Bureaucrats on Douyin: The Official Appropriation of Egao in Promoting Tourism on Chinese Social Media

ABSTRACT

Egao (spoofing), a popular form of Chinese parody, employs humorous and mocking techniques in verbal and visual forms. Its grassroots nature often endows egao with an anti-authoritarian stance, but little scholarly attention has been paid to the increasing use of egao by Chinese public officials on social media. This article looks at this new trend by examining how local officials on the Chinese version of TikTok, Douyin, use egao. Drawing on Bakhtin’s concept of carnivalesque, we employ Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis to examine the online communication style of 54 official accounts on Douyin. We thereby highlight three key features of the dynamic and complex nature of power relations in contemporary political communication in China: how they represent ethnic minority cultures; how they use typical egao forms to parody rebellious characters and subvert traditional Confucian junzi images; and their use of ‘light’ egao to reconstruct ancient characters and heroic images through Gufeng and Wuxia genres. We argue that the power relations between officials and the grassroots are not subverted but rather disguised through a complex negotiation within the state’s promotion of cultural soft power, tourism, and economy, which is aligned with Xi Jinping’s political doctrine of ‘Telling the China Story Well’.

Chinese abstract

恶搞是中国一种流行的, 从口头和视觉上运用幽默和嘲讽技巧的戏仿形式。恶搞的草根性往往赋予其反权威的立场, 但对于中国官员在社交媒体上越来越频繁使用恶搞的现象却鲜有学术关注。本文通过研究中国版抖音上地方官员如何使用恶搞, 来探讨了这一新趋势。借鉴巴赫金的狂欢概念, 我们运用多模式批判话语分析, 研究了抖音上54个官方账户的网络传播风格。通过分析, 我们强调了当代中国政治传播中权力关系的动态和复杂性的三个关键特征:它们如何代表少数民族文化;它们如何使用典型的恶搞形式戏仿叛逆角色并颠覆传统的儒家君子形象;以及它们如何通过古风和武侠流派的“轻”恶搞重新构建古代人物和英雄形象。我们认为, 在中国推动文化软实力, 旅游和经济的各方面权衡中, 官员与草根之间的权力关系并非被颠覆, 而是被掩盖, 这与习近平的政治主义“讲好中国故事”的政治理念是一致的。

KEYWORDS:

• Ethnic minority culture
• public officials
• egao (spoofing)
• Wuxia (martial arts) genre
• Gufeng (ancient Chinese culture) genre
• Douyin
• Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis
• China

Introduction

The emergence of digital media technologies has transformed short videos into a popular form of daily entertainment, news consumption, and a means of stimulating and guiding consumption behaviour (Luo, 2021; Wang & Feng, 2023). Short videos have also become an advantageous channel for local Chinese bureaucrats, such as directors of tourism bureaus,¹ to negotiate and reconstruct their identities and promote local cultural and tourism development (Jiang et al., 2022). For instance, promotional videos and live content featuring Liu Hong, Director General of the Culture and Tourism Bureau from Garzê in the Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, have gained attention from major online media outlets, significantly promoting the tourism, cultural, and economic development of the Garzê region (Jiang et al., 2022). Short-video platforms dominated by Douyin² have witnessed an influx of users with strong regional and ethnic characteristics (Jiang et al., 2022; Luo, 2021; Qiao & Wang, 2022), showing a ‘diverse and integrated’ ethnic and cultural perspective (Luo, 2021, 86).

Ancient Chinese culture (Gufeng) and martial arts (Wuxia) have emerged as the predominant genres in directors’ videos. These new forms of regional tourism promotion, often adopting a popular anti-authoritarian, unserious egao (spoofing) style, represent an innovative method of communication that has arisen under the 讲好中国故事 (Jiǎng hǎo Zhōngguó gùshì, ‘Tell the China Story Well’) political agenda. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a narrative legacy in its ideological project (Wang, 2020), but storytelling as a political communication strategy was explicitly elevated to another level by President Xi Jinping in August 2013. In his speech at the National Conference on Thought and Propaganda, Xi (cited in Ni, 2013) encouraged Chinese people to ‘tell the China story well’ in response to the ‘global changes and developments’. Xi (cited in Ni, 2013) called on people to ‘create our best propaganda forms, striving to model new concepts and new expressions’. The slogan generated unprecedented nationwide ‘storytelling’ campaigns of various kinds. It has evolved into a much larger-scale, multi-strand ‘storytelling’ campaign, with different themes and serving different purposes at different times. As a major strategy that has been applied to both internal and external communication, the ‘China Story’ offensive has drawn wide media and scholarly attention (e.g., Huang & Wang, 2019; Xu et al., 2023). The short videos on Douyin discussed in this article are more organically generated by local officials than the government-backed propaganda initiatives, and often adopt an anti-establishment perspective (e.g., humour and egao), but little is known about this new phenomenon. In this article we address this gap by analysing the implementation of local officials’ egao communication strategy and its complex relationships with official and grassroots discourse.

Drawing on the theoretical framework of Bakhtin’s (1984) carnivalesque and Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis (MCDA), this study examines 54 local directors’ videos, which provide a representative sample of official egao on Douyin. The article proceeds as follows. First, the article reviews the literature on egao in China and introduces the Gufeng and Wuxia genres, before discussing official Douyin accounts and the government’s role in promoting ethnic minorities and local culture. Second, it explains its method and analytical framework. Third, it discusses contemporary tourism policies and the ‘Tell the China Story Well’ propaganda. By focusing on symbolic resources and their representations, the article identifies three distinctive features of online communication styles by directors on Douyin: their representation of ethnic minority cultures; their use of typical egao; and their use of ‘light’ egao in relation to the Gufeng and Wuxia genres.

Egao as a Grassroots Phenomenon?

