After Exit: Successor Missions and Peace Consolidation

Abstract

Devising exit strategies is a challenge for all peace operations but a particular challenge for international territorial administrations (ITAs). Given the scope of the remit of ITAs and the long-term developmental needs of the territories they administer, the withdrawal of international authorities risks leaving weak embryonic institutions in their wake. This article focuses on the importance of follow-on measures – a role for which regional organisations may be particularly well suited – to reinforce positive achievements and to ensure against slippage. It looks at the extent to which such thinking is reflected in actual practice and assesses the effectiveness of successor missions where they have been employed.

Acknowledgement

This article is adapted from the author's International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005) by permission of Oxford University Press.

Notes

 1. No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council Decision-making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN Doc S/2001/394, 20 April 2001).

 2. Charles T. Call and Susan E. Cook, ‘On Democratization and Peacebuilding’, Global Governance 9/2 (2003) p.237.

 3. SC Res 745 (1992) 28 February 1992.

 4. Janet E. Heininger, Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press 1994) p.34.

 5. Mats R. Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping? Adelphi Paper 281 (Oxford: Oxford University Press/International Institute for Strategic Studies 1993) p.13.

 6. Benjamin Reilly, ‘Elections Post-conflict: Constraints and Dangers’, International Peacekeeping 9/2 (2002) p.119.

 7. No Exit Without Strategy (note 1) para.6.

 8. Christine Coleiro, Bringing Peace to the Land of Scorpions and Jumping Snakes: Legacy of the United Nations in Eastern Slavonia and Transitional Missions (Clementsport, Nova Scotia: Canadian Peacekeeping Press Publications 2002) p.115.

 9. Robert J.A.R. Gravelle, ‘The United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES): A Successful United Nations Mission’, unpublished manuscript (undated).

10. Coleiro (note 8) p.107.

11. Figure from United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Lessons Learned Unit, The United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), January 1996–January 1998: Lessons Learned (New York: UN Department of Public Information 1998) para.125. Many of the agreements are listed in Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UN Doc S/1997/953, 4 December 1997) Annex I.

12. Coleiro (note 8) p.107.

13. Sally Morphet, ‘Current International Civil Administration: The Need for Political Legitimacy’, International Peacekeeping 9/2 (2002) p.146.

14. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Permanent Council, Decision No. 176, 26 June 1997, Document No. PC.DEC/176.

15. Benchmarks available at http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/apr02/benchmarks_tablefinal.pdf.

16. Michael Steiner, ‘Standards before Status’, Focus Kosovo (April 2002) pp.4–5, available at http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/apr02/focusklead1.htm.

17. Holkeri cited in ‘UN Chief Unveils Kosovo Roadmap’, Southeast European Times, 10 December 2003, available at http://www.setimes.com/html2/english/031211-SVETLA-001.htm.

18. ‘New Standards for Kosovo’, Balkan Reconstruction Report (15 December 2003) available at http://www.tol.cz.

19. ‘Which Way for Kosova?’ RFE/RL Balkan Report 8/12 (26 March 2004) available at http://www.rferl.org/reports/balkan-report/2004/03/12-260304.asp.

20. Anthony Goldstone, ‘UNTAET with Hindsight: The Peculiarities of Politics in an Incomplete State’, Global Governance 10/1 (2004) p.89.

21. ‘Peacekeepers pulled out of East Timor too soon, UN envoy admits’, Financial Times, 7 June 2006.

22. SC Res 1145 (1997) of 19 December 1997 established the United Nations Police Support Group with effect from 16 January 1998.

23. Final Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Police Support Group (UN Doc S/1998/1004, 27 October 1998) para.2.

24. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Police Support Group (UN Doc S/1998/500, 11 June 1998) and Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Police Support Group (UN Doc S/1998/887, 23 September 1998).

25. Final Report of the Secretary-General (note 23).

26. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Mission to Croatia, ‘Status Report No. 12’ (3 July 2003) p.1, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/mc/2003/07/450_en.pdf.

27. International Policy Institute, A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change (London: King's College London 2003), Ch. 4 (East Timor) para.337.

28. Ibid. para.357.

29. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the ‘Brahimi Report’) (UN Doc A/55/505–S/2000/809, 21 August 2000) paras.198–217.

30. William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle and Moira K. Shanahan, The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center 2003) p.48.

