Humanitarian coercion: Assessing the strategic role of non-state actors in the Kosovo war

Abstract

This article analyses the strategic role of NGOs, the global media, and international criminal courts in the Kosovo war. I argue that the global media, NGOs, the internal displacement of peoples, and international criminal courts are not simply instrumental to the exercise of state power, but are independent factors that actively shape the coercer's strategic policy. Three claims serve as the basis of my argument: first, humanitarian suffering, as evidenced by flows of internally displaced peoples, NGOs and media reporting, bolsters the credibility of the coercer's threats and demands; second, the risk that state leaders may be tried for war crimes unless they comply with the coercer's demands expands the scope of the coercive success; and, third, the demand for peace-building measures enhances the prospects for compliance.

Notes

1. It is worth distinguishing between what is a moral defence of human rights in coercive diplomacy, and a functional defence of human rights. A moral defence of intervention, for instance, may provide the arguments for making human rights abuses a source of moral legitimacy, but fail to grasp how humanitarian objectives provide the basis for economic and moral benefits for long-term compliance. In other words, a strictly moral defence does not directly address the issue of how human rights tend to heighten the target's responsiveness to the coercer's demands. Just because one is willing to defend at whatever cost the moral cause of human rights in coercive diplomacy does not mean that s/he believes that humanitarian objectives can generate successful and predictable outcomes in coercive diplomacy.

2. See L. Freedman, ‘Strategic Coercion’, in L. Freedman (ed), Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998), Chapter 1, pp.15–28; A.L. George, ‘Theory and Practice’, in A.L George and W.E. Simons (eds), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Chapter 1, pp. 13–22; S.J. Cimbala, Coercive Military Strategy (College Station: Texas A&M University Press 1998); E. Herring, Danger and Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcomes (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1995); R.A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1996).

3. George et al. (note 2) pp.12–14.

4. A. Stigler, ‘A Clear Victory for Air Power’, International Security, Vol.27(2002), pp.125–6.

5. D. Byman and M. Waxman, ‘Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate’, International Security, Vol.24 (2000), pp.7–8; Ivo Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 2000).

6. See P.V. Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's Press 1998), p.27. Drawing on the framework of George's model, Jakobsen proposes an ideal policy comprised of four general criteria designed to evaluate the success and failure of coercive diplomacy. These include: ‘a) a threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost, backed by the necessary capability; b) a deadline for compliance, c) an assurance to the adversary against future demands; d) an offer of carrots for compliance’.

7. J.M. Coicaud, ‘Solidarity versus Geostrategy: Kosovo and the Dilemmas of International Democratic Culture’, in A. Schnabel and R. Thakur (eds), Kosovo and the Challenge of humanitarian intervention: Selective indignation, collective action, and international citizenship (New York: United Nations University Press 2000), pp.463–81.

8. C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1996), p.54.

9. Ibid.

10. R.M. Hayden, ‘Biased Justice: Humanitarianism and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, in R.G.C. Thomas (ed), Yugoslavia Unraveled (Lanham: Lexington Books 2003), p.261.

11. See e.g. R. Jervis, ‘Deterrence and Perception’, International Security, Vol.7 (1978), pp.3–30; R. Lebow and J. Gross Stein, ‘Deterrence: Building a Better Theory’, Journal of Social Issues, Vol.43 (1990), pp.155–69. For a critical discussion of the rational limits of deterrence theory, see J. Berejikian, ‘A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.39 (2002), pp.185–205.

12. Freedman (note 2) p.15.

13. Ibid. p.17.

14. It should be noted that George's more recent work focuses on the strengths of preventive diplomacy. See A. George, ‘Strategies for Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: Scholarship for Policymaking’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol.34 (1999), pp.9–21.

15. George (note 2) p.11.

16. Freedman (note 2) p.17.

17. L. Freedman, ‘The Split Screen War: Kosovo and Changing Concepts of the Use of Force’, in A. Schnabel and R. Thakur (eds), Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship (New York: United Nations Press 2000), p.423.