Since the inception of the egao (恶搞) phenomenon in the early 2000s, its evolution as a derivative of the Japanese-originated kuso (‘shit’) culture trend has been extensively reported by both Chinese and non-Chinese media outlets. Egao is a newly coined term in the Chinese language, which can be translated as ‘wicked fun’, with the characters ‘恶’ (e) and ‘搞’ (gao) carrying connotations of ‘evil’ and ‘poke fun’ (Voci, 2010), respectively.

Egao practices encompass a range of humorous and mocking techniques. These may involve verbal modes such as puns, comic poems, and humorous proverbs, as well as visual/audiovisual strategies such as photographs, cartoons, songs, and movies (Voci, 2010). For example, the emergence of the textual form of egao, such as the Grass Mud Horse (草泥马), is a form of online satire that exemplifies the decentralised but powerful communication facilitated by the Internet. Grass Mud Horse is a euphemism and vulgar pun of ‘Cao ni ma’ (f*k your mother) that aims to avoid Internet censorship, representing a ‘collective attempt at resistance’ (Meng, 2011, 44). The associated catchphrases in online discourse have been used extensively by netizens to evade censorship through puns, homophones, and other rhetorical devices (Guo, 2018).

As an emerging online satire culture, egao has been fostered by the dynamics of participation culture and collective intelligence (see Jenkins, 2006). Chinese egao can be seen as an alternative to grassroots participatory cultural resistance to official authority in the binary of authoritarianism and democracy (Yang, 2014). Scholars have extensively explored the carnivalesque nature of the egao genre (see Gong & Yang, 2010; Herold, 2011; Meng, 2011), as egao provides Chinese netizens with a new avenue for individualistic expression and a means of subverting established norms and values (Zhou, 2008).

The nuanced relationship between egao and Internet censorship highlights the ongoing struggle between freedom of expression and government control in China’s evolving media landscape. Yang (2009) notes that Chinese cyberculture is characterised by playful and prosaic digital contention. Egao, a manifestation of this culture, emerged from the intersection of state censorship and consumerist entertainment, drawing on both local and global traditions. Egao primarily centres on social and cultural satire due to the constraints of self-imposed limitations and government censorship in a country where all media is under state control to varying degrees (Voci, 2010). Hence, there are doubts about the political implications of egao. Yang et al. (2015) examine the diaosi (‘loser’) phenomenon, which is part of egao culture, as a form of infrapolitics (see Scott, 1990). They suggest that egao may not be overtly political, but it still involves acts of political resistance often hidden from the dominant power structures in the background or through disguised forms.

However, a more nuanced understanding of egao is still lacking, partly owing to the tendency of commentators to assume a moralising stance. This disposition often results in creators either lauding their perceived political dissidence or lamenting the portrayal of a symptom of societal degradation in public morals (Rea, 2013). Voci (2010, 127, emphasis in original) has described egao as a kind of ‘light humour’. As egao is viewed as lacking explicit political goals and the potential for activism, its cathartic function is significant, serving as an outlet for repressed emotions and allowing creators and viewers to express their dissatisfaction and anxieties (Gong & Yang, 2010). Zou (2020) proposes that egao should be viewed as ‘creative civic expression’ (see also Bennett et al., 2010, 398), emphasising its potential as a means of personal expression, social linkage, and solidarity. This characterisation transcends the simplistic dichotomy between affective and rational-political elements.

Despite egao’s ambiguous political implications and its potential opposition to the official discourse, it is important to acknowledge and appreciate its grassroots origins and widespread popularity. Official sources provide ample evidence that the egao genre deviates from established norms and values upheld by the official discourse, including aesthetic preferences and ideological orientation. This is partly because egao typically consists of ‘nonsensical parody, cliched images, offensive satire, sophisticated commentary, vulgar comedy, slapstick humour, political dissent, and conventional jokes’ (Voci, 2010, 120). For instance, the official newspapers Guangming Daily and China Daily have characterised egao as a subversive and unsettling form of grassroots culture, expressing concern over the disruptive and malicious nature of its humour (Meng, 2011; Rea, 2013). Also, one of the prominent features of egao as a grassroots, subversive genre is its sole reliance on disseminating into the relatively open space of the Internet. In other words, egao is seen as ‘unofficial’ and is kept at a distance from the official distribution channel.

The Gufeng and Wuxia genres as elements of Chinese soft power

Gufeng (古风, ancient Chinese culture) and Wuxia (武侠, martial arts) are complementary, sharing similar cultural symbols and embodying the essence of traditional Chinese history and humanistic values. Despite their similarities, however, subtle differences exist between the two. Gufeng culture originated from Xianxia novels (仙侠小说),³ time-travel fantasy novels, comics, and online games, gradually spreading to creative arts fields such as music, film, and fashion (Li & Mai, 2020). The elements of Gufeng and Guofeng (国风, national style) have some things in common. Guofeng represents a part of the Shijing poetry collection and has historically been associated with ancient traditional practices. It demonstrates a strong passion for traditional Chinese culture, which is evident in diverse modernised expressions often observed in a commercial context (Ng & Li, 2022). Similarly, traditional Chinese instruments, folk songs, classical poetry, and elegant costumes symbolise the Gufeng genre. Overcoming the limitations of time and space, Gufeng creates more imaginary and virtual scenes through the intertextuality of ancient and modern cultures (Tian, 2021).

Wuxia culture, on the other hand, is more closely tied to actual historical events. The origin of Wuxia can be traced back to Wu Du (五蠹),⁴ which recorded the emergence of wandering swordsmen in the context of the collapse of the feudal order: the phrase ‘儒以文乱法, 侠以武犯禁’ (Confucians use literature to disturb the law, while knights use martial arts to violate the prohibition) is the epitome of the Wuxia cultural phenomenon. Following Youxia Zhuan (游侠传; The Biography of Xiake),⁵ which marked the pinnacle of historical documentation, the image of ancient wandering knights gradually transitioned into poetry, fiction, and drama (Chen, 2013).

