state referred to nationalist historical research that traced the origins of Nowruz not to Iran, but to an ancient Turkic celebration coming from north East Asia (Wakamatsu 2015, 42). As such, Nowruz was officially celebrated in 1995 (Aydin 2013, 80). Therefore, in the course of a century, a popular heritage event was transformed into a contested political arena where conflicting nationalistic ideologies clashed (Aydin 2013, 73). In fact, when discussing Nowruz in the Turkish context, a double invention of tradition can be identified: one by Turkey’s Kurdish movement and the other by the Turkish state. Both these inventions have transnational and thus geocultural and geopolitical corollaries. In particular, for the Turkish state, claiming Nowruz has served as an instrument for quelling Kurdish claims to identity and demands for recognition while simultaneously advancing a pan-Turkic sensibility internationally (Aydin 2013, 70; Yücel 2014).

Nowruz: a geocultural tool in the international arena

By the end of 1992, a raft of newly independent republics sprung up in the former Soviet Union. This was an opportunity for Iran and Turkey to expand their sphere of regional influence, largely through culture and religion (Benli Altunışık 2016; Jödicke 2018). Some republics were identified as ethno-linguistically Turkic, but also had deep historical and cultural affiliations with Iran (Amanat and Ashraf 2018). The collapse of the Soviet Union was auspicious for Turkey who leveraged Turkic affiliations as a means for cultural expansion into newly independent Turkic Republics, with Nowruz as a pillar of its heritage diplomacy. For example, former Turkish President Turgut Ozal referred to the role of the Republic of Turkey as the leader of Turkic countries and called for the formation of a new world order centred on these states. He went so far as to state the region now known as Eurasia should be called the Turkish World, emphasising the importance of incorporating Nevruz into the discourse of Turkish nationalism (Wakamatsu 2015, 44).

This policy continued into the first two decades of the twenty-first century, with Turkey attempting to promote Nowruz in the international arena by, pushing 21 March to be recognised by the United Nations as International Nowruz Day (Kaseinov 2015, 20). TURKSOY’s Deputy Secretary General Fırat Purtaş stated in 2011 at a Nowruz celebration in UN General Assembly Hall that the special day had attained its ‘real character’ and became an international day through the efforts of TURKSOY (Ezer 2019, 45).

Building on their attempts to celebrate Nowruz in different Turkish cities and to use it as a tool to strengthen its leadership in the Turkic republics, TURKSOY has pushed more global celebrations, organising Nowruz celebrations in New York in 2010. In 2011, they arranged Nowruz celebrations in the United Nations Headquarters, with almost 150 artists from 11 countries participating (Ezer 2019, 44–5). The first Nowruz ceremonies in Austria and Germany were held in 2015 (Kaseinov 2015, 20), with festivities also reportedly taking place in the UK and France (Sevin 2017, 161). This is in line with Turkey’s attempt to project its soft power, creating international links, and promoting its relationship with the European countries.

The Turkish state’s emphasis on the ‘Turkishness’ of Nowruz thus expands Turkey’s influence and promotes cultural relations with Turkic-speaking countries. According to Yanik (2006, 297), Nowruz became an ‘important [foreign policy] tool for the Turkish state to emphasize the “common roots” with these [Turkic] nations’). Similarly, Wakamatsu notes that a significant motivation behind making Nowruz/Nevruz an official Turkish holiday in 1995 was Turkey seeking to expand its cultural relationships and political influence over the newly-emerged countries after their independence from the Soviet Union:

[A]ttempts were made to share ‘Turkishness’ with the newly independent Turkic countries in order to build economic and political cooperation [with them]. Since Nevruz has been traditionally celebrated in these Turkic countries, the practice of Nevruz is of great importance as a medium through which they [Turkish policymakers] can claim to share a common ‘Turkish culture’ with these countries. (Wakamatsu 2015, 44)

Several Turkish institutions such as TIKA have pointed out the importance of Nowruz in Turkish culture and its potential to enhance Turkey’s relations with the other Turkic countries of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (Republic of Turkiye n.d.). The Turkish pro-government news outlet Daily Sabah (2022) emphasises the importance of Nevruz among Turkic states by explaining its origin: ‘Nevruz marks the day of departure from Ergenekon, where Turks were trapped for years […] Ever since, Nevruz has been accepted as the beginning of the new year by Turkic nations around the world and is still honored with vibrant celebrations’. Daily Sabah also interviewed Alimcan Inayet, a Turkish folklore scholar from Ege University in Turkey, who considers Nevruz celebrations ‘a source of national pride and identity of Turks’. He regards Nevruz to be a common and key feature among all Turkic people (Daily Sabah 2022).