18. Ibid. p.425.

19. Pape (note 2) pp.14–17.

20. See H. Ullman and J. Wade, Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (Washington DC: National Defense University).

21. G. Schaub, ‘Compellence: Resuscitating the Concept’, in L. Freedman (ed), Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998), p.41.

22. Freedman (note 2) pp.15–18.

23. K. Greenhill, ‘The Use of Refugees as Political and Military Weapons in the Kosovo Conflict’, in Thomas (ed), Yugoslavia Unraveled, pp.206–7. See also B. Posen. ‘The War in Kosovo’, International Security, Vol.24 (2000), pp.39–84.

24. For a detailed discussion of these two objectives, see Dresov Kyril, ‘Collateral Damage: The Impact on Macedonia of the Kosovo War’, in M. Waller, K. Drezov and B. Gokay (eds), Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion (London: Frank Cass Publishers 2001), pp.61–65; Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000).

25. S. Livingston, ‘Media Coverage of the war: An Empirical Assessment’, in A. Schnabel and R. Thakur (eds), Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship (New York: United Nations Press 2000), p.375.

26. See J. Van Selm, ‘Perceptions of Kosovo's Refugees’, in M. Buckley and S.N. Cummings (eds), Kosovo: Perceptions of War and its Aftermath (London: Continuum Press 2001), pp.261–2. It is estimated, for instance, that Germany took in nearly 350,000 Bosnian refugees during the Bosnian war, a factor which might explain Germany's objective of protecting the refugees within the region.

27. The total number of internally displaced refugees was estimated at 226,500 as compared to 433,300 and 64,000 refugees that flowed into Albania and Macedonia respectively.

28. Livingston (note 25) p.381.

29. US Department of State, ‘Excerpts from Remarks by Secretary of State Albright, February 23, 1999’, in P.E. Auerswald and D.P. Auerswald (eds), The Kosovo Conflict: A Diplomatic History Through Documents (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2000), p.597. The Contact Group responded to the reported massacre by issuing its own statement, which called upon ‘the FRY to promote the safe return home of all those persons displaced in the past few days from the Racak area … to permit the KVM and its Chief of Mission to carry out their responsibilities unimpeded; co-operate fully with the ICTY, in particular by allowing unimpeded access for its investigators to Kosovo’. The Contact Group statement further declares: ‘The Security Council strongly condemns the massacre of Kosovar Albanians in the village of Racak in Southern Kosovo, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on 15 January 1999, as reported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). It notes with deep concern that the report of the KVM states that the victims were civilians, including women and at least one child. The Council also takes note of the statement by the Head of the KVM that the responsibility for the massacre lay with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia armed forces and Serbian special police had been involved. The Council emphasizes the need for an urgent and full investigation of the facts and urgently calls upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to work with the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and KVM to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice’.

30. The CNN effect is discussed in J. Hoge, ‘Media Pervasiveness’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.73 (1994), pp. 75–80. For a detailed literature review of the CNN effect, see P. Robinson, ‘The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy’, Review of International Studies, Vol.25 (1999), pp.301–9.

31. Edward Herman and David Peterson, ‘CNN: Selling Nato's War Globally’, in P. Hammond and E. Herman (eds), Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis (London: Pluto Press 2000), p.114.

32. S. Ackerman and J. Naureckas, ‘Following Washington's Script: The United States Media and Kosovo’, in Hammond and Herman (eds), Degraded Capability, pp.97–110.

33. Livingston (note 25) p.375.

34. See Human Rights Watch Report on the Kosovo Conflict, http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/03koscape.htm. Human Rights Watch also documented 96 rapes of Kosovar women between March and June of 1999, and determined that most of the rapes were committed by Serbian paramilitaries.