Modern Wuxia literature is exemplified by the martial arts novelist, Jin Yong (1924–2018), who successfully propagated and developed Wuxia through his unique style and remarkable character portrayal. Jin’s literary works have become a rich prism for exploring the essence of the Chinese Wuxia spirit. The chivalrous characters that populate his stories embody themes of patriotism, freedom, and intense emotions amid the tumultuous times in which they exist, creating a profoundly captivating and mesmerising reading experience for countless Chinese audiences. As a result, Jin’s novels are regarded as sources of emotional and spiritual solace, providing a guiding light for readers amid China’s changing social and political landscape (Zhang, 2018). As Chen (2013) notes, the Wuxia spirit encompasses various schools of thought, including Confucianism, Taoism, Mohism, and Buddhism. These traditions have given voice to the resounding echoes of the Wuxia spirit, their reverberations heard throughout the corridors of historical and modern cultural heritage.

Official accounts on Douyin

Douyin was launched in 2016 and has gained recognition for its growth and popularity in marketing tourism destinations and cultural heritage since 2017 (Bytedance, 2020). During COVID-19, using Douyin to promote tourism resources and publicise travel destinations emerged as a novel approach to stimulate local tourism development (Jiang et al., 2022). Douyin has extended invitations to public institutions identified as political or corporate official accounts to establish a presence on the platform. Capitalising on its content distribution and promotional strengths, Douyin empowers these institutions to effectively communicate government affairs, enhance city branding, and facilitate the marketing of agricultural products (Zhang, 2021).

The administrative controls imposed by the state and society on technological innovation are gradually giving way to rules for the operation of technology companies based on algorithmic mechanisms and data-driven and proprietary business models, leading to a remarkable reversal of the conventional hierarchy (Caplan & Boyd, 2018). In response to the rapidly evolving media culture, the Chinese government has struggled to embrace a more innovative form of propaganda, recognising that traditional methods of political indoctrination are no longer compatible with the dynamic nature of the online environment (Chen et al., 2021). For example, the national news radio programme CCTV News, which airs nightly, ends with a short video dedicated to Douyin, using humorous language to communicate with netizens. As Douyin has become the main communication channel for people’s daily access to information, even the most official and orthodox programmes have reformed their formats to suit the timing, language, and presentation of Douyin (Zhang, 2021). Moreover, state accounts on Douyin exhibit a distinct tone compared to their posts in other media. This new variant, known as ‘playful patriotism’, merges state-sponsored patriotism discourse with the savvy nature of cyber-nationalism, aligning effectively with future-focused techno-nationalism (Chen et al., 2021, 11).

Some official videos also take a new and casual approach to expression, drawing on the currently popular concept of ‘time travel’ (part of the Gufeng genre from the Xianxia novel), featuring celebrities and popular topics. For example, these official videos create nostalgia-oriented traditional cultural symbols that combine the idealised urban imagery of the ‘Great Tang’ with a utopian vision of Xi’an’s future development (Wang & Feng, 2023, 407).

The Chinese government’s role in ethnic and cultural displays

To understand the government’s impact on the display of ethnic cultures, one needs to review the historical relationship between the Han and minority ethnicities. Originating from the Han ethnic group and the Confucian state, there exists a distinct historical consciousness that asserts a difference between the ‘civilised’ (superior Han) and ‘barbarians’ (inferior minorities) based on the Han’s cultural achievements and behavioural norms (Bai, 2007; Ma, 2007). This binary framework also influences the representation of minority cultures in the media. For instance, television plays a growing role in constructing the ‘Other’ in China’s ethnic relations (Kang, 2022). Newspapers also depict minority ethnic groups as the ‘Other’, emphasising their unique cultural attributes and need for cultural sensitivity, external aid, and political representation (Zhao & Postiglione, 2010). Similarly, in cinema, these groups are marginalised and portrayed as an exotic and primitive ‘Other’ (Lu, 2020).

Tourism, however, favours a discourse of authenticity rather than hierarchy (Bai, 2007). Consequently, ethnicity is removed from the continuum of progress and backwardness and its related negative evaluations (White, 1998). Instead, ‘authentic’ cultural attributes and practices are highly valued (Bai, 2007) in the promotion of tourism. Nevertheless, the role of the government in ethnic and cultural displays has been highly controversial, particularly in rural ethnic areas of China, where indigenous culture and immigrant culture have a complex history. Ethnic tourism in rural areas is an important part of cultural heritage presentation, which is used as a proxy for the power of the Chinese authoritarian state (Oakes, 2013). This is because heritage presentation is a colonising project that alienates local communities from their own cultural resources (Svensson, 2006). The promotion of ethnic culture takes place in a series of projects initiated, planned, and funded by local townships and municipalities, primarily involving the landscaping of villages to give them a more coherent visual narrative. These projects are likely to emulate prominent examples of successful heritage tourism, such as Lijiang City in Yunnan (Oakes, 2013).⁶ Such displays have been referred to as the ‘rule of experts’, as the experts’ cultural knowledge does not come from the villagers but, instead, claims to represent them (Mitchell, 2002, 4).

Informed by Carnivalesque: A Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis Approach

Bakhtin’s (1984) carnivalesque remains relevant in investigating power relations in digital space. His seminal work Rabelais and his World explores the cultural significance of folk humour within the context of carnival culture, a communicative style that Bakhtin identifies as ‘carnivalesque’. The popular festive comic act, characterised by the grotesque body, abusive language, parodies, and ambivalent laughter, is a vehicle for the dismantling and reversion of traditional societal structures, including established authorities and truths (Bakhtin, 1984). As noted above, the subversive power of egao and other unofficial forms of humour is a contemporary manifestation of carnivalesque (Gong & Yang, 2010; Herold, 2011; Meng, 2011).

