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Abstract
As violent extremists continue to be released from prison and put on probation, further research is needed on the best programs and methods for the reintegration of this population. Based on a series of semi-structured interviews of former extremists, this study describes common challenges and helpful elements in the reintegration process. We identify five notable themes: the importance of rapport, challenges in accessing adequate mental health treatment, the impacts of solitary confinement, and difficulties with counter-productive probation conditions.
Disclosure Statement
The authors report that there are no competing interests to declare.
Notes
1 United States of America v. John Lindh, 02-37A (E.D. Va.), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/plea-agreement. At the time that Lindh joined the Taliban (in May 2001), the United States was not at war with the Taliban. However, Lindh continued to support the Taliban after the United States invaded Afghanistan and was subsequently convicted of supplying services to that organization.
2 US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center, “US Homegrown Violent Extremist Recidivism Likely,” National Counterterrorism Center Current (January 24, 2017).
3 Ken Dilanian, “In letter, ‘American Taliban’ John Walker Lindh said ISIS ‘doing a spectacular job’,” NBC News, May 22, 2019. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/letter-american-taliban-john-walker-lindh-said-isis-doing-spectacular-n1008871.
4 US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center, “US Homegrown Violent Extremist Recidivism Likely.”
5 US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center, “US Homegrown Violent Extremist Recidivism Likely”; Trevor Aaronson, “Is ‘Terrorism Recidivism’ Real?,” The Intercept, May 27, 2019. https://theintercept.com/2019/05/27/terrorist-recidivism-john-walker-lindh/
6 Of 982 total, 849 of the individuals who have been prosecuted for terrorism-related crimes have pleaded guilty or have been found guilty at trial; 333 are currently in custody; 573 have been released from custody. Those who have been released from custody did not necessarily serve time in prison. “Trial and Terror,” The Intercept, First Look Media, last updated November 14, 2022, https://trial-and-terror.theintercept.com/.
7 Trevor Aaronson, “The U.S. Has Released 417 Terrorists Since 9/11. The Latest Owned an Islamic Bookstore,” The Intercept, May 30, 2017. https://theintercept.com/2017/05/30/the-u-s-has-released-417-alleged-terrorists-since-911-the-latest-owned-an-islamic-bookstore/.
8 The FBI and DHS define a domestic violent extremist as “an individual based and operating primarily within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power who seeks to further political or social goals wholly or in part through unlawful acts of force or violence.” US Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Domestic Terrorism: Definitions, Terminology, and Methodology (November 2020).
While joining or supporting an international terrorist group is a violation of US law, there is no US law making it illegal to join or support a domestic violent-extremist group. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 includes a definition of domestic terrorism, however this statute does not include criminal penalties and cannot be used as the sole charge in prosecution. As a result, prosecutors use a variety of charges based on the specific act committed. Thus, many domestic violent extremism cases are prosecuted at the state level for related offenses (e.g., murder, arson). 18 U.S.C. § 2332b; Eric Halliday and Rachael Hanna, “How the Federal Government Investigates and Prosecutes Terrorism,” Lawfare, February 16, 2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-federal-government-investigates-and-prosecutes-domestic-terrorism.
Over the past few years, some legislators have sought to expand legislation addressing domestic terrorism but there are significant challenges related to the First Amendment right to free speech. Congress.gov, “Confronting the Rise in Anti-Semitic Domestic Terrorism, Part II,” July 18, 2022.
https://www.congress.gov/event/116th-congress/house-event/LC65477/text?s=1&r=1; Congress.gov, "Text - H.R.4192 - 116th Congress (2019-2020): Confronting the Threat of Domestic Terrorism Act," August 16, 2019. https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/4192/text.
As the FBI explains, “the mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute extremism, and may be constitutionally protected.” Federal Bureau of Investigations Counterterrorism Division, “Black identity extremists likely motivated to target law enforcement officers” (August 3, 2017), 2.
9 US Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Domestic Terrorism.
10 Many specialists believe that the FBI underreports hate crimes which, according to the FBI’s definition, are related, but not the same as racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism (RMVE). Nathan James and Emily J. Hanson, “Federal Data on Hate Crimes in the United States,” Congressional Research Service (March 2021).
