State collapse, peace enforcement and the responsibility to protect in Somalia

Abstract

Somalia is a collapsed state, hence the responsibility to protect has shifted to the peace enforcement African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This article examines the relationship between state collapse, peace enforcement and the responsibility to protect in Somalia. It focuses on the military component of AMISOM and argues that under conditions of state collapse, coupled with the missions' structural and operational limitations, AMISOM lacks the functional capacity to enforce peace, and extend and restore state authority in Somalia. The structural and operational weaknesses emanating from its mandate have adversely affected its concept of operations and rules of engagement, resulting in human rights violations. It is unable to effectively protect civilians in the country. AMISOM is, therefore, an impediment to the responsibility to protect in Somalia. Under state collapse, shifting the responsibility to protect to the international community can produce unintended detrimental consequences.

Keywords:

• The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
• concept of operations
• rules of engagement
• human rights violation
• protection of civilians

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Oscar Gakuo Mwangi is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political and Administrative Studies, National University of Lesotho. His research interests are in comparative politics, especially in the areas of democratisation and governance, conflict and security, and environmental politics in eastern and southern Africa. His teaching areas are in the fields of comparative politics, international relations, and political economy.

ORCID

Oscar Gakuo Mwangi http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3559-5900

Notes

1 Rebbeca J. Hamilton, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine – But What of Implementation?’, Harvard Human Rights Journal 19 (2006): 289–90.

2 UN, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention (New York: United Nations, 2014), 1.

3 UN, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, General Assembly, 12 January 2009, A/63/677, 8–9.

4 Victoria Holt, ‘The Military and Civilian Protection: Developing Roles and Capabilities', Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) Research Briefing, No. 22, March 2006, 1–2.

5 Hamilton, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, 290–1.

6 UN, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes, 1.

7 AMISOM, ‘AMISOM Background', 2015, http://amisom-au.org/amisom-backround.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 AMISOM, ‘AMISOM Military Component', 2015, http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 UN, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: United Nations, 2008), 8–9.

14 Ibid., 27–35.

15 Ibid., 14.

16 UN, ‘The Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect', Report of the Secretary-General, General Assembly, 27 June 2011, A/65/877-S/2011/393, 7–9.

17 Cecilia Hill Wiklund, ‘AMISOM – A Model for a Peace Operation in Mali, Peace Operations Project and Security in African Security’, March 2013, FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, Memo 4393, 2.

18 Andrews Atta-Asamoah and Neus Ramis Segui, ‘Somalia: fighting the Odds in the Search for Peace after the Transition’, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Situation Report, March 2014, 5–6.

19 Paul D. Williams, ‘AMISOM in Transition: The Future of the Africa Union Mission in Somalia’, Rift Valley Institute (RVI) Briefing Paper, 13 February 2013, 5.

20 AMISOM, ‘AMISOM Mandate', 2015, http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate.

21 Ibid.

22 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2060 (2012), 12 July 2013, S/2013/413, 120.

23 International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War', Policy Briefing, Africa Briefing No. 99, Nairobi/Brussels, 26 June 2014, 3.

24 Ibid., 3.

25 UNSC, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, 120.

26 Ibid., 120.

27 Graham Turbiville, Josh Meservey, and James Forest, Countering the al-Shabaab Insurgency in Somalia: Lessons for U.S Special Operations Forces, JSOU Report 14–1, February 2014 (Tampa Point Boulevard: JSOU, 2014), 80.

28 Ibid., 80.

29 Ibid., 80.

30 UNSC, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, 3–4.

31 Federal Government of Somalia and Interim Jubba Administration (FGS/IJA), Agreement Between the Federal Government of Somalia and Jubba Delegation, 27 August 2013, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3–4; UNSC, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, 120.

32 UNSC, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, 120.

33 FGS/IJA, Agreement Between the Federal Government of Somalia and Jubba Delegation, 3–4; UNSC, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, 120.

34 UN, Special Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, Security Council, 31 January 2012, S/2012/74, 3–5.

35 AU, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, Peace and Security Council 293rd Meeting, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 13 September 2011, PSC/PR/2 (CCXCIII), 11–13.

36 AU, Report of the African Union Commission on the Strategic Review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Peace and Security Council 356th Meeting, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 27 February 2013, PSC/PR/2 (CCCLVI), 4–11.

37 AU, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, Peace and Security Council 462nd Meeting, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 16 October 2014, PSC/PR/2 (CDLXIII) 4.

38 Heather S. Gregg, ‘Beyond Population Engagement: Understanding Counterinsurgency’, Parameters, Autumn (2009): 19–20.

39 Graham Turbiville and James Forest, ‘Al-Shabaab’, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Report 14-1, December 2013 (Tampa Point Boulevard: JSOU), 66.

40 Ibid., 66–9.

41 Ibid., 66.

42 UN, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 87.

43 ICG, ‘Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War', 12.

44 Matt Bryden, ‘The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity?’, A Report of the CSIS Africa Program, February 2014 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2014), 2.

45 UN, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 15.

46 Ibid., 35.

47 Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘You Don't Know Who to Blame': War Crimes in Somalia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2011), 16–17; HRW, ‘The Power These Men Have Over US’: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by African Union Forces in Somalia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2014), 1–4.

48 AU, Report of the Workshop on Mainstreaming Protection of Civilian Considerations into the Operations of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Nairobi, Kenya, 21–22 June 2012, 10–11.

49 Paul D. Williams, ‘The African Union Mission in Somalia and Civilian Protection Challenges', Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 2, no. 2 (2013): 2–3.

50 HRW, ‘You Don't Know Who to Blame', 16–17.

51 Williams, ‘The African Union Mission in Somalia’, 2–3.

52 Ibid., 8.

53 HRW, ‘You Don't Know Who to Blame', 16–17; HRW, Hostages of the Gatekeeper: Abuses against the Internally Displaced in Mogadishu, Somalia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013), 15.

54 AU, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, 8.

55 Ibid., 4.

56 UN, Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Implementation of the Mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia, submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 2093 (2013), Annex, 24 June 2013, S/2013/371, 3.

57 Ibid., 13–14.

58 AU, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, 8.

59 HRW, ‘The Power These Men Have Over US’, 1.

60 Ibid., 1–4.

61 Ibid., 4.