The relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding: comparative evidence

ABSTRACT

Why do voters vote for undemocratic politicians in a democracy? My chief contention is that affective polarization has become a primary factor driving support for undemocratic politicians. Once partisan identification turns into a salient identity in the hierarchy of group affiliations, it has the potential to widen inter-party distances. Such a political environment fosters positive beliefs of their preferred party and negative beliefs of the other party, which promote political cynicism, intolerance and increase partisan loyalty. As a result, crossing party lines becomes costly, even when incumbents violate democratic principles or incumbents’ economic policies do not appeal to supporters’ interests. This tradeoff enables undemocratic politicians to evade electoral sanctions for undemocratic behaviour. I created an extended version of Reiljan’s affective polarization application. The new dataset covers affective polarization scores of 53 countries calculated over 170 national election surveys. I find that increasing affective polarization is highly correlated with democratic backsliding, less accountability, less freedom, fewer rights, and less deliberation in democracies. However, ideological polarization has shown no correlation.

KEYWORDS:

• Affective polarization
• ideological polarization
• democratic backsliding
• partisan identity
• partisan loyalty

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Ora John Reuter, Thomas Holbrook, Natasha Borges Sugiyama, Patrick W. Kraft, Murat Somer, Giancarlo Visconti, Kerim Can Kavaklı, Özge Kemahlıoğlu, audiences at SPSA and MPSA, and two Democratization reviewers for their helpful comments and conversations.

Data availability statement Varieties of Democracy

https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data/ Comparative Study of Electoral Studies: https://cses.org/data-download/ My Affective Polarization Index: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/X3YL21

Notes

1 Lührmann and Lindberg, “A Third Wave of Autocratization Is Here.”

2 Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die.

3 Lust and Waldner, “Unwelcome Change,” 2.

4 Svolik, “When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue.”

5 In my theoretical framework, any politician (whether from the liberal or illiberal party, whether populist or not populist) can be undemocratic and may seek to violate democratic norms and institutions. In my conceptualization, whichever politician starts taking undemocratic actions is the undemocratic politician. That could be people on the left or people on the right. That is why this paper is not about populism and does not place itself in the populist literature. The present article is entirely focusing on undemocratic actions. Indeed, at the moment we live in, it tends to be the case that many of these undemocratic politicians are also populist. Yet, that should not be the case in different historical contexts. Putin, for example, is not a populist at all.

6 See Svolik, “When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue”; Graham and Svolik, “Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States.”

7 Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil; Keefer, “Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies.”

8 Kinder and Kalmoe, Neither Liberal nor Conservative.

9 For an insightful discussion of the concept, see Iyengar et al., “The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States.”

10 Somer, McCoy, and Russell Evan Luke, “Pernicious Polarization, Autocratization and Opposition Strategies”

11 Reiljan, “Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines’ (Also) in Europe.”

12 Kronick, Plunkett, and Rodríguez, “Heresthetic Threats to Democracy”; Chiopris, Nalepa, and Vanberg, “A Wolf in Sheep`s Clothing: Citizen Uncertainty and Democratic Backsliding”; Grossman et al., “The Majoritarian Threat to Liberal Democracy”; Albertus and Grossman, “Democratic Fragilities in the Americas”; Becher and Brouard, “Executive Accountability Beyond Outcomes”; Gandhi and Ong, “Committed or Conditional Democrats? Opposition Dynamics in Electoral Autocracies”; Graham and Svolik, “Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States”; Svolik, “When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue”; Svolik, “Voting Against Autocracy.”

13 McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, “Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy”; McCoy and Somer, “Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms Democracies”; Somer, McCoy, and Russell Evan Luke, “Pernicious Polarization, Autocratization and Opposition Strategies”; Haggard and Kaufman, Backsliding.

14 Haggard and Kaufman, Dictators and Democrats; Boix, Democracy and Redistribution; Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development.

15 Mayer, Dark Money.

16 Snyder, Inside Countries; Gibson, Boundary Control.

17 Capoccia, Defending Democracy

18 Meyerrose, “The Unintended Consequences of Democracy Promotion.”

19 Bermeo, “On Democratic Backsliding”; Pérez-Liñán, Schmidt, and Vairo, “Presidential Hegemony and Democratic Backsliding in Latin America, 1925–2016.”

