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Articles

The politics of international law: the life cycle of emerging norms on the use and regulation of private military and security companies

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Pages 89-127 | Published online: 20 Jun 2017
 

ABSTRACT

The burgeoning use of private military and security company (PMSC) contractors in the wake of the 2003 Iraq War years has given rise to calls for regulation and oversight of PMSCs. The UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries advocates a convention that bans states from outsourcing ‘inherently State functions’, including ‘direct participation in hostilities’, to PMSCs. Others, especially Western states and others behind the boom of the PMSC industry after the 2003 Iraq War, argue that codes of conduct and self-regulation are sufficient to regulate PMSCs. Treaty, principle and policy norms all encompass shared expectations about proper conduct, but treaty norms take form in hard law whereas principle norms are evinced in customary or soft law (or both) and policy norms are evinced in policy statements issued by international organisations and industry bodies. This article hypothesises that norms on PMSCs that are neither puritanical nor overly strong and yet appear to be both normative and concrete are the most likely to be institutionalised by a critical mass of state actors and by the PMSC industry.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Koskenniemi (Citation2011), pp 35–75; Venzke (Citation2012), pp 1–10, 46–71, 214–223.

2 Cf Koskenniemi (Citation2005c), pp 34–41, 58–69, 385–387, 519–521, 590–596.

3 But see Austin (Citation1954), pp 141–142; Kelsen (Citation1966), pp 16–22; Morgenthau (Citation1985), pp 293–327.

4 Mégret (Citation2013), p 487.

5 Koskenniemi (Citation2011), pp 221–222.

6 Avant (Citation2005), pp 1–38; Singer (Citation2003), pp 49–70.

7 On hegemonic contestation, see generally Koskenniemi (Citation2005a), pp 113–124, 598; Koskenniemi (Citation2011), pp 221–223; Koskenniemi (Citation2012c), pp 9–11.

8 For critical analysis of self-regulation, see Hoppe and Quirico (Citation2011), pp 362–380; White (Citation2012), pp 11–16. For the Draft PMSC Convention, see Gómez del Prado (Citation2010), annex.

9 Gómez del Prado (Citation2010), paras 39, 48–54, 82–84.

10 Draft PMSC Convention, art 2.

11 This article analyses the anti-mercenary norm after the introduction.

12 Isenberg (Citation2009), pp 10–11; Singer (Citation2001/2002), pp 200–203.

13 Liu (Citation2015), pp 103–122; Seiberth (Citation2014), pp 37–39, 47–57.

14 Percy (Citation2007b), p 63.

15 Frye (Citation2005), p 2645; Jones (Citation2009), p 255; Perrin (Citation2006), pp 615–616.

16 Betts and Orchard (Citation2014), pp 8–11.

17 For the Montreux Document, see ICRC and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Citation2008). For the ICoC, see Swiss Government (Citation2010).

18 See especially Percy (Citation2007a), pp 386–394; Percy (Citation2007b), pp 193, 218–225, 238–243; Percy (Citation2014), pp 68–84.

19 Cf Koskenniemi (Citation2005c), pp 17–23, 66–69, 513–515, 539–540; Koskenniemi (Citation2011), pp 38–41, 42–43; Koskenniemi (Citation2012a), pp 12, 20.

20 Björkdahl (Citation2002), pp 9–23; Krasner (Citation2000), pp 94–98; Wiener (Citation2007), pp 47–69.

21 On norms as intersubjective, see, for example, Björkdahl (Citation2002), pp 21–22; Finnemore and Sikkink (Citation2001), p 392. But see Finnemore (Citation2000), pp 699–705, questioning whether legal norms are distinctive.

22 Finnemore and Sikkink (Citation1998), pp 895–901.

23 Finnemore and Sikkink (Citation1998), pp 901–904.

24 Finnemore and Sikkink (Citation1998), pp 904–905.

25 Risse and Ropp (Citation1999), pp 242–278; Risse and Ropp (Citation2013), pp 5–12; Risse and Sikkink (Citation1999), pp 11–35.

