Boundary integrationism and its subject: shifts and continuities in the EU framework on migrant integration

ABSTRACT

The European Union emerged as an important actor in debates on ‘migrant integration’, yet remains understudied. This paper critically maps the EU Framework on migrant integration, outlining the ruptures and continuities that have shaped EU’s approach to ‘diversity governance’ in the past three decades. I propose a typology of the (sometimes opposing) discourses that converge in the EU migrant integration policy, differentiating between neoliberal, egalitarian (welfarist), securitarian and boundary integrationism. I argue that while the early predominantly welfarist and neoliberal discourse on integration was only vaguely interested in questions of values and identity, the recent reformulation of the EU’s integrationist strategy represents a break from universalist ideas of a ‘European community’. In particular, the Commission under von der Leyen adopted a more nativist and securitarian discourse that frames ‘integration’ as a wager in an alleged civilizationist clash between the liberal and the ‘illiberal’ world. I argue that the rising importance of adherence to liberal values as a proxy for ‘integration’, the reinvention of ‘European values’ as cultural values springing from the Judeo-Christian liberal tradition, and drawing new boundaries around the subject of integration are three developments that amount to an important shift in the European Union’s migration and integration agenda.

KEYWORDS:

• Migrant integration policy
• European Union
• boundary liberalism
• nativism
• neoliberalism

1. Introduction

Amidst recent immigrant and refugee arrivals and in the context of controversies related to security, Islam and the alleged failure of multiculturalism, the issue of ‘immigrant integration’ has remained high on the European political agenda in the past decades. Rather than improving the livelihoods, rights and opportunities of non-citizens and citizens alike, scholars have argued that integration policies instead serve as a boundary-making tool (Brown 2016) in a neocolonial governmentality of racialized populations (Favell 2022; Schinkel 2017). These critiques have largely focused on controversies in specific national regimes of what scholars call ‘civic integrationism’ (Triadafilopoulos 2011), and related to heated debates on migrant (un)assimilability, cultural (in)compatibility and the alleged threat (Muslim) migrants pose for the liberal identity of Europe (e.g. Rytter 2019 for the Danish context; Schinkel 2017 for the Netherlands). However, it remains unclear how the problem of ‘integration’ is approached at supranational level and how EU institutions have responded to this highly politicised issue. This is important to the extent that the European Union has emerged as an important actor in the increasingly multilevel issue of integration governance (Scholten et al. 2015, 316), developing numerous tools towards shaping national integration policies, such as recommendations, policy guidelines, and targeted funding.

This paper investigates the discourse behind the EU Framework on migrant integration and related debates at EU level in order to map the temporal shifts and continuities in this policy area and explore what ‘diversity governance’ means at supranational level. Research on migrant integration policies has overwhelmingly focused on national-level contexts, in part because – apart from several directives – the EU has no direct authority in mandating national policies in this area. This has led some authors to infer that the EU ‘does not possess or promote a particular migrant integration framework or paradigm’ (Geddes and Achtnich 2015, 293; even if they acknowledge that EU institutions seek ways to legitimate a greater role for the EU in this policy area on p. 303). Challenging this view, I argue not only that the EU is actively seeking to shape the agenda on diversity governance (even if the extent to which it succeeds in this remains unclear), but that these efforts are indeed – and inevitably so – founded on a particular EU paradigm of integration. This paradigm, in turn, paints a specific idea of how society (should) look like, and has material effects by identifying specific bodies as targets of integration. However fragmentary, variegated and, at times, contradictory, the EU has developed throughout the years its own ‘philosophy of integration’ (Favell 2001) that has recently converged in many ways with more restrictive national approaches to diversity governance, at the very least at the level of rhetoric. The present paper, thus, seeks to map the EU approach to the governance of mobility-related diversity, examining the extent to which the EU framework on migrant integration acts as a mechanism for boundary-making.

I take a critical and reflexive approach that approaches the concept of ‘integration’ as a discursive construct shaped by a power dynamic in which EU institutions play an important role. The paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it builds on earlier works on the Europeanization of migration and integration policies (e.g. Carrera 2009; Rosenow 2009), which, however, tend to focus on narrower aspects, such as the implication of EU directives in the introduction of pre-arrival integration measures (Bonjour 2014; Goodman 2011), or ‘dialogues’ between EU policymakers and researchers in producing ‘evidence’ on integration (Geddes and Achtnich 2015; Scholten and Verbeek 2015). In contrast, the present paper seeks to examine the broader trends from a historical perspective, while also scrutinising the most recent developments that have not received attention in the literature. Second, this article seeks to contribute to recent debates on the neocolonial, racializing and exclusionary implications of civic integrationism (e.g. Favell 2022; Kostakopoulou 2014; Schinkel 2018), by bringing the debate to the thus far neglected supranational level.

In the text that follows, I first outline the analytical framework, followed by a section providing context for the Europeanization of integration policy. I then map the various discourses and political strategies that have shaped EU’s integrationist paradigm, outlining the ruptures and continuities it has endured since the 1990s. In particular, recent crises provoked transformations in the Europe-wide response to mobility and diversity, to which EU institutions were not immune. I argue that recent global and Europe-wide moves towards right-wing populism and the normalisation of what were once considered extreme anti-immigrant, nativist and racist positions, have impacted the EU framework on integration, gearing it towards what I call ‘boundary integrationism’.

2. Analytical framework

The paper looks into the body of policy and legal documents on the issue of ‘migrant integration’, issued by EU institutions since the Maastricht Treaty (1992–2022) and here referred as the EU framework of migrant integration. The data includes 89 directives, white papers, declarations, reports, communications and other official documents that deal (exclusively or tangentially) with the questions of migrant integration, social inclusion, racism and anti-discrimination, the rights of non-citizens, citizenship and naturalisation, and ‘social cohesion’ (see Appendix for a full list). In addition to foundational documents (such as the 2004 Common Basic Principles, the 2011 European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, and the 2020 Action plan on Integration and Inclusion), this includes documents that have received less attention but help illuminate the development of the migrant integration paradigm at EU level (e.g. European Migration Forum and Ministerial Conferences reports, decisions on establishing integration funds, and wider migration policies where integration is discussed). Seeking to go beyond policy analysis and to understand wider discourses, I supplant the analysis with a selection of mediatised public statements by EU officials that speak to recent shifts in the discourse on integration.

The paper relies on discourse analysis as a methodological tool (Carabine 2001), that allows for engaging with the power relations that establish ‘integration’ as the dominant discourse on the consequences of mobility in Europe. Discourse is here understood as an assemblage of ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault 1972, 49), meaning that institutional discourse at EU level is not to be seen merely at the level of policy text, but as a practice that produces material effects, such as the objectification of the subject of integration. Since genealogy is more ‘a lens through which to read discourses’ than a prescribed method (Carabine 2001, 276), I combine it with critical frame analysis (Dombos et al. 2012) where this is useful to make sense of the data and systematize the large textual corpus. Framing is the process by which a communication source constructs and defines a social or political issue for its audience (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997). Of particular relevance are metaframes – overarching frames of a higher level of generality that stretch over different policy issues – that include, for instance: equality, human rights, security, health, culture, and liberal values. As the normative aspects of framing that seek to orient the issue frame towards desirable social and political goals or principles (Dombos et al. 2012, 6), metaframes are key in understanding the underlying imaginations of how society should function that are inherent in discourses on integration (see also Schinkel 2017).

