Political Parties and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

Abstract

As key agents of conflict management, political parties should play a critical role in peacebuilding. But despite a widespread consensus on the importance of parties for both political and economic development, international interventions in post-conflict states often have the effect of undermining, rather than promoting, the development of strong parties and stable party systems. While both the scholarly literature and much domestic political practice favour the development of aggregative and nationally focused parties, international post-conflict peacebuilding efforts – particularly cases where the United Nations is involved – often privilege descriptive representation and inclusion over other goals, resulting in fragmented and ethnically based party systems. This neglect of systemic party-building has contributed to extreme political sclerosis in recent high-profile international interventions such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Nepal, amongst others.

Notes

^1. There is a large literature on the contribution of political parties to democratic functioning. Some of the most important works include Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds) Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York, NY: The Free Press 1967); Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 1976); John Aldrich, Why Parties? (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 1995); Peter Mair, Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations (New York, NY: Oxford University Press 1997); Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther (eds) Political Parties and Democracy (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press 2001); Russell Dalton, David Farrell and Ian McAllister, Political Parties and Democratic Linkage: How Parties Organise Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011) and most recently Kenneth Janda and Jin-Young Kwak, Party Systems and Country Governance (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers 2011).

^2. Susanne D. Mueller, ‘Dying to Win: Elections, Political Violence and Institutional Decay in Kenya’ in David Gillies (ed.) Elections in Dangerous Places: Democracy and the Paradoxes of Peacebuilding (Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press 2011).

^3. See Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, ‘When Rebels Change Their Stripes: Armed Insurgents in Post-War Politics’ in Anna Jarstad and Timothy Sisk (eds) From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2008); and Jeroen De Zeeuw, From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner 2007).

^4. Benjamin Reilly and Per Nordlund (eds) Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development (Tokyo: United Nations University Press 2008).

^5. See Thomas Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2006). See also see Gero Erdman, ‘Political Party Assistance and Political Party Research: Towards a Closer Encounter?’, Democratization 17/6 (2010) pp.1275–96

^6. Benjamin Reilly, ‘Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies’, Democratization 13/5 (2006) pp.811–27.

^7. The most comprehensive examination is Matthijs Bogaards, Matthias Basedau and Christof Hartmann (eds) ‘Ethnic Party Bans in Africa’, Democratization 17/4 (2010), special issue.

^8. The opposition Pakatan Rakyat alliance follows a similar model, which offers some but not all the advantages of a single multiethnic party. See Donald L. Horowitz, ‘Making Moderation Pay: the Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management’ in J. V. Montville (ed.) Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (New York, NY: Lexington Books 1991).

^9. For a recent survey see Norm Kelly and Sefakor Ashiagbor, ‘Parliamentary Groups’ in Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspective (Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute 2011).

^10. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1968) p.412.

^11. Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘Introduction: What Makes for Democracy?’ in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1995) p.34.

^12. Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘The Indispensability of Political Parties’, Journal of Democracy 11/1 (2000) pp.48–55.

^13. Janda and Kwak (note 1).

^14. G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1982) pp.99–108.

^15. A. Hicken, K. Kollman, and J. Simmons, Party System Nationalization and Public Goods Production, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, September 2007; A. Hicken, K. Kollman, and J. Simmons, Party System Nationalization and the Provision of Public Health Services, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago IL, April 2008; and Joel Selway, ‘Electoral Reform and Public Policy Outcomes in Thailand’, World Politics 63/1 (2011) pp.165–202.

^16. Bumba Mukherjee, ‘Political Parties and the Size of Government in Multiparty Legislatures: Examining Cross-Country and Panel Data Evidence’, Comparative Political Studies 36/6 (2003) pp.699–728.

^17. Dawn Brancati, Peace by Design: Managing Intrastate Conflict through Decentralization (New York, NY: Oxford University Press 2009).

^18. See Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1995) p.265.

^19. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1977).

^20. Russell Dalton, Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004) p.206.

^21. See Aldrich (note 1); Herbert P. Kitschelt, ‘Party Systems’ in Carles Boix and Susan Stokes (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007) and Philip Keefer, ‘Programmatic Parties: Where Do They Come From and Do They Matter?’ (Washington, DC: World Bank Working Paper 2005).

^22. See Philip Keefer, ‘Collective Action, Political Parties and Pro-Development Public Policy’, Policy Research Working Paper Series 5676 (Washington, DC: The World Bank 2011).

^23. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, ‘Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction’ in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds) Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York, NY: Free Press 1967).

^24. See Ivan Doherty, ‘Democracy Out of Balance: Civil Society Can't Replace Political Parties’, Policy Review April/May (2001) pp.25–35.

^25. Matthijs Bogaards, ‘Ethnic Party Bans and Institutional Engineering in Nigeria’, Democratization, 17/4 (2010) pp.730–49.

