Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Accommodation

ABSTRACT

There has been an intense scholarly debate about what caused the unprecedented Islamist mass demonstrations in Indonesia in late 2016. Some scholars have argued that increasing intolerance and conservatism among the Muslim population are responsible, while others have disputed such notions, claiming that there is no evidence of widespread support for an Islamist agenda. In this article, we analyse a unique set of polling data to show that a) conservative attitudes among Indonesian Muslims were declining rather than increasing prior to the mobilisation, but that b) around a quarter of Indonesian Muslims do support an Islamist socio-political agenda. Importantly, we demonstrate that this core constituency of conservative Muslims has grown more educated, more affluent and better connected in the last decade or so, increasing its organisational capacity. We argue that this capacity was mobilised at a time when conservative Muslims felt excluded from the current polity, following the end of a decade of accommodation.

KEYWORDS:

• Indonesia
• democracy
• populism
• Islamism
• radicalism
• intolerance
• party system

Notes

1. We use the term “conservative Muslims” to denote scripturalist Muslims who believe that the original teachings of the Qur’an are the only source of political and moral guidance and should not be re-interpreted in the context of modernity and national state settings. “Radical”, on the other hand, is – in this context – defined as the preparedness to use violence to translate religiously conservative beliefs into action.

2. No comparable surveys on intolerance were done in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015. Hence, this data is not available for our research.

3. The 2016 LSI survey on intolerance was commissioned by the Wahid Institute.

4. This data was initially not included in the LSI 2016 report, but was processed for this article.

5. MUI issued a “religious stance and opinion” on the Ahok case on 11 October 2016, confirming that – in its view – Ahok had committed blasphemy. This decree – which according to MUI officials had a higher status than that of a fatwa – played a key role in legitimising the mass mobilisation against Ahok. See “Ketua MUI Sebut Keputusan MUI soal Ucapan Ahok Lebih Tinggi dari Fatwa”, Kompas, 31 January 2017.

6. This data was collected in a series of surveys: November 2004 (Centre for the Study of Islam and Society, PPIM); January 2006 (LSI); September 2006 (LSI); October-November 2006 (LSI); February-March 2007 (LSI); September 2007 (LSI); May-June 2008 (LSI); the three LSI intolerance surveys of 2010, 2011 and 2016; and a survey by SMRC from November 2016.

7. This data was initially not included in the LSI 2016 report, but was processed for this article.

8. “Habib Rizieq: Ayat Suci di Atas Ayat Konstitusi”, Suara Islam, 21 January 2015.

9. “SBY Tidak Suka Lihat Pusar”, Detik.com, 24 March 2006.

10. “FPI Akan ‘Sweeping’ Tarian Telanjang”, Kompas, 31 December 2011.

11. “SBY Tidak Tolerir Kasus Ahmadiyah Terulang Lagi”, Tribun News, 7 February 2011.

12. Interview by Marcus Mietzner and Edward Aspinall, Cikeas, 2 December 2014.

13. “Tiap Tahun MUI Terima Rp 3 Miliar Dana APBN”, Koran Tempo, 12 March 2013.

14. “Majelis Dzikir SBY Nurussalam Menolak Disebut Sebagai Otak Aksi 4 November”, Tribun News, 21 November 2016; “Menginap di Kempinski, Al-Khaththath Dibayari Ketua Parmusi”, Detik.com, 3 April 2017.

15. “Habib Rizieq Syihab: ‘Jokowi Pembawa Masalah dan Pengundang Musibah Bagi Umat Islam!’”, Dunia Muallaf, November 2014.