‘Give War A Chance’: All-Out War as a Means of Ending Conflict in the Cases of Sri Lanka and Colombia

Abstract

This article investigates the military approach as a means of solving protracted civil conflicts, in particular focusing on the cases of Sri Lanka and Colombia in comparison. The approach adopted is to study the emergence of these military options within the context of each country's history and to assess whether the call for war was merely a consequence of the international ‘war on terror’, or driven by internal elements. The article explores the epistemological groundings and pitfalls of the all-out war theory informing this approach, before reassessing the significance and validity of the theory in relation to Sri Lanka and Colombia.

Notes

^1. P. Coleman, ‘Intractable Conflict’ in Morton Deutsch and Peter Coleman (eds) Handbook of Conflict Resolution (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass 2000); William Zartman and Cynthia Arnson (eds), Rethinking the Economics of War. The Intersection of Need, Creed and Greed (Baltimore, MD: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press 2005). Civil wars or complex wars can be two different categories ascribed to the same phenomena, but literature appears to draw a distinction between the two. For a discussion on the topic, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, ‘“New” and “Old” Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?’ World Politics 54/01 (2001) pp.99–118; Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1999); Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, ‘International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict’, American Political Science Review 104 (2010) pp.415–29.

^2. Kalyvas, ‘“New” and “Old” Civil Wars’ (note 1).

^3. Elisabeth Wood, Modeling Robust Settlements to Civil War: Indivisible Stakes and Distributional Compromises, Working Paper (Santa Fe, NM: Santa Fe Institute 2003); Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild, ‘Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables’, International Organization 55/1 (2001) pp.183–208; Barbara Walter, ‘The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement’, International Organization 51/3 (1997) pp.335–64; Monica Toft, ‘Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory? International Security 34/4 (2010) pp.7–36; S. Mansoob Murshed and Philip Verwimp, ‘Enforcing Peace Agreements Through Commitment Technologies’ in W. A. Naudé, A. Santos-Paulino, and M. McGillivray (eds) Fragile States: Causes, Costs, and Responses (Oxford: Oxford University Press Nov. 2011) pp.151–65; James D. Fearon, ‘Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?’ Journal of Peace Research 41/3 (2004) pp.275–301; Michaela Mattes and Burcu Savun, ‘Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design’, International Studies Quarterly 53 (2009) pp.737–59; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Søderbom, ‘Post-conflict Risks’, Journal of Peace Research 45 (2008) pp.461–77; Anke Hoeffler, State Failure and Conflict Recurrence, Working Paper (Oxford: Center for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford 2009).

^4. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (eds), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict. Beyond Grief and Grievance (New York: The International Peace Academy 2003); Tim Jacoby, Understanding Conflict and Violence: Theoretical and Interdisciplinary Approaches (New York: Routledge 2008).

^5. Georg Sørensen, ‘War and State Making – Why Doesn't It Work in the Third World?’ Security Dialogue 32/3 (2001) pp.341–54.

^6. The document will refer to civil wars as war. To see a discussion on the definitions of civil war, see Nicholas Sambanis, ‘What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48/6 (2004) pp.814–58.

^7. Nadeeka Arambewela and Rodney Arambewela, ‘Post-war Opportunities for Peace in Sri Lanka: And Ongoing Challenge?’ Global Change, Peace and Security 22/3 (2010) pp.365–75; Amita Shastri, ‘Ending Ethnic Civil War: The Peace process in Sri Lanka’, Common Wealth & Comparative Politics 47/1 (2009) pp.76–99; Neil Devotta, ‘The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka’, Asian Survey 49/6 (2009) pp.1021–51.

^8. Chernik Marc, ‘Economic Resources and Internal Armed Conflicts. Lessons from the Colombian Case’ in Arnson Cynthia and Zartman William (eds) Rethinking the Economics of War. The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed (Baltimore, MD: Woodrow Wilson Center Press 2005); Francisco Gutierrez Sanin and Mauricio Barón, Re-stating the State: Paramilitary Territorial Control and Political Order in Colombia (1978–2004), Crisis States Research Programme, Working Paper No. 66 (London School of Economics Crisis States Research Centre 2005); David Bushnell, Colombia: UnaNación a pesar de símisma (Bogotá: Editorial Planeta 1996).

^9. Charles Tilly, ‘Coercion, Capital, and European States’, Contemporary Sociological Theory (2012) p.251.

^10. Edward N. Luttwak, ‘Give War a Chance’, Foreign Affairs (1999) pp.36–44; Toft (note 3) p.7.