I build on Brown’s (2016) concept of ‘boundary liberalism’ to conceptualise what I call ‘boundary integrationism’. Brown looks at the practice in countries like Germany of subjecting candidates for naturalisation to the requirement of respecting liberal values, where the extent to which one is considered liberal enough is used as a site of boundary making between those who belong and those who do not (Brown 2016). Boundary making on the basis of whether one is ‘liberal’ or ‘modern’ enough is a form of cultural and religious racialisation, or what some scholars have tried to differentiate (from ‘biological’ racism) as ‘differentialist racism’ (Balibar 2007). As a typical post-racial discourse, it allows subjects to claim non-racist, egalitarian and overall liberal identities while engaging in (demands for) nativist exclusion. Importantly, boundary liberalism is not there only to exclude, but to simultaneously mark the contours of the ingroup, by defining who is considered liberal, and thus a ‘true’ member of the (national) community (Brown 2016).

By extension, boundary integrationism likewise serves to mark those who belong, by excluding, in turn, those identified as un-integrated. Rather than strictly the adherence to liberal values, it is the subjectification to integration (with all its contested, multiple meanings) that marks the boundary between those who belong, on the one part, and those who are considered as external to the ‘imagined community’ (Benedict Anderson 1991), on the other. Although integration is often imposed as a condition for access to long-term residence and citizenship, boundary integrationism is not necessarily tied to one’s legal, social or citizenship status. Subjects of integration often are long term and permanent residents, and even full citizens, whose need for integration is rationalised through their alleged enduring link to migrancy and foreignness by way of generational transmission (see, for e.g. Korteweg 2017; Schinkel 2017). This is the case not only in assimilationist national frameworks, but as of recently, also in EU policy, as I will demonstrate below. The adherence to liberal values is indeed one of the most powerful sites of boundary-making in the discourse on integration, due to these values being seen as both non-negotiable for ingroup membership, and incompatible with immigrant (notably Muslim) values. Integration is notoriously hard to achieve for racialized subjects, yet like boundary liberalism, integrationism inherently offers a promise of membership (at least in principle), as long as the subjects of integration are prepared to undergo a subversion of fundamental characteristics of their identities (c.f. Brown 2016). Yet, in addition to suppressing their cultural and religious particularity, targets of integration policies and discourses need to navigate a multitude of additional expectations in order to become the perfect neoliberal subject. To cross the line into (symbolic or official) membership, they must also earn their livelihoods, socialise with their environment, navigate the legal order, and participate in all social systems. In the text that follows, I examine the extent to which the EU framework on migrant integration acted as a mechanism for boundary-making throughout the decades, outlining the political rationalities that underline EU integrationism.¹

3. The Europeanization of integration policy

Despite the fact the EU has no so-called exclusive competence in national-level policymaking in this area and related policy is mostly non-mandatory, several authors have spoken of the ‘Europeanization’ of integration policy (Barbulescu 2015; Block and Bonjour 2013; Carrera and Wiesbrock 2009; Geddes and Achtnich 2015). Europeanization does not involve solely the formal institutionalisation of EU-derived policies in the national legislation of governments. The process of policy formulation itself can be equally influential as Europeanization is not simply about ‘formal policy rules but about less tangible aspects, such as beliefs and values’ (Bulmer & Radaelli, 2004, p. 3). As Bruno, Jacquot, and Mandin (2006) argue, Europeanization ‘cannot be restricted to the direct impact of Community law or to the indirect effects of economic integration’, because non-constraining mechanisms can have an equal effect on national representation and practices. Along these lines, Europeanization is here understood in this broader sense as ‘the impact of the EU on its member states’ (Faist and Ette 2007, 14). While there is little evidence that EU action in the area of migrant integration has spilled over into public debate in the member states (Geddes and Achtnich 2015, 294), the response of member states to EU policies on migrant integration has yet to be properly explored and is beyond the scope of this article. In this section, my focus is on the stage of policy formulation (as per Bulmer & Radaelli, 2004), which can in itself influence member states by communicating a certain (‘right’) way of approaching the issue.

For many decades since the founding Treaty of Rome (1958), European nation-states were reluctant to cede control over matters of border control, national membership and the rights of non-citizens. A case in point is the member states’ reaction to the Commission’s Decision 85/381/EEC from 1985, which imposed the sharing of information and consulting with the Commission on a range of issues related to third country nationals, including ‘the promotion of integration into the workforce, society and cultural life.’² However, member states (notably Germany, France, the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK) saw this as an infringement on their exclusivity over what were seen as domestic issues, and led them to take the Commission to court in 1987.³ Although earlier (largely non-binding) intergovernmental agreements provided guidance with respect to non-citizens and their rights and obligations,⁴ it wasn’t until the 1990s that the governance of mobility and political membership moved high on the EU agenda. A number of key documents comprise what is now an official EU policy framework on immigrant integration, along with numerous tools such as recommendations, policy guidelines, and targeted funding. The EU has historically promoted ‘civic integration’ measures, such as the provision of integration courses, through its funding mechanisms, principally through the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). The creation of the ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ pillar in the Maastricht Treaty (1992) paved the way for this. Though initially reluctant, member states saw a mutual advantage in joining forces to deal with these new circumstances, which they viewed as an opportunity to strengthen capacity for security measures, as well as to circumvent national constraints on migration control and to avoid judicial scrutiny when infringing on rights and liberties (Guiraudon 2000).

Upon signing the Treaty of Amsterdam and drafting the Tampere Programme, national legislation targeting ‘immigrant integration’ officially became a new policy field at the EU level. At the 1999 European summit in Tampere, ‘integration’ of ‘third-country nationals’ – as the principal targets of migrant integration are called in EU jargon – was framed as granting them comparable rights to EU citizens. However, controlling migration and managing asylum proved to be more pressing matters than integration at the time, and it wasn’t until 2003 that the first coherent framework – Communication on immigration, integration and employment – was issued by the Commission to address that particular issue. It advocated a ‘holistic approach’ to integration, which was by now no longer merely about increasing the rights of non-citizens, but was understood to be ‘both a matter of social cohesion and a pre-requisite for economic efficiency’ (17). The 2004 Common Basic Principles for Integration confirmed the ‘integration of third country nationals’ as an area of mutual concern whose significance goes beyond national borders, as ‘the failure of an individual Member State to develop and implement a successful integration policy for migrants can have in different ways adverse implications for other Member States’. This was an important rationale for providing legitimacy to EU intervention in the governance of migrants. Under the three-tiered system introduced in the Lisbon Treaty that regulates EU authority over national legislations, immigration and migrant integration policies are considered ‘shared competences’ and this area is subject to the principle of subsidiarity where the EU may act only if ‘the objective of a proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the EU countries, but could be better achieved at EU level’ (Lisbon Treaty, Article 3b). The necessity for a common action is a sine qua non for EU interference in matters in which states are normally reluctant to cede control, which explains why EU documents consistently frame migrant integration as a common concern, or a European problem.

