Understanding armed groups and party politics

Abstract

Political parties with an armed history are not unusual, yet how these groups function in politics after the transition has largely been ignored. This special issue examines armed groups in party politics, using single and comparative case studies. The introduction forwards five recommendations for future research: (1) We need to see more comparisons across taken for granted boundaries; (2) the consequences for democracy should figure more prominently in our analysis of armed groups; (3) think more critically about standards and conceptual tools; (4) critically examine the interaction between levels of analysis; and (5) methodological pluralism would enrich the field.

The articles in this special issue analyze armed groups in politics, and in particular party politics. Understanding how armed groups, their members and leaders operate in politics is crucial to an examination of how societies move from and transcend violence and war. In recent decades, many former armed groups have replaced their old adversaries in power in the developing world, often following brokered peace agreements that enable armed groups to transform into political parties, mobilize voters, and ultimately stand for elections. But how do such parties formed in the aftermath of war operate, organize and mobilize? What conditions their success as parties and how do they fare in relation to enhancing democracy and managing conflict outside of the battle field? This special issue critically examines the dynamics of armed groups in party politics. Our goal is to understand armed groups in politics, typically after war but not limited to the aftermath of war, using a range of single and comparative case studies. The range of articles included in this special issue tackles this in different ways, from the individual level of ex-combatants, the party organization and the party system level, and through utilizing comparisons which often times have been left out of previous work.

There is a growing literature on the transformation of armed actors into political actors. To date, several of the studies examining the evolution of armed groups in peace times have been limited to focusing on the challenges of transforming from armed to non-armed political organizations (Manning 1998, 2004; De Zeeuw 2007; Deonandan et al. 2007; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Manning and Smith 2016). Others have examined the factors that explain electoral success of former armed groups that turned into political parties (Allison 2006, 2010; Söderberg Kovacs 2008). Recently, this field has also moved to the stage where large-N studies are being conducted on explaining successful rebel-to-party transformations (see forthcoming special issue ‘From Bullets to Ballots’ in Democratization). Yet, how these groups function in politics after the transition and the internal workings of such parties has largely been ignored.

How extensive is the phenomenon of armed groups entering politics? While the total number of successful transformations (to say nothing of the failed attempts) is difficult to estimate, 30 of the 216 peace agreements that have been signed between 1975 and 2011 included provisions for transforming the armed group into a political party (Högbladh 2012). About one third (35.5%) of armed groups entering negotiated peace between 1975 and 2011 transformed into political parties (Söderberg Kovacs and Hatz 2016), whereas Manning and Smith identified 72 political parties emerging from armed groups between 1990 and 2009 (2016). Political parties taking up arms and armed groups becoming (sometimes anew) political parties span the entire globe. Examples of armed groups developing complete political parties include such cases as: the Hezbollah in Lebanon, the IRA in Northern Ireland, the Palestinian Hamas, GAM in Aceh; RENAMO in Mozambique; the CPN(M) in Nepal; CNDD-FDD in Burundi, URNG in Guatemala; the KLA in Kosovo; UNITA in Angola; M-19 in Colombia; the FMLN in El Salvador; ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe; the LTTE in Sri Lanka; and the RUF in Sierra Leone. Examples of political parties turned armed groups or developing armed wings (and back again) includes such cases as: the ANC in South Africa; FRELIMO in Mozambique; the IRTP in Tajikistan; SWAPO in Namibia; the MQM in Pakistan; the Jamiat-i Islami in Afghanistan; and the PKK in Kurdistan. From this it should be clear that political parties with an armed history is not an unusual occurrence, but rather a common and general phenomenon which merits our attention. As more wars come to an end, the more political parties with an armed history will participate in electoral politics. In addition we see many political parties succumbing to the use of electoral violence (see e.g. Bekoe 2012; Höglund 2009), further disintegrating this already fluid boundary.