26 Unidirectional: Brunnée and Toope (Citation2010), p 62; Shor (Citation2008), pp 118, 121–122, 131, 133; Wunderlich (Citation2013), pp 24–25. Outcomes and contested: Sandholtz and Stiles (Citation2008), p 3. Redefinition: Van Kersbergen and Verbeek (Citation2007), pp 217, 219–223.

27 Regression and death: McKeown (Citation2009), pp 5–12. Reversed: Percy (Citation2014), p 81.

28 Ideologically conservative: Koskenniemi (Citation2012a), p 16. Conflate: Goodman and Jinks (Citation2013), p 22. Discursive power: Epstein (Citation2008), pp 8–9; Krook and True (Citation201Citation2), p 105. On discursive power, see also Koskenniemi (Citation2012a), p 16: ‘international relations constructivism believes in homogeneous ideas and undistorted communication’. Contra Hopf (Citation1998), p 177 (citing Walker (Citation1984), p 3): ‘Constructivism argues that both material and discursive power are necessary for any understanding of world affairs. I emphasize both because often constructivists are dismissed as unRealistic [sic] for believing in the power of knowledge, ideas, culture, ideology, and language, that is, discourse’.

29 Koskenniemi (Citation2001), p 484. See also Koskenniemi (Citation2012a), pp 14–19.

30 Koskenniemi (Citation2012a), p 19.

31 See Koskenniemi (Citation2011), pp 271–293.

32 Koskenniemi (Citation2005c), p 58.

33 Koskenniemi (Citation2005c), p 597 (emphasis altered). On hegemonic contestation, see Koskenniemi (Citation2011), pp 221–222; Koskenniemi (Citation2012c), pp 9–11.

34 Koskenniemi (Citation2012c), p 3.

35 Kennedy (Citation2006), p 991.

36 Percy (Citation2007b), pp 84–120, 167; Thomson (Citation1994), pp 69–106.

37 Cassese (Citation1980), p 2; Percy (Citation2007b), p 167.

38 Tshombe and Hoare: Hughes (Citation2003), p 614; Zarate (Citation1998), p 88 n 88. Proxies: International Seminar on Southern Africa (Citation1967), annex I, paras 19–23; UN SCOR, 22nd sess, 1372nd mtg, UN Doc S/PV.1372(OR) (8 November Citation1967), paras 10–44, 68–81, 90–112, 139–142.

39 SC Res 161 (Citation1961) (21 February 1961), para 2.

40 Burmester (Citation1978), p 49.

41 Hampson (Citation1991), p 14.

42 Percy (Citation2007b), p 39.

43 UN GAOR, 4th Comm, 31st sess, 34th mtg, UN Doc A/C.4/31/SR.34 (29 November Citation1976), paras 33–34; UN SCOR, 22nd sess, 1372nd mtg, UN Doc S/PV.1372(OR) (8 November Citation1967), paras 91–111; UN SCOR, 32nd sess, 2004th mtg, UN Doc S/PV.2004(OR) (14 April Citation1977), paras 30–54; UN SCOR, 32nd sess, 2048th mtg, UN Doc S/PV.2048(OR) (23 November Citation1977), paras 17–18.

44 Cesner and Brant (Citation1977), p 341. For the text of the Tribunal’s verdict, see Hoover (Citation1977), pp 374–381.

45 Hoover (Citation1977), p 329; Lockwood (Citation1977), p 188.

46 Resolution on the Activities of Mercenaries, OAU Res AHG/49(IV) (September Citation1967) (cited in Hoover (Citation1977), p 351 n 151; Kwakwa (Citation1990), p 77 n 52); Declaration on the Activities of Mercenaries in Africa, OAU Res CM/St.6(XVII) (June Citation1971) (cited in Hoover (Citation1977), p 351 n 152; Kwakwa (Citation1990), p 77 n 54). For the text of OAU Res AHG/49(IV), see Cesner and Brant (Citation1977), pp 364–365. For the text of OAU Res CM/St.6(XVII), see Cesner and Brant (Citation1977), pp 365–367. For the text of Tribunal’s indictment, see Hoover (Citation1977), pp 352–374.

47 Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes, GA Res 2395 (XXIII) (29 November Citation1968); Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes, GA Res 3103 (XXVIII) (12 December Citation1973); Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res 2465 (XXIII) (20 December Citation1968); Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res 2548 (XXIV) (11 December Citation1969), cited in Hoover (Citation1977), p 333; Kwakwa (Citation1990), p 77 n 53.

