Opposition Movements, Liberalization, and Civil War: Evidence from Algeria and Chile

Abstract

When does bargaining between government and opposition groups turn violent? In this article, I argue that groups with cohesive, developed organizational structures are less likely to engage in conflictual behavior. Opposition movements are often divided into moderate and radical challengers, and groups without developed organizational structures cannot limit radicals' demands. The argument is supported in a comparative analysis of bargaining processes in Algeria and Chile in the late 1980s. In Algeria, the primary opposition group was marred by internal divisions and tensions between radical and moderate elements. When the party emerged victorious in democratic elections, the government feared that radical elements would soon take over, canceled election results and attempted to reestablish control by using force. Opposition parties in Chile, however, presented a cohesive and unified alternative to the Pinochet regime, which contributed to a peaceful transfer of power.

Acknowledgements

Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association Meeting, New Orleans, LA, 8–10 January 2009, and the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association Meeting, New York, 15–18 February 2009. I am grateful to R. William Ayres, Christine Day, Michael Huelshoff, David Lektzian, Amy Poteete, Brandon Prins, Marc Rosenblum, Peter Rudloff, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.

Notes

 1. The argument draws on work by James D. Fearon and David Laitin, ‘Explaining Interethnic Cooperation’, American Political Science Review 90/4 (1996) pp.715–35; and Stathis N. Kalyvas, ‘Commitment Problems in Emergent Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties’, Comparative Politics 32/4 (2000) pp.379–99.

 2. The theoretical argument developed in this paper could in principle be applied to a much larger set of countries. However, studying the role of opposition groups in civil war onset using large-N statistical analysis is difficult because it is not known in advance which actor will challenge the state. Therefore, the empirical test conducted here focuses on two cases.

 3. For examples of such arguments see James D. Fearon, ‘Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?’, Journal of Peace Research 41/3 (2004) pp.275–302; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.75–90; and Paul Collier and Anke E. Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004) pp.563–95.

 4. In practice, the distinction between government and opposition actors is not always clear-cut. For example, opposition groups in authoritarian regimes may be co-opted by the state or, especially in corporatist regimes, exhibit statist features. See Howard J. Wiarda, ‘Law and Political Development in Latin America: Toward a Framework for Analysis’ in Howard J. Wiarda (ed.) Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition (Boston, MA: U of Massachusetts P 1974), pp.199–230. The discussion of opposition parties in Algeria and Chile reflects on this imprecision when appropriate.

 5. See James D. Fearon, ‘Rationalist Explanations for War’, International Organization 49/3 (1995) pp.379–414.

 6. Scott Gates, ‘Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46/1 (2002) pp.111–30.

 7. See Stergios Skarpedas, ‘Warlord Competition’, Journal of Peace Research 39/4 (2002) pp.435–46. A similar emphasis on opportunity can be found in Fearon and Laitin (note 3) pp.79–82, and Collier and Hoeffler (note 3) pp.564–70.

 8. Fearon and Laitin (note 3); Collier and Hoeffler (note 3).

 9. Gates (note 6) p.128.

10. David Cunningham, Kristian S. Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan, ‘It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 53/4 (2009) pp.570–97. The term dyadic in conflict studies refers to the interactions between pairs of actors (such as two states, a government and an opposition group, or two non-state actors).

11. See Lindsay Heger and Idean Salehyan, ‘Ruthless Rulers: Coalition Size and the Severity of Civil Conflict’, International Studies Quarterly 51 (2007) pp.385–403.

12. Nicholas Sambanis, ‘Expanding Economic Models of Civil War Using Case Studies’, Perspectives on Politics 2/2 (2004) pp.259–80.

13. Nicholas Sambanis, ‘Expanding Economic Models of Civil War Using Case Studies’, Perspectives on Politics 2/2 (2004) p.260. While the trade-offs between quantitative and qualitative approaches are well established in the literature, scholars increasingly perceive these approaches as complementary rather than antithetical. For an example see Sidney Tarrow, ‘Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide’ in Henry E. Brady and David Collier (eds) Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004) pp.171–81. Increasingly, research combines quantitative and qualitative research to maximize the leverage of empirical tests.

14. Collier and Hoeffler's (note 3) model is applied in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. Volume 1: Africa; Volume 2: Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications 2005).

15. Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2006).

16. Sambanis (note 12).

17. See for instance Josep M. Colomer, Strategic Transitions: Game Theory and Democratization (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 2000).

18. A possible objection to this argument is that opposition groups may not have a true interest in sharing power. While it is certainly true that liberalization may result in the establishment of an authoritarian regime, a crisis of the regime means at least temporary uncertainty over the future distribution of power where neither actor can immediately prevail. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1991) p.73 points to the indeterminate outcome of regime transitions. A strengthened opposition may intend to establish a broadened dictatorship in the future, but cannot simply seize power without bargaining in the present.

19. Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1997).