What is clear from the growing literature in this field is that both the legacies of armed group mobilization as well as the nature of conflict endings (settlement versus victory) impact the transition process. But how do these features affect the dynamics of party politics beyond the transitional phase? What does the everyday politics of such parties look like, given their violent past? We believe it is high time to address how party politics function in the aftermath of war, after the first initial transition has taken place. Tackling this larger question will also enable us to answer whether such parties are different from, or just like political parties that lack such an origin. This focus on party mobilization in the aftermath of war also addresses an apparent paradox in current peacebuilding agendas. The inclusion of former armed groups into politics seems to counter conventional knowledge from disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR): instead of reducing the movements and removing armed actors from politics, their political role and potential for building strong and representative political parties are emphasized.

Focusing on the broader organizational dynamics of the former armed group in the context of party politics, we believe will help us address dilemmas that are often suggested to be troubling such parties and the peace. This special issue offers a selection of in-depth single and comparative case studies of intra-party dynamics and political mobilization as well as contributions that tackle the theme from the perspective of party system evolution. As a whole the issue covers a wide span of cases in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. This compilation of empirically based articles serves as the basis for developing a more refined understanding of post-conflict party dynamics and thus speaks to pressing issues in the fields of international peacebuilding, democratization and development. These contributions tackle these questions using a variety of levels of analysis as their focus, as well as in terms of the type of data collected and analyzed.

The origins of political actors, often deeply affect their organization, political culture, strategic behavior and democratic capacity and participation in the continued (electoral) political game. It raises the question of what the party culture of such parties actually are, especially in a more long-term perspective. Does this change over time? What allows or determines whether such political parties break such patterns of behavior and adopt more democratic internal workings? Does the nature of conflict-ending matter (Lyons 2016a)? Does the nature of the conflict itself matter for how such parties manage to become efficient parties (Lyons 2016b)? Do insurgent victories produce less inclusive and more authoritarian parties than those emerging from negotiated settlements? What about the foundational ideology or political aspirations of armed movements?

Another concern often raised about helping armed groups transform into political parties relates to their lack of politics (Söderström 2014). As many armed groups are seen driven by other things than legitimate political claims and visions, concerns are raised about whether they will contribute with a serious political agenda when they enter electoral politics. Hence, the political goals and content of such parties are of interest to us. What issues help them mobilize? What is the content of their claims and means of persuasion? When and how do they develop a political agenda, or is mobilization through fear and old allegiances the dominant pathway? The issue of political agendas is highlighted in several of the articles in this special issue (Alfieri 2016; Muriaas et al. 2016; Söderström 2016).

Another area of concern is the strength of networks of former combatants. Peacebuilding and reintegration policies (especially DDR and SSR) often try to break such networks and disconnect individuals from each other. How important are these networks for the functioning of these parties? If they are central to these parties, and the political parties operate according to democratic standards, then perhaps such networks are not as problematic as often assumed (see e.g. Sindre 2016). Of course, if these networks are central and continually hamper internal democratic workings of these parties it does not bode well for democracy. If such networks play only a minor role for shaping such parties, then we need to reconsider what the concern related to such networks actually are. This special issue highlights the linkage between the political reintegration of individual ex-combatants and the political reintegration of armed groups (i.e., transformation into a political party) which so far has not been studied enough (see Söderström 2015, pp. 6–17). How is the political mobilization and participation of former combatants shaped by their armed group’s trajectory in politics? (see Alfieri 2016; Sindre 2016; Söderström 2016 in this issue).

Further, several of the articles explore the wartime legacies of armed groups especially as it concerns mobilization within and below ‘rebel’ parties and hence also their governance output. To what degree can one detect that the origins of these actors continue to matter? Are there path dependencies here that it is difficult to break free from? Furthermore, in order to understand the democratization challenges involved in this process, we need work that builds on contemporary post-conflict and peacebuilding dynamics as contexts and actors in this field undergo constant transformations. In particular, the contributions examine the continued mobilization of the troops within the new party, the strategies and behavior of the elite within the parties as well as how the running of the party in everyday peace is organized (see especially Sindre 2016). An inside view of mobilization and the internal politics of these political actors, further sheds light on the development of postwar politics as well as provide a much needed bottom-up perspective on non-traditional political parties (see especially Söderström 2016).

