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Abstract
Private security companies (PSCs) have experienced explosive growth since 2001, growth that has been matched only by the consequent explosion in academic attention probing their influence. It is not hard to discover that PSCs and their employees constituted the second-largest member of the US-led Coalition of the Willing during the invasion of Iraq in 2003;Footnote1 that this represented a 10-fold increase compared with the first Gulf War in 1991;Footnote2 that there are between 15,000 and 50,000 contractors currently operating in Iraq, according to various estimates;Footnote3 and that these companies suffer, at the very least, from a dearth of effective regulationFootnote4 that some go as far as to call a vacuum.Footnote5 However, there has been very little analysis of the consequences of the use of such companies in civil wars. PSCs have the potential, because they are non-state actors, privately motivated, and often external to the conflict, to complicate civil wars. Indeed, the use of PSCs by the US (by far the largest employer of contractors, as PSC employees are often called) has been characterised by a notable absence of planning and policy, both military and governmental. The United Kingdom, which is host to a number of major companies, has similarly failed to examine the policy consequences of the private security industry. This article examines how the absence of effective policy about the effects of privatising force has led to a series of unintended consequences that are influencing and will continue to influence the nature of civil wars. The first section begins by briefly outlining the nature of the private security industry and the roles it plays in civil wars. The second section examines how poor planning has led to problems for the US in its interventions into civil wars, focusing particularly on the private security industry in Iraq. The third section addresses how a similar lack of policy has caused the UK difficulties in the past, and could mean the UK will face problems in conflicts in the future.
Notes
1. Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies, Occasional Paper No. 6 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2005) p.2, online at < http://rappard.unige.ch/sas/files/portal/issueareas/security/security_pdf/2005_Schreier_Caparini.pdf>.
2. Michael Dobbs, ‘Iraq: Halliburton Reaping Huge Profits’, Washington Post 28 Aug. 2003.
3. Sarah Percy, Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford UP 2007) p.206.
4. Sarah V. Percy, ‘Mercenaries: Strong Norm, Weak Law’, International Organization 61/2 (2007); Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnhardt (eds) From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies (Oxford: Oxford UP 2007).
5. Peter W. Singer, ‘War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law’, Colombia Journal of Transnational Law 42/2 (2004).
6. Blackwater is the exception that proves the rule: they have offered to provide a brigade-sized number of troops for peacekeeping missions, which might imply a greater willingness to use force, but the negative reaction from the rest of the industry and governments has put an end to these comments. See Percy, Mercenaries (note 3) p.231.
7. Previous examples include the now defunct companies Sandline and Executive Outcomes.
8. See United Nations Security Resolutions 1467 (2003).
9. Examples include Kellogg, Brown and Root and Haliburton. It is estimated there are at least 38,000 of these contractors in addition to the armed contractors outlined above.
10. Deborah Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2005) p.16.
11. Peter W. Singer, The Private Military Industry and Iraq: What Have We Learned and Where to Next? (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2004).
12. Deborah Avant, ‘Think Again: Mercenaries’, Foreign Policy (2004).
13. David Isenberg, A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq (London: British American Security Information Council 2004) p.21.
14. Singer, Private Military Industry (note 11) p.6.
15. Avant, Market for Force (note 10) p.21.
16. Erinys, The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force: Infrastructure Security in a Post-Conflict Environment (London and Johannesburg: Erinys 2005).
17. Online at < http://www.dyn-intl.com/subpage.aspx?id = 43>.
18. Including Triple Canopy, Control Risks Group (CRG), Centurion, CSS Global and Granite Intelligence.
19. Such as Thorburn Security Solutions.
20. Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Privatized Military Operations, Industry Study Report (Washington, DC: National Defense U 2006) p.2.
21. See GAO, Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD's and Interior's Orders to Support Military Operations, Report to Congressional Committees No. GAO05201 (GAO Apr. 2005), pp.3–4, online at < http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05201.pdf>.
22. Avant, Market for Force (note 10) p.149.
23. Steven L. Schooner, ‘Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government’, Stanford Law and Policy Review 16/2 (2005) p.559.
24. Avant, Market for Force (note 10) p.128.
25. Sarah Percy, Regulating the Private Security Industry, Adelphi Paper No. 384 (London: Routledge and the International Institute of Strategic Studies 2006) p.16.
26. Steven Brayton, ‘Outsourcing War: Mercenaries and the Privatization of Peacekeeping’, Journal of International Affairs 55/2 (2002) pp.303–29; Thomas K. Adams, ‘The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict’, Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly XXIX/2 (1999).
27. Percy, Regulating (note 25) p.28.
28. Ibid. pp.8, 28.
29. Avant, Market for Force (note 10) p.234.
30. See Percy, Regulating (note 25) pp.28–30.
31. See ibid. p.22; Singer, Private Military Industry (note 11) p.10; Alec Klein and Steve Fainaru, ‘Firms Protest Exclusion from Iraq Security Bid’, Washington Post 5 May 2007.