Since the signature of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, European institutions have been mandated to ‘provide incentives and support for the action of Member States with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals’, thus providing the EU with a legal basis for intervention in integration-related matters.⁵ However, the Treaty of Lisbon simultaneously limited the involvement of the EU to ‘soft’ instruments, as it excluded ‘any harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States’ (Article 79 [4]). The decade to follow saw the adoption of two major policies, the 2011 European Agenda for Integration and the 2016 Action Plan on Integration. It also saw the initiating of major funding schemes intended to support the EU’s goals to introduce and support integration measures in the member states, such as the INTI programme (2002), as well as the Integration Fund launched during the Dutch Presidency of the Council of EU in 2005. The Netherlands was highly involved in pushing forward civic integrationism to the EU agenda, for instance, by successfully including so-called pre-departure integration measures among the eligible actions funded under the European Integration Fund (Bonjour 2014). Immigrant integration is also a key concern in the 2008 Pact on Migration and Asylum and the 2011 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility and was reaffirmed as such with the latest programme⁶ of the Commission under Ursula von der Leyen.

The EU defines integration as ‘a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents’,⁷ differentiating between ‘social, civic and cultural integration’.⁸ For the European Council, integration measures should be based on a ‘balance between migrants’ rights […] and duties’.⁹ But as this article demonstrates, throughout the past two decades, the weight shifted from the former to the latter as concerns with the social status and the gainful employment of migrants that predominated in earlier documents were joined by more securitarian and identitarian concerns in more recent discourse. The following section discusses these trends and presents four main frames that comprise EU integrationism.

4. Competing discourses and shifts across time in EU integrationism

There are four wider discourses that jointly shape the EU’s paradigm on integration. These discourses, the frames under which they are constructed, and the metaframes that structure their normative content are summarised in Table 1. Although some of them dominate in one historical period, while receding in others, there is no clear linear development at play. Neoliberalization, the commitment to human rights and social justice, concerns with national security and the preservation of a manageably homogenous community are all competing rationalities in the EU’s policy agenda, and they all influence EU-level migrant integration policy to some extent.

Table 1. Four ways of framing ‘migrant integration’ (EU policy documents on immigrant integration 1992–2020).

	Egalitarian (welfarist) integrationism	Neoliberal integrationism	Securitarian integrationism	Boundary integrationism
Frames of ‘integration’	Integration as equal and fair treatment of non-citizens	Integration as an economic asset	Integration as preservation of peace and security	Integration as preservation of European community/values
The figure of the ‘migrant’	Migrant as human being	Migrant as net contributor	Migrant as a security threat	Migrant as culturally different
Metaframes	Social inclusion; Non-discrimination; Equality; Citizenship; Welfare; Human rights; Education & Training	Economic growth; Human capital; Demographic decline; Fiscal impact; Entrepreneurship; Education & training; Knowledge-based economy	Internal security; Migration control; Extremism; Radicalisation	Liberal values; Culture; Tradition; Citizenship; Social cohesion; European community

Source: Own illustration.

4.1. Egalitarian and welfarist integrationism

In integration policy, the ‘welfarist’ concerns notably dominated the early Europeanization of integration policy. They stem from the social democratic project of the Keynesian era (Mitchell 2006) and are related to wider social protection policies at EU level. Legally, they are linked to the embeddedness of the protection of rights and freedoms in the founding treaties and international conventions, and in practice also from lobbying on the part of NGOs who seek to advance the rights of non-citizens. These commitments are most evident in the EU support for redistribution programmes and social funds for refugees, migrants and other vulnerable populations. Such measures are usually paired with a discourse surrounding the access to rights and equality of opportunity for non-citizens, as well as ‘fair treatment’ for ‘third country nationals’ that is usually related to fighting xenophobia and racism. Integration is in this logic envisaged as social inclusion, where the dominating metaframes are social protection, human rights, equality, and non-discrimination. In one of the earliest formal positions on migrant integration from a 1994 document, the EC describes ‘integration’ as a way ‘to improve the situation of third country nationals [by] assimilating their rights with those of citizens’, as well as ‘combating racial discrimination and all forms of racism and xenophobia’.¹⁰ According to Rosenow (2009), the EC sought at that time to advance a more liberal approach to migration and diversity to balance the restrictive approach of nation-states.

However, ‘soft’ (non-binding) instruments appear to be much more generous with the status of non-citizens, than binding EU legislation. For instance, the (non-binding) Tampere Programme (1999) sketched an ambitious plan of granting resident non-citizens uniform rights which are ‘as near as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens’ (Article 21), as well as equality of treatment. These were among the key objectives to be achieved in the period between 1999 and 2004. Yet, two binding directives on the Status of Long-term Residents and on Family Reunification that were adopted in this period (2003) fell far short of these objectives. Instead of bringing non-citizens and citizens on par, the Directive on Long-term Residents allowed member states to adopt protectionist measures that privilege citizens in access to employment (Article 14(3)). Non-citizens were conditioned in both directives with passing integration requirements such as courses and tests in order to enjoy the right to long-term resident status, paving the way for more conditional civic integration policies across member states. ‘Core’ rights of EU citizens, according to Article 21 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the EU, are not bestowed to non-citizen residents in either of the directives. The generous egalitarian rhetoric of non-binding legislation was not always matched in financial support either. When a dedicated Integration Fund (2007–2013) was introduced, issues related to increasing the rights of non-citizens, protection from discrimination, or mitigating inequalities were not among the eligible actions. The fund covered actions in the area of integration requirements: measures that are imposed on (potential) migrants as a condition for securing immigration or settlement status, including so-called pre-arrival integration requirements, that serve as additional obstacles to immigration and target family reunification applicants in particular (Bonjour 2014).

Nonetheless, the EU framework on integration retained the goal of granting non-citizens rights and obligations comparable to EU citizens, with the Stockholm Programme (2010) setting a deadline for its implementation to 2014, that, however, remains to be achieved. Human rights discourses are often used as institutional legitimation strategies by international organisations (Bradley and Erdilmen 2022), and the EU is no exception. Symbolically, the welfarist-egalitarian discourse that presents integration policies as a result of the concern with migrants’ ‘social inclusion’ furthers the self-promotion of the European Union as a defender of human rights and global promotor of equality. Ultimately, however, the EU was always primarily an economic project and market-driven concerns kept social policies at the margins, with the project of ‘Social Europe’ failing to fully materialise (Crespy and Menz 2015). Market-driven interests reflect on the EU framework on migrant integration, where in spite of references to ‘social inclusion’ and ‘equality’, neoliberal agendas left a stronger imprint.

