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Abstract
In October 2005, I met an official from the Pentagon in Washington and asked him if the US forces are aware of whom they are fighting in Iraq. He replied: ‘We have a lot of intelligence reports but our information about whom the insurgents are, and most importantly how many they are and where they are, is still limited.’Footnote1Four years after the invasion of Iraq and the insurgency still remains somewhat of an enigma. Working as journalist in Baghdad, I have personal experience of the difficulties in collecting and disseminating objective information over the true nature of the insurgency in Iraq. In December 2004 while conducting an interview with some Iraqis in a Shia district of Baghdad, I was arrested by the Iraqi Police who, without an explanation forced me inside a car, pointed a gun to my head and drove me to a house in a remote district of Baghdad. I was lucky to have survived that incident, not least because according to the International Federation of Journalists over, 135 reporters have been killed in Iraq since the US-led invasion in March 2003.Footnote2 Even so, enough material has emerged from the shadows of the insurgency to question what many regard as its unitary nature and structure. By concentrating on the scope and dynamics of the Sunni based insurgency, this article highlights the fragmented nature of many of the insurgent groups, and examines whether the violence that threatens to dismember Iraq along sectarian lines can be assuaged by the very factors that now drive the insurgency.
Notes
1. Interview with Pentagon official, Oct. 2005. Name withheld on request.
2. International Federation of Journalists, < www.ifj.org>.
3. Interview with Dr Mutaz, the head of the Republic Centre for Security Research and Studies, Dec. 2005, Baghdad.
4. Interview with Dr Mutaz, the head of the Republic Centre for Security Research and Studies, Dec. 2005, Baghdad
5. BBC, ‘Armed Groups in Iraq’, 15 Aug. 2006, < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4268904.stm>.
6. The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index Archive, 21 Sept. 2006 at < www.brook.edu/fp/saban/iraq/indexarchive.htm>.
7. The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index Archive, 21 Sept. 2006 at < www.brook.edu/fp/saban/iraq/indexarchive.htm>
8. BBC, ‘US echoes Iraq civil war warning’, 3 Aug. 2006, < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5243042.stm>.
9. Jonathan Finer, ‘Iraq's Insurgents: Who's Who’, Washington Post, 19 March 2006, < www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/17/AR2006031702087_pf.html>. See also BBC, ‘Armed Groups in Iraq’, 15 Aug. 2006, < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4268904.stm>.
10. Stephen Biddle, ‘Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon’, Foreign Affairs 85/2 (March/April 2006), < www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85201/stephen-biddle/seeing-baghdad-thinking-saigon.html>. Some insurgent activities have been the work of criminals or criminal organizations hiring themselves out for attacks on coalition forces. The US 4th Division's Task Force ‘Iron Horse’ reported in Nov. 2003 that between 70 and 80 per cent of those apprehended for making attacks in their area were paid to do so, the going rate being anything between $150 and $500.See Ian F.W. Beckett, Insurgency in Iraq: An Historical Perspective, US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph (Carlisle, PA: Jan. 2005) p.4 at < www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID = 592>.
11. Interview with Dr Mutaz, the head of the Republic Centre for Security Research and Studies, Dec. 2005, Baghdad.
12. Biddle (note 10).
13. Larry Diamond, ‘What to Do in Iraq’, Foreign Affairs 85/4 (July/Aug. 2006), < http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20061301faresponse85812/larry-diamond-james-dobbins-chaim-kaufmann-leslie-h-gelb-stephen-biddle/what-to-do-in-iraq-a-roundtable.html>.
14. International Crisis Group, In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, Middle East Report No. 50 (15 Feb. 2006) p.1, < www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm.id = 3953&l = 1>.
15. Amatzia Baram, Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report No. 134 (April 2005) p.1 at < www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr134.pdf>.
16. Paul Bremer, My Year in Iraq (New York: Simon & Schuster 2006) p.297: ‘Our de-Baathification policy had targeted the top 1 percent of the party's members, but under Chalabi's direction, the Iraqi De-Baathification council had broadened the policy, for example, depriving thousands of teachers of their jobs.’
17. Baram (note 15) pp.3–6.
18. Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, The Future of Iraq (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2003) p.62.
19. This interview with Abu Ahmad took place at his Internet café, Noor, Baghdad on 15 Dec. 2005 in Baghdad.
20. Anderson and Stansfield (note 18) p.104.
21. Baram (note 15) pp.3–6.
22. Baram (note 15) pp.3–6 p.1.
23. International Crisis Group (note 14) p.5. See also Kevin Woods, ‘Saddam's Delusions: The View from the Inside’, Foreign Affairs 85/3 (May/June 2006), < www.foreignaffairs.org/20060501>.
24. Baram (note 15) p.3-6, see also International Crisis Group (note 14) p.9. This is also supported by interviews I have conducted with among others Dr Mutaz and other senior Iraqis who have requested not to be mentioned by their names.
25. Baram (note 15) p.6.
26. Bremer (note 16) pp.139–42.
29. Anderson and Stansfield (note 18) p.63.
30. Anderson and Stansfield (note 18) p.63
31. Anderson and Stansfield (note 18) p.63 pp.104–7.
32. Anderson and Stansfield (note 18) p.63 p.104.
33. Baram (note 15) pp.6–9.
34. Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell UP and C. Hurst 2006) p.100.