^11. Toft (note 3); Roy Licklider, ‘The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars 1945–1993’, The American Political Science Review 89/3 (1995) pp.681–90; Human Security Report Project, Human Security Report 2012: Sexual Violence, Education, and War: Beyond the Mainstream Narrative (Vancouver: Human Security Press, 2012) p.174.

^12. Virginia Page Fortna, ‘Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace’, International Organization 57 (2003) pp.337–72.

^13. Collier et al. (note 3) p.465.

^14. Hartzell et al. (note 3) p.195.

^15. Toft (note 3) p.20.

^16. Luttwak (note 10).

^17. Sunil Bastian, The Failure of State Formation, Identity Conflict and Civil Society Responses – The Case of Sri Lanka, Working Paper 2 (Bradford: Centre for Conflict Resolution; Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford 1999); World Bank (2011), online at < http://data.worldbank.org/country/>.

^18. Kalev I. Sepp, ‘Best Practices in Counterinsurgency’, Military Review May–June (2005) pp.8–12; Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely, ‘Learning About Counter-Insurgency’, The RUSI Journal 151/6 (2006) pp.16–21; Sebastian L. v. Gorkaand David Kilcullen, ‘An Actor Centric Theory of War’, Policy Essays (Washington, DC: Council for Emerging National Security Affairs 2011); Greg Mills, Ten Counterinsurgency Commandments from Afghanistan (Foreign Policy Research Institute 2007); Steven Metz, ‘New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21^st Century Insurgency’, Parameters Winter (2007) pp.20–32; David Kilcullen, ‘Counter-Insurgency Redux’, Survival 48/4 (2006) pp.111–30; Stuart Kinross, ‘Clausewitz and Low-Intensity Conflict’, Journal of Strategic Studies 27/1 (2004) pp.35–58.

^19. Paul Wolfovitz and Michael O'Hanlon, ‘Plan Afghanistan Why the Colombia Model – Even If It Means Drug War and Armed Rebellion – Is the Best Chance for U.S. Success in Central Asia’, Foreign Policy Journal (2011), online at < http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/27/plan_afghanistan_colombia>, accessed 29 Oct. 2011.

^20. Johan Galtung, ‘An Editorial’, Journal of Peace Research 1(1) (1964) pp.1–4. The positive peace requires the ‘integration of human society’ leading to paxomnium cum omnibus (universal peace towards all). The negative peace implies the absence of war.

^21. Criollo was the descendent of a Spaniard born in Colombia. Also criollo referred to the sons of a Spaniard and a Native. Bushnell (note 8).

^22. Jaime Posada, Manual de historia de Colombia (Bogotá: Editorial Planeta 2004).

^23. Neil Devotta, ‘Institutional Decay, and the Quest for Eelam: Explaining Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’, Pacific Affairs 7/1 (2000) pp.55–76.

^24. Shastri (note 7).

^25. Neil Devotta, ‘From Ethnic Outbidding to Ethnic Conflict: The Institutional Bases for Sri Lanka's Separatist War’, Nations and Nationalism 11/1 (2005) pp.141–59; Kristine Höglund and Camilla Orjuela, ‘Winning the Peace: Conflict Prevention After a Victor's Peace in Sri Lanka’, Contemporary Social Science 6/1 (2011) pp.19–37.

^26. Georg Frerks and Bart Klem, ‘Sri Lankan Discourses on Peace and Conflict’ in Georg Frerks and Bart Klem (eds) Dealing with Diversity: Sri Lankan Discourses on Peace and Conflict (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 2005) pp.1–46.

^27. Bushnell (note 8).

^28. Marco Palacios, Entre la legitimidad y la violencia: Colombia 1875–1994 (Santafé de Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma 1995).

^29. Bushnell (note 8); Paramilitaries can be seen as an extension of the state apparatus, and therefore similar to military forces. In the Colombian case, they are independent organizations.

^30. Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales (IEPRI), Nuestra Guerra Sin Nombre. Transformaciones del Conflicto en Colombia (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma 2006); Eduardo Posada-Carbó, ‘Colombia After Uribe’, Journal of Democracy 22/1 (2011) pp.137–51; Nazih Richani, ‘Caudillos and the Crisis of the Colombian State: Fragmented Sovereignty, the War System and the Privatization of Counterinsurgency in Colombia’, Third World Quarterly 28/2 (2007) pp.403–17; Gustavo Duncan, Del campo a la ciudad en Colombia. La infiltración urbana de los señores de la Guerra, Documento CEDE 2005-2 (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes/CEDE 2005). Gustavo Andrade, Los caminos a la violencia. Vinculación y trayectorias de los niños en los grupos armados ilegales en Colombia (Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes 2010).