Analysing modern media texts necessitates a social semiotics and multimodal approach (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2020). We therefore employ Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis (MCDA) to examine the interplay between semiotic resources, power, and ideology in these videos (Ledin & Machin, 2020). MCDA expands the scope of Critical Discourse Analysis, which examines the production of ideology and power relations within texts and discourses (Fairclough, 2003). A fundamental principle of MCDA is that communication is best studied by looking at communicators’ choices from a given set of semiotic resources, including their linguistic and non-linguistic elements, such as language, images, colours, and gestures (Eriksson & Kenalemang, 2023). These resources possess inherent potential meaning and can be used in specific contexts and for specific purposes, enabling discourse manipulation to uphold a particular ideology (Van Leeuwen, 2008). This proposition reflects the recognition of the complexities inherent in contemporary media, which are characterised by diverse communicative modes.

Our study builds on KhosraviNik’s (2017) argument that social media platforms provide an opportunity to examine ‘counter-discourses’. Bouvier and Way (2021, 357) suggest that ‘counter-discourses’ that seemingly challenge hegemony can reinforce the forms of expression and evaluation they seek to maintain, even if, at first glance, they appear to be ‘counter’. Therefore, instead of focusing on the political resistance expressed through grassroots egao, we enhance the understanding of the unique ‘counter-discourse’ emerging from official Douyin accounts by focusing on its role in promoting the local tourism economy and culture, as well as the power dynamics established through various unofficial communication forms used by local officials. We are guided by three research questions:

• How is China’s minority culture represented in the directors’ videos?

• How do local Chinese officials reconstruct their identities in unofficial or ‘low’ forms through egao?

• How does the dominant use of traditional culture (Gufeng and Wuxia genres) in directors’ videos serve as a discursive practice for reconstructing rebellious official identities?

The main source of data for the study was generated from a keyword search on Douyin for ‘director videos’ (局长视频). This resulted in 54 videos of directors from various counties, districts, and cities across China. This data is public and retrievable. The number of 54 videos represents the maximum sample size collected, as duplicate video content was filtered out. Our analysis focused explicitly on the choices of semiotic resources in the directors’ short videos and wider socio-political agendas to reveal how their video transformations were represented. In doing so, we developed a categorisation framework with a focus on semiotic resources, including provinces, background music, textual elements, costumes, actions, video settings, and transformation types. Here, ‘transformation’ refers to the different character types directors present after switching costumes.

To effectively identify semiotic resources within the dataset, we adopted a systematic and structured approach to documenting data. Given the limited scale of the dataset, we opted for a manual data organisation approach, which allowed us to categorise semiotic resources through direct observations in great detail. A table was manually constructed with individual headings assigned to the aforementioned semiotic resources. We then watched each video and documented the semiotic resources present by their respective categories. For instance, in the case of a video featuring a director from Yunnan Province, who engaged in costume transformation into ethnic attire while dancing by the riverside accompanied by Dai ethnic music, without accompanying textual information such as verses, the table would be populated as follows: province (Yunnan), background music (ethnic music), textual elements (none), costumes (ethnic minority costume), action (dancing), video settings (outdoor/riverside), types of transformation (ethnic culture display).

Finally, videos were analysed in depth using the prism of carnivalesque and MCDA to explore the symbolic meaning of the characters and their discursive constructions. This generated insights into the social structures, hierarchies, and power relations depicted in the videos featuring local officials.

Egao and the ‘Tell the China Story Well’ Campaign

The Chinese government has launched an all-out campaign to ‘Tell the China Story Well’, but this communication strategy is often criticised as inauthentic and propagandist in nature, particularly by Western audiences (Brown, 2020). Compared with the state’s ‘digital diplomacy’, the bureaucrats who assume unofficial roles as ‘Internet celebrities’ have successfully reconstructed their online images to attract ‘clicks’. However, this success does not represent a subversion of power relations but rather a response to the political strategy of ‘Telling the China Story Well’. So, we argue that the phenomenon should be considered in the complex context of the attributes of local officials, and the overall national goal of vigorously developing the economy, expanding tourism development, and promoting the national spirit.

First, the short videos and their official attributes are intricately linked, as the directors are affiliated with China’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism. The ministry, in conjunction with provincial cultural and tourism bureaus, is responsible for implementing party policies, developing the cultural and tourism sectors, coordinating the cultural industry’s growth, and promoting cultural programmes for the public good. It also oversees cultural resource preservation, market regulation, international cultural exchanges, and the dissemination of Chinese culture abroad (Wang, 2018). Consequently, these departments tend to avoid politically or militarily sensitive topics, affording them relatively flexible creative space and some leniency in shaping their public image.

Second, the impact of COVID-19 on high-sensitivity sectors, such as tourism, has been enormous. In 2020, China experienced a significant decline in the number of domestic tourists and tourism revenue. This loss of earnings amounted to more than $600 billion (Qiang, 2022). Starting at the end of February 2020, the Chinese national and local governments introduced a series of policies to support the recovery of the tourism industry, leading to a gradual recovery in the sector (Xiang, 2021). With the urgent need for tourism economic development, short videos are more sustainable because they promote Chinese traditional culture. In an interview with the Farmers’ Daily on 25 June 2022 (reported by Yi Wang, 2022), one director, Liu Hong, said:

Garzê constitutes an integral part of the Southern Silk Road and the Ancient Tea Horse Road, serving as a pivotal route for the 18^th Army of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army during their historic advance into Tibet. Through the portrayal of chivalrous characters, one can transcend time and space to reenact cultural scenes depicting the interactions between the Tibetan and Han ethnic groups, thus allowing online audiences to vividly experience the beauty of Garzê.

Exploring Garzê’s history through the hero character in videos can help netizens better appreciate the region’s cultural richness and historical beauty, contributing to its tourism development. Thus, martial arts heroes are depicted more as a means to enhance the cultural appeal of tourism than as a vehicle for substantive criticism of or resistance to authority. The official use of Gufeng, Wuxia, humour, and egao to drive short video traffic and promote regional cultural and economic development partly mitigates negative perceptions of their public identities. The economic gains stemming from these endeavours help to counterbalance potential negative consequences associated with the officials’ representation in these images.

