Sudan and the Not So Comprehensive Peace

Abstract

This special section examines the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army. It focuses on why the agreement was possible, the challenges involved in reaching and implementing it, and the issues that now lay ahead for both North and South Sudan. The purpose of this undertaking is to tease out what lessons might be learnt from this case for the future study and practice of seeking to settle civil wars through agreement and implementation of conflict settlements. This introductory article first provides a brief summary of the Sudanese civil war; it then examines the CPA's power and wealth-sharing arrangements and their implementation to date; and finally concludes with an analysis of statebuilding in the recently independent South Sudan.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the contributors, the journal editors and the anonymous referees for their contributions to this Special Section.

Notes

 1. The CPA is an amalgamation of a series of protocols and agreements signed by the GoS and the SPLM/A between 2002 and 2005, including: the Machakos Protocol (20 July 2002); the Agreement on Security Arrangements (25 September 2003); the Agreement on Wealth Sharing (7 January 2004); the Protocol on Power Sharing (26 May 2004); the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States (26 May 2004) and the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area (26 May 2004). See Elke Grawert, After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan (Oxford: James Currey 2010) pp.1–2; See also Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars (Oxford: James Currey 2007) p.xviii.

 2. Johnson (note 1) p.xix and David Keen, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983–1989 (Oxford: James Currey 2008) pp.xviii–xxi.

 3. Edward Thomas, Against the Gathering Storm Securing Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (London: Chatham House 2009) p.10.

 4. Southern Sudan Referendum Commission, Southern Sudan Referendum Final Report Results, online at < http://southernsudan2011.com/sites/default/files/Final_Results_Report_20110206_1512.pdf>, accessed 1 Mar. 2011.

 5. For a timeline of these negotiations, see Enough Project, FACT SHEET: Timeline for Negotiations Between the Two Sudans, 17 Jan. 2012, online at < http://www.enoughproject.org/files/SudanNegotiationsTimeline.pdf>, accessed 30 Mar. 2012.

 6. On the failure of the talks over the sharing of oil revenues, see, Alex De Waal, ‘South Sudan's Doomsday Machine’, The New York Times, 24 Jan. 2012, online at < http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/25/opinion/south-sudans-doomsday-machine.html>, accessed 30 Mar. 2012.

 7. Sara Pantuliano, ‘South Sudan: A Nation in the Making’, The Guardian, 8 Jul. 2011, online at < http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/08/south-sudan-independence>, accessed 15 Jul. 2011.

 8. Harry Verhoeven, ‘Northern Sudan at a Deadly Crossroads’, The Guardian, 18 Jan. 2011, online at < http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jan/18/sudannorthern-south-violence>, accessed 1 Mar. 2011; See also Douglas H. Johnson, ‘Once Again War Comes to Southern Sudan’, Parliamentary Brief Online (2011), online at < http://www.parliamentarybrief.com/2011/12/once-again-war-comes-to-southern-sudan>, accessed 7 Jan. 2012 and Edward Thomas, ‘Sudan's Referendum Amidst Revolution’, Middle East Report 258 – People Power, 41 (2011), online at < http://www.merip.org/mer/mer258/sudans-referendum-amidst-revolution>, accessed 30 Mar. 2012.

 9. On the causes and consequences of Sudan's conflicts, see Douglas H. Johnson (note 1); David Keen (note 2); Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflicts of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute 1995); Alex de Waal, ‘Sudan: The Turbulent State’, in Alex De Waal (ed.) The War in Darfur and the Search for Peace (Cambridge, MA: Global Equity Initiative, Harvard University 2007) and Akol Deng Ruay, The Politics of Two Sudans (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute for African Studies 1994).

10. Alex De Waal, ‘Sudan's choices: Scenarios beyond the CPA’, in K. Maas-Albert and T. Weis (eds) Sudan – No Easy Ways Ahead (Berlin: Heinrich Böll Foundation 2009), online at < http://www.boell.org/web/136-531.html>, accessed 10 May 2010, p.17.

11. De Waal (note 9) p.4.

12. Johnson (note 1) pp.61–2.

13. SPLM, Manifesto (SPLM 1983).

14. Johnson (note 1) pp.62–5 and Peter Woodward, The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations (London: I.B. Tauris 2003).