35. In fact the International Crisis group demanded that NATO launch a ground invasion with the aim of removing Milosevic. In a report entitled ‘War in the Balkans: Consequences of the Kosovo Conflict and Future Options for Kosovo and the Region’, the group states: ‘Ground intervention in Kosovo, however, will not in and of itself be sufficient to prevent further shock waves from destabilizing Kosovo and the larger region. The primary goal of international policy in the Balkans should be to remove Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic-the single greatest cause of the crisis and conflict in the region’. By comparison, NATO's threat to send ground troops was predicated on the removal of Serbian troops from the region, which would allow Milosevic to stay in power. International Crisis Group, ‘War in the Balkans: Consequences of the Kosovo Conflict and the Future Options for Kosovo and the Region’. Http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects.showreport.cfm/reportid = 200.

36. See US Department of State, ‘Department of State Press Statement, May 20, 1999’, in Auerswald and Auerswald (eds), The Kosovo Conflict, pp.997–8.

37. Ibid. p.997.

38. Amnesty International, ‘Amnesty International Briefing to the UN Security Council: Evidence of Human Rights Violations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, http://www.amnesty.ca/library/1999/kun2.htm:1-8.

39. It should be noted that NGOs may provide evidence that does not stand up to the strict evidentiary standards of international legal procedure.

40. US Department of State (note 36) p.998.

41. See United Nations, “The Special Report of the Secretary General Prepared Pursuant to Resolution 1160, 1199, 1203 of the Security Council”, UN Doc.S/1999/99, p.5.

42. Coercive theory, for instance, treats the isolation of the target as a contextual variable of coercive diplomacy, which encompasses a range of options for punishing the agent, including trade sanctions and a cut off of conventional military supplies.

43. S. Erlanger, ‘Crisis in the Balkans: Belgrade: Serbs Dismiss Indictment as Just Another Enemy Tactic’, The New York Times, 27 May, p.12A.

44. This is suggested in a Frontline Documentary (2000) entitled The War in Europe, which points to the ‘fact’ that Russia could ill afford to support an accused war criminal while incurring the risk of losing Western economic aid.

45. See e.g. A. D'Amato, ‘Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia’, American Journal of International Law, Vol.88 (1994), pp.502–5; David P. Forsythe, ‘Politics and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, Criminal Law Forum, Vol.5 (1994), pp.401–22.

46. Hayden (note 10) p.261.

47. Ibid.

48. E. Herman, ‘Propaganda System One: From Diem and Arbenz to Milosevic’, in Thomas (ed) Yugoslavia Unraveled, p.248.

49. Article 9 of the ICTY stipulates: ‘At the stage of the procedure, the International Tribunal may formally request national courts to defer the competence of the International Tribunal in accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal’.

50. Erlanger (note 43).

51. Ibid. In a 6 May letter to Germany, Milosevic had indicated Yugoslavian commitment to withdrawing military, police and paramilitary forces' from Kosovo and accepting the deployment of troops to establish an ‘effective international civil and security presence’.

52. Ibid.

53. M. Gordon and E. Schmitt, ‘Crisis in the Balkans: Strategy Shift in Targets Let NATO Jets Tip the Balance’, The New York Times, 5 June 1999, p.1A.

54. K. Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (New York: Cambridge University Press 2001), p.16.

55. Ibid. pp.57–8.

56. L.J. Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom (Boulder: Westview Press 2002), p.342.

57. In dismissing the validity of the Rambouillet Agreement, Milosevic states, ‘That other document, which you call the Rambouillet Agreement, however, is not the Rambouillet Agreement. For neither in Rambouillet nor in Paris did the people who came to negotiate, negotiate. There were no talks between them, therefore there could be no common document to be accepted or rejected’. See United Nations, ‘The Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo (Rambouillet Agreement) as revised by the Serbian Delegation to the Paris Talks, March 15’, in Auerswald and Auerswald (eds), The Kosovo Conflict, pp.625–52.

58. Coicaud (note 7) pp.466–7.

59. Ibid. p.477.

60. T.W. Smith, “The New Law of War: Legitimizing Hi-Tech and Infrastructural Violence”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.46 (2002), pp.366–71.