Third, Xi Jinping stated that the ‘Tell the China Story Well’ strategy not only entails showcasing China’s grand background and stance but also requires a more personalised and humanised approach (Huang, 2016). Previously, China’s external propaganda primarily consisted of content that took a national perspective, describing important policies or events and China’s stance on them. The content was rather tedious and monotonous, with a typical grand narrative style, which made it challenging for it to connect with foreign audiences, ultimately leading to inadequate dissemination of China’s story (Zhang, 2020). Dai Bin (2021, 5), the Director of the China Tourism Academy, offered the following suggestion in a lecture to the International Exchange and Cooperation Bureau of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism on cultural exchange and tourism promotion work in the northern region:

China’s cultural exchange and tourism promotion is not government diplomacy at the national level, military exchanges, or formal debates, but rather a subtle combination of soft power. Our goal is to make people from all over the world feel close to China rather than respecting China from a distance.

This statement implies that the authorities are prioritising less serious, formal, and distant forms of cultural exchange in favour of more personal, engaging, and approachable forms of communication. The egao style of short videos provides evidence of the interaction between personal expression and institutional roles. It reflects the changing nature of identity in the digital age, where individuals (even when representing official entities) can adopt different roles. This role-shifting blurs the boundaries between the official and personal spheres to some extent. It suggests that participants in digital media can engage with broader social narratives, transitioning from grassroots to official roles with broader social impact.

Digital platforms facilitate officials’ dissemination of cultural narratives as a tool for the widespread revitalisation of culture in grassroots forms and a means of revitalising the tourism sector. To some extent, promoting ‘soft power’ and the ‘China story’ has relaxed and renegotiated the strict and established requirements for official identities in China. This ‘counter-discourse’ of using humour and egao to establish official identities reflects the CCP’s desire to enhance its cultural soft power. The partial abandonment of official identities elicits a sense of political affinity with the populace. In other words, power relations between officials and the public have not been overturned. The officials remain officials, but the goal of the egao videos is to serve the government’s political agenda and attract tourists. Their use of parody has lost the rebelliousness once aimed at criticising and satirising the establishment and the accepted norm. In the complex intersection of political agendas and economic revitalisation through tourism, they have chosen a seemingly ‘low’ approach to complement the national campaign of ‘Telling the China Story Well’.

In the following section, we first present the overall distribution of semiotic resources across the 54 videos. We then present three case studies to illustrate how officials use egao and humour to tell the ‘China Story’ in entertaining ways.

The Overall Distribution of Semiotic Resources

The videos of the bureau directors come from various regions within 22 provinces (see Table 1). Of these, three provinces (Jiangsu, Fujian, and Shandong) are economically developed, while the remaining 19 are underdeveloped, with 13 frontier regions and six inland provinces. In terms of background music, traditional music (28) was the most common, followed by ethnic minority music (15) and traditional opera music (8), with modern music being the least commonly used (5). In terms of textual elements, 32 videos did not include text, while 22 videos included text such as ancient poems, proverbs, traditional opera lines, or film lines.

Table 1. The Distribution of Semiotic Resources in 54 Videos

Semiotic resources	Distribution
Provinces	Developed: Jiangsu (4), Fujian (1), Shandong (3) Underdeveloped: Yunnan (3), Shanxi (5), Shanxi (5), Xinjiang (4), Guizhou (2), Sichuan (3), Henan (2), Chongqing (3), Anhui (2), Hubei (1), Gansu (2), Jiangxi (3), Hunan (1), Heilongjiang (2), Ningxia (3), Hainan (1), Neimenggu (1), Guangxi (1), Tibet (1)
Background music	modern (3), ethnic (15), traditional (28), traditional Chinese opera (8)
Textual elements	ancient poem and proverbs (15), opera lines (4), movie line (3), none (32)
Costumes	ethnic minority (18), traditional Gufeng Hanfu (18), Wuxia (11), traditional Chinese opera (4), modern (3)
Action	walking (20), dancing (13), horse-riding (2), archery (2), standing (4), singing (2), ancient fencing (2), rowing (1), playing the flute (1), military salute (1), writing calligraphy (1), drinking (2), saying goodbye to lovers (1), playing drums (1), drinking tea (1)
Video settings	Indoor: Dai temple (1), museum (3), traditional Xinjiang dwelling (1), traditional opera house (1), ancient palace (6), library (1), Buddhist temple (4), Communist Conference Memorial Hall (1), tea room (2) Outdoor: mountain (5), ethnic tribes (1), by the creek (1), grassland (2), boat (2), snowfield (1), desert (1), old city walls (5), ancient stone sculpture landscape (1), ancient town (2), public square (1), bamboo forest (1), vineyard (1), field of rapeseed flowers (1), countryside (1), martial arts tournament (1), yurt (1), film location (4), park (2)
Types of transformation	ethnic culture display (21), egao (16), traditional Gufeng and Wuxia culture display (14), modern dance (3)

The most common costumes were traditional Chinese Gufeng and ethnic minority costumes, which each appeared in 18 videos. Wuxia costumes were also used in 11 videos. For action, walking with background music was the most common, appearing in 20 videos, followed by dancing in 13 videos. In addition, various other actions, such as horse riding, archery, ancient fencing, rowing, flute playing, calligraphy, drumming, and drinking, were observed. These actions were typically associated with Gufeng and Wuxia genres – i.e., a refined and leisurely lifestyle centred on the enjoyment of flowers, plants, calligraphy, and tea.

In terms of video settings, 18 had indoor settings, including cultural and historical sites such as temples, museums, ancient palaces, opera houses, and libraries. There were 36 videos with outdoor settings featuring a variety of natural environments, including mountains, grasslands, riversides, bamboo forests, deserts, and fields of flowers.

For the transformation type, the distribution demonstrates a blend of display of ethnic minority culture, egao, and traditional culture in these videos. The analysis below is therefore divided into three (sub)sections, each detailing the main findings on minority culture, egao, and traditional culture in terms of the Gufeng and Wuxia genres.