11 Cynthia Miller-Idriss, “The FBI’s 2021 Hate Crime Data is Worse Than Meaningless,” Lawfare, December 16, 2022. https://www.lawfareblog.com/fbis-2021-hate-crime-data-worse-meaningless.
12 Outside the US, many countries have developed programs to address these challenges. See, for example: Adrian Cherney and Emma Belton, “The Evaluation of Case-Managed Programs Targeting Individuals at Risk of Radicalisation,” Terrorism and Political Violence (2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2021.1984236; Ahmad Saiful Rijal Bin Hassan, “Denmark’s De-Radicalisation Programme for Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 11, no. 3 (2019): 13-16, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26617829; Sulastri Osman, “Radicalisation, Recidivism and Rehabilitation: Convicted Terrorists and Indonesian Prisons,” in Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform, edited by Andrew Silke (London: Routledge, 2013).; Liesbeth van der Heide and Bart Schuurman, “Reintegrating Terrorists in the Netherlands: Evaluating the Dutch Approach,” Journal for Deradicalization, no. 17 (2018): 196-239, https://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/179; Hakeem Onapajo and Kemal Ozden, “Non-Military Approach Against Terrorism in Nigeria: Deradicalization Strategies and Challenges in Countering Boko Haram,” Security Journal 33, no. 1 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00238-2; Zubair Azam and Syeda Bareeha Fatima, “Mishal: A Case Study of a Deradicalization and Emancipation Program in SWAT Valley, Pakistan,” Journal for Deradicalization, no. 11 (2017): 1-29, https://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/97; Michael J. Williams and Samuel C. Lindsey, “A Social Psychological Critique of the Saudi Terrorism Risk Reduction Initiative,” Psychology, Crime & Law 20, no. 2 (2014): 135-151, https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316X.2012.749474.
13 Megan K. McBride, et al., “Evaluating Terrorist and Extremist Reintegration Programming: A Systematic Literature Review,” Journal For Deradicalization, no. 32 (Fall 2022): 35-75.
14 Jessica Stern, et al., “Practices and Needs in Reintegration Programs for Violent Extremist Offenders in the United States: The Probation Officer Perspective,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (January 2023).
15 In writing this paper we have used he/him pronouns for all interviewees, both for extremists and probation officers, regardless of gender, in an effort to preserve anonymity.
16 FindLaw Staff, “Mail Fraud,” FindLaw, December 27, 2021, https://www.findlaw.com/criminal/criminal-charges/mail-fraud.html; Christopher Coble, “Why Organized Crime Bosses Get Arrested for Tax Evasion,” FindLaw, December 5, 2017, https://www.findlaw.com/legalblogs/criminal-defense/why-organized-crime-bosses-get-arrested-for-tax-evasion/.
17 Former jihadi extremist, interview with the authors, July 9, 2020.
18 Federal PO, interview with the authors, July 8, 2020.
19 Former jihadi extremist, interview with the authors, October 2, 2020.
20 Former jihadi extremist, interview with the authors, August 25, 2020.
21 Leanne F. Alarid and Mark Jones, “Perceptions of Offender Satisfaction on Probation and Supervised Release with STARR Skill Sets,” Federal Probation: A Journal of Correctional Philosophy and Practice 82, no 1 (2018): 37-54.
22 Alyssa W. Chamberlain et al., “Parolee–Parole Officer Rapport: Does It Impact Recidivism?,” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 62, no. 11 (2018): 3581-3602; Patrick J. Kennealy et al., "Firm, Fair, and Caring Officer-Offender Relationships Protect Against Supervision Failure," Law and Human Behavior 36, no. 6 (2012): 496.
