Perceived legitimacy or dull compulsion? Assessing why incarcerated offenders comply with correctional rules

ABSTRACT

Generally, research has shown that offenders’ compliance with correctional rules is motivated mainly by the belief that correction officers are legitimate and should be obeyed. There are also contentions that, in correctional settings with widespread violence and abuse, compliance may not necessarily be driven by the persuasion that correctional officers are legitimate but by feelings of endemic helplessness (a condition that is described as dull compulsion). We are uncertain whether such a claim holds true for the South African correctional setting. From a survey of participants from selected correctional centres in South Africa, this study has examined the factors that predict compliance behaviour among incarcerated offenders in South Africa. Findings indicate (among others) that perceived legitimacy, and not dull compulsion, is a predictor of compliance behaviour in the South African correctional setting. The implications of the findings are explicated.

KEYWORDS:

• dull compulsion
• incarcerated offenders
• legitimacy
• South Africa

Introduction

The importance of compliance behaviour in eliciting lawful attitudes has prompted an increasing body of research on public compliance with the law and legal authorities (see Tyler, 2021; Akinlabi & Murphy, 2018; Reisig, Tankebe, & Mesko, 2014; Murphy, Tyler, & Curtis, 2009). While a large proportion of these studies has focused on compliance with the police and the court as institutional components of the justice system, empirical research investigating compliance in the correctional setting is sparse. This void in criminal justice literature makes it problematic to generalise the findings of studies on compliance to all the constituents of the criminal justice system. The context of such studies also differs, as well as the subjects involved. For instance, studies on why people comply with the law have found that compliance is often shaped by factors within people’s environment, including their contacts with legal authorities, especially with the police and the court (Tyler, 2021; Akinlabi & Murphy, 2018; Murphy, 2017; Jackson et al., 2012; Tankebe, 2009). However, this may not be the case with corrections, particularly with incarcerated offenders. For instance, unlike people’s contact with the police and the court, which could be temporal or ephemeral, incarcerated offenders’ contact with correctional officers occurs regularly and may be continuous. Irrefutably, incarcerated offenders’ compliance with correctional rules may be shaped by factors different from those of the public.

While notable empirical studies have assessed the hypothetical proposition ‘Why do people comply with the law?’ (focusing on the police and the courts) or rules (focusing on corrections), only Western-based studies have tested the proposition in corrections. The current study extends these studies by testing this proposition from an African transitional correctional context. Generally, compliance behaviour among incarcerated offenders may point to the rigidity of custodial rules. However, this may only be the tip of the iceberg. Incarcerated offenders may choose to comply or do otherwise for many reasons other than the severity of custodial rules. Broadly, studies have shown that people’s decisions to comply with or obey the law, on the one hand, are based on the notion that it is morally just to do so, and the persuasion that authority figures are legitimate (see Tyler, 1990; also see Hacin & Meško, 2018 for the correctional services). On the other hand, such decisions might have also grown out of a prudent calculation and assessment of both the benefits and risks of aberrancy (see Nagin, 1998).

Tyler provides an expository justification on why people comply with or obey the law (Tyler, 1990; 2006; 2003). His explanations revolve around the issue of legitimacy—the notion that authority figures ought to be obeyed because they are considered legitimate (see Tyler, 1990; 2009; 2006). However, such explanations may not be absolute or applicable to all settings or contexts. The decision to comply with the law or the directives of legal authority figures could have also developed out of strong feelings of endemic powerlessness or resignation, or what scholars have described as ‘dull compulsion' (Akinlabi & Murphy, 2018; Bello & Matshaba, 2020; Tankebe, 2009; Carrabine, 2005; 2004). For instance, from the findings of his 2009 study on public perception of the police in Ghana, Tankebe echoed that, in transitional societies where law enforcement abuse and corruption are rampant, compliance behaviour was not likely to be explicated by the persuasion that the police were legitimate (see Tankebe, 2009). Instead, people’s decision to comply with the law or the directives of the police was simply borne out of a sense of ‘dull compulsion’ (Tankebe, 2009; see also Akinlabi & Murphy, 2018).

In addition, Tankebe has emphasised that dull compulsion may become evident in circumstances where people believe they are powerless or helpless to confront or challenge the police (as authority figures) over incidences of abuse or brutality (see Tankebe, 2009). As such, they comply with the police to avoid retaliation (Tankebe, 2009; Akinlabi & Murphy, 2018). Hence, such a compliance decision is not necessarily borne out of people’s acceptance of the legitimacy of the police (as authority figures), but out of fear of the consequences of aberrancy. Such actions often result in pseudo-conformity (Tankebe, 2009; Akinlabi & Murphy, 2018; also see Carrabine, 2005 for a similar argument on the corrections). Although Tankebe’s and Carrabine's arguments appear credible, dull compulsion was never tested or empirically measured in their studies. Although few studies have empirically assessed dull compulsion in Africa, such assessment focused almost exclusively on policing (see Akinlabi & Murphy, 2018; Bello & Matshaba, 2020), but none has ever tested such a theoretical proposition in corrections.

Therefore, the current study on which this article reports represents the first effort to empirically test why incarcerated offenders comply with correctional rules in a transitional African correctional setting. The aim is to examine the factors that shape incarcerated offenders’ perceptions of correctional officers’ legitimacy and dull compulsion in South African correctional centres. Specifically, the article intends to establish whether it is perceived legitimacy or expressed feelings of endemic powerlessness (ie, dull compulsion) that shape incarcerated offenders’ willingness to obey or comply with custodial rules.

The study also intends to determine whether in a South African correctional setting, some normative, instrumental and antecedent variables relate to perceptions of legitimacy, dull compulsion and offenders’ self-reported compliance with correctional rules. These variables include procedural justice, institutional effectiveness (performance), the experience of official corruption, predatory correction and experience of abuse and brutality. Before presenting the findings of the study, we will attempt to provide a concise history of correctional services in South Africa and a brief literature review—focusing specifically on procedural justice and legitimacy. Thereafter, an overview of the method used will be presented, as well as the statistical analysis of research data and a discussion. The last sub-heading focuses on the conclusion and recommendations of the study.