Ethnic style for tourism bureau directors

The representation of minority culture was a distinctive aspect of directors’ videos. They exuded a strong ethnic ambience and incorporated various ethnic activities. For example, the director in Figure 1 initially approaches the camera in an imposing pose. As ethnic music begins to play, he undergoes an abrupt transformation by quickly using props to change into ethnic costume through Douyin’s scene-shifting and editing features. The director performs a short and jubilant ethnic dance – in this case, the peacock dance, which is shown in the Dai Water Splashing Festival ceremony. Directors’ expressions usually exude confidence, and their actions show strength. Some videos feature solo dances, while others show group performances.

Figure 1. A screenshot of the Dai minority culture display from the Director of the Culture and Tourism Bureau of Dehong City, Yunnan Province.

Source: Douyin Mobile Platform.

Their videos demonstrate the transformation of minority cultures from a marginalised position to a pivotal role in tourism-driven economic development. Using MCDA to analyse the popular trends through ethnic minority cultural displays, we focus on how their marginalised cultural status has been altered through Douyin.

From a socio-political perspective, ethnic minorities have historically occupied a non-dominant position in China’s historical, cultural, and economic development. According to official estimates, Han Chinese constitute 91.5 per cent of China’s population, with the remaining 8.5 per cent consisting of 55 officially recognised ethnic minorities. Despite comprising less than 10 per cent of the population, these minority regions, which are historically isolated due to poor transport access, account for more than 48 per cent of China’s impoverished areas (Holcombe, 2017). Limited connectivity with urban regions has hindered knowledge exchange, technology access, and industrialisation, resulting in primarily traditional agricultural and pastoral practices (Howell, 2017). China has implemented relatively advanced policies to tackle labour market discrimination and ethnic inequality, but the main determinants of human capital (i.e., differences in household and regional characteristics) continue to leave significant differences in financial revenue and regional economic development between ethnic minorities and Han Chinese (Campos et al., 2016).

The directors themselves take centre stage in performances aimed at accelerating the advancement of regional tourism, culture, and economic growth. What distinguishes these short videos from previous examples of government-mediated ethnic presentations is the direct involvement of government officials in the performances. The ‘expert’ power represented by government-planned displays of cultural and ethnic heritage is not the focus of our attention. We focus instead on the changing role of the government from policymakers to mass-media participants and creators, and the elevation of the status of minority cultures. From this perspective, the representation of minority cultures on Douyin has established a new power relationship in which the disadvantaged position of minorities is reversed and becomes dominant.

Typical egao from officials

Egao, the second-most prevalent form of video transformation, is characterised by a more rebellious style, and aims to challenge or subvert established official norms. As a grassroots performance against elite discourse (Gong & Yang, 2010), the essence of egao’s rebelliousness in the videos is evident through its choice of parody characters and the directors’ self-presentation as harbingers of ‘counter-discourse’.

For example, the director in Figure 2 challenges the traditional Confucian junzi image of a refined and profound scholar. The persona of a junzi, who is often referred to as possessing ‘wen masculinity’ or being a fragile scholar, perpetuated through both Confucian moral teachings and the broader patriarchal symbolic order, represents a typical and idealised form of masculinity in Chinese traditional culture (Song, 2004). The qualities of a junzi are required of orthodox government officials and exemplify the standards of conduct expected of those in power in the traditional Chinese political hierarchy.

Figure 2. A screenshot of a typical egao by the Director of the Suizhou Tourism and Culture Bureau, Hubei Province.

Source: Douyin Mobile Platform.

In Figure 2, such a parody often retains traditional costumes but substitutes different content, often implying a clumsy character. For example, the text ‘我是谁, 我在哪’ (Who am I, where am I) and the question mark symbol featured in the video are an Internet buzzword used to convey the intricate emotion of feeling stunned and, at times, to simulate acting foolish. Furthermore, the director, in a clear departure from the expected, parodies a Confucian scholar donning traditional attire. This parody integrates modern music and dance moves reminiscent of K-pop girl groups. He appears dishevelled, struggles with dance steps, and lacks the expected nobility. This deliberate clumsiness fails to evoke the refined comportment and eloquence of the junzi archetype.

The parody of the K-pop girl group’s dance moves shows a highly carnivalesque manner. The use of grotesque humour in depicting officialdom has shifted from a ‘bottom-up’ counter-discourse to a ‘top-down’ parodic approach. For Bakhtin (1984), the established official truth asserts that social orders are unalterable and unassailable, including existing hierarchies, religious, political and moral values, norms, and taboos. The serious and formal tone of the Medieval church and feudal culture is challenged by humour and satire during carnival festivals. People live a second life, one that exists outside the official sphere. Government officials are expected to be solemn, while their egao behaviour reflects not their established official roles but playful and subversive engagement with the spoofed characters and junzi images.

The nature of parody is inherently unserious, which may undermine the authority of directors since their exaggerated behaviour is incongruent with the conduct expected of their official positions. However, we argue that directors’ ‘top-down’ representation is closely associated with the grassroots expression of the diaosi image to enhance positive political affinity and gain grassroots acceptance.

The self-deprecating humour of the official in Figure 2 presents him as a poorly behaved normal person. This aligns with the label diaosi, which resonates with many young people on online forums. The term diaosi generally refers to individuals occupying middle- or lower-middle-class positions, who work in poorly paid and unsatisfying jobs, lack natural advantages such as physical attractiveness or a wealthy background, and are therefore regarded as pitiable and contemptible losers in contemporary China (Yang et al., 2015). There are some similarities between the egao and diaosi subcultures, particularly in their use of mockery. Diaosi is closely aligned with entertainment and self-mockery (Yang et al., 2015). The director in these videos resembles the stereotypical diaosi due to his unappealing appearance as well as his self-mockery and mischief, which appear to be his defining features. For example, the text in Figure 2 reads, ‘别管我跳的美不美, 随州的春天真的美’ (Regardless of whether or not my dancing is beautiful, Suizhou’s spring is truly beautiful). The video is set in a blooming peach blossom garden. The text serves as a form of self-mockery by the director, playfully acknowledging his lack of dancing skills while highlighting the beauty of Suizhou’s spring.

