A question of trust: military defection during regime crises in Benin and Togo

ABSTRACT

This article examines the role of trust between military officers and opposition forces in fostering mass defections of military personnel during pro-democracy uprisings. The current literature on military defection emphasizes the role of either opposition characteristics, or government control policies. Combining the two, however, takes better account of defection as an interaction between officers and the opposition. Through an analysis of civil–military relations during mass uprisings in Benin (1989–1990) and Togo (1990–1993), this article finds that loyalist stacking creates a core of military personnel with a strong stake in regime preservation, while counterbalancing leaves open the possibility for a military-opposition alliance. Alliance also depends on civic resistance campaign characteristics (the unity of the movement, its nonviolent character, the presence of opposition leaders with social ties to military personnel) and promises to military personnel that acknowledge the latter groups’ interests. These findings provide a new theoretical framework for understanding military actions during regime crises.

KEYWORDS:

• African politics
• Benin
• civic resistance campaign
• civil–military relations
• coup-proofing
• regime crisis
• Togo

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Theodore McLauchlin, Diane Éthier, Mamoudou Gazibo, Jeffrey Sachs, Aurel Croissant and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the African Studies Association (ASA) conference in San Diego in 2015 and at the International Political Science Association (IPSA) conference in Montreal in 2014.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

ORCID

Julien Morency-Laflamme http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2003-2603

Notes

1. I define coup-prevention as policies aimed at thwarting the military's ability to stage coups or pressure the government. See Quinlivan, “Coup-Proofing,” 132.

2. I conceptualize as non-loyalists any military factions that could potentially rebel or stage coups.

3. Albrecht and Ohl, “Exit, Resistance, Loyalty”; Lee, “Military Cohesion and Regime Maintenance”; Makara, “Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring”; Albrecht, “Does Coup-Proofing Work?”

4. Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works; van de Walle, “Tipping Games.”

5. Marks, “Rational Sources of Chaos in Democratic Transition,” 398.

6. Brancati, “Pocketbook Protests,” 1504.

7. Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, 211; Bunce, “Rethinking Recent Democratization,” 175; Barany, “The Role of the Military,” 24.

8. Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, 211; Lee, Defect or Defend, 36, 48–49. A third decision, to stand aside, as in Madagascar in 2009, has the same result as supporting the opposition forces: the authoritarian government, deprived of its ability to use force to reinforce its dominance, is weakened and pushed to negotiate. There is also a fourth possibility: to use the regime crisis to stage a coup, as in Egypt in 2011 and 2013. As it involves returning members of the ancien regime to power, I conceptualize this option as similar to repressing the opposition. Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State,” 598–599.

9. Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization after Twenty Years?,” 125–128; Finer, The Man on Horseback, 35–52; McLauchlin, “Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion,” 338–340.

10. Finer, The Man on Horseback, 41; Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 80.

11. Clark, “Armed Arbiters,” 131–132; Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, 29.

12. Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 58.

13. Ibid., 33; Lee, Defect or Defend, 151–157.

14. This can be an official agreement, like the Naval Club negotiations in Uruguay in 1985, or it can be informal when leaders of both groups never officially meet, like in Mali in 1991.

15. O’Donnell and Schmitter, “Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies,” 40; Barkey, “Why Military Regimes Fail,” 171–172 and 176.

16. North and Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment,” 806.

17. O’Donnell and P. Schmitter, “Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies,” 25; Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” 10–11.

18. North and Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment,” 806; Persson and Tabellini, Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics, 5–6 and 33.

19. O’Donnell and Schmitter, “Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies,” 40.

20. Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 39; Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State,” 598.

21. Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 43–44.

22. Lawrence, “Triggering Nationalist Violence,” 99; Pearlman, “Precluding Nonviolence, Propelling Violence,” 24.

23. See Uvin, “Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda,” 261–262; Lee, Defect or Defend.

24. Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival, 42.

25. Geddes, “How Autocrats Defend Themselves against Armed Rivals,” 3–4.

26. Luckham, “The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa”; Finer, The Man on Horseback.

27. This problem is intensified by the nature of coup-plotting, which is secretive and hard to identify. Roessler, “The Enemy Within,” 308.

28. Quinlivan, “Coup-Proofing,” 132; Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, 19.

29. McLauchlin, “Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion,” 337–339.

30. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 551–553; Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers.

31. Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State,” 594.

32. Bratton and van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa,” 464; Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State,” 598.

33. Lee, “The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule,” 650–651 and 656–657; Kim, “Intra-Military Divisions and Democratization in South Korea,” 705–707.

34. Belkin and Schofer, “Coup Risk, Counterbalancing, and International Conflict,” 144; De Bruin, “Preventing Coups D’État,” 4–6.

35. Singh, Seizing Power, 23.

36. Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, 9; Bethke, “The Consequences of ‘Divide-and-Rule’ Politics in Africa South of the Sahara,” 2; Quinlivan, “Coup-Proofing,” 141.

37. Snyder, “Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships,” 381–383; Makara, “Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring”; Albrecht, “Does Coup-Proofing Work?”

38. van de Walle, “Tipping Games,” 86–87.