Corrections in South Africa: historical development, modern dynamics and popular discontents

Before colonisation, African societies had varieties of indigenous methods of punishment, ranging from restitution, compensation and recompense to ostracisation and banishment in extreme cases (see Lectric Law Library, 2017; Bernault, 2003; Read, 1969). The underlying assumption guiding penal systems at that time was the procurement of compensation for victims of crime as opposed to punishment (Stephens, 2018; Read, 1969). The goal was to restore equilibrium and social cohesion to the society, based on the notion that offending might have blighted communal solidarity and distorted existing cultural values (Read, 1969). Imprisonment was not a common method of punishment in pre-colonial Africa, but rather a means of detaining offenders who are awaiting trials; those sentenced to death and others waiting for further punishment; or debtors (Stephens, 2018, pp. 97–98; Ndlovu, 2010; Sarkin, 2008). The idea of imprisonment was completely alien to Africa during the pre-colonial era (Nwolise, 2010). The advent of colonialism in Africa gave rise to the abolition of the prevailing approach to punishment and replaced it with imprisonment—which was a subtle device to propagate an expansionist agenda at that time (Joh, 2010; Bernault, 2003).

In South Africa, penal laws and policies emerged shortly after the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910. The British invasion and eventual occupation of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal Republics in 1900 resulted in the expansion of prison and penal systems in these provinces (Du Plessis, 2018). After this was the introduction of the prison system of the Cape. The penal system at that time was harsh and brutal. Although places of detention in the form of a fort and a castle were constructed in the Cape, the entire prison system was shambolic and there was no interest in rehabilitation (Du Plessis, 2018; Cilliers & Cole, 1997; Singh, 2005). The idea of imprisonment was also not yet brought into fruition, and punishment was basically for deterrence purposes (see Stephens, 2018). Punishment of offenders was carried out by whipping, public execution (through firing squads) and crucifixion (Du Plessis, 2018; Stephens, 2018; Shabangu, 2006).

Punishment at that time also took the form of deportation. There was a mass deportation of offenders (mostly political leaders of African extraction who opposed the policies of the Apartheid overnment) and of convicted persons by the Dutch to Robin Island and Dutch Colonies (see Du Plessis, 2018; Stephens, 2018; Singh, 2005). Although the use of convicted persons for manual labour was not prioritised, offenders were sometimes held in chains in the Dutch East India Company’s slave camp for labour in public works (Du Plessis, 2018; Stephens, 2018; Singh, 2005; Bernault, 2003). Such was also the fate of convicts deported to Robin Island. However, the British occupation of the country between 1795 and 1803 led to a decline in the use of whipping and other forms of physical abuse as a form of punishment, and they were replaced with incarceration (Stephens, 2018; Bernault, 2003).

The abolition of the slave trade in 1807 resulted in a scarcity of labour (Du Plessis, 2018). This resulted in the practice of drafting prisoners to work for the state. Private individuals were also legally permitted to hire prisoners for labour (Stephens, 2018). Prisoners were also hired to work in construction sites (public roads), mines, sugar cane farms and other agricultural sectors at low cost (Stephens, 2018; Singh, 2005). In the absence of accommodation, farm owners often resorted to detaining the prisoners in their jails (Van Zyl Smit, 1992). Regardless of the sensationalised justification for the practice of hiring the labour of prisoners to decongest the prisons due to overcrowding, the violation of prisoners’ rights to human dignity raised concerns about the validity of such claims. Moreover, during this epoch, offenders were also segregated along racial lines (Stephens, 2018).

Although some reforms were introduced into the prison system in the form of penal policies in post-1910¹ South Africa, they had little or no impact on the prison system. The racial segregation that existed in the society at that time snowballed into the prison. Most of the incarcerated offenders in prison then were Africans, particularly those who failed to pay taxes and those who contravened the pass laws² (Singh, 2005). However, the period between the mid and late twentieth century ushered in the inclusion of some extensive and radical reforms into the South African prison system. This was partly engineered by the liberation movements that engulfed the country at that time and subsequent political changes. Moreover, some of the previous prison policies were repealed, which included the release of political prisoners and the desegregation of prisoners along racial lines. The Prison Service was ultimately renamed the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) after it was separated from the Department of Justice (Du Plessis, 2018; Singh, 2005).

The 1993 Interim Constitution and post-1994 Constitution that had been adopted in 1996 stipulated the rights of South African citizens and all those who resided in the country, including incarcerated offenders. This era also signalled the inculcation of a culture of respect for fundamental human rights, not just across the country, but also into correctional institutions. However, despite all these noble initiatives and policies, some of the structural practices akin to the old prison system still thrive in contemporary South African correctional centres. For instance, modern correctional centres are still faced with the problem of overcrowding and incidences of violence, abuse and brutality (see Van Hout & Wessels, 2021; Rawoot, 2012).

Regardless of the reforms and policy frameworks introduced to transform correctional centres in present-day South Africa, incidences of corruption, violence, assaults, abuse and brutality are inimical to the actualisation of these reforms (Schroeder, 2015). Scholars have argued that incidences of corruption, brutality and miscarriages of justice in correctional centres undermine the legitimacy of correctional officers (see Souryal, 2009; Sparks, Bottoms, & Hay, 1996). These acts also hinder offenders’ voluntary compliance with correctional rules (Penal Reform International, 2021; Hacin & Meško, 2018). Studies have shown that correctional centres will be high-risk environments in the face of discrimination and corruption (Penal Reform International, 2021; Carney, 2020). Offenders who experience or suffer all these illegalities will likely not comply with correctional rules or defer to correctional officers (Hacin & Meško, 2018). They are also likely to consider correctional officers as ineffective, unjust and corrupt (see Wooldredge & Steiner, 2016; Souryal, 2009).

Compliance in correctional centres

Compliance is a broad concept, and its explication lies in detailed understanding or theorisation. It is the act of adhering to a rule or order. In the context of corrections, Nellis (2013, p. 166) defines compliance as the ‘willing alignment of one’s behaviour, however begrudging, with the prohibitions of a penal or civic authority'. Various forms of legal compliance applicable to correctional services have been reported in literature and they include habit compliance, instrumental compliance, constraint-based compliance and normative compliance (Crewe, 2013; Ugwudike, 2012; also see Bottoms, 2001). However, this study focuses on normative and instrumental compliance.