^31. Devotta (note 25); Benedikt Korf, ‘Functions of Violence Revisited: Greed, Pride and Grievance in Sri Lanka's Civil War’, Progress in Development Studies 6/2 (2006) pp.109–22.

^32. Shyamika Jayasundara, Conflict, War and Peace in Sri Lanka – Politics by Other Means? Unpublished article, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague (2011).

^33. Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, ‘Una reflexion en torno a Colombia. 1999–2002: Negociación para la paz o proceso para la Guerra?’ Foro Internacional 44/4 (2004) pp.635–55; Daniel Pecaut, ‘Las FARC: Fuentes de su Longevidad y de la Conservación de su Cohesión’, Análisis Político 21/63 (2008) pp.22–50.

^34. Tokatlian (note 33) p.640.

^35. Ibid.

^36. Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales (note 30).

^37. Pecaut (note 33) p.3.

^38. Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales (note 30).

^39. Höglund and Orjuela (note 25).

^40. Jayasundara (note 32) p.16.

^41. Höglund and and Orjuela (note 25).

^42. Ibid.

^43. Korf (note 31) p.286.

^44. Shastri (note 7); Höglund and Orjuela (note 25).

^45. Jayasundara (note 32).

^46. Ibid.

^47. Jonathan Goodhand and Oliver Walton, ‘The Limits of Liberal Peace building? International Engagement in the Sri Lankan Peace Process’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 3/3 (2009) p.348.

^48. Jayasundara (note 32); Neil Devotta, ‘Sri Lanka: From Turmoil to Dynasty’, Journal of Democracy 22/2 (2011) pp.130–44.

^49. Shastri (note 7).

^50. Also known as the Indian Ocean earthquake of 2004.

^51. Shastri (note 7) p.92; Goodhand and Walton (note 47) p.349.

^52. Shastri (note 7).

^53. Charles Tilly, ‘Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists’, Sociological Theory 22/1 (2004) pp.5–13.

^54. Mary Kaldor, ‘Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror’, International Politics 42 (2005) pp.491–98.

^55. Helen Dexter, ‘The “New War” on Terror, Cosmopolitanism and the “Just War” Revival’, Government and Opposition 43/1 (2008) pp.55–78.

^56. Kaldor (note 1); Kalyvas (note 1).

^57. Höglund and Orjuela (note 25).

^58. Höglund and Orjuela (note 25); Neloufer De Mel, ‘Gendering a New Security Paradigm in Sri Lanka’, IDS Bulletin 40/2 (2009) pp.36–40; Devotta (note 23); David Lewis, ‘The Failure of a Liberal Peace: Sri Lanka's Counter Insurgency in Global Perspective’, Conflict Security and Development 10/5 (2010) pp.647–71.

^59. Kaldor (note 1).

^60. To see another case, see Dominik Helling, ‘Tillyan Footprints Beyond Europe: War Making and State Making in the Case of Somaliland’, St Antony's International Review 6/1 (2010) pp.103–23; Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, ‘Wars and State Capacity’, Journal of the European Economic Association 6/2–3 (2008) pp.522–30.

^61. Luttwak (note 10).

^62. Wood (note 3) p.2; Licklider (note 11).

^63. Besley and Persson (note 60) pp.522–30.

^64. Hartzell et al. (note 3) p.195.

^65. Walter (note 3); Toft (note 3); Murshed and Verwimp (note 3).

^66. S. Mansoob Murshed, ‘National Business, Civil War Abatement and Peacebuilding. Contributions to Conflict Management’, Peace Economics and Development 7 (2008b) pp.365–81.

^67. Fearon (note 3).

^68. The discount rate refers to the rate at which money is valued in the long term. Murshed (note 66) p.372.

^69. Daniel Kanheman and Jonathan Renshon, ‘Why Hawks Win’, Foreign Policy 158 (2003) pp.34–38.

^70. Murshed (note 66) p.371; Wood (note 3).

^71. Mattes and Savun (note 3) p.739.

^72. Murshed (note 66) p.371.

^73. Collier et al. (note 3) p.464.

^74. Hoeffler (note 3) p.9; Murshed (note 66).