23 Kennealy et al., "Firm, Fair, and Caring Officer-Offender Relationships,” 496.
24 Chamberlain et al., “Parolee–Parole Officer Rapport.” Parole refers to a period of supervision of an offender that is granted only after the offender has served part of their prison sentence. In contrast, probation can be granted in lieu of a prison sentence. Both probation and parole generally require that probationers or parolees abide by certain conditions. Federal prisoners are largely not eligible for parole; parole can only be granted for federal offenses committed before November 1987. Probation is used at both the federal and state level. “Victim Witness Program,” U.S. Parole Commission, last modified September 29, 2022. https://www.justice.gov/uspc/how-parole-works; “Parole and Probation,” Justia, last modified October 2022. https://www.justia.com/criminal/parole-and-probation/.
25 Alarid and Jones, “Perceptions of Offender Satisfaction.”
26 Charles R. Robinson et al., “A Random Study of Staff Training Aimed at Reducing Rearrest (STARR): Using Core Correctional Practices in Probation Interactions,” Journal of Crime and Justice 35, no. 2 (2012): 167-188; Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., “Diminishing or Durable Treatment Effects of STARR? A Research Note on 24-Month Re-Arrest Rates,” Journal of Crime and Justice 37, no. 2 (2014): 275–283.
27 Former incel extremist, interview with the authors, January 26, 2021.
28 Former far-right extremist, interview with the authors, September 3, 2020.
29 Former jihadi extremist, interview with the authors, July 27, 2020.
30 Former far-right extremist, interview with the authors, September 3, 2020.
31 Former jihadi extremist, interview with the authors, October 3, 2020.
32 Former jihadi extremist, interview with the authors, October 3, 2020.
33 Former far-right extremist, interview with the authors, January 19, 2021.
34 Former jihadi extremist, interview the authors, July 9, 2020.
35 Former jihadi extremist, interview with the authors, August 25, 2020.
36 Former jihadi extremist, interview with the authors, September 13, 2020.
37 Stern, et al., “Practices and Needs in Reintegration Programs.”
38 Gary LaFree, Michael A. Jensen, Patrick A. James, and Aaron Safer-Lichtenstein, “Correlates of Violent Political Extremism in the United States,” Criminology 56, no. 2 (2018): 233–268.
39 Kiran M. Sarma, Sarah L. Carthy, and Katie M. Cox, “Mental Disorder, Psychological Problems and Terrorist Behaviour: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis,” Campbell Systematic Reviews 18, no. 3 (2022).
40 Paul Gill, John Horgan, and Paige Deckert, “Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists,” Journal of Forensic Sciences 59, no. 2 (2014): 425–435, https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.12312; Jeff Gruenewald, Steven Chermak, and Joshua D. Freilich, “Distinguishing Loner Attacks from Other Domestic Extremist Violence: A Comparison of Far-Right Homicide Incident and Offender Characteristics,” Criminology & Public Policy 12, no. 1 (2013): 65–91, https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12008.; Emily Corner and Paul Gill, “A False Dichotomy? Mental Illness and Lone-Actor Terrorism,” Law and Human Behavior 39, no. 1 (2015): 23–34, https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000102.
41 Emily Corner, Paul Gill, and Oliver Mason, “Mental Health Disorders and the Terrorist: A Research Note Probing Selection Effects and Disorder Prevalence,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, no. 6 (2016): 560–568, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1120099.
42 Randy Borum, Robert Fein, and Bryan Vossekuil, “A Dimensional Approach to Analyzing Lone Offender Terrorism,” Aggression and Violent Behavior 17, no. 5 (2012): 389–96, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2012.04.003.
43 Robert A. Pape et al., “American Face of Insurrection,” Chicago Project on Security and Threats (January 5, 2022): 34.
44 Ronald Kessler and T. Bedirhan Üstün, The WHO World Mental Health Surveys: Global Perspectives on the Epidemiology of Mental Disorders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
45 Eric B. Elbogen and Sally C. Johnson, “The Intricate Link Between Violence and Mental Disorder: Results From the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions,” Archives of General Psychiatry 66, no. 2 (2009): 152–161, https://doi.org/10.1001/archgenpsychiatry.2008.537.