15. Ethiopia had supported Garang's leadership of the SPLM/A since its formation in 1983. Ethiopia had provided Garang with military equipment and support against his rivals for the leadership of the SPLM/A. In exchange, Garang supported Mengistu against Eritrean opposition groups, such as the EPRDF. Douglas H. Johnson, ‘The Sudan People's Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism’, in Christopher Clapham (ed.) African Guerrillas (Oxford: James Currey 1998) pp.62–5.

16. Amnesty International, Sudan: The Human Price of Oil (London: Amnesty International Press 2000); Human Rights Watch, Sudan, Oil and Human Rights (New York: Human Rights Watch 2002); International Crisis Group (ICG), God, Oil, and Country: The Changing Logic of War in Sudan (Brussels: ICG 2002) and Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, ‘“Food Itself is Fighting With Us”: A Comparative Analysis of the Impact of Sudan's Civil War on South Sudanese Civilian Populations located in the North and the South', in Vigdis Broch-Due (ed.) Violence and Belonging: The Quest for Identity in Post-Colonial Africa (London: Routledge 2005).

17. Richard Barltrop, Darfur and the International Community: The Challenges of Conflict Resolution in Sudan (London: I.B. Tauris 2011).

18. For an analysis of such estimates, see Ibid., pp.27–8 and Johnson (note 1) p.143.

19. Ibid., pp.40–7.

20. Øystein H. Rolandsen, ‘A Quick Fix? A Retrospective Analysis of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement’, Review of African Political Economy, 38/130 (2011) pp.552–53.

21. Tim Niblock, ‘Pariah States’ and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2001).

22. Peter Woodward, ‘From CPA to DPA: “Ripe for Resolution”, or Ripe for Dissolution?’ in Elke Grawert (ed.) After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan (Oxford: James Currey 2010) pp.232–33.

23. Peter Woodward, ‘Sudan's Foreign Relations Since Independence’, in Daniel Large and Luke A. Patey (eds) Sudan Looks East: China, India, and the Politics of Asian Alternatives (Oxford: James Currey 2011) p.47.

24. For an overview of the new African peace and security architecture, see Malte Brosig, ‘The Multi-Actor Game of Peacekeeping in Africa’ International Peacekeeping, 17/3 (2010) pp.327–42.

25. Woodward (note 22) p.234 and Jacob Høigilt, Åshild Falch and Øystein H. Rolandsen, The Sudan Referendum and Neighbouring Countries: Egypt and Uganda (Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo 2010) pp.8–9.

26. Peter Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa (London: Ashgate 2006).

27. Barltrop (note 17) pp.50–2.

28. Rolandsen (note 20) p.554.

29. ICG, Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead (Brussels: The ICG 2006).

30. Marc Gustafson, Electoral Designs: Proportionality, Representation, and Constituency Boundaries in Sudan's 2010 Elections (London: Rift Valley Institute 2010) p.25.

31. Thomas (note 3) p.6.

32. Justin Willis and Atta el-Battahani ‘“We Changed the Laws”: Electoral Practice and Malpractice in Sudan Since 1953’, African Affairs, 109/435 (2010) p.192.

33. Johnson (note 1) Revised Edition p.176.

34. Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Sudan Politics: Trade-off?’, 5 Apr. 2010, online at < http://www.intelligencequarterly.com/2010/04/sudan-politics-trade-off/>, accessed 8 Jun. 2010.

35. Gareth Curless, ‘Sudan's 2010 National Elections’, Ethnopolitics Papers, No. 3 (2010) p.7.

36. Carter Center, Carter Center Reports Widespread Irregularities in Sudan's Vote Tabulation and Strongly Urges Steps to Increase Transparency, 10 May 2010, online at < http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/pr/counting-tabulation-may2010.pdf>, accessed 20 May 2010.

37. ICG, Sudan: Major Reform Or More War (Brussels: ICG 2012).

38. The SRF includes the SPLM-N; the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) factions of Mini Minawi (SLA-MM) and Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW); and the JEM.