20. Marc Morje Howard and Philip G. Roessler, ‘Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes’, American Journal of Political Science 50/2 (2006) pp.365–81.

21. Kalyvas (note 1).

22. William B. Quandt, Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press 1998) p.58.

23. Fearon and Laitin (note 1).

24. A possible objection is that the effect of such linkages will depend upon the nature of the respective institution. North's work on institutional stability, however, suggests that institutions are generally status-quo oriented. See Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1990) pp.83–92. Consequently, it is unlikely that pre-existing social organizations would establish linkages with extremist groups. In addition, the appeal of radical groups stems at least in part from marketing themselves as ‘anti-establishment’ alternatives to existing, more moderate groups and organizations. For example, research by Adams et al. shows that extremist parties that moderated their positions are punished at the polls (see James Adams, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow and Garrett Glasgow, ‘Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties’ Policy Shifts, 1976-1998', American Journal of Political Science 50/3 (2006) pp.513–29). Therefore, I expect that links to established institutions function as a signal of moderation.

25. This point draws on Kalyvas (note 1), see especially p.391.

26. See Guglielmo Meardi, ‘The Legacy of “Solidarity”: Class, Democracy, Culture and Subjectivity in the Polish Social Movement’, Social Movement Studies 4/3 (2005) pp.261–80.

27. Kalyvas (note 1) p.389.

28. Megan Meyer, ‘Organizational Identity, Political Contexts, and SMO Action: Explaining the Tactical Choices Made by Peace Organizations in Israel, Northern Ireland, and South Africa’, Social Movement Studies 3/2 (2002) pp.167–97.

29. Alexander L. George, ‘Case Studies and Theory Development: The Theory of Structured, Focused Comparison’ in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.) Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy (New York: The Free Press 1979) pp.43–68.

30. See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sydney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1994) p.139.

31. See Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: John Wiley and Sons 1970) pp.31–47.

32. For a summary of events leading to Algeria's civil war see Miriam R. Lowi, ‘Algeria, 1992–2002: Anatomy of a Civil War’ in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (eds) Understanding Civil War: Volume 1, Africa (Washington, DC: World Bank 2004) pp.221–47.

33. For a description of Chile's transition to democracy see Arturo Valenzuela ‘Chile: Origins and Consolidation of a Latin American Democracy’ in Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn and Juan J. Linz (eds) Latin America (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1999) pp.191–242.

34. Hugh Roberts, The Battlefield: Algeria 1988–2002. Studies in a Broken Polity (London: Verso Books 2003) p.40.

35. Valenzuela (note 33).

36. Algeria's ethnic fractionalization index is at 0.43, its religious fractionalization at 0.01. Chile's index on ethnic fractionalization is at 0.14, the religious fractionalization index at 0.19. While Algeria's degree of ethnic fractionalization is slightly higher than Chile's (with Berbers being the most significant minority), Lowi (note 32) points out that Algeria's civil war was fought between Arabs, thus lacking an ethnic dimension.

37. Algeria's per capita GDP in 1988 is $4,345 compared to Chile's $4,684. Data comes from the Penn World Tables, version 6.1, and are available online at < http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt61_form.php> accessed 6 Aug. 2009.

38. Chile's GINI index for 1988 is 54.5, compared to Algeria's at 39. Higher numbers indicate greater inequality.

39. Several analyses of the Islamic Salvation Front highlight this tension. For a detailed analysis see Hugh Roberts, ‘From Radical Mission to Equivocal Ambition. The Expansion and Manipulation of Algerian Islamism, 1979-1992’ in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds) Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements (Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P 1994) pp.428–90. See also James Ciment, Algeria: The Fundamentalist Challenge (New York: Facts on File 1997); Quandt (note 22); and Kalyvas (note 1).

40. See Roberts (note 39); and Luis Martinez, The Algerian Civil War 1990–1998 (New York: Columbia UP 2000).

41. Valenzuela (note 33); also see Marcelo Cavarozzi, ‘Patterns of Elite Negotiation and Confrontation in Argentina and Chile’ in John Higley and Richard Gunther (eds) Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1992) pp.208–37.

42. Lowi (note 32) p.226.

43. Quandt (note 22) p.47.

44. Ciment (note 39) p.51.

45. Quandt (note 22) p.51.

46. Quandt (note 22) p.60.

47. For a discussion of Islam's role in Algerian politics prior to the 1980s, see Mohammed Hafez, ‘From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria’ in Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.) Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Approach (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP 2004) pp.61–88; and Roberts (note 39) p.439.

48. Although the state had a monopoly on the organization of religion, the dissidents subverted it by establishing ‘free mosques’ outside the government's control. After independence, the state had built a large number of mosques, yet lacked imams to properly staff them. Since many of these mosques remained unfinished, the state did not claim authority over them, and dissident ulemas took over more than 2,000 such mosques by the mid-1980s. For more detail see Roberts (note 39); Quandt (note 22); and John P. Entelis, ‘Islam, Democracy, and the State: The Reemergence of Authoritarian Politics in Algeria’ in John Ruedy (ed.) Islamism and Secularism in North Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press 1994) pp.219–51.