46 Michael Ollove, “Ex-Felons Are About to Get Health Coverage,” The Pew Charitable Trusts, April 5, 2013, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2013/04/05/exfelons-are-about-to-get-health-coverage. “The expansion of Medicaid, a key provision of the health care reform law, is the main vehicle for delivering health insurance to former prisoners.” See also Josiah D. Rich et al., “How Health Care Reform Can Transform the Health of Criminal Justice–Involved Individuals,” Health Affairs 33, no. 3 (2014).
47 “What is Mental Health Parity?,” National Alliance on Mental Illness, accessed February 5, 2022, https://www.nami.org/Your-Journey/Individuals-with-Mental-Illness/Understanding-Health-Insurance/What-is-Mental-Health-Parity.
48 US Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, Bureau of Health Workforce, National Projections of Supply and Demand for Selected Behavioral Health Practitioners: 2013-2025 (Rockville: National Center for Health Workforce Analysis, 2016): 35; US Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, Bureau of Health Workforce, Behavioral Health Workforce Projections, 2016-2030: Psychiatrists (Adult), Child and Adolescent Psychiatrists (2019): 3.
49 US Department of Health and Human Services, Behavioral Health Workforce Projections, 2016-2030, 3; Anand Satiani et al., “Projected Workforce of Psychiatrists in the United States: A Population Analysis,” Psychiatric Services 69, no. 6 (2018): 710–713, https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ps.201700344.
50 “Shortage Areas,” Health Resources and Services Administration, January 30, 2022, accessed January 31, 2022, https://data.hrsa.gov/topics/health-workforce/shortage-areas.
51 Former jihadi extremist, interview with the authors, August 25, 2020.
52 Former far-right extremist, interview with the authors, January 12, 2022.
53 Former jihadi extremist, interview with the authors, August 25, 2020.
54 Former far-right extremist, interview with the authors, January 12, 2022.
55 Former far-right extremist, interview with the authors, October 12, 2020.
56 Pete Simi et al., “Addicted to Hate: Identity Residual among Former White Supremacists,” American Sociological Review 82, no. 6 (December 2017): 1167–87, https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122417728719.
57 Ryan Andrew Brown et al., “Violent Extremism in America: Interviews with Former Extremists and Their Families on Radicalization and Deradicalization” (RAND Corporation, April 1, 2021), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1071-1.html.
58 Scott M. Hyman et al., “Stress and Drug-Cue-Induced Craving in Opioid-Dependent Individuals in Naltrexone Treatment,” Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology 15, no. 2 (2007): 134–43, https://doi.org/10.1037/1064-1297.15.2.134.
59 Sam A. Golden et al., “Basal Forebrain Projections to the Lateral Habenula Modulate Aggression Reward,” Nature 534, no. 7609 (2016): 688–92, https://doi.org/10.1038/nature18601; S. A. Golden et al., “Persistent Conditioned Place Preference to Aggression Experience in Adult Male Sexually-Experienced CD-1 Mice,” Genes, Brain and Behavior 16, no. 1 (2017): 44–55, https://doi.org/10.1111/gbb.12310; Sam A. Golden et al., “Compulsive Addiction-Like Aggressive Behavior in Mice,” Biological Psychiatry, Sociopathy, Impulsivity, Aggression 82, no. 4 (2017): 239–48, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2017.03.004.
60 Golden et al., “Compulsive Addiction-Like Aggressive Behavior in Mice.”
61 Sam A. Golden et al., “Nucleus Accumbens Drd1-Expressing Neurons Control Aggression Self-Administration and Aggression Seeking in Mice,” Journal of Neuroscience 39, no. 13 (2019): 2482–96, https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2409-18.2019.
62 A. Strobel et al., “Beyond Revenge: Neural and Genetic Bases of Altruistic Punishment,” NeuroImage 54 (2011): 671–680, at 677–879; J. Kimmel and M. Rowe, “A Behavioral Addiction Model of Revenge, Violence, and Gun Abuse,” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 48, S4 (2020): 172–178. doi:10.1177/1073110520979419.
63 Former jihadi extremist, interview with the authors, July 27, 2020.
64 ACLU, The Dangerous Overuse of Solitary Confinement in the United States, (2014), https://www.aclu.org/other/stop-solitary-briefing-paper?redirect=criminal-law-reform-prisoners-rights/stop-solitary-briefing-paper.