31. Author interviews with UNTAET officials, Dili and London; and International Policy Institute (note 27) Ch. 4 (East Timor) para.351.

32. International Policy Institute (note 27) Ch. 4 (East Timor) para.341. The following section draws from the East Timor chapter of this study.

33. In accordance with SC Res 1338 (2001), adopted on 31 January 2001, which requested such recommendations.

34. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UN Doc S/2002/80, 17 January 2002) paras.76–94.

35. Ibid. para.77.

36. The original plan envisioned a downsizing of the military component from 3,870 troops to 2,780 in July 2003 and to 1,750 in December 2003. The adjusted plan maintained the higher level through December 2003, with downsizing subsequently to 1,750. Meanwhile, an international police unit would be deployed for one year to respond to riot situations and additional training provided to the East Timor police to strengthen their crowd-control skills. See Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Support of East Timor (UN Doc S/2003/243, 3 March 2003).

37. Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Support of East Timor (UN Doc S/2004/117, 13 February 2004) para.16. SC Res 1543 (2004), adopted on 14 May 2004, approved a six-month extension of UNMISET's mandate with a view to subsequently extending the mandate for a further and final period of six months.

38. Author interviews with UNTAET officials and foreign government representatives, Dili.

39. Special Report of the Secretary-General (note 37) para.24.

40. Ibid. para.21.

41. Ibid. para.38.

42. Ibid. paras.8, 49.

43. Ibid. para.50.

44. No Exit Without Strategy (note 1) para.43.

45. Ibid. para.26.

46. Susan L. Woodward, ‘Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation’ in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (eds.), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002) p.209.

47. Michael Hopkins, ‘Post-conflict Aid and Structural Employment Problems with a Focus on Wages’ in Eugenia Date-Bah (ed.) Jobs After War: A Critical Challenge in the Peace and Reconstruction Puzzle (Geneva: International Labour Organisation 2003) p.431. The impact on local wage setting and labour markets is thought to be the largest negative economic effect of peace operations. See William Carnahan, William Durch and Scott Gilmore, Economic Impact of Peacekeeping: Final Report (March 2006), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons.

48. Carnahan, Durch and Gilmore ibid. pp.1, 21.

49. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UN Doc S/2002/432, 17 April 2002) para.100.

50. World Bank, ‘Background Paper for Donors' Meeting on East Timor, Dili, 14–15 May 2002’ (undated) pp.2–3.

51. Ibid. pp.9–10.

52. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Police Support Group (UN Doc S/1998/887) (note 24) para.30.

53. Jarat Chopra, ‘Building State Failure in East Timor’, Development and Change 33/5 (2002) p.999.

54. Jonathan Steele, ‘Nation Building in East Timor’, World Policy Journal 19/2 (2002) p.82.

55. Timor Sea Treaty, 20 May 2002, Article 4(a).

56. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Support of East Timor (UN Doc S/2003/944, 6 October 2003) para.49; ‘E Timorese Accuse Australia of Delay in Boundary Talks’, Financial Times, 27 November 2003.

57. World Bank (note 50).

58. 15,000 is the high end of the OSCE estimate of 10–15,000. The Croatian government estimate is even higher: 23,343 Serb returnees from the Danube region. Figures from Jelena Smoljan, ‘Socio-Economic Aspects of Peacebuilding: UNTAES and the Process of Peaceful Reintegration of Eastern Slavonia’ (D.Phil thesis, International Relations, University of Oxford 2004) Ch. 7.

59. ‘[Third] Report of the OSCE Mission to the Republic of Croatia on Croatia's progress in meeting international commitments since May 1998’, 8 September 1998 para.23. The European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) figure was even higher: it estimated that more than 40 per cent of the region's Serb community left the region in the two years that it was under UN administration. ‘[First] Report of the OSCE Mission to the Republic of Croatia on Croatia's progress in meeting international commitments since January 1998’ (20 May 1998) para.48.

60. Smoljan (note 58) Ch. 8.

61. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UN Doc S/1997/767, 2 October 1997) para.50.

62. Derek Boothby, ‘The Political Challenges of Administering Eastern Slavonia’, Global Governance 10/1 (2004) p.41.

63. On the difficulties of evaluating the success of peace operations generally, see George Downs and Stephen John Stedman, ‘Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation’, in Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens (note 46) pp.44–54.