Theories of well-being and well-being policy: a view from methodology

ABSTRACT

In the recent well-being literature, various theory-free accounts of well-being have been proposed to ground informative evaluations of policies’ welfare implications without relying on any specific theories of well-being. In this paper, I provide a methodological assessment of theory-free accounts and argue that, despite these accounts, grounding informative evaluations of policies’ welfare implications frequently requires policy makers to rely on specific theories of well-being. Policy makers should ground their evaluations of policies’ welfare implications on explicit specifications of what theories of well-being they rely on and should openly acknowledge the theory-dependent character of their evaluations rather than aiming to provide theory-free welfare evaluations.

KEYWORDS:

• Well-being
• theory
• preferences
• well-being policy
• welfare evaluation

JEL CODES:

• A10
• A12
• B40
• B41
• D60
• I30
• I31

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to John Davis and Wade Hands for their invitation to contribute to this special issue. I also wish to thank Lukas Beck, Donal Khosrowi and Jack Vromen for their comments on previous versions of this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Below I follow the common practice of using the terms ‘well-being’ and ‘welfare’ interchangeably to indicate what is non-instrumentally good for individuals (e.g. Griffin, 1986, part I; Sumner, 1996, pp. 20–25). In particular, I speak of ‘accounts’ of well-being to designate different views of what role theories of well-being should play in well-being policy, and I take theories of well-being to specify both which goods/experiences enhance individuals’ welfare and in virtue of what properties such goods/experiences enhance welfare (e.g. Crisp, 2006; Woodard, 2013, on explanatory theories versus merely enumerative theories of well-being).

2 I speak of ‘theories’ (rather than ‘theory’) of well-being to allow for the possibility that policy makers may ground informative evaluations of policies’ welfare implications on multiple theories of well-being and may justifiably rely on different theories in different policy contexts. Divergences frequently arise not just between distinct theories of well-being, but also between distinct measures of well-being (e.g. Adler & Fleurbaey, 2016). Below I focus on theories (rather than measures) of well-being and I gloss over the interrelations between theories and measures of well-being unless these interrelations directly bear on my evaluation.

3 Theory-free accounts are not the only accounts which aim to ground informative evaluations of policies’ welfare implications while minimizing reliance on philosophical theories of well-being. For instance, the so-called intermediate account holds that ‘we cannot achieve a completely theory-free account of well-being’, but shares theory-free accounts’ aim to ‘provide useful guidance for well-being policy, while minimizing […] reliance on any one substantive theory of well-being’ and while ‘remain[ing] agnostic regarding which substantive well-being theory is correct’ (Hersch, 2020, pp. 44–5). If correct, my claim that grounding informative evaluations of policies’ welfare implications frequently requires policy makers to rely on specific theories of well-being gives reason to doubt the potential for success of both theory-free accounts and other accounts which aim to minimize reliance on philosophical theories of well-being (e.g. Section 4).

4 Similar contrasts may be drawn with regard to objective list theories, which hold that an individual is well off to the extent that she has certain goods/experiences, irrespective of whether the individual experiences specific mental states or satisfies her preferences (e.g. Arneson, 1999). To be sure, several objective list theories grant that experiencing specific mental states and satisfying particular preferences may enhance one’s well-being. Still, on objective list theories, one’s well-being is not determined solely by one’s own mental states and preferences (e.g. Parfit, 1984, pp. 493–502).

5 A proponent of the evidential account may object that on this account even those preferences that satisfy conditions (1)-(4) are a ‘fallible […] guide to what will make [individuals] better off’ (Hausman & McPherson, 2009, p. 16). Hence, the objection would go, the existence of some cases where individuals’ preferences satisfy conditions (1)–(4) while failing to reliably track individuals’ welfare does not per se cast doubt on the adequacy of such conditions. However, the proponents of the evidential account have to show that cases where individuals’ preferences satisfy conditions (1)–(4) while failing to reliably track individuals’ welfare are not widespread if the evidential account is to ground informative evaluations of policies’ welfare implications (e.g. if these cases are widespread, then policy makers cannot reliably take the fact that individuals’ preferences satisfy conditions (1)–(4) to indicate that these preferences reliably track individuals’ welfare). And as noted in the main text - for all policy makers know - there may be several such cases (also Section 4 for further discussion).

6 A proponent of theory-free accounts may object that individuals may be able to access some facts that are relevant to their well-being without relying on any theory of well-being (e.g. Haybron & Tiberius, 2015, p. 725, for the claim that individuals ‘may think nothing about well-being per se [when they think] about what it is for their lives to go well for them’). Hence, the objection would go, no reliance on theories of well-being is required to determine what facts belong to the set of ‘relevant’ facts mentioned by condition (2). However, individuals have to be able to access most of the facts that are relevant to their well-being without relying on any theory of well-being if the evidential account is to ground informative evaluations of policies’ welfare implications (e.g. if individuals are able to access just a few ‘relevant’ facts, then some of the non-accessible ‘relevant’ facts may offset the impact that the accessible ‘relevant’ facts have on individuals’ well-being). And it is dubious that individuals may be able to access most of the facts that are relevant to their well-being without relying on any theory of well-being (also Section 4 for further discussion).

7 These concerns exacerbate if one considers that how reliably preferences track welfare is a matter of degree and that the proponents of the evidential account rarely specify how reliably preferences have to track welfare to justify policy makers’ reliance on preferences. Without such specification, policy makers lack an informative basis to establish whether preferences in a given policy context are sufficiently reliable to justify their reliance on such preferences (e.g. Sarch, 2015, p. 153).

8 A proponent of the evidential account may object that whether preferences provide more reliable evidence of welfare than other indicators crucially depends on what conception of preferences one endorses, and that Hausman’s (2012, part I) conception of preferences as total subjective comparative evaluations can serve as basis to provide more reliable evidence of welfare than most other indicators. I lack the space here to assess the merits of Hausman’s conception of preferences as total subjective comparative evaluations (e.g. Angner, 2018; Moscati, 2012, for discussion). For my evaluation, I note that policy makers can rarely acquire more accurate and reliable information about individuals’ total subjective comparative evaluations than about other indicators (e.g. Fumagalli, 2013, on various behavioural and psychological indicators). This, in turn, significantly constrains the extent to which preferences conceived as total subjective comparative evaluations can serve as basis to provide more reliable evidence of welfare than most other indicators.

9 A proponent of the objection from sufficient reliability may object that policy makers can ‘appeal to well-being theories’ while remaining agnostic as to what ‘the correct […] theory of well-being’ is (Hersch, 2020, p. 53). However, mere ‘appeals’ to different theories of well-being do not enable policy makers to ground informative welfare evaluations unless policy makers supplement these appeals with further assumptions or specifications concerning such theories (e.g. to what theories should policy makers appeal? On what pragmatic and/or theoretical grounds should they assess the merits of different, and possibly conflicting, appeals?).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Roberto Fumagalli

Dr. Roberto Fumagalli is Lecturer at King’s College London and has research affiliations with the London School of Economics and the University of Pennsylvania. His research interests cover a wide range of areas, including philosophy and methodology of economics, philosophy of science, moral and political philosophy, philosophy and public policy. He has published articles in several international journals besides the Journal of Economic Methodology, including Philosophical Studies, Philosophy of Science, Economics and Philosophy, Biology and Philosophy, Erkenntnis, Social Choice and Welfare, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, the Journal of Social Philosophy, Bioethics, Synthese, Studia Leibnitiana, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science.