The official spoofing as a diaosi image is a form of identity reconstruction. The Internet provides a platform for building a sense of solidarity within the group, with its visual media enabling individuals to feel an inherent connection to a large number of people with similar experiences (Szablewicz, 2014). Diaosi culture encompasses a complex interplay of embarrassment and self-identification, both of which are integral to its cultural identity. A sense of ruefulness is often inherent in this phenomenon, but it is frequently replaced by a pervasive sense of playfulness and joviality shared and celebrated by individuals across society (Yang et al., 2015). In this sense, the officials’ self-deprecating humour helps to create a carnival sense of equality and solidarity between officials and the people.

Light egao: The amalgamation of Gufeng and Wuxia genres

Gufeng, Wuxia, and other traditional Chinese elements (e.g., traditional opera) are all critical components of the directors’ videos. As egao practice is understood as a ‘mode of resistance’ (Nordin & Richaud, 2014, 49), we argue that the reconstruction of Gufeng images and Wuxia heroic identity, at least superficially, adopts a form of resistance in egao: namely, light egao. This concept is inspired by Voci’s (2010, 127, emphasis added) ‘light humour’ to describe the form of subtle subversive pleasure associated with egao practices. ‘Light humour’ represents a different type of laughter that is ‘neither subservient nor antagonistic to ideology, nor is it a soft, regulated comedy or an aggressive blasphemous attack on hegemonic power’ (Voci, 2010, 127). We adopt the concept of ‘light’ because, in China, ‘egao’s anti-establishment potential lies more in its mode of production and distribution than in its content’ (Voci, 2010, 121).

However, not all directors’ videos possess humour. For instance, the Wuxia type of egao showcases nostalgia for the ancient martial arts spirit rather than humour. Therefore, we propose the term ‘light egao’ to categorise videos that may not qualify as typical humorous egao but exhibit a sense of rebelliousness by mainly imitating ancient characters (Gufeng) or heroic figures (Wuxia).

Figure 3 is a representative example from Director Liu Hong. The primary aim of his videos is to evoke a nostalgic atmosphere with a retro sentiment and to emphasise the spirit of chivalry. The symbolic representations of Wuxia genres used in Liu’s videos integrate with the multimodal media technologies inherent to this format. The following in-depth MCDA analysis focuses on examining background music, traditional attire, the recontextualisation of classical poetry in video text, and natural environmental settings.

Figure 3. A screenshot of the Wuxia parody by the Director General of the Culture and Tourism Bureau, Garzê, Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan Province.

Source: Douyin Mobile Platform.

Ancient Chinese music is a musical genre characterised by elegant classical lyrics, picturesque imagery, and melodious tunes. It is often played with traditional instruments such as the Xiao (萧), Pipa (琵琶), and Guzheng (古筝) to create sophisticated imagery (C. Wang, 2022). For example, Liu’s videos often feature music with the sound of Xiao in the background, which starts as he transforms from modern attire to ancient costumes. The music is sometimes interspersed with the cries of an eagle and the neighing of horses, creating an immersive atmosphere of the chivalrous martial arts world.

The text in Liu’s videos consists of poetic lines rendered in the style of ancient Chinese poetry. For instance, the line ‘初闻不知曲中意, 再听已是曲中人’ (At first, I did not understand the meaning, but upon hearing it again, I became one with the melody) initially aims to evoke nostalgia in viewers, poignantly reminding them of the passage of time and the evanescent nature of past experiences. However, it is recontextualised to elicit traditional poetic sentiments rather than a sense of longing or regret.

The location for Liu’s videos has a unique natural and cultural geographic value. For example, the Garzê region in Sichuan, where Liu is located, is a geographical location of special significance. Jiancheng Wang’s (2022) research identifies two distinct characteristics of Garzê. First, Mount Gongga, situated on the steep slope between the Qinghai–Tibet Plateau and the Sichuan Basin, boasts a perennially snow-covered main peak, drawing tourists with its sacred and natural beauty. Second, the mountain serves as a transitional zone where the Western Tibetan and Yi ethnic groups meet the Eastern Han ethnic group, fostering the harmonious coexistence of various cultures (J. Wang, 2022). Therefore, the natural and diverse ethnic elements serve as an essential foundation for constructing symbolic scenarios and promoting tourist attractions.

The Wuxia genre implicitly embodies the virtues of passion, courage, and righteousness, facilitating Liu’s association with a virtuous hero archetype and reconstructing his charisma as a local official among the populace. Liu’s actions – i.e., consistently riding a steed hailing from the impenetrable forests and snowy plains – symbolise a reconstruction process that elevates his heroic image to a ‘higher’ level. This imbues him with an epic and sacred quality, emphasising his crucial role in promoting interethnic harmony and undertaking essential regional organisational tasks.

Furthermore, a particular Wuxia spirit, loneliness, is embodied in the director’s image. The creation of such an enigmatic hero moves his image away from the official mainstream and toward a more vibrant portrayal of a solitary figure. By incorporating the eagle’s cry, Liu’s video establishes a significant linkage between his martial arts image and the archetypical hero, Yang Guo, an emblematic character in Jin Yong’s literary oeuvre. Yang’s rebellion against societal norms and conventions results in his portrayal as a solitary and distant figure who ultimately finds solace and companionship with an eagle. Jin’s characterisation of Yang elucidates the constraints imposed upon human behaviour and emotions by prevailing societal norms and conventions. The entirety of Yang’s life embodies his rebellion against tradition and his quest for liberation, which exemplifies the purest ideals of his existence (Shen & Qi, 2015). The portrayal of Yang transcends the conventions and values inherent in the martial arts genre and renounces the feudalistic values of ‘power, heir, wealth, and prestige’ (威福, 子女, 玉帛) while imbuing the narrative with a spirit of individualism and independent personality (Shen & Qi, 2015, 29).

