Iraq and the Region Since the War of 2003

Abstract

The Iraq crisis has generated broad regional implications, including impact on regional democratization, with Iraq considered by the US administration as a model, the heightened radicalization of Islamic groups, the regional empowerment of the Shi'i communities and the growth of public anti-Americanism. The crisis has also aroused particular concerns for countries in the region, including Iran, Turkey, Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. Besides discussing these actual implications, an attempt is made to forecast the regional impact of the crisis in the context of four major scenarios, including the persistence of the crisis situation as it has been developing, the success of the Iraqi system in installing a stable and elected government, an Iraqi civil war and the partitioning of the country into Sunni, Shi'i and Kurdish units. It is concluded that the impact of the crisis has been mostly disruptive and that the assessment would hopefully contribute towards a reappraisal of the course of the crisis by the major actors involved.

Notes

 1. See, for recent assessments, Michael N. Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics, Negotiations in Regional Order (NY: Columbia UP 1998) pp.213–36; Raymond Hinnebusch, ‘The Middle East Regional System’, in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Middle Eastern States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002) pp.46–50; Jerry M. Long, Saddam's War of Words, Politics, Religion and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 2004), pp.10–44 and 139–59; and Ahmed Ibrahim Ali, Al-Nizam Al-‘Alami Al-Jadid wa Harb Al-Khaleej [The New World Order and the Gulf War] (Beirut: Dar Sadir 2004) pp.225–315.

 2. See, for example, Jean Leca, ‘Democratization in the Arab World, Uncertainty, Vulnerability and Legitimacy: A tentative conceptualization and some hypotheses’, in Ghassan Salame (ed.), Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World (London: I.B. Tauris 1994) pp.48–83; Simon Bromley, ‘Middle East Exceptionalism-Myth or Reality?’, in David Porter et al. (eds.) Democratization (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press in assoc. with Open Univ. 1997) pp.321–44; Nazih N. Ayubi, ‘Islam and Democracy’, in ibid., pp.345–66; ‘Abd al-Nur Ibn ‘Antar, ‘Ishkaliyyat Al-Isti‘sa Al-Dimoqrati fi Al-Watan Al-‘Arabi’ [The Problem underlying the Difficulty of Democratization in the Arab Homeland] in the Centre for Arab Unity Studies, Al-Dimoqratiyyah wa Al-Tanmiyyah Al-Dimoqratiyyah fi Al-Watan Al-‘Arabi [Democracy and Democratic Development in the Arab Homeland] (Beirut 2004) pp.51–74; and Khaled Abou El Fadl et al., Islam and the Challenge of Democracy (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UP 2004).

 3. For a discussion of the general ingredients of democracy, see David Held, Models of Democracy, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press 2006) pp.259–89, although there is more concentration on the political aspects.

 4. See text of speech by the former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Anthony Lake, at the School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC, on 21 Sept. 1993 at ⟨www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html⟩; and Douglas Brinkley, ‘Democratic Enlargement: the Clinton Doctrine’, Foreign Policy, No. 106 (Spring 1997) pp.110–27.

 5. See Katerina Dalacoura, ‘US Democracy Promotion in the Arab Middle East Since 11 Sept. 2001: A Critique’, International Affairs 81/5 (Oct. 2005) p.963.

 6. From text of speech at p.5 ⟨http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/print/20031106-2.html⟩.

 7. See text p.3 ⟨www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/Iraq/Iraq_National_Strategy_2005/130.pdf⟩.

 8. See text pp.2 and 4 respectively, ⟨www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051214-1.html⟩.

 9. Louis J. Cantori and Augustus Richard Norton (eds), ‘Evaluating the Bush Menu for Change in the Middle East,’ Middle East Policy 12/1 (Spring 2005) pp.100–1. The article represents a summary of the contributions made at a conference held at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting in Chicago, 5 Sept. 2004. See also Gareth Porter, ‘The Third Option in Iraq: A Responsible Exit Strategy’, Middle East Policy 12/3 (Fall 2005) pp.30–3.