^75. Kyle Beardsley, ‘Agreement Without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency Problems’, American Journal of Political Science 52/4 (2008) pp.723–40; Collier et al. (note 3).

^76. S. Mansoob Murshed, Indivisibility, Fairness, Farsightedness and Their Implications for Security, Research Paper No. 28 (Japan: United Nations University 2006) p.2.

^77. Wood (note 3) p.14.

^78. Mattes and Savun (note 3).

^79. Page (note 11); Hartzell et al. (note 3).

^80. Page (note 11); Hoeffler (note 3) p.9.

^81. Murshed (note 3) p.371.

^82. Stephen Quackenbush and Jerome Venteicher, ‘Settlements, Outcomes, and the Recurrence of Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research 45 (2008) p.740.

^83. Human Security Report Project (note 11) p.174.

^84. Toft (note 3) p.20.

^85. Nigel Dower, Pacifism, Non-Violence and the Way of Peace The Ethics of War and Peace (Cambridge: Polity 2009).

^86. Charles Tilly, ‘War and State Power’, Middle East Report 171 (1991) pp.38–40; Youssef Cohen, Brian R. Brown and A. F. K. Organski, ‘The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order’, The American Political Science Review 75/4 (1981) p.904.

^87. Sørensen (note 5) p.1.

^88. Leonard Nakamura, ‘Economics and the New Economy: The Invisible Hand Meets Creative Destruction’, Business Review Jul. 2000; Herbert Giersch, ‘The Age of Schumpeter’, The American Economic Review 74/2 (1984) pp.103–09; Francisco Gutiérrez-Sanín, Stupid and Expensive? A Critique of the Costs-of-Violence Literature, LSE Destin Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2. Working Paper No. 48 (2009).

^89. Kyle Beardsley, ‘Rebel Groups as Predatory Organizations The Political Effects of the 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 53/4 (2009) pp.624–64; Robert Bates, ‘State Failure’, Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008) pp.1–12; Cohen et al. (note 86).

^90. Julia Sweig, ‘What Kind of War for Colombia?’ Foreign Affairs 81/5 (2002) pp.122–41; James Fearon and David Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) p.80.

^91. Michael Mann, The Crisis of the Latin American Nation State, Paper presented at the conference on The Political Crisis and Internal Conflict in Colombia, Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, 10 Apr.–13 Apr. 2002.

^92. Helling (note 60) p.8.

^93. Authors such as Helling (note 60) analyses the case of this on the SNM (Somali National Movement) as an example of low state capacity state building.

^94. Richani (note 30) p.405; Frerks and Klem (note 26) p.12.

^95. Fearon and Laitin (note 90).

^96. Besley and Persson (note 60).

^97. Fortna (note 12).

^98. Collier et al. (note 3); Hartzell et al. (note 3); Toft (note 3); Quackenbush and Venteicher (note 82).

^99. Helga Binningsbø, Consonciational Democracy and Postconflict Peace. Will Power-Sharing Institutions Increase the Probability of Lasting Peace after Civil War? Paper presented at the Annual Political Science Conference, Hurdalsjøen, Norway, 5 Jan.–7 Jan. 2005.

^100. David Lewis, ‘The Failure of a Liberal Peace: Sri Lanka's Counter Insurgency in Global Perspective’, Conflict Security and Development 10/5 (2010) p.667.

^101. Metz (note 18) p.28.

^102. Kanheman and Renshon (note 69).

^103. Mansoob Murshed, The Economics of Conflict and Peace, unpublished paper, Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus de Rotterdam University (2011).

^104. Sirimal Abeyrane, ‘Economic Roots of Political Conflict’, The World Economy 27/8 (2004) pp.1295–314; Murshed (note 103).

^105. Höglund and Orjuela (note 25) p.371.

^106. Jonathan Goodhand, ‘Stabilising a Victor's Peace? Humanitarian Action and Reconstruction in Eastern Sri Lanka’, Disasters 34/3 (2010) p.346.

^107. Christopher Cramer, ‘Does Inequality Cause Conflict?’ Journal of International Development 15 (2003) pp.397–412; Christina Steenkamp, ‘In the Shadows of War and Peace: Making Sense of Violence After Peace Accords’, Conflict, Security & Development 11/3 (2011) p.366; Murshed (note 103).

^108. Salman Ahmed, ‘Review: No Size Fits All: Lessons in Making Peace and Rebuilding States’, Foreign Affairs 84/1 (2005) pp.162–69; Goodhand (note 106).

^109. Kaldor (note 1).