ABSTRACT
The United Nations has engaged in (neo)trusteeship statebuilding in two different contexts: post-Second World War decolonisation and after the Cold War. On both occasions, statebuilding aimed at preventing organised, large-scale violence. Nevertheless, these statebuilding efforts were confronted by several forms of violence, ranging from civil war to a high level of politically motivated violence. In this article, we ask how and why administrations in French Cameroon, New Guinea, Kosovo and Timor-Leste implementing (de)securitised such violence – by addressing it as a serious threat and imple-menting policies of protection, by portraying it as something manageable or even by ignoring it.
Acknowledgments
We want to thank Hendrik Spruyt, Paul Jackson, Toni Haastrup and the reviewers for comments and critique and Miriam Tekath, Ronja Schicke and Alex Burhardt for support.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Primary Sources
Cameroon
- Art 4 Trusteeship Agreement, ANOM FM DPCT//3
- Bilan des Attentats ATCAM, 11.04.1957, ANOM FM DPCT//26
- Debate Trusteeship Council, DPCT 1
- Note sur le projet de Loi, 18.12.1957, ANOM DPCT//15
- Questions 20.12.1955, ARMS S-0534-–0162
- Proposition de Loi, COAM FM DPCT//37
- Rapport de la prémière mission visite à Cameroun, 16.2.1950, 1 AC 36 (2)
- Report Visiting Mission, 1955.
New Guinea
- United Nations, 1946. United Nations yearbook 1946–1947. New York City: United Nations.
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- United Nations, 1971b. United Nations yearbook 1971. New York City: United Nations.
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- South Pacific Post, 1962. Nobody asks us. South Pacific Post, 13 (February), 3.
- Post Courier, 1969a. Civil war danger, says kiki. Post Courier, 18 (September), 1.
- Post Courier, 1969b. Police fly to Island. Post Courier, 29 (July), 1.
- Post Courier, 1969c. Tear-gas and batons used on villagers. Post Courier, 6 (August), 1.
- Post Courier, 1970. The dangers facing papua new guinea. Post Courier, 14 (April), 2.
- Post Courier, 1971a. Mataungans clash at fermentary. Post Courier, 8 (March), 2.
- Post Courier, 1971b. Police, mobs clash. Post Courier, 15 (March), 1.
- Post Courier, 1971c. Mataungans “threaten life” of DC. Post Courier, 17 (March), 1.
- Post Courier, 1974. Somare calls on nation to unite. Post Courier, 27 (December), 3.
- Post Courier, 1975a. U.N. rejects petition on b’ville break. Post Courier, 1 (September), 1.
- Post Courier, 1975b. Whitlam wrecks b’ville hopes. Post Courier, 12 (August), 1.
- Post Courier, 14 June 1971d. Violence warning on bougainville. Post Courier.
- Post-Courier, 1975c. Emergency plans for B’Ville upgraded. Post Courier, 26 August1.
Kosovo
- S/1999/779
- S/1999/987
- S/2000/1196
- S/2001/218
- S/RES/1244 (1999)
- UNMIK/PR/9
- UNMIK/PR/15
- UNMIK/PR/52
- UNMIK/PR/68
- UNSC resolution 1244 (1999)
Timor-Leste
- SC 6920
- S-PV. 4097
- S-PV. 4114
- S-PV. 4165
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- S-PV. 4625
- S-PV-.4265
- S-2001–436
- S-2002–432
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- UNSC Resolution 1272
Notes
1. As (McDonald Citation2008, p. 569–570) argues, actors can communicate meaning in several different forms: ‘First, language is only one (albeit the most central) means through which meaning is communicated (…). A range of authors in this context have suggested the need to take account of the role of images as potential forms of securitization. Second, an exclusive focus on language is problematic in the sense that it can exclude forms of bureaucratic practices or physical action that do not merely follow from securitizing “speech acts” but are part of the process through which meanings of security are communicated and security itself constructed.’
2. Levine and Nye (Citation1974, p. 118) speak of 10–15,000 victims of this violence.
3. ‘The nationalists no longer acknowledge the French Administration, they have decided to get rid of it by any means’ (Atangana Citation2010, p. 17).
4. Scholars regard the actions by the French administration and the abolition of the party as a major catalyst for the violent resistance (Bayart Citation1985, Mbembe Citation1996, Atangana Citation2010 or Terretta Citation2014).
5. United Nations (Citation2017).
6. For example, internal documents on the role of the former resistance commander L7 (Elle Sette or Cornelio Gama), various ‘terrorist groups’ in Bacau, or the behaviour of resistance troops in cantonment towards citizens in spring 2000.
Additional information
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Notes on contributors
Thorsten Bonacker
Thorsten Bonacker is professor for peace and conflict studies at the Center for Conflict Studies at Marburg University, Germany. He is also board member of the collaborative research center “Dynamics of Security” at Marburg and Gießen University.
Werner Distler
Werner Distler is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Conflict Studies and the Collaborative Research Center SFB/TRR 138 “Dynamics of Security” at the University of Marburg, Germany. His work focuses on interventions as social practices, the role of authority and security in international statebuilding, and on the post-conflict political economy.
Maria Ketzmerick
Maria Ketzmerick is a research fellow at the Centre for Conflict Studies in Marburg, Germany and is currently finalizing her PhD in the collaborative research centre “Dynamics of Security”. In her PhD she analyses the Cameroonian Decolonization process with a postcolonial reading of securitization and is investigating the colonial continuities of security narratives in the current political system.