65 R. J. Kelly and J. Maghan, “Terrorism and Corrections: The Incarcerated Radical,” in International Terrorism: The Decade Ahead, ed. Jane Rae Buckwalter (1989), 40–41.
66 Kelly and Maghan, “Terrorism and Corrections,” 42.
67 Aviva Stahl, “Extreme Isolation for U.S. Prisoners Shields ‘Torture’ From Public View and Accountability,” The Intercept, October 23, 2017., Julia Rushchenko, Prison Management of Terrorism-Related Offenders: Is Separation Effective?, (Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism at The Henry Jackson Society, 2018), https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/HJS-Prison-Management-Report.pdf.
68 Rushchenko, Prison Management of Terrorism-Related Offenders: Is Separation Effective?, 18.
69 Morris, “Short-Term Solitary Confinement Among Violent Prison Inmates.”
70 Fatos Kaba et al., “Solitary Confinement and Risk of Self-Harm Among Jail Inmates,” American Journal of Public Health 104 no. 3 (2014): 442–447.
71 Liat Tayer, Tomer Einat, and Anat Yaron Antar, “The Long-Term Effects of Solitary Confinement From the Perspective of Inmates,” The Prison Journal 101, no. 6 (Philadelphia, Pa., 2021): 652–74.
72 Craig Haney, “The Psychological Effects of Solitary Confinement: A Systematic Critique,” Crime and Justice 47 no. 1 (Chicago, Ill., 2018): 365–416.
73 Craig Haney, “Restricting the Use of Solitary Confinement,” Annual Review of Criminology 1 (2018): 285–310; Tracy Hresko, “In the Cellars of the Hollow Men: Use of Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisons and Its Implications Under International Laws against Torture,” Pace International Law Review 18: no. 1 (2006).
74 Former jihadi extremist, interview with the authors, July 9, 2020.
75 Former jihadi extremist, interview with the authors, October 14, 2020.
76 Former jihadi extremist, interview with the authors, July 9, 2020.
77 Former jihadi extremist, interview with the authors, July 27, 2020.
78 Federal PO, interview with the authors, July 1, 2020.
79 Former jihadi extremist, interview with the authors, August 21, 2020.
80 Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement, ed. Tore Bjørgo and John G. Horgan, (Routledge, 2009).
81 Paul Brennan (Probation Administrator for US Courts), interview with the authors, June 6, 2022.
82 Christopher Wright, “An Examination of Jihadi Recidivism Rates in the United States,” CTC Sentinel 12, no. 10 (2019): 26-31, https://ctc.usma.edu/examination-jihadi-recidivism-rates-united-states/.; Mary Beth Altier,
Emma Leonard Boyle, and John G. Horgan, “Returning to the Fight: An Empirical
Analysis of Terrorist Reengagement and Recidivism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 33, no. 4 (2019): 836–860, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1679781; Thomas Renard,
“Overblown: Exploring the Gap Between the Fear of Terrorist Recidivism and the
Evidence,” CTC Sentinel 13, no. 4 (2020): 19-29, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/overblown-exploring-the-gap-between-the-fear-of-terrorist-recidivism-and-the-evidence/.
83 The term “salad bar” was used by Director Wray in his testimony on 2 March 2021 and reiterated in an ODNI report the same month. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: The January 6th Insurrection, Domestic Terrorism, and Other Threats, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. (2021) (statement of Christopher A. Wray Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation); Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021. March 1, 2021, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/UnclassSummaryofDVEAssessment-17MAR21.pdf.
The lone-actor terrorists involved in the Christchurch massacre and the El Paso mass-shooting attack endorsed both ideologies in their manifestos. Brenton Tarrant, “The Great Replacement: Towards a New Society,” March 2019; Patrick Crusius, “The Inconvenient Truth,” August 2019.