39. As of January 2013, the alliance includes the Communist Party of Sudan (CPS), the National Umma Party (NUP), the DUP/alMirghani, the Popular Congress Party (PCP), the Umma party (Reform and Renewal) of Mubarak al-Fadil, the Sudanese National Alliance of Abdelaziz Khalid, the three factions of the Ba'ath Party, the Nassirite Unionist Party, the Nassirite Arab Socialist Party, the United Unionist Party (a DUP breakaway faction), the Unionist National Party (a DUP breakaway faction), the Justice Party (Original/Mekki Ali Balayel), the Movement of the New Democratic Forces, the Movement of the Modern National Forces, the Sudanese Congress Party of Ibrahim al-Sheikh, the Farmers Alliance, the Alliance of al-Gezira and al-Managil Farmers, the Trade-Union Solidarity, the Political Women Forum and other small groups. ICG (note 37) p.17.

40. Sudan Tribune, ‘Sudan's Bashir Renews Attack on New Dawn Charter, Reiterates Commitment to Shar'ia’, 13 Jan. 2013, online at < http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45177>, accessed 7 Feb. 2013.

41. Sudan Tribune, ‘South Sudan Political Forces Join Hands Ahead of Referendum’, 18 Oct. 2010, online at < http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-political-forces-join,36641>, accessed 8 Dec. 2011.

42. Sudan Tribune, ‘South Sudan Political Forces Join Hands Ahead of Referendum’, 18 Oct. 2010, online at < http://www.sudantribune.com/NCP-minister-criticizedover,36395>, accessed 1 Mar. 2011.

43. ICG, Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan (Brussels: ICG 2011) p.8.

44. J. S Morrison and J. G. Cooke, ‘Sudan's Oil Sector’ (background paper, Center for Strategic and International Studies 2002) cited in Luke Patey, ‘Crude Days Ahead? Oil and the Resource Curse in Sudan’, African Affairs, 109/437 (2010) p.617.

45. Global Witness, Fuelling Mistrust: The Need for Transparency in Sudan's Oil Industry (London: Global Witness 2009) pp.6–9.

46. ICG, Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis (Brussels: ICG 2008) p.13.

47. ICG, Negotiating Sudan's North-South Future, (Brussels: ICG 2010) pp.4–5.

48. Sudan Tribune, ‘Heavy Fighting Erupts in Sudan's Abyei Area’, 20 May 2008, online at < http://www.sudantribune.com/Heavy-fighting-erupts-in-Sudan-s,27218>, accessed 1 Mar. 2011.

49. Luke Patey, ‘Oil and Sudan's Coming Referendum’, Making Sense of Sudan, (2010), online at  < http://blogs.ssrc.org/sudan/2010/10/04/oil-and-sudans-coming-referendum/>, accessed 28 Feb. 2011.

50. Global Witness (note 45) p.7.

51. Amanda Hsiao, South Sudan and Sudan Back to War? A View From Juba (Washington, DC: Enough Project), online at < http://www.enoughproject.org/conflict_areas/sudan_south_sudan>, accessed 14 May 2012, p.12.

52. BBC, ‘South Sudan Slashes Spending After Halting Oil Output’, 20 Feb. 2012, online at < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17098350>, accessed 14 May 2012.

53. Sudan Tribune, ‘Sudan Inflation up by 21 per cent in Q1 2012’, 3 May 2012, online at < http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-inflation-up-by-21-in-Q1,42484>, accessed 14 May 2012.

54. Alex de Waal, ‘Sizzling South Sudan: Why Oil is Not the Whole Story’, Foreign Affairs, 7 Feb. 2013, online at < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138836/alex-de-waal/sizzling-south-sudan>, accessed 26 Feb. 2013.

55. Global Witness, ‘South Sudan Faces Test of Transparency Commitments in Pursuing Oil-backed Financing’, May 2012, online at < http://www.globalwitness.org/library/south-sudan-faces-test-transparency-commitments-pursuing-oil-backed-financing>, accessed 23 May 2012.

