https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8738-9527
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ABSTRACT
After a decade as the stand-out democracy of the Middle East, Tunisia took an anti-democratic turn in July 2021 with President Kaïs Saïed’s self-coup. Using a survey fielded in the weeks after these reforms, this article documents the substantial support for liberal institutions and civil rights in Tunisia. Democracy itself, on the other hand, is not so strongly supported. The study thus identifies potential for democratic backsliding in Tunisia through the strategic implementation liberal but anti-democratic actions. Other would-be authoritarians could follow Saïed’s model of strategic regression to autocratize their regimes.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 I thank Ryan Carlin and Matthew Singer and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on prior versions of this manuscript.
2 Ellali and O’Grady, “Tunisia’s fledgling democracy”
3 POMED. “Examining Tunisia’s Political Crisis.”
4 Ridge, Hannah. “(Il)liberal Democrats in Egypt.”
5 Schedler and Sarsfield. “Democrats with adjectives” and Schedler and Sarsfield. “ Demócratas iliberales”
6 Liberalism and democracy are necessarily distinguished. Democracy means the people rule directly or “must at least be able to choose their representatives in free and fair elections.” Liberalism sets “what the limits to [leaders’] power are once they are in office. These limits, which are ultimately designed to protect the rights of the individual [and] demand the rule of law” (Plattner Citation2019, 7). To avoid confusion from evolving interpretations of “liberal” economic policy, the word social is used for redistributive economic policies.
7 Hammami, “Past as Prologue”
8 Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2022.
9 Brown, “Tunisia's Saied appoints Najla Bouden Romdhane”
10 “Tunisian President to change voting”
11 Amara, “Tunisians union calls national strike”
12 “Tunisia judges strike”
13 “Tunisia: Protest marks new coalition”
14 Marzouki, “Coup in Tunisia”
15 Marzouki, “Coup in Tunisia”
16 Blackman and Nugent, “Tunisia’s president threatened”
17 Note: The word used in the Arab Barometer and Blackman and Nugent questions is dimuqratiyya. Approximately half of MENA citizens construe dimuqratiyya as a set of socio-economic outcomes, rather than a description of political processes (Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins Citation2012). This makes the term a poor translation from an analytical perspective. Questions using dimuqratiyya functionally overestimate democratic commitment (Ridge Citation2019). The word was avoided in this survey for that reason.
18 Grubman and Şaşmaz. “The Collapse of Tunisia’s Party System”
19 Grubman and Şaşmaz. “The Collapse of Tunisia’s Party System”
20 YouGov MENA uses “search engine optimization (SEO), affiliate networks, niche websites, and growth hacking techniques such as panelist refer-a-friend campaigns and social networks” to ensure hard-to-reach populations like young people and ethnic minorities are included in the panel. Panelist demographics are measured every 3–6 months to keep age, income, education, employment, and location information current. YouGov MENA monitors the omnibus for speeders and straightliners; recurrently-flagged respondents are removed from the panel (YouGov Citation2017). Online surveys require access to the internet or mobile phones. According to the International Telecommunication Union, internet penetration in Tunisia is 66.7%; per the Instance Nationale des Télécommunication, 98.9% of the population is covered by 2G, 3G, or 4G, with 4G covering 91.3% of the population (Freedom House Citation2021a). It is thus possible for internet-based surveys to reach most Tunisians. The surveys are answerable in desktop, tablet, and mobile formats.
21 Nyhan and Zeitzoff, “Conspiracy and misperception”; Isani and Schlipphak, “The role of societal cues”; Ridge “(Il)liberal democrats in Egypt”; and Blackman and Jackson, “Gender Stereotypes”
22 Nine foreigners took the survey, but they are excluded from the analysis. Eighteen individuals opened the omnibus link but did not fill it out for unknown reasons. YouGov reported a completion rate of 98.48%. 1.52% either started but did not submit the survey for unknown reasons or failed YouGov’s quality check (correctly identifying a picture of an electronic device or animal).
23 MENA survey-takers may be more likely to answer surveys are sponsored by universities than by governments, though the results are mixed on that front (Corstange Citation2014; Gengler et al Citation2019). The survey and consent procedure were approved by the university IRB.