48 See generally Cesner and Brant (Citation1977), pp 343–344; Hoover (Citation1977), pp 333, 338–340, 345–348.

49 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 82 UNTS 279, opened for signature 8 August Citation1945 (entered into force 8 August 1945), art 6 (Nuremberg Charter), quoted in Hoover (Citation1977), p 346; Kwakwa (Citation1990), p 77 n 55.

50 Lockwood (Citation1977), p 194. See also Hoover (Citation1977), pp 347–349.

51 Contra Cesner and Brant (Citation1977), p 344.

52 Verdict of the Tribunal at para 58, in Hoover (Citation1977), appendix II, p 380.

53 Draft Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of Mercenarism (June 1976) (Draft Luanda Convention), reprinted in Cesner and Brant (Citation1977), pp 367–370.

54 Fallah (Citation2006), p 604; Percy (Citation2007b), pp 177–178; Van Deventer (Citation1976), pp 812–813. For Nigeria’s proposal, see CDDH/III/GT/82 (13 May 1976), in Diplomatic Conference on International Humanitarian Law (Citation1978a), p 192.

55 Life or death consequences: Percy (Citation2007b), p 171, quoting CDDH/236/Rev.1, para 98, in Diplomatic Conference on International Humanitarian Law (Citation1978b), p 405. Confluence: Percy (Citation2007b), p 180.

56 CDDH/III/GT/82, in Diplomatic Conference on International Humanitarian Law (Citation1978a), p 192.

57 Element of motivation: Percy (Citation2007a), p 379. Acquiesced: Fallah (Citation2006), p 603.

58 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December Citation1978), art 47(2) (Additional Protocol I):

A mercenary is any person who:

  1. Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;

  2. Does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;

  3. Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;

  4. Is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;

  5. Is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and

  6. Has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.

59 Tonkin (Citation2011), p 17. See also CDDH/236/Rev.1, paras 99–100, in Diplomatic Conference on International Humanitarian Law (Citation1978b), pp 405–406. Cf Burmester (Citation1978), p 37.

60 Percy (Citation2007b), p 57.

61 Percy (Citation2007b), p 169. I have taken the following examples from Percy but added the references.

62 See, for example, Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res 2465 (XXIII) (20 December Citation1968), para 8; Importance of the Universal Realization of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and of the Speedy Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples for the Effective Guarantee and Observance of Human Rights, GA Res 31/34 (30 November Citation1976), para 6; Importance of the Universal Realization of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and of the Speedy Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples for the Effective Guarantee and Observance of Human Rights, GA Res 35/35A (14 November Citation1980), para 7; SC Res 241 (1967) (15 November Citation1967), paras 2–4; SC Res 289 (1970) (23 November Citation1970), para 2; SC Res 405 (1977) (14 April Citation1977), paras 3–6.

63 Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, opened for signature 3 July 1977, 1490 UNTS 95 (entered into force 22 April Citation1985) (OAU Mercenarism Convention).

64 For discussion of the travaux préparatoires, see de Preux (Citation1978), pp 571–581; Van Deventer (Citation1976), pp 811–816.

65 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, opened for signature 4 December 1989, 2163 UNTS 75 (entered into force 20 October Citation2001) (Mercenaries Convention).

66 UN GAOR, 44th sess, 72nd plen mtg, UN Doc A/44/PV.72 (4 December Citation1989), p 34. But see OAU Mercenarism Convention, opened for signature 3 July Citation1977, 1490 UNTS 95 (entered into force 22 April 1985), art 1(2).

67 Cassese (Citation1980), p 25.

68 Letter Dated 5 December 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/34/247.

69 Drafting of an International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, GA Res 34/140 (14 December Citation1979), para 4. For contemporaneous commentary on the draft resolution, see UN GAOR, 34th sess, 104th plen mtg, UN Doc A/34/PV.104 (14 December Citation1979), paras 404–455.

70 Mercenaries Convention, opened for signature 4 December 1989, 2163 UNTS 75 (entered into force 20 October Citation2001), preamble.

