Bandwagon for Status: Changing Patterns in the Nordic States Status-seeking Strategies?

ABSTRACT

Why do the small Nordic states engage themselves in militarized interventions alongside the United States? The article argues that the Nordic states gradually have begun to perceive militarized coalition participation as an important tool to gain reputation and improve their status position. A good relationship with the United States is considered as a means to either consolidate or improve their relative status position and also secure protection or ‘shelter’ against regional competitors by improving their reputation. Empirically, the article contributes to our understanding of the status-seeking strategies of the Nordic countries and how they might have utilized a more militarized activism to seek status that departs from the traditional Nordic internationalism. Theoretically, the article contributes to our understanding of the concept of ‘status’ in international relations by offering a new explanation of the puzzling willingness of small states to use military means in international conflicts where immaterial gains play a larger role than otherwise assumed in the realist small-state literature.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Rasmus Brun Pedersen, associate professor at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University. His current research includes small states foreign policy and the development of qualitative research methods.

Notes

1 Ingebritsen, “Norm Entrepreneurs”; de Cavalho, “Brasil”; Neumann, “Status is Cultural”; Neumann and de Cavalho, “Small States and Status.”

2 Lawlor, “Janus-faced Solidarity.”

3 Mourtizen and Wivel, Euro-Atlantic integration; Ringsmose, “NATO Burden Sharing Redux”; Bailes, Thayer, and Thorhallsson, “Alliance Theory and Alliance ‘Shelter’.”

4 Kuisma, “Social Democratic Internationalism”; Lawlor, “Janus-Faced Solidarity.”

5 Walt, “Alliance Formation”; Walt, Origins of Alliances.

6 Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit”; Wood, “Prestige in World Politics.”

7 Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, “Motives for War,” 375.

8 The logic here is that small states very seldom challenge or compete with great powers for status. This suggests that global great powers such as the United States have very different peer groups than smaller states such as Denmark.

9 Neumann and de Cavalho, “Small States and Status.”

10 See also Pouilot, International Pecking Orders; Neumann and de Cavalho, “Small States and Status.”

11 See for instance the work of Mouritzen & Wivel 2005, where they use the concept of goodwill.

12 Neumann and de Cavalho, “Small States and Status,” 12–3.

13 Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, “Motives for War,” 4.

14 Ibid.

15 Renshon, “Status Deficits and War.”

16 Neumann and de Cavalho, “Small States and Status.”

17 Mercer, Reputation and International Politics; Mercer, “Illusion of International Prestige.”

18 Press, Calculating Credibility.

19 Wohlforth, “Unipolarity.”

20 Neumann and de Cavalho, “Small States and Status.”

21 Reiter and Gärtner, Small States and Alliances; Walt, Origins of Alliances; Walt, “Theories of Alliance Formation,” 55, 57; Mouritzen, “Denmark’s Super Atlanticism.”

22 Archer, Bailes, and Wivel, Small States and International Security.

23 Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit.”

24 Mouritzen and Wivel, Explaining Foreign Policy.

25 Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit.”

26 Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit,” 79.

27 For example, Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations; Markey, “Prestige and the Origins of War.”

28 Karlsrud and Osland, “Self-interest and Solidarity.”

29 Koops and Tercovich, “European Return,” 2.

30 Nilsson and Zetterlund, “Sweden and the UN.”

31 Smed and Wivel, “Vulnerability Without Capabilities,” 80.

32 Beach and Pedersen, Causal Case Studies.

33 For recent examples, see Henriksen and Ringsmose, What did Denmark gain? Pedersen and Reykers, Small States Bandwagon; Jakobsen, Ringsmose, and Saxi, Bandwagoning for Prestige.

34 Jakobsen, “Denmark and UN Peacekeeping.”

35 Møller, Operation Bøllebank; Petersen, “Den tro allierede.”

36 Branner, I krig igen.

37 Petersen, “Den tro allierede.”

38 Jakobsen, Ringsmose, and Saxi, Bandwagoning for Prestige.

39 Danish Parliament, Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om et dansk militært bidrag; Danish Parliament, Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om et udvidet dansk.

40 Politiken, Danmark klar til militær aktion.

41 Petersen, Den tro allierede.

42 Danish Parliament, Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om dansk militær deltagelse; Danish Parliament, Første behandling af beslutningsforslag nr. B 45.

43 Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, En verden i forandring.

44 Rasmussen, “Hvad kan det nytte?”

45 Rasmussen, “60 året for 29. august 1943”; Rasmussen, “Visioner om Danmarks aktive Europapolitik”; Rasmussen, “Danmark må gøre op med småstatsmentaliteten.”

