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ABSTRACT
Elections are an important source of regime legitimation across sub-Saharan Africa, but they are increasingly being held amidst climates of fear, tension, and threat of ensuing violence. This article explores these climates of fear, arguing that they are, in part, a political construction; the result of strategic efforts to frame elections as a threat to peace and security, in order to legitimize tactics that tilt the playing field and intimidate political opposition. The article draws upon three diverse cases – the 2015 elections in Tanzania, and the 2016 polls in Zambia and Uganda – to explore the use of securitization discourses as a strategy of electoral manipulation. It argues that in these cases, the language of security was used to justify the construction of a “militarized” environment, and restrictions upon the freedoms of assembly and expression. Whilst these served to create a highly uneven electoral playing field, they were nevertheless tolerated by key stakeholders in the process.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Nic Cheeseman and Kristine Höglund for their comments on an early draft of this paper, as well as the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Reuters, “Two Killed in Malawi Campaign Violence.”
2 Ghana Centre for Democratic Development, Ghana’s 2016 Elections.
3 Pitse, “Police Preparing for 2019 Election Violence – Claims.”
4 Interview with Kikuyu youth, Mathare, Kenya, 7 July 2015.
5 This is not to say that opposition candidates do not also manipulate elections. However, incumbents – by virtue of their position and connections – can typically draw on a wider range of tactics and they are in a far more powerful position to construct and utilize securitization discourses. See Cheeseman and Klaus, How to rig an election for a discussion of the strategies commonly employed by the opposition.
6 Brown, “Well what can you expect,” 517.
7 Lehoucq, “Electoral fraud,” 235.
8 Simpser, Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections, 33.
9 Elklit and Reynolds, “Judging Elections,” 189.
10 Birch, Electoral Malpractice, 13.
11 Schedler, “Elections without Democracy,” 40.
12 Ibid.
13 Birch, Electoral Malpractice, 56.
14 Simpser, Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections, 66.
15 Beaulieu and Hyde, “In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion,” 403.
16 Sjöstedt et al.’s examination of threat construction by warlord democrats in post-conflict contexts is an exception, though it does not focus on the use of such narratives as a tactic of manipulation. See Sjöstedt et al., “Demagogues of Hate.”
17 See, Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis, “Democracy and its Discontents”; Brown and Raddatz, “Dire Consequences or Empty Threats?”; Elder, Strigent and Claes, Elections and Violent Conflict in Kenya; Maweu, “‘Peace propaganda’? ”
18 Lynch, Cheeseman and Willis, “From Peace Campaigns to Peaceocracy.”
19 Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 54.
20 Wilkinson, “The Copenhagen School on Tour,” 9.
21 Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, Security, 27.
22 Wilkinson, “The Copenhagen School on Tour,” 5.
23 See Mabon and Kapur, Securitisation in the Non-west; Caballero-Anthony, Emmers and Acharya, Non-traditional security in Asia; Sjöstedt et al., “Demagogues of Hate.”
24 Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka, “‘Securitization’ revisited,” 507.
25 Vuori, “Illocutionary logic,” 68–9.
26 McDonald, “Securitization,” 564.
27 Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization.”
28 Balzacq, “The three Faces of Securitization”; Salter, “Securitization and Desecuritization”; Leonard and Kaunert, “Reconceptualizing the Audience.”
29 Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic,” 76.
30 By international actors, I refer here to Western donors, election observers, and the governments they represent. These actors are intimately connected in the assessment of electoral processes.
31 Cote, “Agents without Agency,” 546.
32 Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization,” 361.
33 Colonial power, electoral system, and timing of the elections are three key variables that are held constant by the selection of these cases.
34 Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm.”
35 Khisa, “Shrinking Democratic Space?” 344.
36 Ibid. p. 347.
37 Data for all three case studies available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.XP.ZS?end=2017&locations=TZ-UG-ZM&start=2015&view=map&year=2015 [Accessed 30 January 2020].
38 Abrahamsen and Bareebe, “Uganda’s 2016 Elections,” 760–1.
39 Kragelund, “Donors Go Home.”
40 It should be noted that press freedom is restricted to an extent in all three cases, but this is particularly pronounced in the case of Zambia, where access to independent media sources was more challenging. Despite this issue of “neutrality”, however, an examination of these sources is still enlightening as to prominence of securitization discourses during elections.
