Abstract
Contemporary scholarship on mindfulness casts it as a form of purely nonevaluative engagement with experience. Yet, traditionally mindfulness was not intended to operate in a vacuum of dispassionate observation, but was seen as facilitative of eudaimonic mental states. In spite of this historical context, modern psychological research has neglected to ask the question of how the practice of mindfulness affects downstream emotion regulatory processes to impact the sense of meaning in life. To fill this lacuna, here we describe the mindfulness-to-meaning theory, from which we derive a novel process model of mindful positive emotion regulation informed by affective science, in which mindfulness is proposed to introduce flexibility in the generation of cognitive appraisals by enhancing interoceptive attention, thereby expanding the scope of cognition to facilitate reappraisal of adversity and savoring of positive experience. This process is proposed to culminate in a deepened capacity for meaning-making and greater engagement with life.
Funding
E. L. G. was supported by grant R34DA037005 from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in preparing this manuscript. The conclusions in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the NIH.
Notes
1 Nonetheless, at certain stages of contemplative practice, mindfulness meditation may evoke acute or persistent psychological distress, experiences of depersonalization, intense negative emotions, and existential terror. These “dark night of the soul” experiences may provide fodder for developing a more profound compassion for the suffering of others, and this connectivity with others in turn may provide the basis for positive emotions and eudaimonic well-being.
2 One concern in relation to mindful savoring is that this practice might lead to a “clinging” to positive experience, resulting in suffering when the experience inevitably ends. A critic of our mindful reappraisal theory may argue that a focus on positive experience promotes attachment—a process eschewed by Buddhism. To address this concern, Wallace and Shapiro (Citation2006) explained: “A common misperception is that Buddhism uniformly denies the value of stimulus-driven pleasures, as if it were morally wrong to enjoy the simple pleasures of life, let alone the joys of raising a family, creating fine works of art, or making scientific discoveries. … The enjoyment of such transient experiences is not in opposition to the cultivation of positive attitudes and commitments or the cultivation of the types of mental balance that yield inner well-being. In fact, one may derive greater enjoyment from hedonic pleasures as a result of cultivating well-being” (p. 692).