Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement Amidst the Clash of Agendas: Attempts, Failures and Lessons Unlearned

Abstract

The euphoria of celebrating South Sudan's independence and the completion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in 2005, must not undermine the significance of assessing and more importantly acknowledging the shortcomings of securing Sudan's stability and unity as a result of its exclusive nature. By all means, the responsibility was primarily that of the government of Sudan to ensure the country's territorial integrity. However, the regional and international mediators are not free of blame. By analysing the objectives and outcomes of the peace process, while considering the conflicting agendas of all involved parties, this article underlines the failures that led to Sudan's secession and left the country with yet another conflict: Darfur.

Notes

 1. Richard Barltrop, Darfur and the International Community: The Challenges of Conflict Resolution in Sudan (London: IB Tauris 2011) pp.36–7.

 2. Ibid. p.39.

 3. Ibid. p.121.

 4. Steven Wondu and Ann Lesch, The Battle for Peace in Sudan: An Analysis of the Abuja Conference 1992–1993 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America 2000) p.175.

 5. Barltrop (note 1) p.43.

 6. African Security Analysis Programme, Somalia: The Sudan-IGAD Peace Process Signposts for the Way Forward (Occasional Paper 86, 2004) p.9.

 7. Peter Woodward, US Foreign Policy and The Horn of Africa (Hampshire: Ashgate 2006) p.96.

 8. Tim Niblock, ‘Pariah States’ and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya Sudan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2001) p.212.

 9. G. Prunier, ‘Sudan's Regional War’, Le Monde Diplomatique Feb. 1997.

10. Al-Quds al-Arabi; as cited in Mideast Mirror (Apr. 1998).

11. Other Southern factions signatory to this agreement were the Equatoria Defence Force, the Union of Sudan African Parties and the South Sudan Independents Group (which was a number of individuals also in disagreement with the SPLM/A).

12. Dimah I. H. Mahmoud, Dynamics of Sudanese Foreign Policy (1998–2010): Attempts to Regain International Legitimacy, PhD Thesis, University of Exeter (2011).

13. Woodward (note 7) p.118.

14. Sudannow (Khartoum), May 1996, p.15; as quoted in ‘The Search for Peace in Sudan: A Chronology of the Sudanese Peace Process 1989–2001’, The European Sudanese Public Affairs Council, 2002. London.

15. Barltrop (note 1) p.118.

16. Daniel Large and Luke A. Patey (eds), Sudan Looks East: China, India and the Politics of Asian Alternatives (Suffolck: James Currey 2011) pp.176–77.

17. Rosenblum Peter (2002) ‘Irrational Exuberance: The Clinton Administration in African’ p.197; as cited in H. Strizek, ‘Central Africa: 15 Years After the End of the Cold War and the International Involvement’, Internationales Afrikaforum 40/3 (2004), pp.273–88, p.5.

18. For further reading on JELI: Mansur Khalid, War and Peace in Sudan: A Tale of Two Countries, Chapter 9; Mahmoud (note 12) Chapter 4; IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis (6 Oct. 1999), Sudan: Egypt-Libya agree new steps for peace initiative; IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis (7 Jul. 2001), Sudan: Khartoum Accepts Libyan-Egyptian Peace Initiative.

19. Barltrop (note 1) p.46.

20. European Sudanese Public Affairs Council (1999), Sudan and the World: The Case For Lifting the 1996 United Nations Limited Diplomatic Sanctions (London: ESPAC), online at < http://www.espac.org/sudan_international/sudan_world.asp>.

21. Ibid.

22. Tim Niblock, Sanctions and Pariah: The Case of Sudan. Paper presented at Conference to the Sudan Study Society of the United Kingdom, University of Durham, 2000. p.6.

23. Fahmi Howeidi; as cited in Mideast Mirror (24 Aug. 1998).

24. Ibid.

25. M. Samman, ‘Interview with Mustafa Osman Ismail’, Ash-Sharq al-Awsat 2 Aug. 1999.

26. Intergovernmental Authority on Development: IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), online at < http://igad.int>.