In efforts to enhance its soft power in these countries, and Eurasia more broadly, TURKSOY carries out Nevruz celebrations with the contribution of artists from the Turkic-speaking countries (Kaseinov 2015, 20). In official Nowruz events celebrated inside Turkey, cultural events, traditional dances, and music from other Turkic-speaking countries are incorporated. For example, in a 2013 Nevruz event at the Ataturk Cultural Center, dance and music from Kazakhstan, Dagestan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan were part of the program (TURKSOY 2013a). Another example includes a Nowruz celebration in 2016, hosting and including artists from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Mongolia by the invitation of the Turkish state. At this event, President Erdogan expressed his wish that Nowruz would facilitate unification of not only Eurasia countries but the entire world (Ezer 2019, 46).

Iranian official media often reacts against Turkish channels that claim Nowruz as uniquely Turkish. After the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 21 March as International Nowruz Day in its resolution thanks to lobbying by several countries (including Iran and Turkey), Iranian state-affiliated agency Tabnak News claimed that, ‘Following the approval of the recognition of Nowruz in the United Nations General Assembly, Turkish State Radio and Television published a report, emphasizing that this had been done with Turkey’s efforts’ (Aghazadeh 2010). According to Tabnak News, Turkey’s official state media explained, ‘Nowruz, the ancient holiday of the Turks and the people of the region, with the proposal of the countries of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran was recognized as ‘International Nowruz Day’ by the United Nations. Tabnak’s report continued that Turkish state media introduced Nowruz as an ancient holiday with roots in the history of the Turks, adding that, ‘The first day of spring or Nowruz […] is celebrated by the Turks all over the world as an ancient holiday’ (Aghazadeh 2010). Tabnak News objected that the Turkish state had made minimal reference to Iran when explaining the importance of Nowruz, seeking to de-emphasise its Iranian roots (Aghazadeh 2010).

Similar to Turkey, Iran also uses Nowruz as means of soft power. Iranian presidents often send good wishes countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan as a means of emphasising their close cultural connections with Iran (Akbarzadeh and Barry 2016, 617). Tehran also use the event to increase its influence in the countries where Nowruz is traditionally celebrated, including Turkic countries where Turkey exercises influence. (among these, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan stand out). To illustrate, to increase its soft power reach in Azerbaijan, Tehran holds Nowruz and other events, such as an exhibition of tourist attractions of Iran, to promote the country locally (Baku Bureau 2019), in which Iranian officials including the ambassador attend (Mozaffari and Akbar 2022). In Turkmenistan, the cultural section of the Iranian embassy also holds Nowruz-related ceremonies, and, at times, Iran’s ambassador to Turkmenistan gives short talks on cultural topics to invited Turkmen dignitaries. In March 2022, they emphasised Nowruz as a key cultural commonalities between the two countries and highlighted its importance for the strengthening of the two countries’ relationship:

These two countries have many cultural commonalities. Nowruz is one of the common celebrations between the two countries. The ancestors of the Turkmens also celebrated Nowruz and honored it as a sign of blessing, abundance and comfort […] Just as Nowruz has been a key factor of bonding and friendship between the two nations, it is hoped that Nowruz celebration would become a factor of furthering relationship between Iran and Turkmenistan. (Khosh-Niyyat 2022)

Using Nowruz as means of soft power, Iran and Turkey compete for influence in countries with which they have historic relations. Notably, however, Iran’s effort to exercise influence on Turkic-speaking countries, such as in the case of Azerbaijan, through the event of Nowruz is far less effective than Turkey’s (Mozaffari and Akbar 2022). Further, with regards to shared cultural heritage, Iran and Azerbaijan also have competing claims over traditional sports and music with UNESCO. Notable among these is Chogan, a traditional horse-riding game, for which both countries have claimed its origin. UNESCO initially recognised Azerbaijan’s custodianship of Chogan (Chovgan) to which Iran objected (Heil 2013).

