A Marriage of Inconvenience: Tsunami Aid and the Unraveling of the LTTE and the GoSL's Complex Dependency

Abstract

Scholars have shown how transnational forces can influence the behavior of belligerents in a civil war, dramatically altering the trajectory of the conflict. The breakdown of the peace process in Sri Lanka, less than a year after the Asian tsunami, has led many to question the relationship between the disaster and the return to war. In this paper, I explore the complex relationship between Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) governance structures and the international community, arguing that post-tsunami relief efforts closed the door to a negotiated settlement by contributing to the insurgency's failed play for autonomy from the Sri Lankan state upon which it had long been reliant for assistance in governing the civilian population in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. Through a detailed case study of the micro-level impacts of a massive spike in foreign aid on the organization of a long-running insurgency, the paper is able to assess the merit of the ‘substitution effect’ posited by scholars that argues that foreign aid can allow rebels to ignore civilian concerns in favor of a purely military focus. While generally supportive of this argument, the paper complicates the picture, demonstrating the importance of understanding local contexts for the international relief apparatus that continues to serve as the primary response to disasters, both natural and man-made.

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2008 American Political Science Association Meeting. I am grateful to Jessica Stanton, Arthur Rhodes, Jeevan Thiagarajah and Nimmi Gowrinathan for their feedback.

Notes

 1. For quantitative studies see the work by Patrick Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Interventions in Intrastate Conflict (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P 1999); Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers 56/4 (2004) pp.563–95; Kristian Gleditsch, ‘Transnational Dimensions of Civil War’, Journal of Peace Research 44/3 (2007) pp.293–309. For qualitative studies see Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa (Oxford: James Currey 1997); Mary Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War (New York: Lynne Rienner 1999); Adam Branch, ‘Uganda's Civil War and the Politics of the ICC Intervention’, Ethics and International Affairs 21/2 (2007) pp.179–98; Dominik Zaum, ‘International Non-Governmental Organisations and Civil Wars’, Civil Wars 11/1 (2009) pp.22–38.

 2. On Biafra, see Chapter 4 of de Waal (note 1). On Sudan, see A. Branch and Z. Mampilly, ‘Winning the War, but Losing the Peace? The Dilemma of SPLM/ A Civil Administration and the Tasks Ahead’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 43/1 (2005) pp. 1–20. For a discussion of the phenomenon in general see Clifford Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and International Activism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2006).

 3. Philip Le Billon and Arno Waizenegger, ‘Peace in the Wake of Disaster? Secessionist Conflicts and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 32/3 (2007) p.412.

 4. Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2003).

 5. Gleditsch (note 1).

 6. Carolyn Nordstrom, Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century (Berkeley and LA: UC Press 2004); Mats Berdal, ‘Beyond Greed and Grievance - And Not Too Soon …’, Review of International Studies 31/3 (2005) p.692.

 7. Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, ‘Diasporas and International Relations Theory’, International Organization 57 (2003) pp.449–79; Paul Collier, V. L. Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Queral and Nicholas Sambanis, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, DC and New York: World Bank and Oxford UP 2003).

 8. de Waal (note 1); Anderson (note 1); Peter Uvin, ‘The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict’, Development Assistance Committee Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-Operation, OECD, Paris, 1999; Thomas Weiss, ‘Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action’, Ethics and International Affairs 13 (1999) pp.1–20; Branch (note 1).

 9. de Waal (note 1) pp.73–77.

10. Mary Anderson, Reflection on the Practice of Outside Assistance: Can We Know What Good We Do (Berlin: Berghoff Research Center 2001) p.4.

11. Scholars have examined the relationship between natural disasters and conflicts, but tend to assume that international actors have little role in shaping the eventual outcomes. See for example Le Billon and Arno Waizenegger (note 3).

12. Since the unification of the northern and eastern provinces in 1987, people refer to the combined region, home to the densest concentrations of Tamils in the country, as the NorthEast. In this text I use either ‘N&E province,’ ‘NorthEast,’ or ‘northeastern’ interchangeably to refer to the province. In 2006, the province was again separated into its two constituent parts.

13. Interview with S. Puleedevan, secretary general, LTTE Peace Secretariat, Kilinochchi, July 2004 and July 2005.

14. Stanley Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy (Chicago: U of Chicago P 1986); Robert Rotberg (ed.), Creating Peace In Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press 1999); Karthigesu Sivathamby, Being Tamil and Sri Lankan (Colombo: Aivakam 2005).

15. Interview with N. Ethirveersingam, Tamil diaspora activist, Lancaster, CA, October 2005 and Cerritos, CA, February 2006.

16. Donald Snodgrass, ‘The Economic Development of Sri Lanka: A Tale of Missed Opportunities’, in Rotberg (note 14).

17. Rotberg (note 14).

18. S. Bastian, ‘Sri Lanka's International Straitjacket’, Himal South Asian (December 2006) pp.37–39.

19. S. Bastian, ‘Sri Lanka's International Straitjacket’, Himal South Asian (December 2006) pp.37–39

20. M. R. Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Lanka (New Delhi: Konark Publishers 2002); R. Hoole, D. Somasundaram, K. Sritharan and R. Thiranagama, Broken Palmyrah: The Tamil Crisis in Sri Lanka: An Inside Account (Claremont, CA: The Sri Lanka Studies Institute 1990).

21. V. Daniels, ‘Suffering Nation and Alienation’, in A. Kleinma, V. Das and M. Lock (eds) Social Suffering (Oxford: Oxford UP 1997).