27. A. Omar, ‘The IGAD Peace Process’, The Ploughshares Monitor 21/1 (2000) pp.1–2.

28. Ibid.

29. Abdelwahab El Affendi, ‘The Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process For Sudan: The Limits of Regional Peacemaking?’ African Affairs Journal 100 (2001) p.592.

30. Barltrop (note 1) pp.52–3.

31. ‘Sudan Opposition Cairo Declaration’ 26 May 2003. Democratic Unionist Party, Sudan People's Liberation Movement, and Ummah Party. Cairo, Egypt.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Mohammed Hassan Ahmed, ash-Asharq al-Awsat; as cited in Mideast Mirror 11 Jun. 2003.

36. John Young, ‘Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process Leading to a Flawed Peace’, Review of African Political Economy 32/103 (2005) p.101.

37. ICG (28 Jan. 2002) p.153.

38. D. Mozersky and J. Prendergast (2006), ‘Love Thy Neighbor: Regional Intervention in Sudan's Civil War’, Harvard International Review 26/1, online at < http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/print.php?article=1220>, accessed c.2010.

39. El Affendi (note 29) p.595.

40. African Security Analysis Programme (note 6) p.4.

41. Barltrop (note 1) p.48.

42. M. Al-Hussein, ‘FM Sudan: The US has a Role to Play’, Asharq al-Awsat 3 Sept. 2001.

43. Young (note 36) pp.99–113.

44. Ibid. p.101.

45. For further reading Mahmoud (note 12), Chapter 6.

46. R. L. Brown, American Foreign Policy Towards Sudan: From Isolation to Engagement, Why the Bush Administration Turned Around US Sudan Policy January 2001–December 2002, PhD Thesis, National Defense University (2003).

47. Ibid. p.25.

48. ‘Report to the President of the United States, from John C. Danforth, Special Envoy for Peace: The Outlook for Peace in the Sudan.’ John C. Danforth. 26 April 2002. US.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. ICG (27 Jun. 2002) p.10.

52. K. Adar, ‘Ethno-Religious Nationalism in Sudan’, in S. Bekker, M. Dodds and M. Khosa (eds) Shifting African Identities (Pretoria: Human Science Research Council 2001) pp.81–114, p.43.

53. S. Cleary, The Role of NGO's Under Authoritarian Political Systems (New York: St. Martin's Press 1997); as cited in Adar (note 52) p.43.

54. International Crisis Group, Dialogue or Destruction? Organizing for Peace as the War in Sudan escalates, Africa Report No 48 (2002) p.13.

55. Woodward (note 7) p.127.

56. African Security Analysis Programme (note 6) p.6.

57. Barltrop (note 1) p.55.

58. ‘Quick Guide: Darfur’, BBC World News 2006.

59. SLM/A is the dominant rebel group in Darfur and was founded as the Darfur Liberation Front. Among its leaders were Abdul Wahid alNur and Minni Minnawi.

60. Young (note 36) p.102.

61. Mahmoud (note 12) Chapters 4 and 6.

62. Tribal Militas who are, despite government denial, believed to be allied to the GOS. They operated as lawless bandits who took up arms and attacked the rebels and areas known for their support of the rebels in Darfur.

63. BBC News, Powell Declares Genocide in Sudan (London: BBC 9 Sept. 2004).

64. Mideast Mirror (9 Sept. 2004).

65. Fahmi Howeidi in ash-Asharq al-Awsat; as cited in Mideast Mirror (23 Dec. 2004).

66. Barltrop (note 1) p.148.

67. ‘Conversation with Mustafa Osman Ismail’, Council of Foreign Relations, 2004.

68. Mahmoud (note 12) pp.212–215.

69. Barltrop (note 1) p.40.

70. Ibid. p.55.

71. Young (note 36) p.101.

72. Barltrop (note 1) p.141.

73. Ibid. p.59.

74. ‘Sudan: Opposition leaders warn against bilateral peace deal’, 17 Dec. 2003; as cited in Barltrop (note 1) p.59.

75. Mahmoud (note 12) pp.212–215.

76. Barltrop (note 1) p.46.