Normative compliance is the outcome of internalised mechanisms. It could be the outcome of the bond offenders form with correctional officers or based on the belief that authority figures are just or use their authority fairly (Bello & Matshaba, 2022a; Crewe, 2013; Tyler, 2010, 2013). Contrastively, instrumental compliance explains compliance in terms of perceived benefits or are based on the belief that the costs of non-compliance outweigh its benefits (Crewe, 2013). It explains a situation where offenders’ compliance is shaped by a careful calculation of the costs of non-compliance. Such compliance often leads to pseudo-conformity and may be counterproductive in the long run. The concern is that, since such compliance is borne out of dull compulsion, it would be difficult for offenders to imbibe most of the treatments organised through various programmes to transform their behaviours and make them responsible people after their release from corrections.

As explained earlier, compliance in correctional centres may be shaped by peculiar contextual factors relative to different correctional settings. For instance, studies have shown that legitimacy of correctional officials in Western corrections is often predicted more strongly by procedural justice concerns than other types of factors (eg, effectiveness) when surveying offenders. However, we are not sure such an outcome would be recorded in an African correctional context. Research has shown that correctional settings in most African countries, including South Africa, are driven by violence, conflict, abuse and brutality, to mention a few (Postman, 2020; Bruce, 2019). Hence, offenders’ compliance may not necessarily be shaped by an internalised feeling that correctional officers are legitimate. There is a possibility for such compliance to be borne out of a sense of dull compulsion. This article intends to test whether compliance in correctional centres in South Africa is borne out of normative feelings that correctional officers are legitimate and deserve to be obeyed or due to the consequences of aberrancy (ie, dull compulsion).

Procedural justice, legitimacy, institutional performance (effectiveness) and compliance

In recent times, there has been a growing body of research on procedural justice and legitimacy in correctional centres (Bello & Matshaba, 2022b; Campbell et al., 2020; Maguire, Atkin-Plunk, & Wells, 2021; Beijersbergen, Dirkzwager, Molleman, Van der Laan, & Nieuwbeerta, 2015; Tyler, 2010). Such interest is predominantly shaped by the increasing understanding that to elicit lawful behaviour and compliance, power relations between correctional officers and incarcerated offenders should not be constructed mainly on deterrence. Rather, research has publicised that lawful behaviour and compliance should be structured on several normative factors (Bello & Matshaba, 2022b; Campbell et al., 2020; Maguire et al., 2021). Legitimacy has been found to be an important factor for correctional authorities to garner inmates’ cooperation and compliance (Jenness & Calavita, 2018; Steiner & Wooldredge, 2008; Jackson, Tyler, Bradford, Taylor, & Shiner, 2010). However, this article seeks to examine whether legitimacy is considered similarly in correctional settings like those in South Africa and, which is of explicit interest and a critical issue.

In the West, studies have shown that compliance with correctional rules is influenced by incarcerated offenders’ judgements about correctional officers’ legitimacy (Hacin & Meško, 2018; Jenness & Calavita, 2018; Steiner & Wooldredge, 2008; Beijersbergen, Dirkzwager, & Nieuwbeerta, 2016). It indicates that incarcerated offenders will comply with correctional rules when they perceive correctional officers as legitimate (Hacin & Meško, 2018; Brunton-Smith & McCarthy, 2016).

It has been reported that judgement about the legitimacy of criminal justice institutions is usually shaped by two key factors; ie, procedural justice and institutional effectiveness (Tankebe, 2013; Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Franke, Bierie, & MacKenzie, 2010; Reisig & Meško, 2009; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). About the correctional services, it implies that the fairness of the measures or procedures through which correctional officers treat inmates and make decisions, as well as their effectiveness or overall institutional performance promote perceived legitimacy (Nuño & Morrow, 2020; Hacin & Meško, 2018; Jackson et al., 2012).

While the procedural justice of correctional officers is measured by two main factors—the quality of decision making and quality of treatment—their effectiveness is assessed by how well they have performed or carried out their constitutional responsibilities; that is, how efficient correctional officers are in maintaining order and enforcing compliance in the correctional centres. The basic assumption is that the perceived legitimacy of correctional officers will be measured by offenders’ judgement about the performance, as well as the quality of decisions made by correctional officers and the fairness of the treatment they received from them; that is, whether correctional officers have performed well or not and whether they treat incarcerated offenders fairly or not (Gau, 2019; Hacin & Meško, 2018). The outcome of such assessment will likely inform offenders’ decisions on compliance.

While positive assessment of correctional officers’ procedural justice and effectiveness engenders offenders’ perceived legitimacy and voluntary compliance, negative assessment inhibits deference and compliance (Barkworth & Murphy, 2021; Maguire et al., 2021; Beijersbergen et al., 2015; Reisig & Meško, 2009). For instance, from a survey of 213 adult male inmates in a Chicago prison facility, Maguire et al. (2021, pp. 15–16) assessed the effects of procedural justice and other factors on cooperation and compliance. Their findings revealed that inmates’ perceptions of procedural justice have a combination of direct and indirect effects on their cooperation and compliance (Maguire et al., 2021, pp. 15–16). In another survey of 177 Australian offenders, Barkworth and Murphy (2021, p. 554) found a strong association between offenders’ perceptions of procedural justice in the corrections and their self-reported compliance with correctional rules.

Like the experience in many correctional centres across the globe, the relationship between correctional officers and offenders in South African correctional centres is driven by suspicion, violence and abuse and brutality (Schroeder, 2015; Rawoot, 2012). Corruption and practices that are predatory in nature are also common (see Schroeder, 2015). The peculiarity of the South African experience is that some of these practices are driven in part by the country’s historical legacy of offender punishment (see Singh, 2005; Stephens, 2018), and ultimately, by the violent nature of the society (see Kynoch, 2008). Additionally, as a transitional society with a history of socioeconomic and racial polarisation, South Africa is likely to inherit some correctional practices and perceptions that could shape how current incarcerated offenders relate with correctional officers. Contemporarily, in South African correctional centres, offenders still face a substantial risk of being coerced, assaulted, raped and even killed at the hands of correctional officers and fellow inmates (Ashmont, 2014; Luyt, 2007).