In the article by Muriaas et al. we see a comparison between parties with and without a history of armed struggle (the ANC in South Africa and MMD in Zambia). They show how ideational and administrative capital are benefits of an armed struggle which help parties to institutionalize (Muriaas et al. 2016). This kind of comparison is important for the development both of the field of research pertaining to political parties, but also to the peacebuilding literature. Yet, often political parties with a violent background are seen as too odd, or as outliers, to be given much consideration in the general party literature. This is unfortunate. Especially as they represent a substantial portion of parties today. Adding more comparisons across this divide also furthers our understanding of how and whether the war legacy sets these parties apart or not. The idea that political parties with an armed history are outliers is also ahistorical, as witnessed both by the growth of fascist parties from paramilitary organizations, but also as WWII resistance movements gave rise to political parties.

The importance of an organizational legacy arising from a war experience is highlighted by several of the contributions in this special issue. Lyons compares various conflicts/war histories and how this has mattered for party capacities in postwar Uganda, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Libya. In doing so, he demonstrates how wars fought over small territories without much international support is more conducive to postwar capacities of the winning group, whereas wars fought over larger areas with a lot of external support/intervention reduce the organizational capacity of these proto-parties and make the transition to capable political parties more difficult (Lyons 2016b).

Another larger theme visible in these articles is that the identity, loyalty, and emotional ties that are forged during armed struggle carry over in important ways to shape postwar party politics. It matters for fragmentation questions, but also for the mobilization of individual voters. Personal ties and personal sacrifice during the war are often very enduring. In the case of M19 in Colombia, this tie has survived several decades after demobilization as we see in Söderström’s article (2016). Söderström’s article uses life history interviews with former members of a guerilla group in order to track how their political mobilization was influenced by the success and eventual failure of their party over the course of 20+ years after they disarmed. Notably she finds that the mobilization of these individuals is not dependent on the success of the party.

In other cases, this tie also becomes instrumental when former rebel group members seek positions or representation in the postwar setting. Sindre discusses how former rebel parties in Aceh and East Timor relate to former combatants and view them either as resources or challengers to organizational survival and the chances of winning office (2016). The experience of armed struggle can give rise to political capital for individuals as well. In certain wars, the former combatant is seen as credible, loyal and as a hero that has sacrificed him- or herself for others. Participation can also give rise to network resources that can be used for running for office (see also Söderström’s contribution). At the same time, the issues of party membership and identity are not purely instrumental. While Alfieri’s contribution draws attention to the political agency, it also emphasizes the ideational capital displayed by individual party members, both ex-combatants and non-combatants. Her study of three main parties in Burundi is a study not of party elites but of party members whose political participation is determined by individuals’ desire to take control of their destiny (Alfieri 2016). This argument counters common assumptions about party membership as merely instrumental and short-lived. These perspectives also reiterate the important observation that political parties in post-conflict societies may have deeper roots in society than is often assumed.

Research on political parties in general is often concerned with how candidate selection operates, for instance how different party strategies and quotas affect the ability of certain types of candidate to selected (such as women or ethnic minorities). This suggests that one new avenue research on armed groups and political parties should explore is the importance of a military or war experience for individuals running for office. Thus, examining candidate lists and the war traits of such individuals is a field that could be integrated into the research on candidate selection in general.

Wittig’s and Berti’s contributions to this special issue both question set categories, especially the notion of a linear process of complete or incomplete peacebuilding and rebel-to-party transformation. Comparing two politico-military organizations, Hezbollah and Hamas, Berti demonstrates how these organizations operate in a liminal space at different times fulfilling different tasks (Berti 2016). This notion of moving in and out of war refutes the very idea of transition. Similarly, Wittig’s interviews with party cadres in Burundi also refute a linear story where groups necessarily move from one end to another. Rather violence and politics are more intertwined and function in parallel (Wittig 2016).

The legacy of armed conflict is central to understanding the challenge of democratization – a peace agreement does not represent a complete break with the past, instead researchers need to explore the linkages across this divide. However, as Wittig’s contribution makes clear, the prewar history of these groups should also figure more prominently in our work. We cannot ignore the often authoritarian setting that was constitutive of the war as well. This highlights the need to understand these groups as actors deeply embedded both in place and time, and study them over longer time frames.

