Nineteenth-century statecraft and the politics of moderation in the Franco-Prussian War

Abstract

In the nineteenth century there was a distinct form of moderation in European statecraft. This moderation worked within the broader the framework of the European concert where the exercise of prudence and forbearance acted as the measure of state conduct in European politics. The overarching intention behind moderation was to maintain a balanced, peaceful Europe. Using the context of the Franco-Prussian War, this study attempts to highlight the place of moderation in diplomacy, as contemporaries understood it. In doing so, it provides an enriched perspective of nineteenth-century statecraft.

Keywords::

• diplomacy
• Great Power politics
• moderation
• the Franco-Prussian War

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Dr Maartje Abbenhuis and the anonymous reviewers of this article for all their helpful comments.

Notes

^1. See, for example, F.R. Bridge and Roger Bullen who argue that: “In the exercise of their dominance over the European state system the great powers showed remarkable restraint, particularly in the decades from 1815 to 1856. They rarely acted arbitrarily or capriously.” The Great Powers and the European States System, 1815–1914, 9. See also C.J. Bartlett's history of “peace and war” (as opposed to war and peace) which alludes to a type of moderation or restraint on a number of occasions, noting in one instance how statesmen were often guided by restraint more so than ideas of “ambition, honour or gallantry” for the wider goal of maintaining a balance in Europe in Peace, War, and the European Powers, 1814–1914, 23.

^2.Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1768–1848. Cf. E. Kraehe, “A Bipolar Balance of Power;” and H.M. Scott, “Paul W. Schroeder's International System: The View from Vienna,” 663–80.

^3.Schroeder, “The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European Political System,” 7.

^4. As Schroeder points out: “Means make more difference than ends in international politics.” The Transformation of European Politics, 244.

^5.Schroeder, “The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?,” Review of International Studies 15 (1989): 142.

^6.Chabod, Italian Foreign Policy: The Statecraft of the Founders, 1870–1896.

^7. For more see Soutou, L'Europe de 1815 à nos jours, 9–27.

^8.Fiore, Nuovo dritto internazionale pubblico secondo i bisogni della civiltà moderna (Milan, 1865), 279.

^9.Abbenhuis, An Age of Neutrals: Neutrality and Great Power Politics, 1815–1914, introduction.

^10. As Metternich wrote in 1808: “Peace does not exist within a revolutionary situation, and whether Robespierre declares eternal war against the chateaux or Napoleon makes it against the Powers, the tyranny is the same, and the danger is only more general.” Quoted from Sofka, “Metternich's Theory of European Order: A Political Agenda for ‘Perpetual Peace’,” 122–3.

^11. The liberal Viennese daily Neue Freie Presse for one saw it as a childish affair that need not endanger the peace of Europe. Neue Freie Presse, 6 July 1870, 1.

^12. See for example H[ouse of] C[ommons] P[arliamentary] P[apers], 1870, C.167, LXX. 17, p. 2.

^13. Ibid., 3.

^14. For more, see Agatha Ramm's biographical sketch of Granville as Foreign Secretary in “Granville,” in Wilson, British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy from Crimean War to First World War, 85–101.

^15.Oncken, ed., Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleons III von 1883 bis 1870 und der Ursprung des Krieges von 1870/71, vol. 3, 394.

^16. See Schmitt, “Count Beust and Germany, 1866–1870: Reconquest, Realignment, or Resignation?”

^17. Ibid., 26.

^18.Chodźko, Recueil des Traités, conventions, actes, notes, capitulations et pièces diplomatiques concernant la Guerre Franco-Allemande, vol. 1, 22.

^19.Discussioni della Camera dei Deputati, Seconda della Legislatura X, 2e, vol. 3, 3219.

^20.Oncken, Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleons III, 418–19.

^21. Ibid.

^22. Ibid., 396.

^23. Ibid., 397.

^24.Carroll, “French Public Opinion on War with Prussia in 1870,” 684.

^25.Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Les Origines diplomatiques de la guerre de 1870–71, vol. 28 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1931), 64. Gramont expressed this sentiment further noting to his Berlin Ambassador, scarcely days after the declaration: “If the King does not want to counsel Prince Hohenzollern to renounce, eh bien! C'est la guerre, tout de suite, and in a few days we will be in the Rhine.” Ibid., 193.

^26. See Wetzel, ADuel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War, 37–62.

^27. Some historians claim that Ollivier did not push for war, instead allowing himself to be led by Gramont, which is not the case; see Houston, “Émile Ollivier and the Hohenzollern Candidacy,” 125–49. Thiers quoted from Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War, 35.

^28. Lyons, a particularly astute observer of the Tuilières Court, noted to Granville how “the war has been forced upon the Emperor principally by his own party in the Chamber, the Right, and by his Ministers … the whole affair is a series of blunders which has culminated in an awful catastrophe.” Legh, ed., Lord Lyons: A Record of British Diplomacy, vol. 1, 301–2. Earlier in May 1870, Lyons had noted to Granville: “There is danger in the influence of the Emperor's old political friends, who want to regain their old position and in some of the influential military men who want a war for promotion and glory.” Ibid., 291.

^29.von Bismarck, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 6b, 344–5.

^30. Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Les Origines diplomatiques, vol. 29, 140.

^31. “The Political Correspondence of Mr Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1868–71,” 109.

^32. HCPP, C.167, LXX. 17, p. 12.