The ideological symbols relating to individualism and freedom are represented by official identities, and this is crucial for exploring whether these bureaucrats’ videos can be classified as egao. A recognised official image is predicated on the practice of ‘typification’ within the framework of Socialist realism. In accordance with this principle, a hero must not only embody the quintessence of the proletarian class, as denoted by traits such as wisdom, courage, uprightness, and strength, but also epitomise the ‘prescribed political identity’ (Wang, 1997, 258). Consequently, heroes are expected to espouse collectivism and serve as objects of emulation for the masses. In this context, a typical character is deemed to represent the essence of a given social group or stratum (Fang, 2004). However, a Wuxia hero does not conform to the typical official hero archetype. The ‘loner’ image suggests that they are unencumbered by the responsibilities of marriage and family and are not constrained by collective interests. Instead, they embody qualities of individualism and a solitary warrior motivated by the pursuit of personal freedom. The typical heroes hailed during the high Socialist era are no longer viable representations in today’s cultural milieu, but Yang’s persona may still potentially deviate from the typical official image despite being contrary to the social norm. By crafting a solitary hero unencumbered by collectivist values, this subversive force allows for a reconstruction of official identity in an individually liberating spirit in contrast to the seriousness of the official.

Conclusion

This article has used Bakhtin’s carnivalesque concept and MCDA to analyse the popular short videos made by 54 Chinese tourism director officials on Douyin. First, it has explored why the deviation from the traditional ideological aesthetic and subversion of official seriousness by these officials have been welcomed by the public and even tolerated by the higher authorities. Three factors contribute to the success of these videos: the cultural and tourism departments are less politically sensitive; there is an urgent economic imperative for the development of the tourism industry, which was seriously disrupted by COVID-19; and these short videos fall within the purview of Xi Jinping’s call to ‘Tell the China Story Well’.

The article identified three online communication styles. The first is the heavy use of ethnic minority cultural symbols in the videos. Douyin has played a significant role in bringing ethnic minorities and their cultures to the forefront of social media attention as bureaucrats actively engage in reconstructing narratives of these cultures. It serves to incorporate local power structures into grassroots videos, allowing them to reach a broader audience and shape public perceptions of minority cultures. This implies that ethnic minorities are no longer emblematic of a ‘barbaric and backward culture’ but rather constitute a narrative that is acknowledged, represented, and promoted by those in positions of authority. Consequently, these short videos reconstruct the cultural power dynamics between ethnic minorities and the Han majority, elevating minority cultures from a marginalised status to greater prominence. This signifies a gradual transformation of their cultural influence within mainstream Chinese society.

The second style uses typical egao to parody rebellious characters and other carnival elements (including the diaosi image) to ameliorate the established official image. The last is a form of light egao, which uses Gufeng and Wuxia genres to recontextualise the bureaucrats as heroes from martial arts novels. Specifically, the Wuxia genre subverts the typical image of a Socialist hero with a sense of individualism that deviates from collectivism.

We argue that official parody is not an actual reversal or subversion of power relations but rather a new kind of communicative strategy disguised as egao for the purpose of developing China’s tourism economy, revisiting traditional culture, and enhancing China’s soft power internationally. The subversion of official image-construction is worthy of recognition in these cases. Egao shares some artistic traditions with parody and satire and an anti-establishment spirit with Medieval carnivals. This article contributes to the discussion of ‘counter-discourse’ on social media through the MCDA lens and provides a new perspective to the study of egao by examining it as an official initiative. The examples discussed in this article illustrate how the nature of egao has been significantly transformed with the participation of government officials, indicating that Chinese egao has indeed taken another new direction. This echoes Meng’s (2011) discussions on how digital technologies and networks are taking the phenomenon of egao in new directions. The new development of the egao phenomenon invites further investigation into its increasingly complex features and role in future identity negotiation.

This study of representations could be strengthened by in-depth interviews with representative directors and netizens. Future research could consider incorporating interviews with relevant officials and viewers to better understand the ‘insider’ view and consumption of official egao. Moreover, we have observed that some female directors are also involved in egao practices in short videos, acting as ancient consorts and emperors or chivalrous heroes. Some male directors, meanwhile, have dressed as women. The official cross-dressing for males and females is another topic that might be fruitfully pursued in future research into official egao with a gender perspective.

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to acknowledge the editors-in-chief, Dirk Tomsa and David Hundt, and the deputy editor, Jonathan Benney, for their support of this project, and the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions.

Disclosure Statement

The authors report there are no competing interests to declare.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Australian Research Training Program (RTP) Scholarship.

Notes

^1. In this article, the term ‘director’ refers to government officials or bureaucrats in various regions of China. These individuals often hold leadership positions in government departments.

^2. Douyin is culturally significant because it provides micro-entertainment and personalised content that meet a variety of social needs of its users (especially young people). Easy-to-use editing tools have led to a proliferation of grassroots user-generated content, which also provides immersive experiences, facilitates virtual relationships, and shapes modern digital culture (Lu & Lu, 2019).

^3. Xianxia novels are a traditional literary genre in China that typically depict supernatural powers, mysterious cultivation methods, heroic adventures, and battle stories. Xianxia novels depict a diverse world where humans, gods, immortals, demons, monsters, and ghosts coexist (Li & Mai, 2020).

^4. Wu Du is a prose piece written by Han Fei, a representative of the school of Legalism in the late Warring States period (c. 3^rd century BCE).

^5. The Biography of Xiake is a chapter in the Book of Han (the first Chinese historical book in the chronicles genre), written by Ban Gu during the Eastern Han Dynasty (82–92 AD).

^6. The well-preserved Naxi ethnic culture in Lijiang (including traditional artefacts and performances), coupled with picturesque natural landscapes and numerous historically significant sites and ancient architecture, makes it an ideal destination for travellers seeking an ethnic and cultural experience.