35. Interview with Loay occurred in Dec. 2005. He and four of his brothers were beheaded in their home by the insurgents in April 2006. (For security reasons and at the request of Loay's relatives I cannot write the full names of Loay and his brother.)
36. Al Jazzeera broadcasting, The War on Iraq, during March and April 2003. The first reports of American humiliation of Iraqi civilians and the body searches of Iraqi women, came after the liberation of the Shia sacred cities of Najaf and Karbala.
37. Baram (note 15) pp.6–9.
38. BBC, ‘Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’, 10 Nov. 2005, < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3483089.stm>.
39. ‘Al-Zarqawi declares war on Iraqi Shia’, Al-Jazeera, 14 Sept. 2005.
40. The well- known Iraqi newspaper Azzaman has in several reports showed when and how the militias attack Sunni areas. Information about the militias' violent activities are also reported by Iraqi television channels such as Asharqiya.
41. As reported by Iraq Body Count, from the start of the war until 1 Aug. 2006, the number of Iraqi police killed totalled 2,280, while 40,091 civilians had lost their lives. According to The Brookings Institution's Iraq Index Report, 8,197 Iraqis have been killed by roadside bombs and suicide attacks conducted by the insurgents. The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index, p.12, < www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf>.
42. Biddle (note 10).
43. Anderson and Stansfield (note 18) p.102.
44. Baram (note 15) p.2.
45. According to Global Security recruiting militants takes place in three stages. ‘First, there is some form of contact initiated, perhaps in a mosque after daily prayers. In this first conversation, a later meeting is arranged. After this meeting, some of the prospective militants are eliminated, leaving the third round of candidates that will train in the campus.’ See < globalsecurity.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_insurgency.htm>.
46. Centre for Arab Unity Studies (Beirut, Lebanon) Ihtilal al-Iraq, Aug. 2004.
47. Centre for Arab Unity Studies (Beirut, Lebanon) Ihtilal al-Iraq, Aug. 2004
48. Both moderates and the radicals are inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood movements. But while moderates do not believe in a violent struggle, the radicals and ultra radicals are deeply influenced by the most extreme interpretation of Islam as presented by Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), who was a preacher of Jihad.
49. Professor Amatzia Baram is one of the scholars who holds this opinion. See Baram (note 15) p.2.
50. BBC, ‘New study details Iraq Insurgency’, 17 Nov. 2005, < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4447778.stm>.
51. International Crisis Group (note 14).
52. The Council on Foreign Relations writes in a report about Muhajir, published 13 June 2006: ‘No one seems to know for certain. The website announcing al-Muhajir's new post said he is “a good brother, has a history in jihad, and is knowledgeable”.’ On 13 July The Times (London) cited ‘insurgent sources’ who described their new leader as an Egyptian national with experience fighting in Afghanistan and against US forces in Fallujah in 2004. Farhana Ali, a terrorism expert at the RAND Corporation, says ‘Abu Hamza al-Muhajir may be an alias of Abu Ayub al-Masri, an Egyptian trained in Afghanistan who was identified by the US military as a likely successor to al-Zarqawi.’
53. International Crisis Group (note 14) p.2.
54. International Crisis Group (note 14) p.2 p.1
55. International Crisis Group (note 14) p.2 p.3.
56. International Crisis Group (note 14) p.2 p.1.
57. BBC, ‘Armed Groups in Iraq’, 15 Aug. 2006, < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4268904.stm>. The Mujahidin's Shura Council issues statements and posts videos on a website – including a video showing the executions of two Russian hostages in June 2006.See also Jonathan Finer, ‘Iraq's Insurgents: Who's Who’, Washington Post, 19 March 2006.
58. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Next Attack (London: Hodder & Stoughton 2005) pp.17–19.
59. Brian Fishman, ‘After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq’, Washington Quarterly 29/4 (Autumn 2006) p.20, < www.twq.com/06autumn/docs/06autumn_fishman.pdf>.
60. Brian Fishman, ‘After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq’, Washington Quarterly 29/4 (Autumn 2006) p.20, < www.twq.com/06autumn/docs/06autumn_fishman.pdf> p.21.
61. Radio Free Europe, ‘Sunni Insurgents turning against al-Zarqawi’, 26 Jan. 2006, < www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m = 01&y = 2006&id = 2E2E0357-55E5-4E06-AD2D-B890F8F21442>.
62. Radio Free Europe, ‘Sunni Insurgents turning against al-Zarqawi’, 26 Jan. 2006, < www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m = 01&y = 2006&id = 2E2E0357-55E5-4E06-AD2D-B890F8F21442>
63. Fishman (note 59) p.19.
64. US Dept. of State, Report to Congress, 6 July 2006, < www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/1227/68892.htm>.
65. Biddle (note 10).
66. Diamond (note 13).
67. Biddle (note 10).
68. Biddle (note 10)
69. Biddle (note 10)
70. Edward Wong, ‘To stay alive Iraqis change their names’, New York Times, 6 Sept. 2006. The Iraqi television channels Asharqiya and al-Fayha, and Iraqi newspapers such as Azzaman have also reported this issue extensively.
71. Biddle (note 10).
72. This is one of the most common debates among Iraqis I met during my trips to Baghdad.
73. Baram (note 15) pp.16–18.