^33. Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Les Origines diplomatiques, vol. 28, 107–8.

^34. HCPP, C.167, LXX. 17, p. 49.

^35.Ministero degli Affari Esteri, I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, series I, vol. 13, 37.

^36. There is a rich historiography on Bismarck's role in the Hohenzollern Crisis. Recently, historians Josef Becker and David Wetzel engaged in a debate over whether or not Bismarck had premeditated the Franco-Prussian War through his intimate involvement with the Spanish candidature. See, in the following order, Wetzel, “Review: Bismarcks spanische ‘Diversion’: 1870 und der preussischdeutsche Reichsgründungskrieg,” 606–12; Becker, “The Franco-Prussian Conflict of 1870 and Bismarck's Concept of a ‘Provoked Defensive War’,” 93–109; and Wetzel, “A Reply to Josef Becker's Response,” 111–24. Their positions reiterate the same historiographical points of order of past historians, demonstrating the enduring controversy of the debate.

^37.Halperin, “Bismarck and the Italian Envoy in Berlin on the Eve of the Franco-Prussian War,” 33.

^38. HCPP, C.167, LXX. 17, p. 35.

^39. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, I Documenti Diplomatici, series I, vol. 13, 257.

^40. Quoted from Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848–1871, 308.

^41. Quoted from Ibid., 315.

^42. Quoted from von Beust, Memoirs of Friedrich Ferdinand Count von Beust, vol. 2, 205.

^43. Paraphrased from Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 323.

^44.Fryer, “The War of 1870 in the Pattern of Franco-German Relations,” 80.

^45. Quoted from HCPP, C.244, LXXI. 1, p. 179.

^46.Journal Officiel de la République franc¸aise, 21 Sep. 1870, 1.

^47. Ibid.

^48. In a diplomatic circular, Bismarck stated victory was not enough to secure a durable peace but rather a defensive bulwark through the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was needed. HCPP, C.244, LXXI. 1, pp. 90–1.

^49.Beatrice Heuser notes that Bismarck was often shut out of the all-important war councils in Reading Clausewitz, 60. For more see Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, vol. 1, 462–8; and Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter: the Problem of Militarism in Germany, vol. 1, 187–260.

^50. Ibid., 459.

^51. See Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun, 19–21.

^52. Bismarck noted in St Petersburg in 1887 that the survival of France as a Great Power “was as necessary to Germany as the survival of any other great power”, offering an important balance to both Britain and Russia. Quoted from Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter, 249.

^53.Abbenhuis, An Age of Neutrals, conclusion.

^54. As Beust noted Metternich on 22 October, Austria-Hungary had “unceasingly signalled to London and St Petersburg the urgency of a European intervention.” Chodźko, Recueil des Traités, vol. 3, 836.

^55. Quoted from Beust, Memoirs, 205.

^56. Ibid., 205.

^57. See Chodźko, Recueil des Traités, vol. 3, 783.

^58. Ibid.

^59. In his memoir published in 1887, Beust was able to look back upon the Franco-Prussian War and rhetorically answer the question he fretfully raised in October 1870, writing: “It cannot be denied that a fairly successful intervention of the neutral powers would only have made the victors more moderate in their demands, but would have convinced the vanquished of the uselessness of continuing the struggle, and have placed Europe in a much more dignified position after the war was over … But the future is dark, however reassuring may be the guarantees afforded by those who now have the direction of German affairs; and it would have been a great security for Germany herself and for the peace of Europe, if the neutral powers had bound themselves not only to prevent excessive demands on the part of Germany, but also not to participate either actively or passively in any French enterprise of revenge.” Beust, Memoirs, 209.

^60. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, I Documenti Diplomatici, series II, vol. 2, 42.

^61. Ibid.

^62. Ibid., 16–17.

^63. Ibid., series II, vol. 1, 158.

^64. As Visconti emphasised to Nigra on 3 October that any assistance from Italy would not be able to “restore the odds of the war in favour of France.” Ibid., 128.

^65. Chabod, Italian Foreign Policy, 97.

^66. Quoted from Millman, British Foreign Policy and the Coming of the Franco-Prussian War, 216.

^67. HCPP, C.244, LXXI. 1, p. 160.

^68. Ibid., 170.

^69. Ibid.

^70. Ibid.

^71.Michael Pratt argues that Prussia became a “fallen idol” amongst British intellectuals once Napoleon was defeated at Sedan in “A Fallen Idol,” 543–75.

^72. Chabod, Italian Foreign Policy, 29.

^73. For a detailed account of the struggle between Gambetta and moderate politicians within the French government during the armistice negotiations, see Wetzel, A Duel of Nations, 180–212.

^74. The fortress of Belfort was also part of the original peace terms. However, Bismarck prudently dropped this stipulation.

^75.A History of Modern Germany, 1840–1945, vol. 3, 221.

^76. HCPP, C.266, LXXI. 321, p. 1.

^77. Legh, Lord Lyons, 373.

^78. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, I Documenti Diplomatici, series II, vol. 2, 246–7.

^79. Chabod, Italian Foreign Policy, 101.

^80. Chodźko, Recueil des Traités, vol. 5, 44.

^81. Chabod, Italian Foreign Policy, 103.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Christopher Ernest Barber

Christopher Ernest Barber is a postgraduate history student in the School of Humanities at the University of Auckland.