Another reason explaining Turkey’s stronger cultural soft power influence in Azerbaijan is that Azerbaijan is a TURKSOY member country. Ankara holds events and ceremonies in Turkic countries, including Azerbaijan (Kazinform 2013), Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, but also cooperated with them to coordinate events related to Nowruz in non-Turkic countries, such as France and the UK (TURKSOY 2013b). Indeed, when it comes to the international arena, Turkey has used Nowruz better than Iran to pursue its objectives, although Turkey still finds it challenging to convince populations in target countries – beyond Turkic-speaking countries – about its claim to a ‘pure’ Turkish origin for Nowruz. Indeed, Tehran’s effort to project soft power through Nowruz is much more limited and Iran has failed to work with other countries that celebrate Nowruz, including Turkic-speaking countries, to hold common international events. Tehran’s limited efforts to maximise its cultural diplomacy policies in the international arena have been noted in official Iranian media. One Iranian news agency, for example, criticised the government, suggesting it should make more effort to create opportunities for Iran in UNESCO. The report (Titreshahr 2017) states, ‘despite the existence of various handicrafts, historical and ancient works, as well as valuable heritage cites in Iran, Iran has not been able to gain a privileged [enough] position in the international arena to register them [in UNESCO]’.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the use of shared intangible heritage in the competition between Iran and Turkey in West Asia. As demonstrated, this competition unfolds through heritage diplomacy, which relies on a complex set of identity and heritage processes (including exhibitions, performances, and conservation activities) and the establishment of institutional structures for their dissemination. Heritage diplomacy is a tool for constructing a geoculture and thus implicated in international power games. This has been omitted in some influential definitions of heritage ~’s). Lahdesmaki and Cenginskas advocate for understanding heritage diplomacy as a contact zone where ‘intercultural dialogue within and between diverse communities and cultural groups’ occurs (Lähdesmäki and Čeginskas 2022, 645). We observe that, while this may work within the EU, for Iran and Turkey, where different modes of international engagement apply, this is more appropriately framed as a zone of friction or competition, where one country, Iran, has reacted to another’s exclusive claims to shared heritage. It is apparent that heritage diplomacy has a better chance of yielding soft power outcomes in countries where a country has a precedent of historical presence or influence in another. Similarly, it is strengthened by relying on a continuum of domestic and international identity politics, even though this may rely on invented traditions.

Turkey’s use of Nevruz is a clear example of how the state seeks to make dual usage of heritage: to appropriate and dilute Kurdish claims to identity while congruently reaching out to other Turkic countries to form a geopolitical power bloc with economic benefits. In this process, Turkey appropriated a Kurdish invented tradition into its official narrative and also relied on other countries, in particular Turkic-speaking countries such as Azerbaijan, to authenticate its claims of the ‘Turkishness’ of this tradition. The use of Nowruz to foster and strengthen Turkey’s relationships with Turkic-speaking countries is founded on the persisting cultural memory of Nowruz practices in these countries. This is an example of how countries, in competing for power, redefine their own heritage concurrently with their perception of heritage in the international arena. Turkey uses the heritage of Rumi in a similar fashion for both domestic and international purposes. Domestically, it has economic benefits for the country as it attracts many international tourists to Konya and, it provides opportunities for Turkey to increase its soft power in other countries.

In contrast to Turkey’s appropriation and invention of traditions, Iran’s use of Rumi and Nowruz as tools for public and cultural diplomacy is somewhat different. Initially, Iran did not see it necessary to claim ownership as the country and its population considered Rumi an Iranian poet and Nowruz an Iranian event. Rumi and Nowruz were taken-for-granted cultural norms in everyday Iranian life. Iran’s response to Turkey’s ownership claims over Rumi and Nowruz gradually increased. As noted above, Iran has been reactive in both cases; Iranian officials, policymakers and intellectuals contest Turkey’s claims to ownership. These responses, however, are not just rhetorical. Iran, much like Turkey, saw it necessary to use Rumi and Nowruz to increase its influence and soft power internationally, including in, but not limited to, Turkic-speaking countries, fuelling their competition over heritage.

Comparing Iran and Turkey’s mobilisation of heritage for international influence and in heritage diplomacy, we conclude that Turkey follows a more coherent plan, especially when it comes to their soft power reach in Azerbaijan (using Nowruz) and Afghanistan (using Rumi). In the case of Rumi, as discussed, there were some voices in Ashraf Ghani’s administration who strongly criticised Iran, declaring their preference for Turkey in international cultural collaboration. Further, Turkey seems to invest more in Nowruz-related celebrations worldwide. Despite these efforts by Turkey, the Turkish myth of Nowruz’s origin will remain a significant issue for the country at the international level as it barely stands up to sustained historical and scholarly scrutiny.