4.2. Neoliberal integrationism

Following the contraction of the ‘welfare state’, neoliberalism has been a key general strategy of population governance in the European Union. EU institutions have been at the forefront of endorsing neoliberal restructuring in many areas beyond the economy, from education (Mitchell 2006) to citizenship (van Houdt, Suvarierol, and Schinkel 2011). van Houdt, Suvarierol, and Schinkel (2011) demonstrate how citizenship has been reinvented in Western Europe by means of combining a renewed sacralization of the nation with a commodification of citizenship as a prize one needs to earn through individual effort. Such works have analyzed the European integration process primarily as a ‘disciplinary neoliberal’ system of governance (e.g. Mitchell 2006). Through the lens of governmentality (Foucault 1991), neoliberalism is understood as the emergence of institutions and practices that facilitate and encourage individual and group conformity to market norms.

Like many other aspects of social life, the political programme of the EU related to migration and diversity is fundamentally shaped to fit primarily a neoliberal form of governmentality. At the macro level, the EU is invested in regulating the participation of non-citizens in Europe’s capital accumulation system. So-called ‘labor integration’ is a major goal of the framework on integration, often framed as part of the 2000 Lisbon Strategy to make the EU ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’. The strategy for governing non-citizens was, therefore, geared primarily towards maximising the ‘contribution [immigrants] could make to the Lisbon objectives’¹¹ and exploiting immigration ‘as a means of ensuring that high levels of employment and productivity can be maintained in future decades’.¹² In this manifestation of biopower, that combines biopolitical goals to ensure longevity with the extractionist logic of capital accumulation, non-citizens are commodified as a resource for an uninterrupted and continuously growing market economy. Through metaframes such as economic growth, entrepreneurship and demographic decline, integration is framed as an ‘opportunity’ that ensures non-citizens have a ‘positive fiscal net contribution’¹³ that ‘can boost GDP’.¹⁴ Even concerns with gender perspectives do not aim primarily to ensure full emancipation and equality between (immigrant) women and men, but rather ‘to fully utilise the potential of immigrant women in the labour market’.¹⁵

At the micro level, neoliberal discourse shapes integrationist policies by seeking to manage the behaviour of individuals, i.e. to discipline subjects of integration. The current European system of b/ordering gave birth to a new type of subjectivity that presupposes responsible, self-sufficient, industrious, self-regulated and self-disciplined individuals (see, e.g. Moffette and Walters 2018). One must now excel in personal achievements in order to gain access not only to EU territory, but also to EU membership (i.e. become naturalised). The EU consistently outlines the importance of the task to ‘compete in the global race for talent’.¹⁶ A special scheme (that was largely a failure) was introduced in 2009 for this purpose, known as the Blue Card Directive, aimed at highly skilled migrants with well above average income. A special favourable procedure for admitting researchers was also introduced in the context of ‘attracting talents’ with Directive 2016/801. But such ‘talents’ are exempted from integration measures, as the level of integratedness of high-skilled workers is not considered wanting since they are seen as sufficiently socialised in the market logic of capitalism (unlike so called low-skilled migrants or dependent family members). For instance, the recent Directive 2021/1883, aimed primarily at IT workers, proscribes the imposition of integration conditions on family members of privileged migrants, ‘as highly qualified workers and their families are likely to have a favourable starting point regarding integration in the host community’ (Article 50). This confirms the importance of the ability to not only be self-sufficient, proactive and entrepreneurial, but also to earn well as key parameters in the EU’s paradigm on migrant integration. Individual behaviour is, thus, increasingly competing with fundamental rights to determine access to immigration, settlement, permanent residence and EU citizenship.

Neoliberal logic continues to guide the EU’s interventions related to immigrant integration. However, this rationale is recently being challenged by more culturist and securitarian arguments, with the most striking alteration occurring in the immediate aftermath of the refugee ‘crisis’.

4.3. Securitarian integrationism

It was in relation to security that EU member states first started to cooperate in the realm of immigration regulation. Security concerns were the lowest common denominator that led states to compromise on giving up some of the sovereignty they enjoy with respect to managing non-citizens, and security cooperation indeed paved the way for harmonising integration policies (Geddes 2008). This has to be understood against the backdrop of rising securitisation of migration in the post-Cold War period, leading to the emergence of immigration as a global security problem (Bigo 2001). Security and integration were already seen as related problematics in the early 2000s, with the EC finding that ‘wide-spread concerns relating to security and the need for greater social cohesion have already led to renewed debate on the strategies needed to ensure the integration of migrants.’¹⁷

However, it was in the past decade that security was explicitly constructed as one of the rationales behind integration measures in EU discourse. Earlier on, security was linked in integration-related documents with securing the borders against clandestine crossings, the concern being that undocumented migrants cannot ‘integrate’ in the absence of ‘any guarantee of having a declared job’.¹⁸ More recently, however, the security/integration nexus is justified rather with preventing potentially dangerous behaviour among existing, often long-settled, migrant populations and their children. The latest Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion (2020) dedicates a significant space to argue that ‘a more cohesive and inclusive society for all can help prevent the spread of all forms of extremist ideologies that can lead to terrorism and violent extremism’.¹⁹ These sorts of issues were hardly ever the subject of earlier integration policy documents. The securitisation of integration policy was confirmed in the controversial general objective of the EC under the presidency of Ursula von der Leyen to ‘promote our European way of life’, whose main headings are ‘strong borders, a fresh start on migration and internal security’.²⁰ The creation of this portfolio represents a formal acknowledgement of the merging of the security agenda with the migration and diversity agenda, where security now seems to compete with social inclusion aspects of the EU integration framework.

The securitisation of integration has been apparent not only in policy documents, but also at administrative level, where migration ‘management’ and integration policy are jointed with the policy areas of security, defense and anti-terrorism. For instance, the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) is a key EC body that is jointly responsible for migration and integration-related affairs and for internal security. Issues as diverse as external borders, immigration control, immigrant integration, asylum management, human smuggling, law enforcement cooperation, and fighting terrorism are all bundled together under the same policy area. This is important to the extent that it constructs not only immigration control, as has been established earlier (e.g. Bigo 2001), but also diversity governance as a question not (merely) of rights, equality and justice, nor of economic development, but primarily of security and order.

5. Boundary integrationism

The last frame in the typology, that I call boundary integrationism, requires more attention due to representing a significant shift in the history of the ‘migrant integration’ problem at EU level and, as such, requires a separate section. As I argue below, recent developments demonstrate the normalisation of nativist and neocolonial arguments for ‘integrating’ immigrants and their escalation to EU level. As a technique of power that marks the boundary between racialized, undesirable and migranticized populations and exemplary citizens, boundary integrationism works through subjecting certain bodies to integration, while dispensing (Schinkel 2017) others from needing to integrate. Due to the strong focus on national membership in this manifestation of civic integrationism, the adherence to liberal values and the (in)compatibility of certain ‘migrants’ with liberal subjecthood emerges as a focal point, undergirded by a neocolonial civilizationist discourse of Eurosuperiority, as well as gendered constructions that centre on women as reproducers of the disciplined subject. I discuss this logic in EU integrationism in this section by drawing on the EU framework on migrant integration and accompanying debates at supranational level.

5.1. Civic integrationism and Europeanness

In the EU Framework on migrant integration, the logic of boundary integrationism emerges when two more general political strategies are incorporated into integration policy. The first is the EU’s strong commitment to communitarianism as a strategy for political legitimacy (c.f. Etzioni 2007), while the second is the increasingly nativist conceptualisation of that community and of what it means to be ‘integrated’ in it.