41 Buguzi, “Women and the Young will Decide TZ’s Future Today.”
42 Sengoba, “Why the Message of Hope is Vital for the 2016 Election.”
43 The Daily Monitor, “Elections will be Peaceful.”
44 Musisi, “Why are Campaigns Taking a Violent Turn?”
45 Katureebe, “Watch Out for Politicians Who Use Media to Incite Violence.”
46 See Lynch, Cheeseman, and Willis, “From Peace Campaigns to Peaceocracy” for a discussion of this phenomenon in Ghana, Kenya and Uganda.
47 See Lynch et al. “From Peace Campaigns to Peaceocracy.”
48 The Daily Monitor, “Preach Peace but Fix Causes of Conflict.”
49 Abrahamsen, “Blair’s Africa,” 60
50 Paget, “Tanzania: Shrinking space,” 162
51 Interview with middle aged man, Mbezi Juu, Dar es Salaam, 20th October 2015.
52 Chisala, “Futility of Violence in Modern Politics.”
53 The Daily Mail, “UPND Danger to Society.”
54 The Daily Monitor, “Please Stop Beating those War Drums … .”
55 Mvula, “Stop Insults.”
56 The Daily Mail, “Don’t Drag UPDF into Election Process.”
57 Katureee, “Watch Out for Politicians Who Use Media to Incite Violence.”
58 Musa, “100 Youth Preparing for Violent Acts: RPC.”
59 The Daily Mail, “Police Ops Should Not Cause Terror.”
60 The Citizen, “Optimism and Ecstasy Greet Magufuli Victory.”
61 Kron, “Yoweri Museveni, Uganda’s President Wins.”
62 Vokes and Wilkins, “Party, Patronage and Coercion,” 594.
63 Saramba, “Missing the Point.”
64 Vokes and Wilkins, “Party, Patronage and Coercion,” 593.
65 Interview with male resident, Mbezi Juu, Dar es Salaam, 19 October 2015.
66 The Daily Mail, “Police Ops should Not Cause Terror.”
67 Söderberg Kovacs and Bjarnesen, Violence in African Elections, 2–3.
68 FHRI, “Human Rights and Elections,” 11.
69 The Carter Centre, “Final Report Zambia,” 34.
70 Hichilema, “HH Says that UPND will Go Ahead.”
71 Mbebwe, “Public Order Act Applied Fairly.”
72 The Daily Monitor, “Opposition Rights to Contest Poll Outcome.” See also EISA, “Election Observer Mission Report.”
73 EUEOM, “Final Report,” 5.
74 Ibid. 19.
75 United States Department of State, “Country Report: Uganda,” 17.
76 United States Department of State, “Country Report: Zambia,” section 2a.
77 Ibid.
78 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2016 – Zambia.”
79 Cross, “Cybercrime,” 197–8.
80 Ibid. 202.
81 Quoted in Human Rights Watch, “Keep the People Uninformed,” 25.
82 Cross, “Cybercrimes,” 198–9.
83 Ibid. 25.
84 United States Department of State, “Country Report: Zambia,” section 2a.
85 Wesaka, “Media Practitioners, Rights Activists Condemn Police Brutality on Journalists.”
86 Nyanje, “My Own Take on This.”
87 Cross, “Cybercrimes,” 195.
88 See CIPESA, “State of Internet Freedom,” 10 for two examples.
89 Quoted in McNeish, “Tanzania Accused of Making Laws.”
90 Musisi, “UCC Shutdown of Social Media Backfires.”
91 Bratton and Bhoojedhur, “Africans Want Open Elections.”
92 Ibid., 11.
93 Cheeseman et al. “How Election Monitors are Failing.”
94 See Fisher and Anderson, “Authoritarianism and Securitization,” for a discussion of the securitization of development in Africa for example.
Additional information
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Sarah Jenkins
Sarah Jenkins is a Lecturer in Politics and International Development at the University of East Anglia. Her research interests revolve around electoral violence and manipulation, ethnic conflict, and the micro-dynamics of violence and peace. Her work has been published in a number of journals, including African Affairs, Civil Wars, and the Journal of Contemporary Ethnography.