How do we continue to move this field forward? Based on this special issue and our reading of the field as a whole, we want to make five recommendations for how the field should continue to increase our understanding of armed groups in politics:

(1)	We need to see more comparisons across taken for granted boundaries. Comparisons across types of categories will further our understanding of the traditional cases within this field and broaden the conceptual tools we use. We suggest that comparisons between parties with and without armed histories can be particularly enlightening, for both the study of political parties in general as well as for study of rebel-to-party transformations. We also believe that comparing cases of negotiated settlements, or liberal peacebuilding, with cases that emerge from military victories and contested sovereignties, can help push the field forward. Thus, useful comparisons could include contrasting political parties with and without an armed history, various conflict trajectories, conflict endings, types of war, across time, and across the Global South and the Global North divide. Limiting our empirical points of comparison risks constraining our theoretical thinking. We believe this special issue shows how fruitful it can be to open up for comparisons across divides hitherto avoided.
(2)	The consequences for democracy should figure more prominently in our analysis of armed groups. While variations in terms of democratic prospects ultimately motivate a lot of this research, we can move forward in terms of being more explicit about the variation we seek to explain. In order to understand how such groups influence the prospects for democracy, we need to be more explicit about what democratic consequences are at stake. This is not just a question of building the institutions of democracy, and hence operational political parties. Rather, we need to consider how these groups and their members shape opportunities for political voice, accountability, and how collective goods are distributed and accessed. What agendas and legislative outcomes do we see these parties espousing? What political strategies are employed for reforms, and what kind of reforms are on the agenda? What kind of political values and attitudes are created and reinforced and how do they support or undermine democracy? We hope to see more explicit analysis of the consequences for democracy as the field continues.
(3)	Think more critically about standards and conceptual tools. Comparing cases across traditional theoretical divides will help improve our conceptual tools. If traditional party research is concerned with such issues as ideational capital, degree of institutionalization, candidate selection, than those are tools and questions we should be exploring in this field as well. Similarly, research concerning political participation in general offers many interesting conceptual tools as well as hypotheses which could be brought more squarely into the research on armed groups and their members. Similarly, our standards for success should be more clearly motivated and problematized; again other fields can help us set such standards. Political parties growing out of armed groups or armed struggle should in the long run be held to the same standards as other political parties. What are our expectations when it comes to the internal workings of these parties, when it comes to candidate selection, building partisanship, canvassing and elite rotation, if they are to contribute to efficient and democratic government? Of course, different researchers will deem different bars as appropriate measures of success, but we suggest that spelling out such expectations will benefit the field greatly. Not the least because it would also allow for a close scrutiny of the normative assumptions within the field.
(4)	Critically examine the interaction between levels of analysis. The contributions in this special issue show the importance of separating levels of analysis. The political trajectory of the party, its elite, and the members of the armed group are not the same, even if these processes shape one another. Including the rank and file can be a pathway for success for the party, as it helps them create a grassroots organization, giving more vibrancy and organizational strength to the party. Similarly, the party and its elite can either help certain candidates run for political office, or simply not play a decisive role at all, for the degree to which individual former combatants have access to political voice after they have laid down their guns. We need to pay closer attention to questions concerning interactions between levels as we move forward.
(5)	Methodological pluralism would enrich the field. Single and comparative case studies have served this field well, so far, but there is room for more innovation and methodological pluralism. We hope to see a broader range of approaches used in the future, including, but not limited to, quantitative research, political ethnography, explicit process tracing, case studies over extended time frames, and hypothesis testing research designs. As we start asking new questions, bringing more cases together and opting for different types of comparisons, such new methodological options need to accompany this endeavor.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

The editorial work has been shared equally between the two editors, both in terms of writing the introduction and the editorial work as a whole. The majority of the article manuscripts offered for this journal issue was presented and discussed at a two-day Workshop on the Dynamics of Party Politics in the aftermath of War in Bergen, Norway, March 19–20 2015. We are grateful to the Bergen University Fund for financial support toward the workshop.