Conditions for Successful Multiparty Mediation in Separatist Armed Conflicts: A Fuzzy-Set Analysis

Abstract

Contemporary international mediation is often multiparty and involves a number of states and multilateral organisations. What are the conditions that account for successful multiparty mediation in conflict resolution? To address this question, I use qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) and focus on individual dimensions of mediation, namely internal cohesion of the mediating coalition, the use of reward and coercive power, and the presence of a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (MHS). I posit that the presence of a cohesive mediating coalition is a necessary condition for conflict resolution, whereas the provision of security guarantees, the imposition of sanctions and the presence of an MHS play a causal role in conflict resolution only in conjunction with other conditions. I test these conditions using a fuzzy-set approach and data from 20 mediated agreements over separatist conflicts in the post-cold war era. Empirical findings provide support for some of these propositions and challenge relevant theories of international mediation. More specifically, this research shows that a high convergence of interests among mediators is the only necessary – albeit not sufficient condition – for conflict resolution. Second, the analysis highlights the presence of two main sufficient paths for mediation success.

Notes

1. Mediation is understood as ‘a mode of negotiation in which a third party helps the parties find a solution which they cannot find by themselves’ (Zartman and Touval 2007, p.438). The term ‘multiparty’ refers to ‘mediation attempts that involve multiple interveners’ (Böhmelt 2011, p. 859).

2. The term ‘separatist conflict’ is preferred to that of ‘secessionist conflict’ since the first is a more encompassing concept that includes all ‘instances of political alienation which feature a desire for the reduction of control by a central authority in a specific area’ (Wood 1981, p. 110).

3. Mediation is successful when it leads to the signing and implementation of a peace agreement, namely when the belligerents, with the help of third parties, achieve conflict resolution.

4. In evaluating the relevance of incentives for conflict resolution, I focus exclusively on security guarantees since the positive effects associated to humanitarian assistance and economic incentives are still highly debated. Please see Anderson and Nuttlefield (1998), Anderson (1999), Goodhand and Sedra (2006) and Narang (2011).

5. The calibration of each condition and the outcome is provided in the Appendix. The data presented in this paper are based on information taken from a selection of publicly available printed and electronic sources. The sources include research articles and books, research reports, official text of the peace treaties, journals, and documents of international and regional organizations.

6. Separatist conflicts are selected among ‘conflicts over territory’ included in the UCDP Armed Conflict Data-set, v. 17.1, 2017, accessible at: http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ucdpprio/ucdp-prio-acd-171.xlsx.

7. 19 out 20 cases have been selected among mediated conflicts included in the UCDP Peace Agreement Data-set, 1975–2011. Since this data-set covers only the period until 2011, the Minsk Protocol – signed in 2014 – has been added to the population of cases by the author.

8. Data on war magnitude and duration are provided by UCDP battle-related deaths datasets, v.5–2015, UCDP One-sided Violence Data-set, v.5–2015 and UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data-set v. 17.1, 2017. Data on population are provided by World Bank.

9. For detailed accounts of the effects of protraction on conflict resolution, see Crocker et al. (2005).

10. The Doha Agreement (2011) belongs to this configuration, but it is an outlier.