Such experiences will likely have an unpropitious impact on offenders’ perception of correctional officers as legitimate or deserving of their deference in the long run. In such circumstances, will incarcerated offenders not comply with correctional rules because they do not consider correctional officers legitimate or deserving of their deference? We argue that offenders might comply based on other reasons. We also contend that the factor of legitimacy may not provide an absolute explanation for offenders’ compliance, especially in South African correctional settings with a long history of racial segregation, violence and brutality (Bruce, 2019; Stephens, 2018). As argued by Tankebe (2009), expressions of dull compulsion could provide explanations for compliance behaviour. Specifically, he contends that people’s willingness or decisions to obey or comply with the directives of legal authority (police) may not necessarily be shaped by their perceived legitimacy, but because they fear the consequences of aberrancy (Tankebe, 2009).

In another African-based study, Akinlabi and Murphy (2018, p. 187) examined ‘the relationship between perceived police legitimacy and expressed feelings of dull compulsion on self-reported willingness to comply with the law in Nigeria'. The study was conducted against the background of policing context in Nigeria, which they described as historically corrupt, abusive and brutal, as well as predatory. They also alleged that The Nigeria Police have ‘an impressive profile of abuse and ruthless oppression of citizens, citing incidences of arbitrary arrests, brutality, violence, extortion, and procedural injustices' (Akinlabi & Murphy, 2018, p. 188).

Their study specifically attempted to assess and ‘understand the significance of dull compulsion as a major explanation for why people comply with the law in postcolonial and socially polarised societies' (Akinlabi & Murphy, 2018, p. 187). One of the aims of the study was ‘to examine the relationship between perceived police legitimacy and expressed feelings of dull compulsion on self-reported willingness to comply with the law in Nigeria' (Akinlabi & Murphy, 2018, p. 187). The study also examined ‘whether in a country like Nigeria, antecedent variables such as procedural justice and police effectiveness, as well as experiences of police abuse, police corruption, and predatory policing are associated with perceptions of police legitimacy, dull compulsion, and self-reported compliance with the law' (Akinlabi & Murphy, 2018, p. 187).

The results of their study showed ‘a significant relationship between perceptions of police effectiveness and perceptions of police legitimacy. However, perception of procedural justice was not associated with police legitimacy' (Akinlabi & Murphy, 2018, p. 195). Their findings also suggested that procedural justice may not be the primary driver of police legitimacy perceptions in all settings or contexts.

In addition, neither dull compulsion nor legitimacy was associated with citizens’ self-reported compliance. The fact that legitimacy was unrelated to compliance was unexpected: ‘The findings therefore challenge the view that police legitimacy is crucial for ensuring citizens comply with laws' (Akinlabi & Murphy, 2018, p. 195). The findings also contradict Tankebe’s (2009) suggestions that people in countries with widespread police corruption may comply with the law owing to expressions of dull compulsion.

While the foregoing study laid the foundation for the assessment of dull compulsion as a precondition for compliance with the law (police), the current study seeks to examine whether similar results can be obtained in an African correctional context. We seek to determine whether in a South African correctional context, factors such as procedural justice, legitimacy, institutional performance (effectiveness), corruption, abuse and brutality and predatory corrections will shape compliance.

It is important to note that currently no known study accurately assesses or theoretically validates the motivational basis for compliance from a transitional African correctional setting perspective. An inquiry into why incarcerated offenders choose to disobey correctional rules may conceivably portend the weakness of custodial institution regulations or the justice system. However, this might just be a fragment or a small proportion of a larger probability. There might be other justifiable explanations for offenders’ decisions to either comply with or disobey correctional rules that surpass the limitations of custodial regulations or the justice system.

As indicated earlier, previous research on the significance of procedural justice, legitimacy and effectiveness in shaping offenders’ compliance behaviour were conducted in developed Western correctional centres (see Barkworth & Murphy, 2021; Maguire et al., 2021; Beijersbergen et al., 2015). However, there is a dearth of research explaining compliance behaviour in an African correctional context. Considering the sporadic violent clashes between correctional officers and offenders in South African correctional centres, it will be interesting to know how such ferociousness impact on offenders’ compliance behaviour. However, we are uncertain whether such conflicting relationships will influence incarcerated offenders’ perceptions of correctional officers’ legitimacy and negatively affect their compliance with correctional rules.

Although prior research from Western correctional settings reported that it could swing either way (see Barkworth & Murphy, 2021; Maguire et al., 2021; Beijersbergen et al., 2015), we are uncertain as to whether related results will be obtained if replicated in an African setting. Additionally, we cannot conclude in haste that incarcerated offenders’ negative perceptions of correctional officers will always result in non-compliance or cynicism without first passing it through some experimental or empirical lenses. This study is guided by the following questions: (i) Will perceived legitimacy or dull compulsion be more important for predicting compliance in a South African correctional setting? (ii) Will procedural justice predict legitimacy more so than effectiveness? (iii) Will predatory corrections, corruption and experience of abuse and brutality predict dull compulsion more so than procedural justice or effectiveness concerns?

Data collection and participants’ selection

Data for this paper were drawn from a study conducted in 2020 from a sample of male participants from two correctional centres (Zonderwater and Boksburg) in Gauteng, South Africa. From an estimated population of 1000 offenders in the two facilities, we were able to survey a sample of 315 participants using a convenience sampling technique. The technique was considered suitable based on some factors such as access restrictions to the facilities owing to a national lockdown in a bid to curb the spread of COVID-19 at the time of data collection. Moreover, the need for social distancing and other strict measures put in place by correctional authorities made this sampling technique the most viable option. Nonetheless, we endeavoured to secure a sample that comparatively reflected the demographic configuration and diversity of incarcerated offenders in the selected correctional centres. The authors sought the services of some research assistants in administering questionnaires to participants in their dormitories after obtaining permission from the authorities of the institutions.

The research was conducted in line with the ethical guidelines stipulated in the University of South Africa (UNISA) School of Criminal Justice, College of Law, Research Ethical Committee Protocol.

Prior to the survey administration, participants were briefed on the purpose of the study, and that their involvement is strictly voluntary. They were informed of their rights to participate and withdraw from the survey at any stage without any penalty. Participants were also informed that the survey is anonymously structured and that they are not permitted to writetheir names and other means of identification on the survey. All these were confirmed by obtaining signed informed consent forms from them.

This was followed by the distribution of hard-copy questionnaires. From the total of 350 questionnaires distributed (the remaining 20 did not meet the eligibility criteria), we were only able to retrieve 315 completed questionnaires. The remaining questionnaires were either not fully completed or not returned. Some of the participants also withdrew voluntarily from the survey. The demographic structure of the study participants is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Demographic Composition Structure of the Sample.