24 An internet panel increases anonymity, which improves honesty while reducing skipping and bias (Lupu and Michelitch Citation2018). Research on the influence of Covid-19 on surveys suggests it is not biasing response patterns (Peyton, Huber, and Coppock Citation2020).
25 These summary statistics do not include the demographic weights YouGov provides for age and gender representativeness.
26 This is higher than the 21.6% measured in the Arab Barometer, but that survey also showed that 49.1% of Tunisians had completed secondary education. The country is generally well-educated. To the extent that education is associated with support for democracy, this could lead to a slight overestimation of democratic commitment. Other MENA studies have not substantiated that relationship, however (Jamal Citation2006; Ridge Citation2019). Thus, although the moderate support here for democracy could represent the best-case scenario for measuring democratic commitment, it is not evident that it is an overestimation.
27 UNESCO. “Education and Literacy.”
28 Non-response to income is expected; 8.4% declined to name their income. In 2018, the Arab Barometer treated 450 dinar as the median monthly income, so these figures are in line with the national statistics.
29 The reference to America likely reflects the fact that respondents were told an American researcher originated the survey so that they knew it was not the Tunisian government.
30 Schmitter and Karl, “What democracy is,” 76
31 Plattner, “Illiberal Democracy”
32 Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics
33 This is a standard democratic support question; it is used in surveys like the Afrobarometer. It is useful to distinguish individuals who will support and protect a democratic regime from those who would be merely tolerant of one. Those who view democracy as one acceptable choice among many would be less likely to constrain a would-be autocrat, who could claim exceptional circumstance or propose one of their accepted alternatives.
34 Arab Barometer II
35 Arab Barometer VI
36 Ridge “(Il)liberal democrats in Egypt”
37 Schedler and Sarsfield (Citation2007;2009), who conducted a similar study in Mexico, addressed indigenous populations and homosexuals. While four-fifths endorsed participation by indigenous citizens, only about half endorsed homosexuals’ participation.
38 Ridge “(Il)liberal democrats in Egypt”
39 Schedler and Sarsfield. “Democrats with adjectives” and Schedler and Sarsfield. “ Demócratas iliberales”
40 Arab Barometer V
41 Arab Barometer VI
42 Ridge “(Il)liberal democrats in Egypt”; Schedler and Sarsfield. “Democrats with adjectives” and Schedler and Sarsfield. “ Demócratas iliberales”
43 Rollinde and Le Saout, Émeutes et mouvements sociaux; Thyen and Karadag, “Between affordable welfare”
44 Bishara, “Precarious collective action”; Hong, “Demographic Pressure”
45 Arab Barometer V
46 Schedler and Sarsfield “Democrats with adjectives,” 639
47 Plattner “Illiberal Democracy,” 6–7
48 Carlin and Singer “Support for Polyarchy,” 1058
49 Schedler and Sarsfield. “Democrats with adjectives” and Schedler and Sarsfield. “ Demócratas iliberales”
50 Carlin and Singer (Citation2011)
51 Carlin, “Distrusting democrats”
52 Ridge “(Il)liberal democrats in Egypt”
53 Schedler and Sarsfield. “Democrats with adjectives” and Schedler and Sarsfield. “ Demócratas iliberales”
54 Carrión, “Illiberal democracy”; Ciftci, “Secular-Islamist cleavage”; García-Peñalosa and Konte, “Why are women”
55 Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer, “The relationship between”
56 Ellali and O’Grady, “Tunisia’s fledgling democracy”
57 Marzouki, “Coup in Tunisia”
58 POMED, “Examining Tunisia’s Political Crisis,” 10
59 Blackman and Nugent, “Tunisia’s president threatened”
60 “Poll: Tunisia President Saied”
61 Welzel, “Democratic Horizons”
62 Foa, Mounk, and Klassen, “Why The Future”
63 Mounk, The people vs. democracy
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Hannah M. Ridge
Hannah M. Ridge is a postdoctoral scholar in the University of Chicago Center for Human Rights. Her research features public opinion on democracy, Middle Eastern politics, religion/secularism politics, and construct validity. She earned a Ph.D. in Political Science at Duke University and an M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Chicago.