ABSTRACT
Discussions surrounding a new labor law in Egypt, started after the 2011 uprising. However, this law has not yet been promulgated until today. How can this delay be explained? The present article argues that the delay reflects the difficult position in which the post-2014 regime found itself and the difficult choices it had to make. Building on a systematic reading of Egyptian media from 2014 to 2020, this article reconstructs discussions about different versions of the draft law, identifying dilemmas the post-2014 regime faced: on one hand, it sought to opt for a more nuanced approach to flexibility and deregulation while also limiting the arbitrary power of employers over workers that had led to wildcat strikes under Mubarak. On the other hand, it sought to prevent international companies from stopping imports from Egyptian factories and suppliers due to their lack of compliance with international labor standards. In response, the regime coopted moderate segments of the independent unionist movement and adopted some labor-friendly measures that were rejected by employer representatives. This led to a postponement of a decision regarding the law.
Acknowledgements
Research for this paper has been generously supported by a grant of the Volkswagen-Stiftung in the context of the research project “Struggles over Socioeconomic Reforms: Political Conflict and Social Contention in Egypt and Tunisia post 2011 in Interregional Comparison”, a cooperation of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, the Arab Forum for Alternatives and the University of Sfax.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Worth noting is that the budget deficit in Egypt leaped from an already high rate of 8.1 per cent of GDP in 2010 to 11.6 per cent in 2015. Egypt’s public debt, which is largely domestic, as a percentage of GDP, rose sharply from 73.7 per cent in 2010 to 85 per cent in 2015, expanding to 92 per cent of GDP in 2017 (Adly, 2020, p. 15). Moreover, Egypt’s crushing debt burden is reflected by the high cost of servicing it. In 2018, interest payments absorbed some 35 per cent of the budget, eating up almost 55 per cent of all government revenue (Osama, 2018).
2. See also: ILO Officer. (2022, August 21). Personal Interview.
3. Ibid.
4. For more information about the position of Egypt according to the World Bank Governance Indicators, please check: https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports.
5. Ex-minister of labour. (2020, February 25). Personal interview.
6. ILO Officer. (2022, August 21). Personal Interview. op.cit.
7. Ex-minister of labour and ILO officer. Personal interviews. op. cit.
8. Ex-minister of labour. Personal Interview. op. cit. and ILO officer. (2019, March). Personal interview.
9. For more info about this tool, please check: https://betterwork.org/portfolio/better-works-global-compliance-assessment-tool/.
10. For more info on the work of the BWP with factories, please check: https://betterwork.org/our-work/better-work-factory-services/.
11. ILO Officer. (2022, August 21). Personal Interview. op. cit.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. One point worth noting is that Mohamed Al-Sewidy, president of the Federation of Egyptian Industries (FEI), also holds the position of the head of the parliamentary governmental coalition and that Farag Amer, member of the executive board of the Egyptian Federation of Investors Association (EFIA), is also head of the parliamentary Industrial Committee.
15. Senior executive at CTUWS (2019, March). Personal interview.
16. The amount of the ´social security income´ as determined by the employer is usually less than the real amount of income earned by the worker. This enables employers to decrease the amount of social security payments due to the workers. (Ex-Minister of Labor. Personal Interview. op.cit).
17. Consultant to the ILO. (2022, September 9). Personal interview.
18. Labour Lawyer and ex-member of the committee drafting the current labour law appointed by the Ministry of Labour post-2011 (2019, March 16). Personal Interview.
19. Ex-minister of labour. Personal interview. op.cit.
20. The HCW is a governmental body charged with determining the minimum wage in line with price fluctuations.
21. In addition, Gamal Uqbi, vice-president of the ETUF, and Mohamed Wahb Allah, the ETUF’s secretary-general, hold the positions of deputy heads of this committee.
22. The coalition is composed by 317 members out of 596 parliament deputies.
23. Senior Executive in CTUWS (2020, January 21). Personal interview.
24. Ibid.
25. The proposed parallel draft labour law was titled Workers first, then the investment. https://www.facebook.com/7amla.na7o.kanon.3adel.lel3aml/.
26. Senior Executive in CTUWS. Personal interview. op.cit.