39. Mahoney, “Strategies of Causal Assessment in Comparative Historical Analysis,” 159.

40. Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa; Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State”; Houngnikpo, “The Military and Democratization in Africa”; Thiriot, Démocratisation et démilitarisation du pouvoir.

41. Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, 211.

42. Decalo, “The Politics of Military Rule in Togo,” 63; Decalo, “Regionalism, Politics, and the Military in Dahomey,” 451.

43. Geddes et al. define military rule as, “autocratic rule by a member of the military, regardless of the nature of the rest of the leadership.” See Geddes, Frantz, and Wright, “Military Rule,” 152.

44. Heilbrunn, “Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo,” 298.

45. Seely, “The Legacies of Transition Governments,” 358.

46. Other former French colonies, like Congo-Brazzaville, Madagascar and Mali, also embraced socialist ideologies during the Cold War. The fear of further socialist propagation pushed French authorities to actively support the governments of its former colonies still aligned with France, and to undermine African socialist governments.

47. Seely, Transitions to Democracy in Comparative Perspectives, 79.

48. Ibid., 108.

49. By point, Captain Bodjollé had already been pushed out of the army after a failed power play in 1965.

50. Toulabor, Le Togo sous Eyadéma, 186.

51. Ellis, “Rumour and Power in Togo,” 467.

52. They were also seen as potential allies to the exiled civilian forces affiliated with former President Sylvanus Olympio. Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa, 234.

53. Toulabor, “Togo,” 4.

54. Toulabor, “La ‘bataille finale’ du général Eyadéma au Togo,” 18.

55. Thiriot, Démocratisation et démilitarisation du pouvoir, 295–296.

56. Tète, Démocratisation à la togolaise, 69–70.

57. Interview, National Conference Representative, Lomé [Togo], November 2013.

58. Interview, Ex-RPT dignitary, Lomé [Togo], November 2013.

59. Toulabor, “La ‘bataille finale’ du général Eyadéma au Togo,” 18.

60. These resolutions included calls for the forced retirement of many senior officers, the arrest of some officers close to President Eyadéma and a complete overhaul of the army's recruitment mechanisms. See Thiriot, Démocratisation et démilitarisation du pouvoir, 390–394.

61. Heilbrunn, “Togo,” 233.

62. Thiriot, Démocratisation et démilitarisation du pouvoir, 389.

63. The first generation, who were non-commissioned officers and rank-and-files in the colonial army, were opposed by a second generation, who had received their commissions after independence, and a third generation, who came out of the French military academies in the late 1960s and early 1970s and were influenced by the French radical-left movements. See Lemarchand, “Dahomey,” 51–52.

64. For instance, Colonel Alphonse Alley – who had been a candidate to lead the 1972 junta before Major Kérékou was selected – was arrested in 1973. See Agboton, Louis-Fabien Agboton, 139.

65. Down from 80% at independence. Decalo, Civil-Military Relations in Africa, 6.

66. Decalo and Houngnikpo, Historical Dictionary of Benin, 57.

67. This ethnic diversification opened the path for the professionalization of Benin's armed forces as no ethnic group would dominate the armed forces. However, the professionalization process only truly started in 1997 after security sector reforms and foreign training programmes, notably by Belgium, were implemented. See Akindes, “Civil-Military Relations in Benin,” 55–56; Banégas, La Démocratie à pas de caméléon, 70; Dickovick, “Legacies of Leftism,” 1124–1125.

68. Allen, “Restructuring an Authoritarian State,” 47.

69. Noudjenoume, La démocratie au Bénin, 1988–1993, 127.

70. Allen, “‘Goodbye to All That’,” 70.

71. In any case, the PCD lost most of its appeal, and influence, in the months preceding the National Conference. Banégas, La Démocratie à pas de caméléon, 147.

72. Adamon, Le renouveau démocratique au Bénin, 61.

73. Dossou, “L’expérience béninoise de la conférence nationale,” 225; Akindes, “Civil-Military Relations in Benin,” 50.

74. Seely, Transitions to Democracy in Comparative Perspectives, 240.

75. Akpo, Mathieu Kérékou, 135.

76. Fondation Friechrich Saumann, Les actes de la conférence nationale, 7–8.

77. Decalo, “Benin,” 55.

78. Fondation Friechrich Saumann, Les actes de la conférence nationale, 7–8.

79. Omitoogun and Onigo-Itite, “The National Conference as a Model for Democratic Consolidation,” 35.

80. It is estimated that 90% of all military personnel had stopped supporting President Kérékou by that point. Noudjenoume, La démocratie au bénin, 1988–1993, 166; Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 293.

81. Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” 10.

82. Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, 211.

Additional information

Funding

Funding for this research was generously provided by the Le Fonds de recherche du Québec – Société et culture [Grant Number 148025].

Notes on contributors

Julien Morency-Laflamme

Notes on the contributor

Julien Morency-Laflamme is a Professor of Political Science at John Abbott College. After receiving his PhD in Political Science from the Université de Montréal, he held a Postdoctoral Fellowship funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council at McGill University.