10. Dalacoura, ‘US Democracy Promotion’ (note 5) p.971.

11. Adeed Dawisha, ‘The Prospects for Democracy in Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities’, Third World Quarterly 26/4–5 (2005) pp.723–37.

12. See ibid. p.727; and Al-Hayat (London), 12 Oct. 2006.

13. Eric Davis, ‘History Matters: Past as a Prologue in Building Democracy in Iraq’, Orbis 49/2 (Spring 2005) pp.229–44.

14. Mark Tessler et al., ‘What do Iraqis Want?’, Journal of Democracy 17/1 (Jan. 2006) pp.39 and 45–6.

15. See statement of the G8 Summit held on Sea Island, Georgia, USA, on 9 June 2004 at ⟨www.g8usa.gov/d_060904c.htm⟩.

16. See Al-Hayat, 4, 22 and 23 March 2004.

17. See text of the declarations issued by the summits following their conferences in Tunis (22–23 May 2004), in Algiers (22–23 March 2005) and Khartoum (28–29 March 2006) in Al-Hayat, 24 May 2004, 24 March 2005 and 29 March 2006.

18. See Charles O. Cecil, ‘Oman's Progress Toward Participatory Government’, Middle East Policy l3/ No. 1 (Spring 2006) pp.62 and 64; Anne Marie Baylouny, ‘Jordan's New “Political Development Strategy”, Middle East Report 35/3 (Fall 2005) pp.40–3; James A. Russell, ‘Saudi Arabia in the 21st Century: A New Security Dilemma’, Middle East Policy 12/3 (Fall 2005) pp.73–5; Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman (eds.), Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Politics, Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs (London: C. Hurst 2005) pp.446–9; Steven A. Cook, ‘The Promise of Pacts’, Journal of Democracy 17/1 (Jan. 2006) p.63; and Al-Hayat, 27 Nov. and 21 Dec. 2006.

19. Anthony Cordesman, ‘Winning the “War on Terrorism”: A Fundamentally Different Strategy’, Middle East Policy 13/3 (Fall 2006) pp.104–5.

20. Mu‘tazz Bi Allah Abd al-Fattah, ‘Al-Dimoqratiyyah Al-‘Arabiyyah bayn Muhaddidat Al-Dakhil wa Dughut Al-Kharij’ [Arab Democracy between Internal Determinants and External Pressures] Al-Mustaqbal Al-‘Arabi, No. 326 (April 2006) p.15.

21. F. Gregory Gause III, ‘Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?’ Foreign Affairs 84/5 (Sept./Oct. 2005) p.63.

22. Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge: CUP 2005) pp.80 and 273.

23. See text of the fatwa announcing the formation of this front in John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito (eds.), Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, 2nd ed. (NY and Oxford: OUP 2007) pp.430–2.

24. Gerges, The Far Enemy (note 22) pp.251–2 and 274.

25. For details see Henry Munson, ‘Islamic Militancy’, in Rick Fawn and Raymond Hinnebusch (eds.), The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2006) pp.235–46.

26. See text of the interview, p.1.at ⟨www.msnbc.msn.com/id/667974/print/1/displaymode/1098/⟩.

27. See text of the interview, pp.2–3 at ⟨www.meforum.org/pf.php?id = 688⟩. These are excerpts from Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2005).

28. Al-Hayat, 16 Sept. 2006.

29. See proceedings of the symposium entitled ‘A Shia Crescent: What Fallout for the United States?’ Middle East Policy 12/4 (Winter 2005) pp.9 and 11. The symposium covers pp.1–27.

30. Juan Cole, ‘A “Shiite Crescent”? The Regional Impact of the Iraq War’, Current History 105/687 (Jan. 2006) p.20. The article covers pp.20–6.