32. Schooner (note 23) p.565.
33. Ibid. p.569.
34. Percy, Regulating (note 25) pp.36–38.
35. Confidential interview.
36. ‘Why the Democrats Won’, CBS News 8 Nov. 2006, noted the rising unpopularity of the Iraq war in America since 2004. In June 2007, CBS reported on the drop in recruitment numbers, especially amongst black Americans, as a result of the war's unpopularity. See ‘Military Recruitment of Blacks Plunges’, CBS News 24 Jun. 2007.
37. See David Ivanovich, ‘Contractor Deaths Up 17 Percent Across Iraq in 2007’, Houston Chronicle 9 Feb. 2008. The statistics are based primarily on those lodged with the US Labor Department and other sources. They are generally acknowledged to be lower than actual totals.
38. Contractors on the Battlefield, FM 3-100.21 (100-21) (Department of the Army 2003).
39. Ibid. p.15 [1–23].
40. See ibid. pp.2–3 [2–7], 2–12 [2–40].
41. Isenberg, ‘Fistful of Contractors’ (note 13) p.22.
42. Schreier and Caparini (note 1) p.47.
43. Caroline Holmqvist, Private Security Companies: The Case for Regulation (Stockholm: Stockholm Institute for Peace Research 2005) p.26.
44. Singer, Private Military Industry (note 11) p.18.
45. See Isenberg, Fistful of Contractors (note 13) p.20. For a longer discussion see Percy, Regulating (note 25).
46. Steven J. Zamparelli, Contractors on the Battlefield: What Have We Signed up For? (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War College, Air U 1999) p.18.
47. Holmqvist (note 43) p.29; Singer, Private Military Industry (note 11) p.7.
48. Singer, Private Military Industry (note 11) p.8.
49. Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York: Nation Books 2007) pp.129–30.
50. Schreier and Caparini (note 1) p.59.
51. Holmqvist (note 43) pp.25–26.
52. Quoted in Scahill (note 49) p.71.
53. See, for example, ‘The Iraq Reconstruction Fiasco’, New York Times 9 Aug. 2004.
54. Stein has made the analogy in relation to MEJA: see Frederick A. Stein, ‘Have We Closed the Barn Door Yet? A Look at the Current Loopholes in the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act’, Houston Journal of International Law 27/3 (2005).
55. Brad Knickerbocker, ‘Silent Surge in Contractor “Armies”’, Christian Science Monitor 18 Jul. 2007.
56. See James Glanz and Alissa J. Rubin, ‘From Errand to Fatal Shot to Hail of Fire to 17 Deaths’, New York Times 2 Oct. 2007. See also Yochi Dreazen, ‘New Scrutiny for Iraq Contractors: Killing by Blackwater Worker Poses Dilemma for US Authorities’, Wall Street Journal 14 May 2007; ‘Blackwater Shooting Echoes Through Iraq’, CBS News 19 Sept. 2007; Jonathon Beale, ‘Iraq Row Puts Security Firms in the Dock’, BBC News 2 Oct. 2007.
57. See Sean Rayment, ‘“Trophy” Video Exposes Private Security Contractors Shooting Up Iraq Drivers’, Telegraph 26 Nov. 2005. The account given of the video incident on the Aegis website is available online at < http://www.aegisworld.com/aegis-faq.html>.
58. See John Broder and James Risen, ‘Blackwater Tops Firms in Iraq Shooting Rate’, New York Times 26 Sept. 2007.
59. See confidential interview, T. Christian Miller, ‘Iraq: Private Security Guards Operate with Little Supervision’, Los Angeles Times 4 Dec. 2005; Jonathon Finer, ‘Security Contractors in Iraq under Scrutiny after Shootings’, Washington Post 10 Sept. 2005.
60. Singer, Private Military Industry (note 11) p.14.
61. See, for example, Steve Fainaru, ‘Iraq Contractors Face Growing Parallel War’, Washington Post 16 Jun. 2007.
62. Knickerbocker (note 55).
63. See ‘Recent Developments’, Yale Journal of International Law 33 (2008), pp.261–62. Note also Singer, ‘War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law’ (note 5) p.537.
64. See 18 USC § 3267(1)(A); Percy, Regulating (note 25) pp.28–30.
65. The MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007 passed the House of Representatives on 4 Oct. 2007. See Sue Pleming, ‘Lawmakers Seek to Make Contractors Accountable’, Reuters 4 Oct. 2007; cf. State of Administration Policy on the Act, released by President George W. Bush on 3 Oct. 2007, online at < http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid = 75852>.
66. See George Akin, ‘Joint Implications for Contracted Logistics’, US Army War College Strategy Research Project, Mar. 2007, p.1, online at < http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD = ADA469202&Location = U2&doc = GetTRDoc.pdf>.
67. See Christopher Kinsey, ‘Problematising the Role of Private Security Companies in Small Wars’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 18/4 (2007) pp.609–10.