Demographics	%		%
Age group		Education level
Below 25	7.3	No schooling	8.0
26–37	50.7	Grade R-11	51.0
38–49	34.4	Matric	19.4
50 and above	7.6	Diploma/degree	20.1
		Postgraduate	1.4
Citizenship
South Africa	87.2	Zonderwater	57.0
Foreign nationals	12.8	Boksburg	43.0
Categories of offence
Aggressive		Race
Economical	38.9	Black	91.7
Sexual	16.0	White	3.1
Narcotics and alcohol	3.8	Asian	0.7
Others	7.3	Coloured	4.5

Measures and instruments

The researchers utilised a range of instruments to test the study hypotheses. These instruments and their application to the study are explicated next. The outcome variables are measured as a composite. The researchers also constructed a composite measure of five concepts reputed to shape compliance with rules. All instruments were measured on a four-point Likert-type scale.

Compliance with rules

It assessed participants’ willingness to comply with correctional rules. The Cronbach’s alpha was α = 0.80, the Mean (MN) = 1.69 and the Standard Deviation (SD) = 0.75. A high score on this scale indicated a higher willingness to comply with rules.

Procedural justice

The scale assessed the procedural justice or fairness of correctional officers. The Cronbach’s alpha was α = .88, MN = 2.27 and SD = 0.68. A high score on this scale indicated that correctional officers used fair procedures when dealing with inmates and were perceived as just or fair by inmates, while a low score indicated that the procedures adopted by the correctional officers were perceived as unfair.

Legitimacy

It assessed the views of participants on their obligation to obey correctional officers. The Cronbach’s alpha was α = .76, MN = 2.71 and SD = 0.60. A high score on this scale indicated a greater perception of legitimacy.

Dull compulsion

Drawing from recent arguments raised in literature (ie, Akinlabi & Murphy, 2018; Tankebe, 2009; Carrabine, 2005), a four-item scale was developed by the first author to test dull compulsion in the South African correctional context. Items in the dull compulsion scale assessed whether deference to or failing to comply with correctional instructions would be detrimental to offenders’ safety and overall well-being in the correctional centres. The Cronbach’s alpha was α = .85, MN = 2.72 and SD = 0.67. A high score on this scale indicated stronger feelings of dull compulsion.

Institutional performance or correctional officers’ effectiveness

It was designed to determine the participants’ assessment of the performance of correctional officers. The Cronbach’s alpha was α = .82, MN = 2.45 and SD = 0.80. A high score on this scale indicated that the correctional officers/institutions were effective or performed well.

Experience of abuse and brutality

This scale was adapted from Akinlabi and Murphy’s (2018) research. It was designed to measure offenders’ personal and actual experience of abuse and brutality in the correctional centres. The Cronbach’s alpha was α = .79, MN = 2.41 and SD = 0.97. A high score on the scale indicated an increased experience of correctional officers’ abuse and brutality.

Predatory correction

Predatory correction is best described as a systematic subjugation of offenders by correctional officers (see Gerber & Mendelson, 2008, for further explanations and as applicable to the police). A predatory correction scale was constructed using a seven-item scale adapted from police research conducted by Akinlabi and Murphy (2018). The Cronbach’s alpha was α = .90, MN = 2.45 and SD = 1.05. A high score on this scale indicated a high prevalence of corrective measures that were considered predatory.

Officials’ corruption

Officials’ corruption was measured using a six-item scale adapted from police research conducted by Tankebe (2009) and Akinlabi and Murphy (2018). It focused mainly on perceptions rather than actual experiences of correctional officers’ corruption. It incorporated items about bribe-taking, rule-breaking and other forms of inducement that made correctional officers ignore lawlessness in the correctional centres. The Cronbach’s alpha was α = .88, MN = 2.45 and SD = 0.76. A high score on this scale indicated greater perceptions of correctional officers’ corruption.

Results

The main aims of this study are to examine the predictors of correctional legitimacy in South African institutional correctional centres, and to determine whether incarcerated offenders in these South African centres comply with correctional rules owing to their perceptions of correctional officers as legitimate or dull compulsion. The appendix presents both the descriptive statistics for each survey question used to construct scales and factor analysis testing the construct validity of the scales. All eight scales were subjected to Principal Component Analysis (PCA) using Varimax rotation (see Table 3). The results show that The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy had a value of .82, which surpassed the recommended value of .60 (see Kaiser, 1974). The outcome of the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity validates the significance of the scales and supports the factorability of the correlation matrix. The PCA revealed the presence of eight components with eigenvalues exceeding 1, with a total of 86%.

Table 2 shows the bivariate correlation analysis between the scales (using Pearson Correlation Analysis), Tables 3 and 4 present the findings of the regression analyses (ie, the Ordinary Lead Square (OLS) and the hierarchical multiple regression analyses). These analyses were performed using the IBM Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Statistics 27. In addition, the bivariate correlation results depicted in Table 2 show some significant correlations between the scales. While some of the relationships were positively correlated, others were negatively correlated. We also noticed some non-significant relationships. Importantly, compliance with rules was found to be significant and positively correlated with legitimacy (r = .22, p < .01), but not with dull compulsion. Additionally, procedural justice, though significant, was found to be negatively correlated with the experience of abuse and brutality (r = −.29, p < .01) and officials’ corruption (r = −.27, p < .01).

Table 2. Bivariate correlations.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Compliance with rules	1	.092	.217**	.069	.006	.289**	.338**	.061
(2) Dull compulsion		1	−.037	−.019	.190**	.155**	.238**	.130*
(3) Legitimacy			1	.437**	.058	−.205**	−.184**	−.046
(4) Procedural justice				1	.257**	−.288**	−.269**	−.024
(5) Inst. performance					1	−.260**	−.301**	.058
(6) Abuse and brutality						1	.488**	.075
(7) Corruption							1	.147**
(8) Predatory correction								1
N = 315

** Correlation significant at p < 0.01; * Correlation significant at p < 0.05

Table 3. Predictors of legitimacy and dull compulsion.