Acknowledgments

Authors wish to acknowledge Andrew Stapleton, Robert Steele, Carsten Paludan-Muller, and Henric Katze for reading various drafts of the paper. Usual caveats apply.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This paper was made possible through a generous grant provided by the Australian Research Council [Grant Number DE170100104] to Dr Ali Mozaffari.

Notes on contributors

Ali Mozaffari

Ali Mozaffari, PhD is an Australian Research Council (DECRA) Fellow and Senior Fellow with the Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University, Australia. His current research interests include geopolitics of the past as well as culture and the built environment with a specific focus on West Asia. His publications include Heritage Movements in Asia: Cultural Heritage Activism, Politics, and Identity (edited volume with Tod Jones, Berghahn 2020), Development, architecture and the formation of heritage in late-twentieth century Iran: A vital past (Manchester University Press 2020), World Heritage in Iran: Perspectives on Pasargadae (Routledge 2016), and Forming National Identity in Iran: The Idea of Homeland Derived from Ancient Persian and Islamic Imaginations of Place (IB Tauris 2014). Mozaffari is the founding co-editor of Berghahn’s series Explorations in Heritage Studies.

Ali Akbar

Ali Akbar is a Research Fellow with the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University and Fellow at the University of Melbourne, where he received his PhD in Islamic Studies. He is an expert in the fields of Islamic studies and Middle Eastern politics as well as Iranian politics. He is the author of Contemporary Perspectives on Revelation and Qur’anic Hermeneutics (Edinburgh University Press, 2020) and Contemporary Approaches to the Qur’an and Its Interpretation in Iran (co-authored with Abdullah Saeed, Routledge, 2020). He has also published extensively in journals including Iranian Studies, British Journal of Middle East Studies, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, Mediterranean Politics, and Political Theology.

Notes

1. Nowruz is commonly celebrated among a few different countries from north-eastern Asia to south-western Europe. It is therefore pronounced and spelt in different forms. Here we adopt the Persian transliteration. Rumi is also known in various dialects including Persian Mowlavi and Turkish Mevlevi. Here we adopt Rumi as it is his most globally recognised title.

2. Examples include Kaya and Tecmen (2011), Lähdesmäki and Čeginskas (2022), Luke and Kersel (2013), Nakano and Zhu (2020), Todorović (2022, 2021) and Winter (2015, 2016, 2019, 2022a, 2022b, 2022c).

3. Iran and Turkey are not alone in this dual use of heritage. See Nakano and Zhu (2020).

4. That geoculture, geoeconomics and geopolitics are inextricably linked is observed by Wallerstein (1991) as well as others, including in Rozov (2012).

5. In recent years, Azerbaijan has supported some separatist movements in Iran (Mozaffari and Akbar 2022).

6. Iran and Turkey have had a complicated relationship in Syria. See MacGillivray (2020, 1046).

7. For another institution, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), see Çevik (2020, 352).

8. In this context, our use of the term Persian New Year is not implying ethnic or national exclusivity (the assumption of a Persian ethnicity has long been a convenient academic fallacy, and Nowruz is practised in multiple places outside the borders of contemporary Iran). Rather, we refer to the origins of its formation in accordance with existing scholarship.

9. For more on the significance of the Mevlevi Order (after Rumi) and its place in Ottoman and Turkish Republican imaginaries see Sağlam (2017).

10. Any tourist, even in Istanbul, would encounter commercial paraphernalia related to ‘whirling Dervishes’ in tourist shops and even some restaurants.

11. This performance which directly relates to the Mevleviyeh Sufi order, was, in 2008, inscribed as the ‘Mevlevi Sema Ceremony’ on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity. See https://bit.ly/46eRmnI.

12. For a map of countries celebrating Nowruz see https://mapsontheweb.zoom-maps.com/image/172374785867.

13. Yücel (2014, 38); Wakamatsu (2015) claim that this was done after heavy clashes with the PKK and its supporters on the Nowruz of 1992. Although in the same paper Wakamatsu (2015, 43) notes that the ministry of culture began officialising the event in 1991.