68. Lord Diplock, Derek Walker-Smith and Geoffrey de Freitas, Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors Appointed to Inquire into the Recruitment of Mercenaries [Diplock Report] (London: Stationery Office 1976) p.16.
69. Percy, Mercenaries (note 3) p.186.
70. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office 1976) pp.239–40.
71. Ibid. p.240.
72. Diplock et al. (note 68). Percy, ‘Strong Norm, Weak Law’ (note 4) pp.379–80 discusses the Diplock Report at length.
73. Accessed early 2008. Website no longer available.
74. For example, Tim Spicer, ‘Interview with Lt. Col. Tim Spicer’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs XIII/1 (1999).
75. David Shearer, ‘Dial an Army’, The World Today 53 (1997) p.203.
76. Mary-Louise O'Callaghan, ‘The Sandline Crisis’, The Australian 10 Feb. 1997.
77. P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca and London: Cornell UP 2003) p.195.
78. See David Isenberg, ‘Combat for Sale: The New, Post-Cold War Mercenaries’, USA Today 128/2658 (2000).
79. For more details see Percy, Mercenaries (note 3) pp. 210–11.
80. Spicer, ‘Interview’ (note 74) p.167.
81. Speech by Robin Cook outlining the tenets of an ethical foreign policy, 12 May 1997, online at < http://www.guardian.co.uk/ethical/article/0,2763,192031,00.html>.
82. Ian Douglas, ‘Fighting for Diamonds – Private Military Companies in Sierra Leone’, in Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds) Peace, Profit or Plunder?: The Privatization of Security in War-Torn African Societies (Johannesburg: Institute for Security Studies 1999) p.196.
83. Ibid. p.195.
84. Author interview with Tim Spicer, 11 Sept. 2002. See also David Shearer, ‘Outsourcing War’, Foreign Policy (1998) p.78.
85. Sir Thomas Legg and Sir Robin Ibbs, Report of the Sierra Leone Arms Investigation (London: Stationery Office 1998).
86. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation (London: Stationery Office 2002).
87. Ibid. pp.20–21, 22–27.
88. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Private Military Companies (London: Stationery Office 2001–2002) p.11.
89. Ibid. p.35.
90. Ibid. p.39.
91. Ibid. pp.5–6. It has recently been reported that the outcome of this process will be extremely tight regulation, because of recognition that companies ‘are taking advantage of unstable political regimes by disregarding humanitarian and ethical codes’.
92. For further information, see Ben Reilly, ‘The Africanisation of the South Pacific’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 54/3 (2000) p.263; Anthony Regan, ‘The Bougainville Political Settlement and the Prospects for Sustainable Peace’, Pacific Economic Bulletin 17/1 (1992) p.117; Ron May, ‘Papua New Guinea: Disorderly Democracy or Dysfunctional State?’ in Dennis Rumley, Vivian Louis Forbes and Christopher Griffen (eds) Australia's Arc of Instability: The Political and Cultural Dynamics of Regional Security (Dordrecht: Springer 2006) p.120. See also Lansana Gberie, ‘An Interview with Peter Penfold’, African Affairs 104/414 (2005) p.122; Gerry Cleaver, ‘Subcontracting Military Power: The Privatisation of Security in Contemporary SubSaharan Africa’, Crime, Law and Social Change 33 (2000) p.143.
93. There are currently 21 provisional members and 16 associate members registered with BAPSC.
94. Shearer, ‘Dial an Army’ (note 75) p.205.
95. David Shearer, ‘Private Military Forces and the Challenges for the Future’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs XIII/1 (1999) p.82.
96. See Brayton (note 26) p.323.
97. A 2006 census put the number at 100,000 contractors, which was subsequently quoted in a White House Briefing on 5 Dec. 2006. See Renae Merle, ‘Census Counts 100,000 Contractors in Iraq’, Washington Post 5 Dec. 2006; White House Press Briefing, 18 Dec. 2006.
98. See Aegis Specialist Risk Management, Frequently Asked Questions, online at < http://www.aegisworld.com/aegis-faq.html>. See also Alec Klein and Steve Fainaru, ‘Firms Protest Exclusion from Iraq Security Bid’, Washington Post 5 May 2007.
99. See Sean Rayment, ‘Soldiers to be Allowed a Year Off to Go to Iraq to Earn £500 a Day as Guards’, Telegraph, 22 May 2004.
100. See Clayton Hirst, ‘Dogs of War to Face New Curbs in Foreign Office Crackdown’, The Independent, 13 Mar. 2005.
101. Percy, Regulating (note 25) pp.32–34.
102. Confidential interview.
103. As of early 2008.
104. The Armed Forces Act is updated every five years. See Armed Forces Act 2006 (UK), cl. 370, Schedule 15. Under cl. 383(2), these provisions will come into effect on such day as the Secretary of State may by order appoint. See also Armed Forces Act 2001 (UK), Sched. 6, Pt 6, cl. 44–48, 50–53.