71 Best (Citation1980), pp 374–375 n 83, quoted in Scheimer (Citation2009), p 613.

72 Ad Hoc Committee on Drafting the Mercenaries Convention (Citation1981), para 53. The Committee was established in Drafting of an International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, GA Res 35/48 (4 December Citation1980), para 1.

73 Percy (Citation2007a), pp 383–386; Percy (Citation2007b), pp 195–202.

74 Ad Hoc Committee on Drafting the Mercenaries Convention (Citation1981), para 43; Ad Hoc Committee on Drafting the Mercenaries Convention (Citation1983), para 75; Percy (Citation2007b), p 199.

75 Ad Hoc Committee on Drafting the Mercenaries Convention (Citation1981), para 43; Percy (Citation2007a), p 383.

77 Panke and Petersohn (Citation2012), pp 729–731, 735–736; Panke and Petersohn (Citation201Citation6), pp 11–13, 14–15.

78 For discussion of the anti-mercenary norm, see Krahmann (Citation2013), pp 57–58; Percy (Citation2007b), pp 206–243; Percy (Citation2007c), pp 11–28; Petersohn (Citation2014), pp 475–493. For discussion of the state monopoly on violence, see Krahmann (Citation2013), pp 53–71; Seiberth (Citation2014), pp 68–74, 129–132. For Max Weber’s seminal analysis of the state monopoly on violence, see Weber (Citation1946), pp 78–80, 121–126; Weber (Citation1978), pp 54–55, 367, 901–902, 1006–1069.

79 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [Citation1986] ICJ Rep 14 at 103–104.

80 Koskenniemi (Citation2005c), p 540 (see also pp 548–561). Full consideration of the textual nuances of recent soft law mechanisms on PMSCs requires a level of depth and precision that is beyond the scope of a journal article; thus, this article focuses on the ‘context-bound character’ of emerging norms on PMSCs.

81 Bina (Citation2005), p 1248 n 73.

82 UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries (Citation2008), paras 28–29, 33.

83 ‘Blackwater Sentencing: UN Experts on Mercenaries Call for International Regulation of Private Security’, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15840&LangID=E, 14 April 2015. For the jury’s decision, see US v Slough (DC, 1:14-cr-107-RCL, 1:08-cr-360-RCL, 22 October Citation2014).

84 See, for example, Pattison (Citation2014), pp 1–25.

85 Legal vacuum: Gómez del Prado (Citation2011b), p 162; Gómez del Prado (Citation2012), p 270. Grey zone: Gómez del Prado (Citation2009), pp 429, 440, 449; Gómez del Prado (Citation2011b), pp 153–154; Nikitin (Citation2009), paras 41, 49.

86 Pattison (Citation2014), pp 8–14, 228–232.

87 Brooks and Mangan (Citation2011), pp 181–186. See also Brooks (Citation2000), pp 131–136; House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Blackwater USA, 110th Congress, 1st sess (2 October 2007), pp 23–31, 53, 81, 82, 86 (Erik Prince, CEO, Blackwater USA).

88 Krahmann and Friesendorf (Citation2011), p 6.

89 Koskenniemi (Citation2005c), pp 58–69, 513–515, 563–589.

90 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [Citation1996] ICJ Rep 226 at 240, para 25.

91 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [Citation2004] ICJ Rep 136 at 178, para 106. For analysis of lex specialis, see ILC (Citation2006), paras 56–122.

92 Duffy (Citation2013), p 509.

93 Pejic (Citation2011), p 192, quoting Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-94-1-A, 2 October Citation1995) at para 70. See also Dickinson (Citation2008), pp 362–363; Quirico (Citation2011), pp 428–429.

94 Dickinson (Citation2008), p 363, citing Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature 8 June Citation1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978), art 1.

95 Ntoubandi (Citation2012), p 503. Cf Perrin (Citation2009), pp 311–313.

96 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July Citation1998, 2187 UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002), art 5(1) (Rome Statute). On complementarity, see Rome Statute, art 17.