A communitarian approach is concerned with building and maintaining a community through common values and depends on the commitment of individuals to defend those values. But what kind of a ‘community’ does the EU seek to construct in a Europe of so many different nations, cultures and histories? The nature of the EU as a supranational unifying project demands the embrace of ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity and a common identity of a higher order than the separatist one offered by nationalism, one that can consolidate a versatile population on both sides of the imagined East/West axis. At the same time, having endured extended criticism implying an ‘identity crisis’ of the EU (Jenkins 2008), EU institutions recognised that Europeanness cannot be fostered solely on the basis of a political community. Scholars (e.g, Shore, 2013) have argued that despite their post-national ambitions, EU institutions strongly borrow from traditional nationalist techniques of identity building in forging the narrative on the ‘European community’. For instance, recent heritage initiatives and branding campaigns such as the European Heritage Label seek to create a narrative that linearly connects legacies from antiquity to the founding of the EU to convey common memories, culture, values and history (Lähdesmäki 2019). The promotion of ‘common European values’ as the foundation for a ‘European community’ is a way for the EU to find a common denominator beyond national idiosyncrasies and can be regarded as its key source of legitimacy. This principle is translated in integration policy by outlining the adherence to values as an obligation on the part of immigrants. For instance, in 2005, integration policy was understood as measures that enable third-country nationals ‘to adapt to the society of the Member State in socio-cultural terms, and to share the values enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’.²¹

In the context of communitarianism and its rootedness in common values, the EU has tentatively followed Northern and Western European countries (‘old’ member states) in the so-called ‘civic integration turn’, where integration became conceptualised primarily as assimilation into a national political community (Carrera and Wiesbrock 2009; Fernández and Jensen 2017; Joppke 2007). In practice, this usually refers to the stricter requirements for residence and citizenship where minorities are expected to assimilate into a ‘historically derived core of cultural values’ (Fernández and Jensen 2017). Through civic discourses citizenship becomes a moral status, imbued with culturally contingent meanings of virtues, values, worthiness and loyalties (Bridget Anderson 2013). Since civic integration programmes always incorporate cultural and identity elements that are understood to undergird national belonging, they easily become nationalist tools in the allocation of rights to non-citizens.

EU institutions provided ample encouragement in this respect, firstly, by endorsing integration programmes and tests. Many member states used the newly consolidated EU migrant integration framework to impose civic integration programmes, tests and courses and tie them to the rights of non-citizens (Carrera and Wiesbrock 2009). Secondly, EU policy documents consistently stress that civic integration should incorporate respecting national values and traditions, and not just liberal fundamental values. For instance, the 2008 European Pact on Migration and Asylum states that ‘language learning and access to employment are essential factors for integration’, but that migrants must respect ‘the identities of Member States and the EU’. The debate around respecting values in relation to ‘integration’ took sway notably since 2016, when it was discussed by the Council in the context of safeguarding the rule of law on two occasions, both initiated by the Dutch Presidency. At the annual rule of law dialogue at the Council (General Affairs) on 24 May 2016, the link between values and migration was a main topic, and the key question was ‘how to help refugees and migrants to integrate smoothly […] and embrace fundamental values and rule of law’.²² The question of how to reconcile migrants’ ‘cultural background’ with respecting fundamental values was also the topic of a special seminar organised by the Council earlier that year. Similarly, in its opinion on the 2016 Action Plan on Integration, the Committee of the Regions (CoR) emphasises that ‘if integration is to be successful, both third country nationals and the host society must understand and accept these European norms and values’.²³ Hinting perhaps at European Muslims, CoR points out that integration policy should focus more on ‘the considerable diversity that exists within the various third country nationals’ groups’, not least based on their ‘cultural background’.

It is worth reflecting on the gendered aspects as they manifest in the EU framework on migrant integration, as they form an important rationale behind boundary integrationism. It is well established that gender and sexuality play a crucial role in the politics of national belonging, which in Europe is recently increasingly mobilised through the debate on migrants (Dahinden and Manser-Egli 2022; Korteweg 2017). A good example is a resolution adopted in 2006 in the European Parliament, ‘The role and place of immigrant women in the European Union’, which stresses that ‘in very many cases the integration of immigrant women into society determines the integration of members of the second and third generations of citizens descended from immigrants.’²⁴ Hence, immigrant women are invoked as key targets due to being understood as ‘conduits of their children’s integration’, to use Korteweg’s (2017) expression. The Parliament problematises (implicitly Muslim) immigrant customs, saying that ‘so-called honour crimes, forced marriages, female genital mutilation, or other violations cannot be justified on any cultural or religious grounds and should in no circumstances be tolerated’ and that ‘parents preventing immigrant girls from taking part in sports, swimming and school classes must not be tolerated and cannot be excused on cultural or religious grounds’. It overall takes a very intolerant approach to religious diversity, making it repeatedly clear that it stands for ‘refusing all forms of cultural and religious relativism which could violate women's fundamental rights’. Migrant women here are both a ‘vulnerable category because they suffer two-fold discrimination based on ethnic origin and on sex’ and at the same time are expected to ‘take responsibility for integration into their host society’. There is a very strong discourse of salvation, where migrant women are victimised, while European societies are presented as saviours that will protect women not only from society but also from ‘discrimination in the family’. This is a typical gendernativist (Dahinden and Manser-Egli 2022) view of Muslim women as lacking agency and waiting to be saved by white men. In the nativist conceptualisation of a community, women, in general, are allocated an important role as carriers of the intergenerational transmission of nationhood, not only by ensuring the biological reproduction of the ‘nation’, but also through instilling the proper values in their offspring. While this is assumed to happen automatically in the case of ‘native’ women (those on the ‘us’ side of the boundary), migrant women are understood to need patronage in properly socialising their children.

5.2. Protecting the garden of Europe

Therefore, one element of nativist communitarianism in EU’s boundary integrationism is providing justification to the restriction of rights of non-citizens through the requirement to assimilate into national(ist) ‘cultural’ values, in which women play a key role in the socialisation of their children. But a more important element in the move towards more explicitly nativist ideas in the EU framework on integration refers to the trend that sees the Judeo-Christian foundation of ‘European values’ becoming increasingly emphasised, at the expense of a purely juridical interpretation linked to the founding treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. European values are usually framed in integration policy documents as ‘fundamental values, such as human rights, freedom of opinion, democracy, tolerance, equality between men and women, and the compulsory schooling of children.’²⁵ While since the 1990s the EU attempted to balance the nativist discourse of member states by emphasising universalist aspects of Europeanness (such as human rights, equality, social protection, and diversity), the Commission under von der Leyen adopted a different discourse. By 2020, the conditions of possibility had been created (albeit not without internal conflict) for the Commission to speak of ‘protecting’ Europe from migration and cultural diversity. Even before she formally took office, von der Leyen immediately caused controversy by replacing the office for migration, home affairs, and citizenship with a new portfolio titled ‘Protecting a European Way of Life’. The reactions were so divided that, following a formal complaint from the EP, initiated by left, green and social-democrat MEPs, the EC eventually substituted ‘protecting’ with ‘promoting’ to soften the tone. This seemed to appease critics within the EP, who opposed the word ‘protecting’ and its far-right connotation, but did not object to the assumption of a bounded and clear-cut ‘European way of life’. The EC defended their new framing, claiming that it referred to the liberal values upon which the EU is founded, citing Article 2 of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty:

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail (Matamoros 2019).

