Abstract
This article investigates the effect of motivations on the perceived kindness of an action within the context of social indirect reciprocity (if A helps B, then C helps A). We test experimentally the hypothesis that, for a given distributional outcome, an action is perceived by a third party to be less kind if it can be strategically motivated. As a consequence, intention-based reciprocity should be stronger in the absence of strategic motivations. The results do not support this hypothesis: social indirect reciprocity is found to be less strong when strategic motivations can be ruled out.
Notes
1Indirect reciprocity is defined as the conditional behaviour to respond to helpful and harmful acts in kind in a sequential interaction that involves a third agent. Indirect reciprocity can take two forms. In generalized indirect reciprocity, an action is reciprocated towards a third agent (e.g. if A helps B, then B helps C). In social indirect reciprocity, an action is reciprocated by a third agent (e.g. if A helps B, then C helps A) (Stanca, Citation2009).
2Note that subjects are simply given instructions about stage 1, without any explicit reference to the game ending thereafter, so that subjects are not in any way cheated by the announcement of stage 2. On the other hand, there is no reason why, when playing stage 1, subjects should expect stage 2 to follow.