Variable	Legitimacy		Dull compulsion
	β	T	β	T
Age group	−.05	−.96	−.10	−1.75
Race	−.02	−1.16	.03	.63
Education	.06	1.24	−.05	−.84
Offence classification	−.10	−1.88	.12	2.08
Citizenship	.08	1.55	−.02	−.29
Corruption	.05	.79	−.06	−.97
Institutional performance	.08	1.50	.26	1.87
Procedural justice	.41***	7.63	.28	1.38
Abuse/brutality	−.10	−1.64	.10*	−1.68
Predatory correction	−.02	.34	.05***	.97

Note: * Significant at p < 0.05; ** Significant at p < 0.005; *** Significant at p < 0.001

Table 4. Predictors of self-reported compliance with correctional rules.

Variable	Β	t	R	R^2	ΔR^2	F
Step 1			.48***	.23***	.23	10.23***
Age group	−.05	−.96
Race	−.04	−1.24
Education	.06	1.24
Offence classification	−.09	−1.88
Citizenship	.08	1.55
Step 2			.41***	.17***	.17	6.68***
Age group	−.09	−1.75
Race	.002	.10
Education	−.05	−.84
Offence classification	.11	2.08
Citizenship	−.02	−.29
Corruption	−.06	−.97
Institutional performance	.26***	4.87
Procedural justice	.28***	4.38
Experience of abuse/brutality	−.15***	−2.68
Predatory correction	.05	.97
Step 3			.42***	.18**	.16	9.62***
Age group	−.06	−1.17
Race	−.05	−1.16
Education	.07*	1.36
Offence classification	−.00	−.06
Citizenship	.07	1.43
Corruption	−.11*	−1.77
Institutional performance	.13***	2.19
Procedural justice	.29***	4.58
Experience of abuse/brutality	−.18***	−2.95
Predatory correction	−.01	−.09
Legitimacy	.18*	3.10
Dull compulsion	−.02	−.43

* Statistically significant at p < .05

*** Statistically significant at p < .001

Predictors of correctional legitimacy and dull compulsion

Three multiple regression analyses (ie, two OLS and one HMR) were performed to address the aims of this study. While Table 3 shows the results for the regression analysis explaining the predictors of correctional officers’ legitimacy and dull compulsion, Table 4 displays the results for a hierarchical multiple regression explaining the predictors of offenders’ self-reported compliance with correctional rules.

Turning to the first model of analysis in Table 3, four demographic variables (age group, education, offence classification and citizenship) were entered into the model predicting correctional officers’ legitimacy. Individually, only one independent variable—perceived procedural justice (β = .41; p < .001) was a significant predictor of offenders’ perception of correctional officers’ legitimacy. The results indicated that those who perceived correctional officers as procedurally fair or just were more likely to defer to correctional officers and consider them legitimate.

From the second model with dull compulsion as the outcome variable, none of the demographic variables were found significant. However, only independent variables exerted a significant effect on dull compulsion. Specifically, perceived experience of abuse and brutality (β = .10; p < .05) and predatory corrections (β = .05; p < .001) were significant predictors of expressed dull compulsion. Notably, those who perceived correctional officers as abusive and brutal, as well as those who believe correctional officers are predatory in their approaches, were more likely to pragmatically acquiesce to correctional officers (ie, an expression of dull compulsion).

Importantly, the findings suggested that for incarcerated offenders to defer to correctional officers in South African correctional centres, factors such as offenders’ age group, education, offence classification and citizenship, and officers’ corruption were not significant. Here, the normative factor (procedural justice) reported the highest significant value among the predictors of correctional officers’ legitimacy. Like the Western correctional centres, this value indicated that incarcerated offenders in South African correctional centres placed increased value on the procedural fairness of correctional officers in terms of how they treated them and the outcome of the decisions they made. Regardless of their perceived expression of defencelessness (ie, dull compulsion), procedural justice was found to be the major determinant of offenders’ deference to correctional officers in the South African correctional setting.

Beyond perceived procedural fairness, offenders’ experiences of abuse and brutality could be a blight on the legitimacy of correctional officers in South Africa. This indicates that regardless of the efforts of correctional officers to reform incarcerated offenders and the legality of their mandates, if correctional officers do not desist from abusing and brutalising offenders, they can refuse to consider them deserving of their deference.

Predictors of self-reported compliance with correctional rules

Table 4 presents 11 variables as predictors of offenders’ voluntary compliance with correctional rules in South African correctional centres. Individually, six variables, namely education (β = .07; p < .05), corruption (β = −.11; p < .001), institutional performance (β = .13; p < .001), procedural justice (β = .29; p < .001), experience of abuse and brutality (β = −.18; p < .001) and legitimacy (β = .18; p < .05) were significant predictors of offenders’ self-reported compliance with correctional rules. In step 1, four demographic variables were entered into the model. However, none predicted voluntary compliance with correctional rules.

In step 2, five independent variables were added to the initial four (4) demographic variables, and all were included in the model. Yet, none of the demographics predicted compliance. However, three independent variables, namely, institutional performance (β = .26; p < .001), procedural justice (β = .28; p < .001) and experience of abuse and brutality (β = -.15; p < .001) predicted voluntary compliance with correctional rules.

In step 3, two further variables were added to the model. Unlike the first two models, education (β = .07; p < .05), as a demographic variable, was found to be a significant predictor of compliance. Additionally, corruption (β = -.11; p < .001), institutional performance (β = .13; p < .001), procedural justice (β = .29; p < .001), experience of abuse and brutality (β = −.18; p < .001) and legitimacy (β = .18; p < .05) were significant predictors of offenders’ self-reported compliance with correctional rules.

In summary, while incarcerated offenders who perceived correctional officers to have performed well, and believed correctional officers were procedurally just and legitimate, were more likely to say they would comply with correctional rules, those who had experienced corruption and had suffered abuse and brutality from correctional officers said they would not comply.

Discussion

The aims of this study have been as follows: (1) to explore the factors that motivate incarcerated offenders’ perceptions of correctional officers’ legitimacy and feelings of dull compulsion and (2) to assess whether perceived correctional officers’ legitimacy or dull compulsion predicted incarcerated offenders’ self-reported willingness to comply with correctional rules. Western studies have reliably found correctional officers’ procedural justice or fairness and effectiveness (or institutional performance) to be major determinants of perceived correctional legitimacy (Maguire et al., 2021; Hacin & Meško, 2018). That is, when incarcerated offenders perceive correctional officers as effective in carrying out their duties, especially in maintaining order in correctional facilities, and when they consider them to be procedurally fair, the likelihood that they will consider correctional officers as legitimate is very high.

