![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
The role of war in processes of state-making has long been hotly disputed. Although generally considered an African ‘success story’, the case of Somaliland, whose unilateral declaration of independence was embedded in violent conflict, may be instructive. Applying the conceptual prism of ‘rule standardization’, this article argues that episodes of large-scale violence were constitutive of Somaliland’s state-making trajectory. Based on theoretical reasoning and empirical findings, the article concludes that, while collective political violence is neither an angel of order nor a daemon of decay, war can be constitutive of state-making under the condition that it advances institutional and identity standardization.
Notes
1. Here, state-making denotes processes that encompass state-building and nation-building, with the former referring to the establishment of institutions and organizations of government, and the latter capturing issues of (national) identity formation.
2. Something that Deutsch (Citation1953) might call ‘assimilation’.
3. See also Conversi (Citation2007, p. 372) who proposes that ‘the broader relationship between homogenisation and war should be reconsidered as a key feature in the historical development of nationalism’, whereby he defines ‘homogenisation’ as ‘the sociopolitical process of deliberately fostering cultural homogeneity’. The argument that military service and war can contribute to nationbuilding is, however, disputed by Krebs (Citation2004).
4. In fact, it is frequently argued that the 1991–93 period was characterized by peace-building and that statebuilding did not set in until 1993 (Battera Citation2004, Bradbury Citation2008, Walls Citation2008, Pham Citation2012). A notable exception to this line of argument is Samatar (Citation1997).
5. Interview: former member of the SNM Central Committee and former Somaliland government minister, Hargeysa, 22.07.2008; Interview: SNM veteran, Hargeysa, 12.03.2009; Interview: former official of the House of Parliament of Somaliland, Hargeysa, 13.3.2009; Interview: senior official of the Somaliland Ministry of Interior, Hargeysa, 20.4.2009; Interview: Member of Parliament of Somaliland, Hargeysa, 3.7.2011.
6. Interview: former member of the SNM Central Committee and former Somaliland government minister, Hargeysa, 22.07.2008; Interview: former official of the House of Parliament, Hargeysa, 13.3.2009.
7. Yet, it was not until after the war that the guurti was established as a national platform, including traditional authorities of other regions and clans (Interview: Member of Parliament of Somaliland, Hargeysa, 3.7.2011).
8. Interview: former official of the House of Parliament, Hargeysa, 13.3.2009; Interview: SNM veteran, Burco, 21.4.2009.
9. This assessment is put into perspective by (Dool Citation1998, p. 242) who argues that ‘[o]f all the Somali political movements, the SNM was undoubtedly the most organized and efficient’.
10. Interview: senior politician, Hargeysa, 8.7.2011.
11. Interview: official of the Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, Erigavo, 8.4.2009; Interview: SNM veteran, Hargeysa, 20.4.2009; Interview: former official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, 4.7.2011.
12. Interview: Member of Parliament of Somaliland, Hargeysa, 21.7.2011.
13. Interview: senior official of the Somaliland National Demobilization Commission, Hargeysa, 25.7.2008; Interview: official of the Somaliland Police Force, Hargeysa, 17.3.2009.
14. Interview: journalist, Hargeysa, 25.7.2008.
15. Interview: former minister of the governments of Somalia and Somaliland, Hargeysa, 7.8.2008; Interview: former official of the House of Parliament, Hargeysa, 13.3.2009.
16. Interview: Member of Parliament of Somaliland, Hargeysa, 21.7.2011.
17. Interview: local researcher in Somaliland, Hargeysa, 28.7.2008; Interview: SSDF veteran, Hargeysa, 4.7.2011; Interview: former official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, 4.7.2011; Interview: official of the Somaliland Ministry of Education, 10.7.2011; Interview: intellectual, Hargeysa, 6.7.2011.
18. Interview: senior official of the Somaliland National Demobilization Commission, Hargeysa, 25.7.2008; Interview: former official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, 4.7.2011.
19. Interview: Intellectual, Hargeysa, 6.7.2011. By and large, Egal simply suppressed the participation of the elders of his own Habar Awal clan, thus depriving the other clans’ elders of their equipollent negotiation party and bringing the talks to a halt.
20. Interview: Member of Parliament of Somaliland, Hargeysa, 21.7.2011. The Hargeysa conference numbered about twice as many voting delegates as the Boroma conference, because Egal insisted on supplementing the traditional authorities by an equal number of parliamentarian delegates (International Crisis Group Citation2003, p. 12, Academy for Peace and Development Citation2008). While he justified this modification by arguing that the legislature should have a say in national matters, this alteration lay largely in the President’s goal to maximise his chances of emerging from the conference as political victor.
21. Interview: local researcher in Somaliland, Hargeysa, 28.7.2008; Interview: senior official of the Somaliland Ministry of Interior, Hargeysa, 20.4.2009.
22. See e.g., the case of Puntland, which ‘was unaffected by the civil strife that accompanied the collapse of the Somali state’ (Battera Citation2003, p. 230), but nevertheless formed a similar polity.