20 Kronick, Plunkett, and Rodríguez, “Heresthetic Threats to Democracy”; Chiopris, Nalepa, and Vanberg, “A Wolf in Sheep`s Clothing: Citizen Uncertainty and Democratic Backsliding.”

21 Grossman et al., “The Majoritarian Threat to Liberal Democracy.”

22 Albertus and Grossman, “Democratic Fragilities in the Americas.”

23 Becher and Brouard, “Executive Accountability Beyond Outcomes.”

24 Gandhi and Ong, “Committed or Conditional Democrats? Opposition Dynamics in Electoral Autocracies”

25 Graham and Svolik, “Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States”; Svolik, “When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue”; Svolik, “Voting Against Autocracy.”

26 McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, “Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy”; McCoy and Somer, “Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms Democracies”; Svolik, “When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue”; Graham and Svolik, “Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States.”

27 Graham and Svolik, “Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States”; Svolik, “When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue.”

28 Graham and Svolik, “Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States.”

29 Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil; Keefer, “Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies.”

30 Kinder and Kalmoe, Neither Liberal nor Conservative.

31 McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, “Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy”; McCoy and Somer, “Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms Democracies”; Somer, McCoy, and Russell Evan Luke, “Pernicious Polarization, Autocratization and Opposition Strategies”; Haggard and Kaufman, Backsliding.

32 Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, “Affect, Not Ideology.”

33 See Mason, “‘I Disrespectfully Agree’.”

34 Iyengar and Krupenkin, “The Strengthening of Partisan Affect”; Mason, “‘I Disrespectfully Agree’.”

35 Levendusky and Malhotra, “(Mis)perceptions of Partisan Polarization in the American Public.”

36 Iyengar et al., “The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States.”

37 Iyengar and Westwood, “Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines.”

38 Baumeister and Leary, “The Need to Belong.”

39 Brewer and Pierce, “Social Identity Complexity and Outgroup Tolerance”; Tajfel and Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.”

40 See Tajfel, “Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination.”

41 Oakes, “The Salience of Social Categories.”

42 Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, “Affect, Not Ideology”; Mason, “‘I Disrespectfully Agree’.”

43 Gidron, Adams, and Horne, “Toward a Comparative Research Agenda on Affective Polarization in Mass Publics.”

44 Laebens and Öztürk, “Partisanship and Autocratization.”

45 Iyengar and Westwood, “Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines.”

46 Iyengar et al., “The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States”; Gidron, Adams, and Horne, “Toward a Comparative Research Agenda on Affective Polarization in Mass Publics”; Reiljan, “‘Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines’ (Also) in Europe”; Huddy, Bankert, and Davies, “Expressive Versus Instrumental Partisanship in Multiparty European Systems”; Westwood et al., “The Tie That Divides.”

47 Iyengar and Krupenkin, “The Strengthening of Partisan Affect.”

48 Gidron, Adams, and Horne, American Affective Polarization in Comparative Perspective.

49 Iyengar et al., “The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States”; Druckman et al., “Affective Polarization, Local Contexts and Public Opinion in America.”

50 Broockman, Kalla, and Westwood, “Does Affective Polarization Undermine Democratic Norms or Accountability? Maybe Not.”

51 Campbell, Polarized.

52 Webster and Abramowitz, “The Ideological Foundations of Affective Polarization in the U.S. Electorate.”

53 Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, “Affect, Not Ideology.”

54 Mason, “‘I Disrespectfully Agree’.”

55 Handlin, State Crisis in Fragile Democracies.

56 Payne, The Broken Ladder.

57 Partizanship does not necessarily be “bad” for democracy. That is why my theoretical framework focuses on the changes in identity hierarchy. To me, affective polarization reflects the increasing salience of partisan identities, but it is not the synonym of strong partizanship. Strong partisans do not necessarily be the affective partisans, although they are vulnerable to be. Thus, affective polarization mainly requires high levels of dislike of out-party but not necessarily relies on positive views of in-party.

58 Gaertner et al., “The Common Ingroup Identity Model.”

59 See Billig and Tajfel, “Social Categorization and Similarity in Intergroup Behaviour.”

60 Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz, “Party Polarization in American Politics.”