97 Quirico (Citation2011), pp 434–435. See also Montreux Document, pt 1, para 27.

98 MacLeod (Citation2011), p 351.

99 European University Institute, ‘About the Project’, http://priv-war.eu/, last viewed 11 March 2017.

100 On the right to life, see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December Citation1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), art 6 (ICCPR); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (10 December Citation1948), art 3 (UDHR). On the right to be free from torture, see Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December Citation1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987), arts 1–5; ICCPR, art 7; UDHR, art 5.

101 Francioni (Citation2011), pp 93–110; Lenzerini and Francioni (Citation2011), pp 60–79.

102 Reus-Smit (Citation2001), pp 526–527.

103 Finnemore and Sikkink (Citation1998), pp 890 n 14 (citing Ruggie (Citation1998)), 895, 898.

104 Acharya (Citation2004), pp 243–244, quoting Farrell (Citation2001).

105 Goodman and Jinks (Citation2013), pp 25–30.

106 On consonance-dissonance, see generally Venzke (Citation2012), pp 223–225. For discussion of how norms emerge through contestation, see Acharya (Citation2004), p 214; Finnemore and Sikkink (Citation1998), p 897; Krook and True (Citation201Citation2), pp 104–108; Niemann and Schillinger (Citation201Citation7), pp 29–40; Price (Citation1998), pp 616–617, 622, 639–640; Sandholtz (Citation2009), pp 2–13; Weber (Citation1978), pp 753–758; Wiener (Citation2008), pp 43–50, 63–68, 208–210; Wiener and Puetter (Citation2009), pp 1–16.

107 Keck and Sikkink (Citation1998), p 8.

108 Finnemore and Sikkink (Citation1998), pp 899–900; Keck and Sikkink (Citation1998), pp 1–4.

109 Keck and Sikkink (Citation1998), p 9.

110 Bernales Ballesteros (Citation1998), annex. The Special Rapporteur’s mandate was established by the Commission on Human Rights in The Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination. CHR Res 1987/16 (9 March Citation1987).

111 Commission on Human Rights (Citation2005), paras 64, 65.

112 ‘Communication of Peace and Security Companies at the Conclusion of the Meeting with the Special Rapporteur (London, 27–28 June 2005)’, in Shameem (Citation2005), annex II.

113 The Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, CHR Res 2005/2 (7 April Citation2005), para 11.

114 Percy (Citation2007c), pp 25–26. For the mandate, see Benavides de Pérez (Citation2007), para 1.

115 See, for example, The Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, HRC Res 27/10 (3 October Citation2014), para 8.

116 Draft PMSC Convention, art 1(1)(b). See also Arias (Citation2015), p 20; UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries (Citation2015), pp 2–3; UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries (Citation2016), para 96.

117 Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group to Consider the Possibility of Elaborating an International Regulatory Framework on the Regulation, Monitoring and Oversight of the Activities of Private Military and Security Companies, HRC Res 15/26 (1 October Citation2010), para 4.

118 Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group to Consider the Possibility of Elaborating an International Regulatory Framework on the Regulation, Monitoring and Oversight of the Activities of Private Military and Security Companies, HRC Res 22/33 (22 March Citation2013), para 1; Renewal of the Mandate of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group to Consider the Possibility of Elaborating an International Regulatory Framework on the Regulation, Monitoring and Oversight of the Activities of Private Military and Security Companies, HRC Res 28/7 (26 March Citation2015), para 1.

119 Gómez del Prado (Citation2009), p 441.

120 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August Citation1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950), arts 3, 9, 10, 11; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature 12 August Citation1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950), arts 3, 9, 10, 11; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature 12 August Citation1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950), arts 3, 9, 10, 11; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature 12 August Citation1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950), arts 3, 10, 11.

121 Additional Protocol I, arts 5, 6, 17, 81.

122 ICRC (Citation2013).

123 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (Citation2005a, Citation2005b). The description of the study as ‘monumental’ is from Wilmhurst and Breau (Citation2007), p vii.

124 Nicholls (Citation2006), p 241.

125 Marsh (Citation2008), pp 117–118, 161–163.

126 See, for example, Sandoz (Citation1987), pp 287–295.

127 Cockayne (Citation2009), p 418 (vacuum: citing Singer (Citation2004)). State actors included the European Commission; PMSC industry representatives included the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC) and the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA).

