Fragments of equality in representative politics

Abstract

Deploying a broadly interpretive approach, the article explores the extent to which, and the ways in which, equality is enacted in non-elective as well as elective representation. It argues that the fleeting and fragmentary equalities evident in non-elective representation are democratically significant, and that examining them can enhance understanding of the democratic promise and limits of different modes of representation.

Keywords:

• political equality
• democratic representation
• elections and representation
• non-elective representation
• representative democracy

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the editors of the special issue and the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments and suggestions.

Notes

1. Although the constitutive character of representation is prominent in recent accounts including those focused on judgement (Urbinati 2011), reflexivity (Disch 2011) and aesthetics (Ankersmit 2002), it has deeper roots in the account of Bourdieu (1991) and, according to Disch in particular, in Pitkin’s modern classic The Concept of Representation (1967). Arguably, it goes all the way back to Hobbes: ‘For it is the unity of the representer, not the unity of the represented, that maketh the person one’ (Hobbes 1968 [1651], p. 220).

2. For the sake of clarity the discussion distinguishes in quite black-and-white terms between the elected and the unelected. In practice there are shades of grey – degrees and types of electedness. Some form of election often operates for leadership of civil society organisations. Leading EU officials, such as the President of the Commission, for example, can claim forms of indirect election (via links to electoral processes) and therefore some degree of democratic legitimacy. In short, there are hybrid forms of semi-elective representation.

3. Whether the establishment of such bodies has co-optive or empowering intent, they may be read as a representative response to the problem that Aboriginal people cannot form a critical electoral mass – a fact that, according to Evans and Hill (2012), may prompt a different institutional response.

4. For detailed discussion of the ‘appropriate constituency’ and other specific features of this account, see Saward (2010, 2014).

5. Plurality, equal access, variability and reflexivity are key democratic ingredients in fields or systems of representation. A number of commentators regard the promotion of similarly conceived conditions as essential to the democratic or just character of representation (e.g. Garsten 2009, Hayward 2009).