31. Vali Nasr, ‘When the Shiites Rise’, Foreign Affairs 85/4 (July/Aug. 2006) p.58.

32. See results of these polls in ‘Iraq Issues: Is Iraq the Reason We Are Hated?’ pp.3–5 at ⟨www.socialsecuritywaste.org/iraq_issues.htm⟩.

33. Ali Balci and Murat Yesiltas, ‘Turkey's New Middle East Policy: The Case of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq's Neighbouring Countries’, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 39/4 (Summer 2006) p.23. For a brief account of the discussion at these meetings, see pp.18–37.

34. See ⟨www.usip.org/isg/about.html⟩; and ⟨www.usip.org/isg/fact-sheet.html⟩. See The Iraq Study Group Report, released on 6 Dec. 2006 at ⟨www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/iraq_study_group_report.pdf⟩, pp. 24–26 and 32–41; and President Bush's speech on 7 Dec. 2006 at ⟨www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/print/20061207-1.html⟩.

35. On Turkey's anxiety about the Iraq impact on its Kurdish problem, see Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics and Military Lessons, published in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC (Westport, CT: Praeger 2003) pp.564–5; Gareth Winrow, ‘Turkey Recalcitrant Ally’, in Fawn and Hinnebusch, The Iraq War (note 25) pp.198–200; and Balci and Yesiltas, ‘Turkey's New Middle East Policy’ (note 33) p.19.

36. Winrow, ‘Turkey’ (note 35) p.200.

37. Winrow, ‘Turkey’ (note 35) p.199; and Zaki Chehab, Iraq Ablaze: Inside the Insurgency (London: I.B. Tauris 2006) p.200.

38. See, for example, President George W. Bush's answer regarding Iran's nuclear weapons, following a speech at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC on 10 April 2006, p.5 at ⟨www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/04/print/20060410-1.html⟩. On Iran's nuclear programme and the arguments about it, see Jahangir Amuzegar, ‘Nuclear Iran: Perils and Prospects’, Middle East Policy 13/3 (Summer 2006) pp.90–112; and Mark Fitzpatrick, ‘Assessing Iran's Nuclear Programme’, Survival 48/3 (Fall 2006) pp.5–26.

39. Kamran Taremi, ‘Iranian Foreign Policy Towards Occupied Iraq, 2003–2005’, Middle East Policy 12/4 (Winter 2005) pp.35 and 37.

40. See Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (London: C. Hurst 2006) pp. 136, 230–2, 235–40 and 248; and Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and its Legacy (London: C. Hurst 2006) pp.138–40.

41. Taremi, ‘Iranian Foreign Policy’ (note 39) p.36.

42. See Paul Rogers, Iraq and the War on Terror: Twelve Months of Insurgency 2004/2005 (London: I. B. Tauris 2006) pp.35 and 42–3.

43. The statement of President Bush is in Augustus Richard Norton, ‘Making War, Making Peace: The Middle East Entangles America’, Current History 103/669 (Jan. 2004) p.6; on the Israeli factor in the Iraq War of 2003, see John Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, ‘The Israeli Lobby and US Foreign Policy’, Middle East Policy 13/3 (Fall 2006) pp.53–9.

44. Clive Jones, ‘Israel: Major Beneficiary’, in Fawn and Hinnebusch, The Iraq War (note 25) pp.187 and 189.

45. It has been stated that Iraq (through the Iraqi-controlled Arab Liberation Front) was paying $10,000 for each of the families of the ‘martyrs’ in the al-Aqsa Intifada. See Rex Brynen and David Romano, ‘The Palestinians: Finding No Freedom in Liberation’, in Fawn and Hinnebusch, The Iraq War (note 25) p.164.

46. It has been stated that Iraq (through the Iraqi-controlled Arab Liberation Front) was paying $10,000 for each of the families of the ‘martyrs’ in the al-Aqsa Intifada. See Rex Brynen and David Romano, ‘The Palestinians: Finding No Freedom in Liberation’, in Fawn and Hinnebusch, The Iraq War (note 25) pp.166–7.