This defense, however, fails to address the most important cause of controversy; namely, why the need to protect ‘European values’ is framed in the context of migration and integration. This frame implies that migrants are somehow threatening ‘European values’, which are irreconcilable with non-European values that migrants allegedly bring with them. A more revealing definition of what the protection of European values really means is given by the leader of the European People’s Party and the largest political group in Parliament (the EPP group), Manfred Webber. Webber apparently coined the controversial phrase and enacted influence in shaping von der Leyen’s programme (Matamoros 2019). For him, these values ‘come from our history, from Judeo-Christian values, but also from the philosophical tradition and the great thinkers of the Enlightenment. They make the European Way of Life so different from the rest of the world’.²⁶ This affirmation of Europe as white, Christian, exceptional and implicitly superior to the rest of the world is closer to the implications of the EC’s rebranding than the reference to the Lisbon treaty. Webber is a known proponent in EU politics of the idea that the adherence to ‘European values’ should be a condition for affording formal membership and access to rights to migrants. At a 2017 debate in the European Parliament on the State of the Union, Webber stated, on the issue of integration, that ‘we must defend Europe’s identity’ and ‘make it clear that only those who respect our basic values can get European citizenship. All the others must leave Europe’.²⁷

Most recently, social media were shaken by a scandal emerging from the highest echelons of the EU leadership. The High Representative of EU’s diplomatic service and Vice-President of the Commission Josep Borrell caused a public outcry following his speech in October 2022 at the European Diplomatic Academy in Bruges, where the EU trains future EU diplomats. In a speech marked by a discourse of European superiority as opposed to the barbarism of ‘most of the rest of the world’, Borrell used an unfortunate metaphor:

Yes, Europe is a garden. […] It is the best combination of political freedom, economic prosperity and social cohesion that the humankind has been able to build – the three things together. […] The rest of the world – and you know this very well, Federica [Mogherini, Rector of the College of Europe] – is not exactly a garden. Most of the rest of the world is a jungle, and the jungle could invade the garden. The gardeners should take care of it, but they will not protect the garden by building walls. A nice small garden surrounded by high walls in order to prevent the jungle from coming in is not going to be a solution. Because the jungle has a strong growth capacity, and the wall will never be high enough in order to protect the garden. The gardeners have to go to the jungle. Europeans have to be much more engaged with the rest of the world. Otherwise, the rest of the world will invade us, by different ways and means.²⁸

Juxtaposing Europe as a ‘garden’ with the rest of the world as a ‘jungle’, Borrell flouted European privilege as something to be defended against ‘jungle invaders’ (while implicitly justifying EU intervention in the Global South). Again, Europe is reaffirmed as exceptional and far above ‘most of the rest of the world’ on a (Eurocentric) scale of progress drawing on racist tropes rooted in modern-colonial global hierarchies. Borrell, too, sees the problem of immigration similarly to his colleague from the EP, Manfred Weber, who stated that ‘this is not a conflict between Christians and Muslims. It is a conflict between humanity and barbarism’.²⁹ Ideas of progress – of a similar kind to those that have historically been used to justify colonial conquest, slavery and racial capitalism – have been argued by Schinkel (2017), Favell (2022) and others to be at the heart of the idea of ‘migrant integration’. Rooted in ideas of inherent cultural distance (Blankvoort et al. 2023) and a civilizationist clash between the modern and the unmodern (Brubaker 2017), this manifestation of ‘integration’ as a way to tame the savage (if she cannot be stopped from coming in the first place) seems to increasingly be shaping not only national but also EU-level debates.

5.3. Integration 2.0 and its new subject

Another transformation brought about by the Commission under von der Leyen, that also appeases nativist anxieties across Europe, is the shift in the subject of integration policy. It is known that categories and classifications have the power to shape social reality and determine the status and livelihood of those concerned (Moncrieffe 2007). Until 2020, the subjects of integration policy in the EU framework were exclusively ‘third country nationals’, or EU residents with a non-EU citizenship, the legal basis for which was drawn from the Lisbon Treaty (Article 79.4). The EU citizenship criterion for drawing the boundaries around who is considered ‘migrant’ and ‘(un)integrated’ is related to the principle of a borderless union, where intra-EU movements are conceptualised as ‘(internal) mobility’ or ‘free movement’, rather than ‘migration’. Furthermore, EU citizenship, while a secondary status derived from national membership, confers certain rights emanating from the treaties (and leaves no room for making the access to rights and services conditional on fulfilling integration requirements). For example, the Lisbon Treaty prohibits discrimination in employment matters of EU citizens based on their nationality, in contrast to the Employment Equality Framework Directive (2000) that applies to third-country nationals, which does not include nationality as a basis for discrimination. For most of the history of the EU framework on migrant integration, ‘EU citizens’ were understood in a formal manner as those possessing a passport from one of the member states, with no distinction between ‘native’ citizens and naturalised persons or those born into European citizenship but with naturalised or non-citizen parents. There was also a symbolic rationale behind this non-distinction: if integrationism is a boundary-making technique, as I argue, then claiming any EU citizens need integration would not only challenge the soundness of the rights framework derived from EU citizenship, but would effectively create a two-tiered hierarchy of citizenship, undermining efforts for inclusivity on which the European community is ostensibly based. However, the new Action plan on Integration and Inclusion (2020) introduced, for the first time, such a distinction in clarifying who needs ‘integration’ measures, and therefore who belongs, by including, in addition to third-country nationals, also ‘EU citizens of migrant background’. This category is defined as:

nationals of EU Member States who had a third-country nationality and became EU citizens through naturalisation in one of the EU Member States as well as EU citizens who have a third country migrant background through their foreign-born parents.³⁰

The EC doesn’t dwell too much on why it was thought necessary to widen the scope of the integration agenda, saying only that ‘the challenge of integration and inclusion is particularly relevant for migrants, not only newcomers but sometimes also for third-country nationals who might have naturalised and are EU citizen’.³¹ The move away from formal criterions towards symbolic meanings of membership and ‘integratedness’ is in line with wider changes in EU identity-building. Classifying certain populations (mostly Muslims and people of colour) who were born and bred in their country of residence as ‘migrants’ and singling out descendants of people who once migrated to Europe as ‘un-integrated’ have been argued to have racializing effects for concerned groups, who are denied belonging due to the perceived incompatibility of their ‘origin culture’ with modern European societies (Bridget Anderson 2013; Korteweg 2017). The answer to why the Commission suddenly decided to legitimize such narratives after a long record of avoiding inflammatory rhetoric that causes controversies across member states, can only be hypothesised as a result of the general change in the political climate across the Global North towards normalising nationalist, nativist, anti-immigration and Islamophobic discourses that were once relegated to the fringe Far Right. The ‘protecting Europe’ trope is the most glaring example of this shift, that opened space for high-level EU officials to liken the Global South to a ‘jungle’ and migration to an ‘invasion’ of ‘barbarism’ against ‘humanity’. Boundary integrationism at EU level, therefore, involves also the establishment of stricter and culturally defined boundaries around who is a member of the ‘EU community’, who is a subject of integration policy (and hence, an outsider), and what rights are accorded to each.