61 Iyengar and Krupenkin, “The Strengthening of Partisan Affect.”

62 Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, “Affect, Not Ideology.”

63 See footnote 13.

64 See Haggard and Kaufman, Backsliding. They convincingly draw the governing strategies of backsliding autocrats.

65 Svolik, “Polarization Versus Democracy.”

66 Lust and Waldner, “Unwelcome Change,” 2.

67 Croissant and Haynes, “Democratic Regression in Asia.”

68 Skaaning, “Waves of Autocratization and Democratization.”

69 Lust and Waldner, “Unwelcome Change.”

70 Dahl, Polyarchy.

71 Since my research mainly concerns the correlation between affective polarization and democratic backsliding, it only includes 5-year differences of the years when the CSES surveys have been conducted.

72 “Feeling thermometer” becomes the primary form to measure affective polarization. Typically, respondents are asked to rate their feelings for all of the political parties in their elections on a 101-point scale ranging from cold (0) to warm (100).

73 See for a comprehensive review Iyengar et al., “The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States.”

74 Reiljan, “Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines’ (Also) in Europe.”

75 Ward and Tavits, “How Partisan Affect Shapes Citizens’ Perception of the Political World”; Gidron, Adams, and Horne, “Toward a Comparative Research Agenda on Affective Polarization in Mass Publics”; Wagner, “Affective Polarization in Multiparty Systems.”

76 Reiljan, “Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines’ (Also) in Europe.”

77 McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, “Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy”; McCoy and Somer, “Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms Democracies”; Svolik, “When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue”; Graham and Svolik, “Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States.”

78 Ezrow, “The Variance Matters”; Lachat, “The Impact of Party Polarization on Ideological Voting”; Dalton, “The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems”; Lupu, “Party Polarization and Mass Partisanship”; Reiljan, “‘Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines’ (Also) in Europe.”

79 Boix, Democracy and Redistribution; Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.

80 Kapstein and Converse, The Fate of Young Democracies.

81 Ginsburg and Moustafa, Rule by Law; Gibler and Randazzo, “Testing the Effects of Independent Judiciaries on the Likelihood of Democratic Backsliding.”

82 Gelman and Hill, Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models; Clark and Linzer, “Should I Use Fixed or Random Effects?”

83 Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil; Keefer, “Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies.”

84 See Somer, McCoy, and Russell Evan Luke, “Pernicious Polarization, Autocratization and Opposition Strategies”. They convincingly explains how backsliders both thrive and fuel it.

85 Svolik, “Learning to Love Democracy.”

86 Dahl, Polyarchy.

87 Dryzek, Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance.

88 Strickler, “Deliberate with the Enemy? Polarization, Social Identity, and Attitudes Toward Disagreement.”

89 McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, “Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy.”

90 Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, “Affect, Not Ideology.”

91 A recent measurement from V-Dem seeks to provide panel data on polarization. Since they look at how opposing political camps are reluctant to engage in friendly interactions only, their data have several theoretical problems. Despite these limitations, a recent article written by Somer et al. published in this journal has found significant relationships between pernicious polarization and democratic backsliding – which reinforces this research’s findings. See Somer, McCoy, and Russell Evan Luke, “Pernicious Polarization, Autocratization and Opposition Strategies.”

92 Graham and Svolik, “Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States”; Svolik, “When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue.”

93 See Broockman, Kalla, and Westwood, “Does Affective Polarization Undermine Democratic Norms or Accountability? Maybe Not.”

94 Lipset, Political Man; Dahl, Polyarchy; Sartori, Parties and Party Systems; Linz and Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes; Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.

95 Svolik, “Polarization Versus Democracy.”

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Yunus Emre Orhan

Yunus Emre Orhan is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science at UWM. His scholarly work focuses on political behaviour in developing countries, determinants of democratic backsliding, and authoritarian survival. His dissertation project, “The Road to Democratic Backsliding: How Affective Polarization Increases Support for Illiberal Politicians?”, is a theoretical and empirical investigation of the causes and consequences of the support for democratic backsliding. https://uwm.edu/political-science/people/orhan-yunus/