47. Rogers, Iraq and the War on Terror (note 42) p.35.

48. Ahmed Yusuf Ahmed, ‘Al-Nata'ij wa Al-Tada'iyat ‘ala Al-Watan Al-‘Arabi’ [The Results and Implications for the Arab Homeland], in the Centre for Arab Unity Studies, Ihtilal Al-‘Iraq wa Tada'yatihi ‘Arabiyyan wa Iqlimiyyan wa Dawliyyan [The Occupation of Iraq and Its Arab Regional and International Implications] (Beirut 2004) pp.324–6.

49. See statements of the Arab Summits in Al-Hayat, 24 May 2004, 24 March 2005 and 29 March 2006.

50. Chehab, Iraq Ablaze (note 37) pp.197–8.

51. Chehab, Iraq Ablaze (note 37) pp.180–1. See also The Sunday Telegraph 1 Oct. 2006.

52. On the mapping of the Saudi opposition, see Abdulaziz Sager, ‘Political Opposition in Saudi Arabia’, in Aarts and Nonneman, Saudi Arabia in the Balance (note 18) pp.234–59. On the Shi'i restiveness, see Toby Jones, ‘The Iraq Effect in Saudi Arabia’, Middle East Report 35/4 (Winter 2005) pp.20–5.

53. See Joseph Kostiner, ‘Coping with the Regional Challenges: A Case Study of Crown Prince Abdullah's Peace Initiative’, in Aarts and Nonneman, Saudi Arabia in the Balance (note 18) pp.352, 353 and 364–6.

54. On this problem see Rachel Bronson, ‘Understanding US-Saudi Relations’, in Aarts and Nonneman, Saudi Arabia in the Balance (note 18) pp.384–96.

55. Chehab, Iraq Ablaze (note 37) pp.188–9; and Hashim, Insurgency (note 40) pp.136–7.

56. Volker Perthes, ‘The Syrian Solution’, Foreign Affairs 85/6 (Nov./Dec. 2006) pp.34–5.

57. See Al-Hayat, 20 March and 28 and 29 April 2004.

58. See Raymond Hinnebusch, ‘Syria: Defying the Hegemon’, in Fawn and Hinnebusch, The Iraq War (note 25) pp.130–1. The figure for Syrian workers in Lebanon is given by Fouad Ajami, ‘The Autumn of the Autocrats’, Foreign Affairs 84/3 (May/June 2005) p.33.

59. Text of the Congressional Act (in 9 pages) at ⟨www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/108th/pl_108_175.pdf⟩; text of the Presidential sanctions against Syria on 11 May 2004 at ⟨www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/print/20040511-7.html⟩; and the White House statement about Syria and Iran on 12 July 2006 at ⟨www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/print/20060712.html⟩.

60. For figures and details see Neil Quilliam, ‘Jordan: Appeasing the Hegemon’, in Fawn and Hinnebusch, The Iraq War (note 25) p.145.

61. Balci and Yesiltas, ‘Turkey's New Middle East Policy’ (note 33) pp.29–30.

62. See Walter Posch, ‘Staying the Course: Permanent US Bases in Iraq?’ Middle East Policy 13/3 (Fall 2006) pp.109–20.

63. According to the Iraqi Immigration Minister, ‘Abd al-Samad Sultan, the estimated number of migrants due to sectarian violence reached about 300,000 (or 51,000 families) by 10 Oct. 2006. See Al-Hayat, 11 Oct. 2006.

64. See Al-Hayat, 10 April 2006. See also comments by Iraqi observers, rejecting the comparison between Iraq and Lebanon, in Al-Hayat, 5 Oct. 2006.

65. See interview with President Bush by Bill O'Reilly on 20 Oct. 2006, p.2. at ⟨www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,221501,00.html⟩.