128 Cockayne (Citation2009), p 420.

129 White (Citation2012), p 12 n 7. The 17 endorsing states are: Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, China, France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., Ukraine and U.S.A. The Montreux Document was included as an annex in Letter Dated 2 October 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Docs A/63/467 and S/2008/636.

130 DCAF (Citation2014), pp 107–108.

131 DCAF (Citation2011); DCAF (Citation2014), p 15.

132 DCAF (Citation2014), pp 15, 107.

133 See, for example, DCAF (Citation2014), p 5.

134 Seiberth (Citation2014), p 161 (see pp 161–190 for analysis of the ICoC).

135 See generally Blitt (Citation2012), pp 38–62; Mares (Citation2014), pp 294–343.

136 ICoC, para 45.

137 Seiberth (Citation2014), p 163.

138 UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries (Citation2012a), para 77.

139 Finnemore and Sikkink (Citation1998), p 902.

140 See nn 7, 32–34 and accompanying text.

141 UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries (Citation2012b), para 7.

142 Percy (Citation2007c), pp 25–28.

143 Cockayne (Citation2012), para 21.

144 Cockayne (Citation2012), para 23.

145 Cockayne (Citation2012), para 24. See also Perrin (Citation2009), pp 310–311.

146 Gómez del Prado (Citation2011a), p 14; White (Citation2012), pp 18–26.

147 Ndimeni (Citation2011), para 53; on state responsibility, see paras 43, 55.

148 Contra Percy (Citation2007b), pp 222–225 (contending that senior UN officials are not willing to engage in ‘serious debate’ about using ‘private force’ to support UN peacekeeping and other missions). Strong and puritanical: Percy (Citation2007b), pp 218–222. Modalities of mercenarism: Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, GA Res 62/145 (18 December Citation2007), preambular para 9.

149 Tonkin (Citation2011), pp 139, 200; Vrdoljak (Citation2011), pp 283–284.

150 Østensen (Citation2011), pp 16–17, 39, 54–55.

151 Pingeot (Citation2014), p 6, citing UN Office for Project Services (Citation2013), pp 112, 120.

152 Pingeot (Citation2014), p 9, citing Use of Private Security – Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/67/539 (22 October Citation2012), para 3.

153 Pingeot (Citation2014), p 10, citing UN Department of Safety and Security (Citation2012), pt E, para 22.

154 UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries (Citation2014), para 40.

155 UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries (Citation2014), para 40.

156 Draft resolution: Special Subjects Relating to the Programme Budget for the Biennium 2012–2013, UN Doc A/C.5/67/L.23 (28 March Citation2013), pt V para 11. Fifth Committee’s report: Fifth Committee (Citation2013), pt V, para 11.

157 Special Subjects Relating to the Programme Budget for the Biennium 2012–2013, UN Doc A/C.5/67/L.23 (28 March Citation2013), pt V, para 15 (see also pt V, para 13).

158 Special Subjects Relating to the Programme Budget for the Biennium 2012–2013, UN Doc A/C.5/67/L.23 (28 March Citation2013), pt V, para 17.

159 Special Subjects Relating to the Programme Budget for the Biennium 2012–2013, GA Res 67/254 (12 April Citation2013). Fifth Committee’s report: Fifth Committee (Citation2013).

160 Moravcsik (Citation1997), pp 516–524, 533–535.

161 Axelrod (Citation198Citation6), pp 1097, 1108–1110.

162 Venzke (Citation2012), p 42.

163 See nn 22–28 and accompanying text. On the ideational power of norms in international law, see Onuma (Citation2012), pp 168–169, 182–184.

164 See Koskenniemi (Citation2012a), p 19.

165 ILC (Citation2006), para 34.

166 Finnemore and Sikkink (Citation1998), p 901.

167 Ruggie (Citation2004), pp 509–510.

168 Think and act: Ruggie (Citation2004), p 510. Socialisation: Finnemore and Sikkink (Citation1998), p 902.

169 Cockayne and Meers (Citation2009), pp 3–5, 15–16.

170 Pingeot (Citation2014), p 16 (emphasis added).

171 Global Policy Forum, ‘About GPF’, https://www.globalpolicy.org/about-gpf-mm.html, last viewed 11 March 2017.

172 Control PMSC, ‘Declaration to Control Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs)’, http://controlpmsc.org/declaration-on-private-military-and-security-companies/, last viewed 11 March 2017. For the membership list of Control PMSC, see Control PMSC, ‘List of Members’, http://controlpmsc.org/list-of-members, last viewed 11 March 2017.

