![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
Non-intervention in Syria highlights how the theory of the responsibility to protect (R2P) is flexible and depends on the strategic position and geopolitics of the state which violates human rights. Indeed the Security Council's several attempts to adopt a resolution have been blocked by the threat of Russia and China to veto. Accepting a Kofi Annan proposal, the only, but unsuccessful, resolution adopted was 2042/2012 which provided for sending a team of observers to verify the maintenance of the ceasefire. Subsequently, the United States proposed a resolution condemning Syria for the failure to authorise the sending of aid to the people but to no avail as this resolution also did not result in any action based on R2P.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Gabriele Lombardo is a PhD student in international order and human rights at the Department of Political Science, University of Rome ‘Sapienza'.
Notes
1 We The Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, UN Doc. A/54/2000, 48; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 55/2, 18 September 2000, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2.
2 Charter of United Nations, article 2, para. 4: ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.'
3 Ibid., para. 7: ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.'
4 Report ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, cap. 4, para. 4.1: ‘The responsibility to protect implies above all else a responsibility to react to situations of compelling need for human protection. When preventive measures fail to resolve or contain the situation and when a state is unable or unwilling to redress the situation, then interventionary measures by other members of the broader community of states may be required. These coercive measures may include political, economic or judicial measures, and in extreme cases – but only extreme cases – they may also include military action. As a matter of first principles, in the case of reaction just as with prevention, less intrusive and coercive measures should always be considered before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied.'
5 Ibid., Synopsis Basic Principles: ‘A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.'
6 C. Focarelli, ‘La dottrina della “Responsabilità di Proteggere” e l'intervento umanitario’, Rivista di diritto internazionale 2 (2008): 323–4.
7 Report ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: ‘The Just Cause Threshold Military intervention for human protection purposes is an exceptional and extraordinary measure. To be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following kind: A. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or B. large scale “ethnic cleansing”, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape. The Precautionary Principles A. Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned. B. Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded. C Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective. D. Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction’, Focarelli, ‘La dottrina della “Responsabilità di Proteggere” e l'intervento umanitario’, 324–5.
8 United Nations, General Assembly Resolution A/59/565, 2 December 2004.
9 United Nations, General Assembly Resolution A/Res/60/1, 24 October 2005.
10 P. Hilpold, ‘The Responsibility to Protect', in The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a New Paradigm of International Law?, ed. Peter Hilpold (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2015), 1–38, at 13.
11 United Nations, General Assembly Resolution A/59/2005, 21 March 2005.
12 World Summit Outcome Document, paras 138–9: 138. ‘Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability’; 139: ‘The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.'
13 L. Panella, ‘La responsabilità di proteggere: un'ulteriore possibilità di tutelare i diritti umani o un diritto d'ingerenza?', in Studi in Onore di Augusto Sinagra, ed. P. Bargiacchi (Roma: Aracne Editrice, 2013), 468; Focarelli, ‘La dottrina della “Responsabilità di Proteggere” e l'intervento umanitario’, 328.
14 African Union Constitutive Act, article 4, para. H: ‘the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave Circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’.
15 S.K. Sharma., ‘The 2007–08 Post-election Crisis in Kenya, A Success Story for the Responsibility to Protect?, in Responsibility to Protect from Principle to Practice, ed. J. Hoffmann and A. Nolkaemper (Amsterdam: Pallas Publications/Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 27–35.
16 R. Cohen, ‘How Kofi Annan Rescued Kenya', The New York Review of Books, 14 August 2008.
17 Panella, ‘La responsabilità di proteggere', 477.
18 T. Ballarino, ‘RtoP/Responsability to Protect', scritti in memoria di Maria Rita Saulle, edizione scientifiche, 23–48.
19 U. Villani, Dalla dichiarazione universale alla Convenzione europea dei diritti dell'uomo (Bari: Cacucci Editore, 2012), 60.
20 Cf. Rivista di diritto internazionale 2 (2011): 630.
21 U. Villani, ‘L'intervento militare in Libia: responsibility to protect o … responsabilità per aggressione?’, in I diritti dell'uomo. Cronache e battaglie 2 (2011): 53–9.
22 Human Rights Council, The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 22 August 2011, S-17/1, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/ResS17_1.pdf.
23 United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), January 2012, http://www.unicef.it/Allegati/HAC2012_LOW_WEB_Final.pdf.
24 Human Rights Council, The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 16 August 2012, A/HRC/21/50, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HCR-21-50_en.pdf.
25 Siria, una crisi senza fine, http://ispinews.ispionline.it/?p=2766.
26 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 2042, 14 April 2012, UN Doc. S/RES/2042 Annex Six-Point Proposal of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States ‘(1) commit to work with the Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people, and, to this end, commit to appoint an empowered interlocutor when invited to do so by the Envoy; (2) commit to stop the fighting and achieve urgently an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties to protect civilians and stabilize the country; To this end, the Syrian government should immediately cease troop movements towards, and end the use of heavy weapons in, population centres, and begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres; As these actions are being taken on the ground, the Syrian government should work with the Envoy to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism. Similar commitments would be sought by the Envoy from the opposition and all relevant elements to stop the fighting and work with him to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism; (3) ensure timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting, and to this end, as immediate steps, to accept and implement a daily two hour humanitarian pause and to coordinate exact time and modalities of the daily pause through an efficient mechanism, including at local level; (4) intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, including especially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons involved in peaceful political activities, provide without delay through appropriate channels a list of all places in which such persons are being detained, immediately begin organizing access to such locations and through appropriate channels respond promptly to all written requests for information, access or release regarding such persons; (5) ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a non-discriminatory visa policy for them; (6) respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed.'
27 United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/2042 adopted on 14 April 2012.
28 United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/2043 adopted on 21 April 2012.
29 Siria: il ruolo chiave della Russia, 28 May 2012, http://it.euronews.com.
30 Syria Insta-Symposium: André Nollkaemper – Intervention in Syria and International Law: Inside or Out?, 1 September 2013, http://www.opiniojuris.org.
31 Charter of United Nations, article 2, para. 7.
32 Syria Insta-Symposium: André Nollkaemper.
33 V. Risuglia, Ripensare l'ONU. La Risoluzione 1973 e la guerra in Libia, http://magna-carta.it/content/ripensare-nazioni-unite-risoluzione-1973-e-lintervento-libia.
34 United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/1970 adopted on 26 February 2011.
35 Ibid.