22. N. Subramaniam, ‘Tamil Diaspora for Nothing Less than Eelam?’, The Hindu 22 Nov. 2000.

23. P. Chalk, ‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) International Organization and Operations – A Preliminary Analysis’, Commentary No. 77, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2000.

24. Interview with D. Sivaram, Tamil journalist and activist, Marina Del Rey, December 2004.

25. See Z. Mampilly, Stationary Bandits: Understanding Rebel Governance, PhD thesis, UCLA (2007).

26. Ibid.

27. Branch and Mampilly (note 2).

28. During the first four years of the war (1983–87), the LTTE controlled little territory, instead operating alongside existing institutions and focusing mainly on wiping out its competitors. From 1983 to 1987, in areas the LTTE controlled, the administration of justice and the police force remained in the hands of the GoSL. Interview with Ethirveersingam (note 15).

29. Swamy (note 20) p.213.

30. Bastian (note 18).

31. In 1996 and 1997, the LTTE bombed Colombo's World Trade Center, but the attacks were timed to minimize any civilian casualties with only one person killed in both. The effects on the Sri Lankan economy were far less substantial.

32. This was probably a wise decision. After the first Gulf War, Saddam Hussein hoped to punish the northern Kurdish population by cutting off the region from supply lines in the south of the country. Instead of destroying the Kurdish population as he hoped, it triggered the development of an autonomous Kurdish government in the north that only solidified the Kurdish secessionary claims.

33. Interview with Ethirveersingam (note 15).

34. Interview with anonymous Asian Development Bank official, Colombo, June 2004.

35. K. Stokke, ‘Building the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State Institutions and Forms of Governance in LTTE-controlled Areas in Sri Lanka’, Third World Quarterly 27/6 (2006) pp.1021–40. Mampilly (note 25).

36. M. Sarvananthan, An Introduction to the Conflict Time Economy of the North and East Province (Colombo: Point Pedro Institute 2005).

37. Interview with anonymous provincial director of health services, Kilinochchi, July 2005.

38. J. Goodhand and N. Lewer, ‘Sri Lanka: NGOs and Peace-Building in Complex Political Emergencies’, Third World Quarterly 20/1 (1999) pp.69–87.

39. Estimates I heard in the region put the number of INGOs operating in LTTE areas around five or six including the Red Cross, Oxfam and Care. Interview with Nagendran, local resident, Kilinochchi, July 2005.

40. For example, in early 2003, representatives of the ADB met with LTTE leaders in Kilinochchi promising assistance for reconstruction and rehabilitation. See Asian Development Bank, ‘ADB President Discusses Sri Lanka's Reconstruction Needs in Conflict Affected North and East’, News Release No. 026/03, 2003, online at  < www.adb.org/Documents/News/2003/nr2003026.asp> accessed 24 Aug. 2008.

41. Interview with Mathy, Administrative and Gender Issues, LTTE Planning and Development Secretariat, Kilinochchi, July 2005.

42. Interview with Puleedevan (note 13).

43. Interview with Puleedevan (note 13)

44. Interview with Puleedevan (note 13); N. Shanmugaratnam and K. Stokke, ‘Development as a Precursor to Conflict Resolution: A Critical Review of the Fifth Peace Process in Sri Lanka’, in N. Shanmugaratnam (ed.) Between War and Peace: Deprivation and Livelihood Revival in Sudan and Sri Lanka (Oxford: James Currey 2008).

45. J. Goodhand and B. Klem, Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000–2005 (New York: The Asia Foundation 2005).

46. One possible explanation for why the LTTE does not go back to war at this point is that its eastern command had split from the group in early 2004 triggering an internal crisis, and weakening the group's overall strength. However, it is important to note that despite widespread acknowledgment that Sri Lanka's security forces had played a role in engineering the split, the LTTE still did not choose to reignite its war with the Sri Lankan state, preferring instead to keep the door open to a political solution.

47. Jayadeva Uyangoda, ‘Ethnic Conflict, the State and the Tsunami Disaster in Sri Lanka’, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 6/3 (September 2005) p.352 fn. 6.

48. Interview with Mathy (note 41).

49. J. Maheswaran, ‘Rehabilitation and Development During the Pre-Transition Phase in the Tamil Homeland – What the Planning and Development Secretariat Offers…’, PowerPoint Presentation, LTTE Planning and Development Secretariat, January 2004.

50. The World Bank Group, Sri Lanka 2005 Post-tsunami Recovery Program – Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment (Washington, DC: World Bank Group 2005).

51. Interview with K. Sivananthan, Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation, July 2005.

52. Interview with Puleedevan (note 13).

53. Interview with Sivananthan (note 51).

54. Personal interviews; Uyangoda (note 47) p.346.

55. Uyangoda (note 47) p.348.

56. V. S. Sambandan, ‘For Equitable Allocation of Funds: Interview with Lakshman Kadirgamar’, Frontline 22/4 (February 2005) pp.12–25.

57. Uyangoda (note 47) p.346.

58. Human Rights Watch, Besieged, Displaced, and Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka's Vanni Region (New York: Human Rights Watch 23 Dec. 2008).

59. For example, in early 2005 Kofi Annan chose to release a critique of the LTTE for using child soldiers through the secretary-general's fifth report on children and armed conflict, undermining the group's incremental progress towards international legitimacy and recognition.