49. Ciment (note 39) p.92.

50. Roberts (note 39) p.448.

51. Ray Taykeh and Nikolas Gvosdev, The Receding Shadow of the Prophet: The Rise and Fall of Radical Political Islam (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger 2004) p.45.

52. Ciment (note 39) p.94.

53. Hugh Roberts, ‘Doctrinaire Economics and Political Opportunism in the Strategy of Algerian Islam’ in John Ruedy (note 48) pp.82–124.

54. John P. Entelis, ‘Civil Society and the Authoritarian Temptation in Algerian Politics: Islamic Democracy vs. the Centralized Strate’ in Augustus Richard Norton (ed.) Civil Society in the Middle East, vol. 2 (Leiden: E.J. Brill 1995) p.67.

55. Taykeh and Gvosdev (note 51) p.46.

56. Reuters, 16 June 1990.

57. Le Monde 17 Jun. 1990.

58. Quoted in Catherine Lloyd, ‘Multi-Causal Conflict in Algeria: National Identity, Inequality, and Political Islam’, Queen England's House Working Paper Series 104, p.15.

59. As quoted in Taykeh and Gvosdev (note 51) p.46.

60. Séverine Labat, Les Islamistes Algériens: Entre les Urnes et le Maquis (Paris: Editions du Seuil 1995) p.187.

61. Ahmed Roudjia, ‘Discourse and Strategy of the Algerian Islamist Movement (1986–1991)’ in Laura Guazzone (ed.) The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World (Reading, UK: Ithaca 1995) pp.74–75.

62. Roberts (note 39) p.455.

63. Roberts (note 39) p.456.

64. Ciment (note 39) p.74; Quandt (note 22) p.102.

65. The Economist 4 Aug. 1990 p.31.

66. Roberts (note 39) p.450.

67. Mohand S. Tahi, ‘Algeria's Democratisation Process: A Frustrated Hope’, Third World Quarterly 16/2 (1995) p.209.

68. Ciment (note 39) p.95.

69. Kalyvas (note 1).

70. Quandt (note 22) p.102.

71. In addition, US efforts to undermine the Allende government contributed to an atmosphere of confrontation. See Valenzuela (note 33) p.220.

72. The estimates are from the Organization of American States, Commission of Human Rights, Informe Sobre la Situacion de los Derechos Humanos en Chile (Washington, DC: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1985).

73. For more detail on Chile's democratic breakdown see Timothy R. Scully, ‘Reconstituting Party Politics in Chile’ in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully (eds) Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 1995) pp.100–38.

74. For more detail on Chile's democratic breakdown see Timothy R. Scully, ‘Reconstituting Party Politics in Chile’ in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully (eds) Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 1995) p.124.

75. Valenzuela (note 33) p.231.

76. More details on the transition to democracy in Louis Hecht Oppenheim and Silvia Borzutzky (eds) After Pinochet: The Chilean Road to Democracy and the Market (Gainesville, FL: UP of Florida 2006).

77. Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies: Chile under Pinochet (New York: Norton 1991) p.282.

78. Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies: Chile under Pinochet (New York: Norton 1991) p.294.

79. Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, ‘Party Oppositions under the Chilean Authoritarian Regime’ in J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (eds) Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 1986) p.208.

80. Constable and Valenzuela (note 77) p.282.

81. The decision on whether to participate was hotly debated within the Communist Party. When party officials reiterated the need to pursue a violent overthrow of the regime in a meeting, Constable and Valenzuela (note 77) p.302 quote a rank and file member's objection as follows: ‘An election is a form of a struggle too, and we feel we must do everything possible to defeat the dictatorship.’

82. Constable and Valenzuela (note 77) p.301.

83. For more detail see Cesar N. Caviedes, Elections in Chile: The Road Toward Redemocratization (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1991) p.56; and Manuel Garreton, ‘Political Processes in an Authoritarian Regime: The Dynamics of Institutionalization and Opposition in Chile, 1973-1980’ in J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (note 79) p.269.

84. Cited in La Epoca 11 Dec. 1989, p.12.

85. On the role of the Catholic Church see Manuel Garreton (note 83) pp.259–77; Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela (note 79) pp.184–230; Brian H. Smith ‘Old Allies, New Enemies: The Catholic Church as Opposition to Military Rule in Chile, 1973-1979’ in J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (note 79) pp.270–304; William M. Lies, ‘A Clash of Values: Church–State Relations in Democratic Chile’ in Oppenheim and Borzutzky (note 76) pp.64–93; and Constable and Valenzuela (note 77).

86. Constable and Valenzuela (note 77) p.283.

87. Smith (note 85) p.293.

88. Kalyvas (note 1).