6. Conclusion

I argued that several rationalities from which integrationism draws legitimacy and purpose coexist in the EU Framework on migrant integration since its inception. These agendas are diverse and sometimes mutually opposing, which reflects the various interests invested in the EU as a union of nation-states, each with its own priorities and political programmes. Although a clear linear development cannot be identified, certain patterns delineate which frames dominated over others in different contexts and historical periods. As was discussed earlier, three decades ago there was sufficient egalitarian impetus at EU level to argue that ‘integration’ means granting non-citizens rights comparable to those of EU citizens, derived from the EU’s commitment to the protection of fundamental rights, equality of opportunity and non-discrimination. The 2000s saw an increased emphasis on the ‘active participation’ of non-citizens and their contribution to the economy in particular, which paved the way for discourses on ‘earned’ rights that presuppose a proactive, independent individual. At present, these agendas, while still existing, clash with concerns with security and the preservation of an exclusionary community, implicitly defined in terms of Judeo-Christian values, whiteness and Europe’s exceptionalism. In line with developments in national-level civic integration regimes, we witness a shift in emphasis from social inclusion and equality, towards integration as a condition for acquiring rights such as residence status and family reunification. At least at the level of rhetoric, European institutions seem to have recently embraced a more nativist and securitarian discourse that pays lip service to corresponding concerns in member states the problematise the adherence of (Muslim) populations to ‘liberal’ and ‘European values’ amidst increasingly anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim debates.

Tentatively, three ongoing transformations that characterise the EU migrant integration agenda can be discerned from the above analysis, that suggest that rationales rooted in boundary integrationism are increasingly gaining ground. The first sees ‘European values’ moving from the juridical sphere of constitutional rights and freedoms, towards cultural values springing from the Judeo-Christian liberal tradition. The second transformation refers to how the adherence to ‘European’ or ‘liberal values’ becomes an important proxy for integration as well as for restricting immigration, now seriously competing with economic, security and human rights concerns. The third saw the subject of integration being reinvented along nativist lines to include those that fail to achieve ‘Europeanness’ based on symbolic (rather than juridical) assessment, even though they are formally EU citizens. Thus, EU integration policy curiously manages to combine at the same time egalitarian and welfarist concerns, with nativist imagination of a European community into which undesired subjects can be accorded rights only if they are properly trained in ‘European values’. Such shifts showcase that the normalisation of nativist, anti-immigrant, neocolonial, racist and nationalist positions vis-à-vis those categorised as migrants and their institutionalisation in current national political landscapes are increasingly reflected at supranational level.

Acknowledgements

I am thankful to B. Savić, S. Nováková, J.C. Mayer, S. Manser-Egli, A. Cunningham and members of MOVES for their helpful feedback on earlier versions of this paper, as well as to the two anonymous reviewers. Any responsibility remains solely mine.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 812764.

Notes

1 I use ‘integrationism’ to denote the discourses, policies and political rationales related to the governance of ‘migrant integration’, not to be confused with ‘integrationism’ in the context of European integration.

2 Decision 85/381/EEC, Article 1.

3 Germany and Other Member States v Commission (C-281/85, 1987), Court of Justice of the European Union.

4 For instance, the 1977 (1983) European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers (ETS No. 093) and the 1992 Convention on the participation of foreigners in public life at the local level (ETS 144), as well as the numerous conferences of European Ministers responsible for Migration Affairs since 1980.

5 European Website on Integration, EC. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/eu-grid/eu-strategy_en.

6 COM/2020/758.

7 14615/04.

8 COM(2005)123.

9 13440/08.

10 COM(1994)23, foreword.

11 COM/2003/336, p. 4.

12 COM/2003/0005.

13 Action Plan on the Integration of Third-country nationals: Factsheet, EC, DG HOME, 2016.

14 COM/2016/0377.

15 COM(2005)389, p. 3.

16 For example, in the Revised Blue Card Directive (2021/1883), Article 2.

17 COM/2003/336, p. 4.

18 COM/2004/0811.

19 COM/2020/758, p. 6.

20 Strategic Plan for 2020–2024, DG HOME, EC, 2020.

21 COM(2005)123.

22 Presidency non-paper for the Council (General Affairs) on 24 May 2016 – Rule of law dialogue (8774/16), p. 3.

23 Opinion on the Action plan on integration (CIVEX-VI/015), European Committee of the Regions, 2016, p. 1.

24 2006/2010(INI).

25 13440/08, Article I(g).

26 An EPP spokesperson for Euronews (Matamoros 2019).

27 Summary of speech published on website of European People’s Party, ‘Today is about asserting and defending the European way of life’, 13.09.2017. Available at: https://www.eppgroup.eu/newsroom/news/we-must-assert-and-defend-the-european-way-of-life (accessed 13 September 2022).

28 Speech available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-diplomatic-academy-opening-remarks-high-representative-josep-borrell-inauguration_en (accessed 12 November 2022).

29 ‘Today is about asserting and defending the European way of life’, website of European People’s Party, 13.09.2017. Available at: https://www.eppgroup.eu/newsroom/news/we-must-assert-and-defend-the-european-way-of-life (accessed 13 September 2022).

30 COM/2020/758, p. 1.

31 COM/2020/758, p. 1.

Appendix

Key policy documents comprising the EU Framework on migrant integration* and related documents where migrant integration is discussed.