^26. An exception to this rule applies in Aceh, and was a key part of the 2005 peace agreement there. See Ben Hillman, ’Power-Sharing and Political Party Engineering in Conflict-Prone Societies: The Indonesian Experiment in Aceh’, Conflict, Security and Development 12/2 (2012) pp.149—69.

^27. Johanna Birnir, ‘Party Regulation in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America: The Effect on Minority Representation and the Propensity for Conflict’ in Reilly and Nordlund (note 4).

^28. Anika Moroff and Matthias Basedau, ‘An Effective Measure of Institutional Engineering? Ethnic Party Bans in Africa’, Democratization, 17/4 (2010) pp.666–86.

^29. See Allen Hicken, ‘Political Engineering and Party Regulation in Southeast Asia’ in Reilly and Nordlund (note 4).

^30. See Benjamin Reilly, Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006).

^31. Edward Aspinall, ’Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses', Journal of East Asian Studies 11 (2011) p.311.

^32. See ‘Fiji Decree Restricts Political Participation’, The Australian 16 Jan. 2013.

^33. See Matthias Catón and Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, ‘Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies in Latin America’ in Reilly and Nordlund (note 4).

^34. Ergun Özbudun, ‘The Institutional Decline of Parties in Turkey’ in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther (eds) Political Parties and Democracy (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press 2001).

^35. Soli Özel, ‘Turkey at the Polls: After the Tsunami,’ Journal of Democracy 14/3 (2003) pp.80–94.

^36. See Catón and Tuesta Soldevilla (note 33).

^37. Reilly (note 6).

^38. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1985).

^39. See Reilly (note 6).

^40. A point I discuss at more length in Benjamin Reilly, ‘Post-Conflict Elections: Uncertain Turning Points of Transition?’ in Jarstad and Sisk (note 3).

^41. Rein Taagepera and Mads Qvortrup, ‘Who Gets What, When, How – Through Which Electoral System?’, European Political Science 10 (2011) p.8.

^42. Joel Barkan, ‘Elections in Agrarian Societies’, Journal of Democracy 6/4 (1995) pp.106–16.

^43. See, for example, Gary W. Cox and Matthew McCubbins, ‘The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes” in Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins (eds) Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001).

^44. See Toby Dodge, ‘Back to the Future: The Failure to Reform the Post-War Political Economy of Iraq’ in Mats Bersdal and Dominik Zaum (eds) Political Economy of Statebuilding: Power After Peace (New York, NY: Routledge 2012).

^45. Lise Howard, U.S. Foreign Policy, Ideational Path Dependence, and Ethno-Religious Civil Conflict, Paper presented at the annual conference of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 2 Sep. 2010.

^46. See Paul Salem, ‘U.S. Leaves Behind a Sectarian Iraq’, USA Today 22 Dec. 2011, online at  < http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa = 46322&lang = ru>.

^47. Andrew Reynolds, ‘The Curious Case of Afghanistan’, Journal of Democracy 17/2 (2006) pp.104–17.

^48. See Andreas Mehler, Constitutions for Sustainable Peace? A Look at Recent Trends to Overcome Conflicts in Divided Societies by Constitutional Change, Paper presented at the conference ‘Peace Through Institutions: What Works Under Which Conditions – And What Does Not?’, Hamburg: GIGA, 13–14 Apr. 2011.

^49. Drude Dahlerup (ed.) ‘Introduction’ in Drude Dahlerup (ed.) Women, Quotas and Politics (London and New York, NY: Routledge 2006).

^50. See Mala Htun, ‘Is Gender like Ethnicity? The Political Representation of Identity Groups’, Perspectives on Politics, 2/3 (2004) pp.439–58.

^51. For example, the UNDP's Centre for Constitutional Dialogue (online at < http://www.ccd.org.np/new/index.php>), the main think-tank advising the Assembly in Nepal, highlights the following ‘special’ issues on its webpage:

• Women and the Constitution Building Process.

• Indigenous Peoples and the Constitution Building Process.

• Civil Society Organisations in the Constitution Building Process.

• Transition to a Federal Structure and Implementation of the New Constitution.

^52. See online at < http://nepalitimes.com/issue/2011/05/20/StateOfTheState/18228>.

^53. See Mohamad Ali Harissi, ‘Iraq Veering towards “Lebanonisation”’, Agence France-Presse 14 Dec. 2011.

^54. ‘Still Struggling to Form Government, Iraq Breaks a World Record’, Washington Post 1 Oct. 2010, p.A11.

^55. See Bitter Feud, ‘Between Top Iraqi Leaders Stalls Government’, New York Times 25 Jun. 2011.

^56. René Lemarchand, ‘Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, African Affairs 106/422 (2006) p.3.

^57. Thomas Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy 13/1 (2002) p.10.

^58. Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand, ‘Party Institutionalization in New Democracies’, Party Politics 8/1 (2002) pp.6–29.