173 Control PMSC, ‘List of Members’, http://controlpmsc.org/list-of-members, last viewed 11 March 2017.

174 Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘Participating States of the Montreux Document’, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/participating-states.html, last viewed 11 March 2017.

175 ICoCA, ‘Membership’, http://www.icoca.ch/en/membership?view_type=list, last viewed 11 March 2017. For the pre-ICoCA membership numbers, see Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘Private Security Companies: The International Code of Conduct Takes an Operational Dimension’, https://www.news.admin.ch/message/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=50311, 19 September 2013.

176 ICoCA, ‘Membership’, http://www.icoca.ch/en/membership?view_type=list, last viewed 11 March 2017.

177 ICoCA, ‘Observers’, http://www.icoca.ch/en/membership/observers, last viewed 11 March 2017.

178 On codes of conduct and triggering transnational rules, see Leander (Citation2012), pp 91–119. For reasons of brevity, this article does not discuss the pertinence of human rights provisions in International Organization for Standardization (ISO) ISO 26 000: Guidance on Social Responsibility, or the certification standards ISO 9001 and ISO 14 001 for providing, respectively, ‘quality management systems’ and ‘environmental management’ standards for PMSCs. Nor does the article discuss EU guidelines on the use and hiring of private security services: see, for example, Council of the European Union (Citation2014).

179 Voluntary Principles (Citation2000).

180 Voluntary Principles (Citation2000). For the UN guidelines, see UN (Citation1979, Citation1990).

181 Voluntary Principles (Citation2000).

182 Seiberth (Citation2014), p 209.

183 Voluntary Principles: see Sarajevo Code (2006), para 1. UN Guidelines: see Sarajevo Code (2006), annexes A (UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials), B (UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials). For discussion of the Sarajevo Code, see Seiberth (Citation2014), pp 215–216.

184 Sarajevo Client Guidelines (Citation2006), pp 3, 8.

185 Sarajevo Code (2006), pp iii–v.

186 SEESAC, ‘About’, http://www.seesac.org/About, last viewed 11 March 2017.

187 ANSI/ASIS PSC.1-2012: Management System for Quality of Private Security Company Operations – Requirements With Guidance; ANSI/ASIS PSC.2-2012: Conformity Assessment and Auditing Management Systems for Quality of Private Security Company Operations; ANSI/ASIS PSC.3-2013 Maturity Model – Phased Implementation of a Quality Assurance Management System for Private Security Service Providers; ANSI/ASIS PSC.4-2013: Quality Assurance and Security Management for Maritime Private Security Companies: Guidance.

188 Krahmann (Citation2016), p 42.

189 ASIS International, ‘About ASIS’, https://www.asisonline.org/About-ASIS/Pages/default.aspx, lasted viewed 11 March 2017.

190 Krahmann (Citation2016), p 41.

191 Dunigan (Citation2014), p 523.

192 Krahmann (Citation2016), pp 27–48.

193 See nn 218–222 and accompanying text.

194 See nn 223–227 and accompanying text.

195 Finnemore and Sikkink (Citation1998), p 904.

196 Finnemore and Sikkink (Citation1998), pp 898, 904–905.

197 Finnemore and Sikkink (Citation1998), pp 898, 912.

198 Goodman and Jinks (Citation2013), p 170; on material inducement, see pp 4, 23–24.

199 Betts and Orchard (Citation2014), p 2.

200 Betts and Orchard (Citation2014), p 5.

201 Acharya (Citation2004), p 241; Checkel (Citation1998), p 339.

202 Percy (Citation2014), pp 80–83.

203 Percy (Citation2014), p 83. Cf Liu (Citation2015), pp 125–126, 147–148.

204 Betts and Orchard (Citation2014), p 3.

205 Finnemore and Sikkink (Citation1998), pp 914–915.

206 Juma (Citation2011), p 208.

207 Percy (Citation2014), pp 68–69. See also Petersohn (Citation2014), pp 482–492.

208 For the proposals, see Bernales Ballesteros (Citation2003), paras 37–47; Commission on Human Rights (Citation2005), paras 59–62, 69–89.