Table

Year	Document	Code	Institution
1992	Maastricht Treaty		European Community
1994	Communication on immigration and asylum policies	COM (1994) 23	European Commission
1994	White paper ‘European Social Policy – A way forward for the Union’	COM (1994) 333	European Commission
1995	Reflection group report in preparation for Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) (Turin)		Council of the European Union
1996	Intergovernmental Conference in Turin		Council of the European Union
1997	Treaty of Amsterdam (in force 1999)		European Community
1999	Tampere Programme (1999–2004) (Tampere European Council 15 And 16 October 1999 Presidency Conclusions)	SN 200/99	European Community
2000	Lisbon strategy (Presidency conclusions for European Council of the European Union special meeting 23–24 March 2000)		EUCO
2000	Council of the European Union Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin	2000/43/EC	Council of the European Union
2000	Council of the European Union Directive on establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation	2000/78/EC	Council of the European Union
2001	Proposal for a Council of the European Union Directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents	COM(2001)127 final	European Commission
2002	Conference on integration in labour market, Copenhagen, July 2002	/	Council of the European Union
2002	Taking stock of five years of the EES	COM(2002)416	European Commission
2003	Communication on immigration, integration and employment	COM/2003/0336	European Commission
2003	Directive on the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents	2003/109/EC	Council of the European Union
2003	Directive on the right to Family Reunification	2003/86/EC	Council of the European Union
2003	Opinion on "Access to European Union citizenship"	OJ C 208	EESC
2004	Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic migration	COM/2004/0811	European Commission
2004	Study on the links between legal and illegal immigration	COM (2004) 412	European Commission
2004	Opinion on the ‘communication from the Commission on immigration, integration and employment	2004/C 109/08	Committee of Regions
2004	Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy	14615/04	Council of the European Union
2004	Handbook on Integration for Policymakers and Practitioners (1st edition)		European Commission and NCPI
2004	First Annual Report on Migration and Integration	COM/2004/0508	European Commission
2005	Strategic Objectives 2005–2009 – Europe 2010: A Partnership for European Renewal Prosperity, Solidarity and Security	COM(2005)12	European Commission
2005	Policy Plan on Legal Migration	COM/2005/0669	European Commission
2005	Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years	COM(2005) 184	European Commission
2005	A Common Agenda for Integration – Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union (2005–2010)	COM(2005) 389	European Commission
2005	Action Plan implementing the Hague Programme on strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union	2005/C 198/01	European Commission Council of the European Union
2005	Framework programme on Solidarity and the Management of Migration Flows for the period 2007–2013	COM(2005) 123	European Commission
2006	Second Annual Report on Migration and Integration	SEC(2006) 892	European Commission
2006	Opinion on the Communication from the Commission: The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years (COM(2005) 184 final)	2006/C 65/22	EESC
2006	European Parliament resolution on women's immigration: the role and place of immigrant women in the European Union	2006/2010(INI)	European Parliament
2006	European Parliament resolution of 26 September 2007 on the policy plan on legal migration	2006/2251(INI)	European Parliament
2006	European Parliament resolution on strategies and means for the integration of immigrants in the European Union	2006/2056(INI)	European Parliament
2007	Treaty of Lisbon	2007/C 306/01	EU
2007 [2012]	Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union	2012/C 326/02	EU
2007	Handbook on Integration for Policymakers and Practitioners (2nd edition)		European Commission and NCPI
2007	Third Annual Report on Migration and Integration	COM(2007) 512	European Commission
2007	Decision of establishing the European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals for the period 2007 to 2013	2007/435/EC	Council of the European Union
2007	Decision establishing the European Refugee Fund for the period 2008 to 2013	573/2007/EC	European Parliament Council of the European Union
2007	Decision laying down rules for the implementation of Decision establishing the European Refugee Fund for the period 2008 to 2013	2008/22/EC	European Parliament Council of the European Union
2008	Strenghtening the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility	COM/2008/0611	European Commission
2008	Vichy Declaration on Integration (European Ministerial Conference on Integration, Vichy, 3–4 November 2008)	14898/08	Council of the European Union
2008	A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools	COM/2008/0359	European Commission
2008	European Pact for Migration and Asylum	13440/08	Council of the European Union
2008	Council of the European Union Decision of 14 May 2008 establishing a European Migration Network	2008/381/EC	Council of the European Union
2009	Council of the European Union Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment	2009/50/EC
2009	Tracking method for monitoring the implementation of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum	COM/2009/0266 final	European Commission
2009	European Parliament resolution on problems and prospects concerning European Citizenship	2008/2234 (INI)	European Parliament
2010	The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens	2010/C 115/01	Council of the European Union
2010	Zaragoza Declaration on Integration		Council of the European Union of Ministers
2010	Handbook on Integration for Policymakers and Practitioners (3rd edition)	10.2758/15387	European Commission and NCPI
2010	EU Citizenship Report 2010: Dismantling the obstacles to EU citizens’ rights	COM(2010) 603 final	European Commission
2010	Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth	COM(2010) 2020	European Commission
2011	The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility	COM/2011/0743	European Commission
2011	Opinion on ‘Cooperation between civil society organisations and local and regional authorities in integrating immigrants’ (additional opinion)	2011/C 318/11	EESC
2011	European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (2011–2015)	COM(2011) 455	European Commission
2011	Directive on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State	2011/98/EU	European Parliament and Council of the European Union
2012	4th Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum	COM/2013/0422	European Commission
2014	European Modules on Migrant Integration – Final Report		European Commission
2014	An open and secure Europe: making it happen	COM(2014)154	European Commission
2014	Regulation on establishing Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) (2014–2020)	516/2014	European Parliament Council of the European Union
2014	European Ministerial Conference on Integration (Milan): Draft Outcome of Proceedings		Council of the European Union
2014	5th Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum	COM/2014/0288	European Commission
2016	Opinion on the Action plan on integration (2016)	CIVEX-VI/015	Committee of Regions
2016	Action Plan on the integration of third country nationals	COM/2016/0377	European Commission
2016	Directive on students and researchers	2016/801	European Parliament and Council of the European Union
2016	EU Fundamental Values, Immigration and Integration: A Shared Responsibility – A report on seminar on EU fundamental values, immigration and integration (2 February 2016, Strasbourg)	8774/16 (Annex)	Council of the European Union
2016	Presidency non-paper for the Council of the European Union (General Affairs) on 24 May 2016 – Rule of law dialogue	8774/16	Council of the European Union
2016	2nd European Migration Forum: Summary Report		European Commission and EESC
2017	3rd European Migration Forum: Summary Report		European Commission and EESC
2018	4th European Migration Forum: Summary Report		European Commission and EESC
2019	President von der Leyen's mission letter to Margaritis Schinas		European Commission
2019	5th European Migration Forum: Summary report		European Commission and EESC
2020	Action plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021–2027	COM/2020/758	European Commission
2020	Regulation amending 2014 Regulation for establishing AMIF	2020/445	European Commission
2020	Analysis of the responses to the public consultation on the integration and inclusion of migrants and people with a migrant background (Synthesis report)	ISBN 978-92-76-25458-4	European Commission
2020	Report on the consultation on the integration and inclusion of migrants and people with a migrant background (Final Report)	ISBN 978-92-76-25428-7	European Commission
2020	AMIF implementation report [no formal title]	DB2021	European Commission
2020	New Pact on Migration and Asylum	COM/2020/609	European Commission
2020	European Skills Agenda	COM(2020) 274	European Commission
2020	Call for applications for the selection of members of the expert group on the views of migrants in the field of migration, asylum and integration		European Commission
2020	Coordination and Support Action under Horizon 2020: Sustainable practices for the integration of newly arrived migrants into societies	MIGRATION-10-20	European Commission
2021	Revised Blue Card Directive (Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment, and repealing Council of the European Union Directive 2009/50/EC)	2021/1883	European Commission and Council of the European Union
2021	Resolution of 25 November 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on legal migration policy and law	2020/2255 (INL)	European Parliament
2021	Partnership on integration (between CoR and EC): Supporting cities regions, and rural areas in migrants’ integration		European Parliament CoR
2021	6th European Migration Forum: Summary Report		European Commission and EESC
2021	European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on legal migration policy and law (adopted)	2020/2255 (INL)	European Parliament
2022	Proposal for a Directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents (recast)	COM/2022/650	European Commission

*These are marked in bold.