Previous studies have shown that perceived procedural justice tends to be the most significant determinant of offenders’ perceived legitimacy of correctional officers (Hacin & Meško, 2018; Steiner & Wooldredge, 2008; Beijersbergen et al., 2016; Franke et al., 2010). Additionally, previous studies have also found offenders’ judgements about correctional officers’ legitimacy to be strongly linked with offenders’ self-reported compliance with correctional rules (see Maguire et al., 2021; Hacin & Meško, 2018; Brunton-Smith & McCarthy, 2016).

The findings of the current study showed some consistency with previous studies. For instance, in the current study, procedural justice proved to be the highest significant predictor of correctional officers’ legitimacy in South African correctional centres. That is, when incarcerated offenders receive sustained fair treatment from correctional officers, and when they judge the outcome of the decisions made by correctional officers as fair, they are likely to consider them (correctional officers) as legitimate and deserving of their deference (see Hacin & Meško, 2018; Steiner & Wooldredge, 2008).

We found experience of abuse and brutality to undermine offenders’ perceived legitimacy of correctional officers. Such experiences would likely foster negative perceptions of the legitimacy of correctional officers (Steiner & Wooldredge, 2008). In relative terms, it implies that incarcerated offenders in South African correctional centres suffer abuse and brutality. This may not be unconnected with the sporadic confrontations and violence between the offenders and correctional officers which have serious implications for social control and order maintenance in correctional centres. The implications also extend to the legitimacy of correctional officers. Previous findings have given credence to this (Barkworth & Murphy, 2021; Symkovych, 2019; Franke et al., 2010; Sparks et al., 1996). For instance, Sparks et al. (1996, p. 60) have long echoed that:

[E]very instance of brutality in prisons, every casual racist joke and demeaning remark, every ignored petition, every unwarranted bureaucratic delay, every inedible meal, every arbitrary decision to segregate or transfer without giving clear and well-founded reasons, every petty miscarriage of justice, every futile and inactive period—is delegitimizing.

Therefore, for incarcerated offenders to consider correctional officers worthy of their deference in South African correctional centres, correctional officers must desist from assaulting and brutalising offenders regardless of their offense.

Previous studies have exposed that acts of abuse and brutality breed social distance, as well as widen the relational gap between incarcerated offenders and correctional officers (Barkworth & Murphy, 2021; Meško & Hacin, 2018). Such experience will arguably have significant negative impacts on correctional officers’ ability to secure offenders’ cooperation, which is critical to effective treatment of offenders (Meško & Hacin, 2018). It will also impact negatively on the success of other institutional programmes geared towards restorative and transformative justice.

Such experiences do not necessarily portend correctional centres as spaces that fail to incorporate restorative justice practices or transform the roles of correctional officers, but they could undermine, and ultimately, scuttle the entire training process for restorative and transformative justice (Dhami, Mantle, & Fox, 2009; Carrabine, 2005). In fact, restorative and transformative justice will be counterproductive in spaces where there is social distance between incarcerated offenders and correctional officers. Therefore, a thorough assessment of the extent of offenders’ absorption and adherence to correctional treatment programmes would help determine the effectiveness of correctional programmes. However, in all these, corrections managers should prioritise the building and promoting of healthy relationships between corrections officers and incarcerated offenders. Such an approach is likely to promote confidence in offenders, increase an internalised sense of obligation to obey correctional officers, and might increase inmates’ beliefs that correctional officers are deserving of their deference (Maguire et al., 2021; Hacin & Meško, 2018). Such initiative is also likely to foster offenders’ voluntary compliance with correctional rules (Maguire et al., 2021; Hacin & Meško, 2018).

It is important to reiterate that the current study represents the first attempt to empirically test whether dull compulsion is associated with incarcerated offenders’ self-reported compliance with correctional rules in South African correctional centres. We established earlier that we were uncertain about whether perceived legitimacy or expression of dull compulsion would be associated with incarcerated offenders’ self-reported compliance with correctional rules. Interestingly, the current study found the perceived legitimacy of correctional officers to be associated with incarcerated offenders’ self-reported compliance with correctional rules. Procedural justice, the experience of abuse and brutality and institutional performance or correctional officers’ effectiveness were also found to be associated with offenders’ self-reported compliance with correctional rules. Although not envisaged, dull compulsion did not predict incarcerated offenders’ self-reported compliance.

That dull compulsion did not predict compliance in our study does not necessarily connote the absence of abuse and brutality, corruption and other forms of predatory correctional practices. However, it only shows that offenders in South Africa are more concerned about the legitimacy, procedural and institutional justice of correctional officers. It, therefore, suggests that if correctional officers hope to achieve order and generate voluntary compliance from offenders, they need to place priority on factors that promote legitimacy, procedural and institutional justice.

Previous studies from the West found perceived legitimacy, perceived procedural justice or fairness and the effectiveness of correctional officers as determinants of incarcerated offenders’ compliance with correctional rules (Maguire et al., 2021; Hacin & Meško, 2018; Steiner & Wooldredge, 2008). Consistent with these studies, the current study showed that for incarcerated offenders in South African correctional centres to comply with correctional rules, issues of fair treatment and voluntary deference and effectiveness of correctional officers were important. It also showed that offenders’ compliance in South African correctional centres was determined by normative expectations and not necessarily owing to feelings of endemic powerlessness (ie, dull compulsion).

Conclusion

The study reported on in this article has set out to establish whether it is perceived legitimacy or dull compulsion that shapes incarcerated offenders’ self-reported compliance with correctional rules in South African correctional centres. More importantly, it has contributed to the existing body of literature in the field of criminal justice by complementing and contesting previous findings, especially from the West, on the determinants of incarcerated offenders’ compliance with correctional rules. It is also the first empirical attempt in South Africa, and indeed in Africa, to test the dull compulsion assumption as a precondition for compliance in the correctional setting. The current study has established that perceived legitimacy and not dull compulsion shapes incarcerated offenders’ self-reported compliance with correctional rules in correctional centres in South Africa.