Matt Heimbach, who was involved in organizing the 2017 Unite the Right Rally, and who had a history of involvement on the hard right, publicly renounced his commitment to the hard right, but later committed himself to National Bolshevism. Duane Pohlman, “Can a man turn 180 degrees and renounce fascism?,” WKRC, February 4, 2021. https://local12.com/news/investigates/can-a-man-turn-180-degrees-and-renounce-fascism (accessed January 16, 2023).
Daniel Koehler used the term “side-switching” in “Switching Sides: Exploring Violent Extremist Intergroup Migration Across Hostile Ideologies.” Daniel Koehler, “Switching Sides: Exploring Violent Extremist Intergroup Migration Across Hostile Ideologies,” Political Psychology 41, no. 3 (2020): 499–515.
84 Borum, Fein, and Vossekuil, “Analyzing lone offender terrorism.”
85 On the importance of primary data, see, e.g., Marc Sageman, “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 4 (2014): 565-580, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2014.895649; Bart Schuurman and Quirine Eijkman, “Moving Terrorism Research Forward: The Crucial Role of Primary Sources,” ICCT, (June 2013).; Ivan Sascha Sheehan, “Assessing and Comparing Data Sources for Terrorism Research.” In Evidence-Based Counterterrorism Policy. (New York, NY: Springer New York, 2011): 13-40, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-0953-3_2; Bart Schuurman, “Research on Terrorism, 2007–2016: A Review of Data, Methods, and Authorship,” Terrorism and Political Violence 32, no. 5 (2020): 1011-1026, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2018.1439023; John Horgan, “Interviewing the terrorists: reflections on fieldwork and implications for psychological research,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Aggression 4, no. 3, (2012): 195-211. Studies employing primary source data include: Mary Beth Altier, Emma Leonard Boyle & John G. Horgan, “Returning to the Fight: An Empirical Analysis of Terrorist Reengagement and Recidivism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 33 no. 4, (2021): 836-860. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1679781; Simon Copeland, “Telling stories of terrorism: a framework for applying narrative approaches to the study of militant’s self-accounts,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 11, no. 3 (2019): 232-253. https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2018.1525417; Lana De Pelecijn, Stef Decoene & Wim Hardyns, “‘If I said I trust you, I would be lying’. Reflections and recommendations for conducting interviews with (violent) extremist prisoners,” Journal for Deradicalization 27, (2021): 284-310; John F. Morrison, “Analyzing Interviews with Terrorists,” RESOLVE Network (2020). DOI: https://doi.org/10.37805/rve2020.7.
86 Altier, Boyle, and Horgan, “Terrorist Reengagement and Recidivism,” 846.
87 Copeland, “Applying Narrative Approaches to Militant’s Self-Accounts.”
88 Horgan, “Interviewing the terrorists”; Schuurman and Eijkman, “The Crucial Role of Primary Sources.”
89 Schuurman and Eijkman, “The Crucial Role of Primary Sources.”
90 Schuurman and Eijkman, “The Crucial Role of Primary Sources.”
91 Horgan, “Interviewing the Terrorists,” 200.
92 James Khalil, “A Guide to Interviewing Terrorists and Violent Extremists,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 42, no. 4 (2019): 429–443.
93 Morrison, “Analyzing Interviews with Terrorists.”
94 A. Silke, “The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems in Research on Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 4 (2001): 1–14.
95 Horgan, “Interviewing the Terrorists.” Though not included in this article, the interview guide is available upon request; please contact the corresponding author for a copy.
96 Horgan, “Interviewing the Terrorists.”
97 De Pelecijn, Decoene, and Hardyns, “Conducting Interviews with (Violent) Extremist Prisoners.”
98 Jeff Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (2005): 7.
99 It is worth noting that a recent assessment of terrorist reengagement and recidivism observed that increased age and socioeconomic status are correlated with greater prospects for success; while marriage, children and other factors widely assumed to be protective did not have a significant impact on the rate of recidivism, at least in the population studied. Altier, Boyle, and Horgan, “Terrorist Reengagement and Recidivism.”
100 Stern, et al., “Practices and Needs in Reintegration Programs.”
101 Sarah Winegar Budge (ExitUSA Program Director, Life After Hate), interview with the authors, November 15, 2022.