Governance through brokerage: informal governance in post-civil war societies

Abstract

There is currently a lack of knowledge about how elites rule post-civil war societies without strong state institutions. This paper argues that elites oftentimes overcome such institutional deficiencies by engaging in governance through brokerage. According to this perspective, elites outsource central state functions to influential broker figures. This is particularly true when dealing with war-affected groups that possess much violent agency. By functioning as social membranes, brokers can help elites and war-affected groups to redefine a new social contract. Liberia is employed as an example to illustrate the paper’s central arguments.

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to Lotta Themnér and the editors and external reviewers at Civil Wars for their helpful comments. We are also thankful to Network for Empowerment and Progressive Initiatives (NEPI), and Kofi Annan Institute for Conflict Transformation (KAICT) in general, and, Fofana Abraham, Pindarous W.T. Allison, K. Johnson Borh, Arthur Johnson, Ilmari Käihkö, Mariam Persson, Allan Quee and Morlee Gugu Zawoo, in particular, for the contributing field work that they conducted in Liberia.

Notes

1. It is important to stress that elites in weak states – like those in most countries – tend to govern via both formal and informal structures (see e.g., Wedel 2009). The point is, however, that informal modes of governance are often more prevalent in post-civil war societies and particularly useful when it comes to ruling war-affected groups with much violent agency.

2. In many post-war societies the term youth does not connote all young people within a certain age bracket, but rather a young population which is socially marginalized. That is how youth is used in this text.

3. It is not only in post-civil war societies that governing elites struggle to uphold their authority. Wedel (2009) has shown how powerful broker figures hold much informal power in ‘western’ democracies.

4. From now on, the term refugee will be used to depict both IDPs and refugees.

5. This observation is based on fieldwork that the authors have conducted in Liberia, the Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone.

6. An example of this is the weak support the Palestinian Authority has had in Gaza, whose population is, to a large extent, living in refugee camps.

7. For more information on brokers, see Burt (2005), McAdam et al. (2001), and Gould (1989).

8. Presentation by Joschka Philipps at The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, 2 October 2013, and Philipps (2013).

9. For instance, measured in gross national income per capita (based on purchasing power parity), Liberia was amongst the five poorest countries in both 2004 and 2013. See ‘GNI per capita PPP (current international $).’World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD (accessed 10 March 2015).

10. The research assistants were Pindarous W.T. Allison, K. Johnson Borh, Arthur Johnson, Ilmari Käihkö, Mariam Persson, Allan Quee and Morlee Gugu Zawoo.

11. Unless otherwise indicated, the empirical material is based on interviews with these ex-MiLCs and ex-fighters. We only refer to specific interviews when we are using direct quotes.

12. For more information on the DDRR process in Liberia, see Bøås and Hatøy (2008), Jennings (2008), and Söderström (2011).

13. Interview with ex-LURD commander 1, Tubmanburg, Liberia, 9 November 2012.

14. Interview with ex-LURD commander 2, Tubmanburg, Liberia, 8 November 2012.

15. Interview with ex-NPFL combatant 1, Monrovia, Liberia, 5 September 2011.

16. Interview with ex-NPFL commander, Monrovia, Liberia, 14 September 2011.

17. Interview with ex-NPFL combatant 2, Monrovia, Liberia, 12 September 2011.

18. Interview with ex-LURD commander 2, Tubmanburg, Liberia, November 9, 2012.

19. See also Persson (2012).

20. Ewa Kaijser, The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, 10 September, 2013; and ICG (2009, p.5).

21. Interview with ex-LURD commander 2, Tubmanburg, Liberia, 8 November 2012.