46 Jakobsen, Ringsmose, and Saxi, Bandwagoning for Prestige.

47 Ibid.

48 Jakobsen, “The Danish Libya Campaign,” 199.

49 Jakobsen, Ringsmose, and Saxi, Bandwagoning for Prestige.

50 Rasmussen, “60 året for 29. august 1943.”

51 Rasmussen, “60 året for 29. august 1943”; Rasmussen, “Visioner om Danmarks aktive Europapolitik”; Rasmussen, “Danmark må gøre op med småstatsmentaliteten.”

52 Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, En verden i forandring.

53 Ibid.

54 Karlsrud and Osland, “Self-interest and Solidarity,” 16.

55 Jakobsen, Ringsmose, and Saxi, Bandwagoning for Prestige.

56 Saxi, “So Similar.”

57 Forsvarsdepartementet, Beredskap for fred, 61–69.

58 Saxi, “So Similar.”

59 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Tilpasning av forsvaret, 10.

60 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interesser, Ansvar og Muligheter, 98.

61 Quoted from Jakobsen, Ringsmose, and Saxi, Bandwagoning for Prestige.

62 Devold quoted in The New York Times on August 24, 2003.

63 Godal et al., En god alliert, 138–55.

64 Jakobsen, Ringsmose, and Saxi, Bandwagoning for Prestige.

65 Saxi, Norwegian and Danish Defence Policy; Jakobsen, Ringsmose, and Saxi, Bandwagoning for Prestige.

66 Utenriksdepartementet, Irak.

67 Jakobsen, Ringsmose, and Saxi, Bandwagoning for Prestige.

68 Verdens Gang, “Norge sier nei til NATO”; Browning, “Brand Nordicity,” 36–9.

69 Saxi, “So Similar.”

70 Stoltenberg, Min Historie, 447.

71 Ask, “Stoltenberg skal møte Obama.”

72 White House, United States and Norway.

73 Nilsson and Zetterlund, “Sweden and the UN.”

74 Haglund, “Credible Defense Forces.”

75 Forsberg, “The Rise of Nordic Defence Cooperation.”

76 Archer, “Small States,” 54–5.

77 Doeser, “Finland, Sweden, and Operation Unified Protector.”

78 Ibid.

79 Swedish Government, Sweden in NATO Led Operations – Completed; Swedish Government, Sweden in NATO Led Operations – Ongoing.

80 Doeser, “Finland, Sweden and Operation Unified Protector.”

81 Ibid.

82 Swedish Parliament 2010/11 March 29, 2011, Statement 1.

83 Bildt, Personal Blog.

84 Swedish Government, Sweden in NATO Led Operations – Completed.

85 Doeser, “Sweden’s Participation in Operation Unified Protector,” 648–9.

86 Quoted in Doeser, Sweden’s Participation, 649.

87 Doeser, “Sweden's Libya Decision.”

88 Kaim, Reforming NATO's Partnerships, 15.

89 Ringsmose, “NATO Burden Sharing Redux”; Moore, “Lisbon and the Evolution of NATO's New Partnership Policy.”

90 Doeser, “Finland, Sweden, and Operation Unified Protector.”

91 Finnish Ministry of Defense, “Finlands säkerhets- och Sörsvarspolitik 2012.”

92 Coffey and Kochis, The Role of Sweden and Finland; NATO, “Relations with Finland.”

93 Gotkowska and Szymański, Pro-American Non-alignment.

94 Eelland, “Friends, But Not Allies”; Gotkowska and Szymański, Pro-American Non-alignment.

95 Finnish Ministry of Defense, “Puolustusministeri Niinistö.”

96 NATO, “Relations with Finland.”

97 Finnish Ministry of Defense, Section III.

98 Gotkowska and Szymański, Pro-American Non-alignment.

99 Stubb, “Finnish Participation.”

100 Doeser, “Finland, Sweden and Operation Unified Protector,” 290.

101 Halonen, “Halonen Lukewarm.”

102 NATO, “Relations with Finland.”

103 Lawlor, “The Good State in World Politics.”

104 Doeser, Sweden’s Participation; Doeser, Sweden's Lybia decision.

105 Doeser, “Finland, Sweden and Operation Unified Protector.”

106 Swedish Government, Nationell strategi för svenskt deltagande, 4.

107 Ibid., 6.

108 Doeser, “Sweden's Libya Decision.

109 Doeser, “Finland, Sweden and Operation Unified Protector.”

110 Sweeney and Fritz, Jumping on the Bandwagon.

111 Pedersen and Reykers, Small States Bandwagon for Status?

112 Mouritzen, “Small States and Finlandisation.”