209 Percy (Citation2014), pp 72–76.

210 Draft PMSC Convention, art 4(3). See also nn 9–10, 116, 145, 210 and accompanying text.

211 Gómez del Prado (Citation2011a), p 43; Minty (Citation2012), para 61. See also Ndimeni (Citation2011), para 43.

212 See, for example, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 63rd sess, 13th mtg, UN Doc A/C.6/63/SR.13 (7 November Citation2008), paras 22, 31, 41, 62, 75; UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 63rd sess, 14th mtg, UN Doc A/C.6/63/SR.14 (18 November Citation2008), para 8; UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 67th sess, 15th mtg, UN Doc A/C.6/67/SR.15 (24 December Citation2012), paras 26, 53.

213 Koskenniemi (Citation2005b), p 64.

214 On the ‘fate’ of public international law, see Koskenniemi (Citation2005b), pp 61, 61–64, 73–92; Koskenniemi (Citation2011), pp 331–361. On soft law, see generally Boyle and Chinkin (Citation2007), pp 211–229; Klabbers (Citation1998), pp 381–391; Shelton (Citation2000), pp 1–18. On the fragmentation of international law, see generally ILC (Citation2006), paras 5–26, 481–493; Koskenniemi (Citation2011), pp 228–230, 264–265, 334–339; Koskenniemi and Leino (Citation2002), pp 553–579.

215 See generally Liu (Citation2015), pp 1–67, 146–155, 318–321.

216 Cockayne (Citation2014), p 648.

217 Cockayne (Citation2014), pp 643–655.

218 Gómez del Prado (Citation2011a), p 33; UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries (Citation2013), paras 63–73; White (Citation2012), pp 12–16. See ICoC, paras 2, 21, 45, 50 (outlining due diligence principles); Montreux Document, pt 1, paras 4, 10, 19 (outlining due diligence principles; see also pt 2, paras 7, 33, 38, 50, 61, 68).

219 Seiberth (Citation2014), pp 217–221.

220 Seiberth (Citation2014), pp 149–150, 158.

221 Campaign Against Arms Trade, U.K., et al (Citation2013); Seiberth (Citation2014), pp 149–150, 195–203. Articles: ICoCA, ‘The Articles of Association’, http://icoca.ch/en/articles_of_association, last viewed 11 March 2017. Oversight: ICoCA (Citation2013).

222 On the two initiatives as pragmatic, see Seiberth (Citation2014), pp 127, 161–162. On the difficulty of finding a middle path between apology-concreteness and utopia-normativity, see nn 32–33 and accompanying text.

223 Trite: Venzke (Citation2012), p 23. Circular: Koskenniemi (Citation2011), p 57. Axiomatic: Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (Citation2005a), p xxxviii, quoting Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta) (Judgment) [Citation1985] ICJ Rep 13 at 29, para 27.

224 For such a claim, see Kelly (Citation2000), pp 535–543.

225 Minty (Citation2014), para 47. (Here, Abdul S Minty, Rapporteur of the Third Session of the UN’s ‘Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group to Consider the Possibility of Elaborating an International Regulatory Framework on the Regulation, Monitoring and Oversight of the Activities on Private Military and Security Companies’, is summarising a presentation to the session by Natalino Ronzitti, Professor of International Law, Libera Università degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli of Rome). See also Seiberth (Citation2014), pp 29–30, 129, 229–269.

226 Quoted in Cockayne (Citation2012), para 33.

227 Cockayne (Citation2012), para 33.

228 Koskenniemi (Citation2012b), p 61.

229 Percy (Citation2007a), pp 367–397; Percy (Citation2007b), pp 169–179.

230 Percy (Citation2007b), pp 218–222; Percy (Citation2014), pp 68–84.

231 See, for example, Pattison (Citation2014), p 201.

232 Koskenniemi (Citation2012a), p 12. See also Koskenniemi (Citation2011), p 40.

233 Cockayne (Citation2012), para 31.

234 Koskenniemi (Citation2005c), p 58.

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