56. Hsiao (note 51) pp.2–3.

57. Ibid., p.6.

58. Sudan Tribune, ‘Sudan Declares “Liberation” of Heglig as Juba Announces SPLA Pullout’, 20 Apr. 2012, online at < http://www.sudantribune.com/BREAKING-NEWS-Sudan-declares,42329>, accessed 14 May 2012 and Sudan Tribune, ‘Juba in Full Control of Heglig Area, Dismisses Khartoum's Claim of Takeover – Kiir’, 20 Apr. 2012, online at < http://www.sudantribune.com/Juba-in-full-control-of-Heglig,42333>, accessed 14 May 2012.

59. Harry Verhoeven, Black Gold for Blue Gold? Sudan's Oil, Ethiopia's Water and Regional Integration (London: Chatham House 2011) p.13.

60. World Bank, Sudan the Road Toward Sustainable and Broad-Based Growth (Washington, DC: World Bank 2009) p.11.

61. ICG (note 43) p.1.

62. World Bank (note 60) p.11.

63. De Waal (note 10) p.18.

64. ICG (note 43) p.1.

65. Rolandsen (note 20) pp.560–61.

66. J. Bennett, S. Pantuliano, W. Fenton, A. Vaux, C. Barnett, and E. Brusset, Aiding the Peace: A Multi-Donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan, 2005–2010 (Hove, East Sussex: Itad 2010) p.67.

67. Rolandsen (note 20) p.560.

68. Scanteam, Review of Post-Crisis Country Multi Donor Trust Funds, Final Report and Annexes, (Commissioned by World Bank, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORAD in Cooperation with CIDA, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DFID, 2007) pp.80–123.

69. Sara Pantuliano, ‘International Engagement in Fragile States: Lessons from Southern Sudan’, ODI Opinion, 135, (2009) p.1.

70. Bennett et al. (note 66) p.73.

71. Thomas (note 3) p.27; Government of Southern Sudan, Approved Budget 2010 (Juba: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2010), online at < http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliapublic/en/ministries/Finance/AnnualBudgets/mainColumnParagraphs/0/content_files/file/Budget%202010%20-%20Final.pdf>, accessed 27 Jan. 2011, p.2.

72. World Bank, Sudan Public Expenditure Review: Synthesis Report (Washington, DC: World Bank 2007) pp.67–74.

73. Thomas (note 3) p.27; Government of Southern Sudan, Approved Budget 2007 (Juba: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2007), online at < http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/ministries/Finance/AnnualBudgets/mainColumnParagraphs/0/content_files/file9/2007%20Budget.pdf>, accessed 27 Jan. 2011, p.11.

74. Small Arms Survey, ‘Conflicting Priorities GoSS Security Challenges and Recent Responses’, Sudan Issue Brief, No. 14 (2009) pp.1–11, online at Conflicting Priorities GoSS Security Challenges and Recent Responses, accessed 1 Mar. 2011.

75. Ibid.

76. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA in 2010: Annual Plan and Budget (Geneva: United Nations 2010), online at < http://ochaonline.un.org/ocha2010/OCHA2010_hires.pdf>, accessed 3 Mar. 2011; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Update Southern Sudan, 5 Sept. and Oct. 2010, online at < http://ochaonline.un.org/sudan/SituationReports/SouthernSudanReports/tabid/3369/language/enUS/Default.aspx>, accessed 3 Mar. 2011.

77. Small Arms Survey (note 74) p.1.

78. Ibid.

79. Bennett et al. (note 66) p.39.

80. Ibid.

81. Claire McEvoy and Emile LeBrun, Uncertain Future: Armed Violence in Southern Sudan, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), ICG; Jonglei's Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan (Brussels: ICG 2009); Adam O'Brien, Shots in the Dark: The 2008 South Sudan Civilian Disarmament Campaign (Geneva: Small Arms Survey 2009) and Small Arms Survey ‘Anatomy of Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei State’, Sudan Issue Brief, No. 3 (2006–2007) pp.1–8.

82. Small Arms Survey, ‘Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile’, Sudan Issue Brief (2011) p.9.

83. Ibid.

84. ICG (note 43) p.12; Laura Heaton and Amanda Hsiao, ‘Sometimes We See Ourselves as Apart’ South Sudan's Response to Violence in Jonglei (Dec. 2012), online at < http://www.enoughproject.org/files/JongleiReport.pdf>.