While our findings have implications for the effective management of institutional correctional centres in contemporary South Africa, it is not immune to limitations. Given the cross-sectional nature of the survey data used, the causal directions implied in this study cannot be ascertained. While those who perceive correctional officers as legitimate are more likely to comply with correctional rules, it could be the case that those who are least likely to comply with correctional rules at the time of completing the survey are less likely to evaluate correctional officers as legitimate. To overcome this limitation, following offenders over time using longitudinal data methods will yield clearer conclusions regarding the direction of relationships implied in our study. However, these limitations do not detract from the significance of the current study and its contribution to a scarce body of literature on compliance among incarcerated offenders, especially in institutional correctional centres from transitional African settings.

In conclusion, this study has shown that although it might be practically impossible to generalise all theoretical propositions and findings from the developed Western-oriented societies to developing African societies, there could also be a point of convergence. For instance, consistent with the dominant findings from Western-oriented studies, the article has shown that matters of procedural justice, correctional legitimacy and performance (effectiveness) are key contributors to incarcerated offenders’ compliance with correctional rules in a transitional African correctional setting. Therefore, correctional managers, policymakers and other relevant stakeholders should focus more on how to promote fairness, deference and effectiveness, especially among correctional officers, while discouraging actions that could blight the image of the custodial institution.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The Union of South Africa was formed in 1910.

2 The Pass Laws Act of 1952 required black South Africans over the age of 16 to carry a pass book, known as a dompas, everywhere and always.

Appendices

Appendix a: Mean and standard deviation for each variable item

Table

	Variable Items	MN	SD
	Compliance
COMPL_1	You have used contrabands in the facility even when you knew they were illegal	1.62	.77
COMPL_2	You have engaged in disorderly acts or behaviour within the facility even when you knew they are unlawful	1.97	.89
COMPL_3	You have used substance like drugs within the facility	1.60	.80
COMPL_4	You have deliberately acted against correctional rules	1.70	.80
	Procedural Justice
PROJ_1	Correctional officers treat all inmates with respect	2.91	.93
PROJ_2	Correctional officers treat all inmates fairly and equally	2.01	.87
PROJ_3	Correctional officers give inmates the opportunity to express their views before decisions are made	2.80	.88
PROJ_4	Correctional officers listen to inmates before making decisions	2.89	.92
PROJ_5	Correctional officers are always polite when dealing with people	2.83	.88
PROJ_6	Correctional officers make decisions based upon facts, not their personal biases or opinion	2.84	.93
	Legitimacy
LEGI_1	Even if correctional officers are doing the wrong thing, I still feel a moral obligation to obey them	3.67	1.85
LEGI_2	I may not like correctional officers, but it is my duty to obey all correctional rules in this centre	3.68	1.92
LEGI_3	I personally don’t think there is much that can happen to me if I choose to disobey correctional officers	3.72	1.93
LEGI_4	Inmates should always obey correctional officers even if it goes against what they think is right	3.79	1.90
LEGI_5	Overall, I obey correctional officers with good will	3.55	1.82
	Dull Compulsion
DUL_C_1	It is better to obey correctional officers than argue with them	2.77	.88
DUL_C_2	Correctional officers often treat inmates who argue with them harshly	2.69	.86
DUL_C_3	Arguing with correctional officers is to sign up for maltreatment or brutality	2.63	.87
DUL_C_4	If you don’t cooperate with correctional officers, they will get tough with you	2.77	.88
	Institutional performance (effectiveness)
INST_P_1	The Department of Correctional Services (DCS) / Correctional officers have done a good job controlling violence problems in correctional facilities	2.53	.90
INST_P_2	The DCS / Correctional officers are always ready to provide satisfactory assistance to victims of crime	2.49	.95
INST_P_3	The DCS / Correctional officers respond promptly to calls about violence or complaints within the facility	2.25	.91
INST_P_4	Overall the DCS / Correctional Officers are always able to provide the assistance offenders need from them	2.38	.91
	Abuse and brutality
AB_BR_1	Have you been subjected to harsh treatment by Correctional officers	2.98	.07
AB_BR_2	Have you witnessed someone being tortured or mistreated by Correctional officers	2.42	.12
AB_BR_3	Have you been forced by Correctional officers to do something against your wishes	2.90	.05
AB_BR_4	Have you witnessed a situation where Correctional officers threaten inmates	2.27	.18
	Predatory Corrections (Correctional officers …)
PRED_1	… sometimes subject inmates who disobey their directives to harsh treatment	1.92	.93
PRED_2	… sometimes punish inmates indiscriminately	2.01	.88
PRED_3	… sometimes attack inmates even when not provoked	1.82	.89
	Corruption (Correctional officers …)
CORR_1	… take bribes	2.43	1.14
CORR_2	… sell contrabands to inmates, eg, cigarette, drugs, phones, etc.	2.50	1.13
CORR_3	… sometimes plant evidence or frame inmates for offenses they did not commit	2.37	1.18
CORR_4	Sometimes ask for something in return for a favour or service rendered	2.50	1.17

Appendix b: factor analysis

Factor Analysis of Different Variables Used in the Study

Table

Items		Factors
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Factor 1:	Compliance
COMPL_1		.66
COMPL_2		.73
COMPL_3		.84
COMPL_4		.68
Factor 2:	Procedural Justice
PROJ_1			.75
PROJ_2			.78
PROJ_3			.77
PROJ_4			.76
PROJ_5			.72
PROJ_6			.68
Factor 3:	Legitimacy
LEGI_1				.63
LEGI_2				.73
LEGI_3				.77
LEGI_4				.69
LEGI_5				.64
Factor 4:	Dull compulsion
DULL_C_1					.65
DULL_C_2					.79
DULL_C_3					.76
DULL_C_4					.76
Factor 5:	Institutional Performance
INST_P_1						.80
INST_P_2						.84
INST_P_3						.82
INST_P_4						.80
Factor 6:	Abuse and brutality
AB_BR_1							.64
AB_BR_2							.61
AB_BR_3							.72
AB_BR_4							.67
Factor 7:	Predatory Corrections
PRED_1								.84
PRED_2								.86
PRED_3								.81
Factor 8:	Corruption
CORR_1									.83
CORR_2									.86
CORR_3									.86
CORR_4									.87

The eight components explain a total variance of 86%.

The KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy = .817

The Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity

Approximate. Chi-square = 4775.226

df = 561

Sig = .000

Extraction method: PCA

Rotation method: Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization

Only factor scores > 0.30 are computed.