ABSTRACT
Problems of civil-military relations have been at the centre of recurring political crises in contemporary Africa. Routine military intrusion in politics characterised the first four decades of independent Africa. Citizens suffered at the hands of the armed forces, infamous for widespread human rights violations. One key response to this dual civil-military problem was to pursue a strategy of politicising the armed forces in order to make them a) subordinate to civilian authority and b) organically close to the public and protective than predatory. This also entailed the militarisation of politics ostensibly to bring the political class into closer conversation and collaboration with the military. To what extent did this strategy contribute to transforming civil-military relations? Taking the Ugandan case, this article argues that transformation was attained in making the military more respectful of citizens’ rights while simultaneously creating a fusion with the ruling class thereby subverting the very goal of professionalism.
Acknowledgement
For their critical comments and suggestions, I am grateful to Joe Oloka-Onyango, William Reno, the co-editors and two anonymous reviewers of this journal.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Following Huntington’s seminal publication, the literature is legion. There has been a whole research programme built around Huntington’s definition of the civil-military problematique and his liberal, institutional school of thought, on the one hand, and the counter sociological school of Morris Janowitz, on the other.
2. For example, US President Donald Trump’s decision to send troops to the southern border a few days to the 2018 midterm elections.
3. Save for the endemic problem of racialised policing in the United States which, at in any rate, is a policing not a military matter. However, western militaries that go out on foreign missions have engaged in abuses against civilians especially when pursuing counter-insurgency operations.
4. The first was Hissen Habre’s National Liberation Front (FROLINAT) in Chad in 1978 and 1982.
5. In contemporary times, authoritarian rulers too have used this strategy. See Nate Allen’s study of Sudan under El-Bashir in this issue.
6. Between 1962 and 1985, Uganda experienced at least four successful military coups and since the first major war to oust Idi Amin in 1979, the country had countless deadly armed conflicts until at least 2007. See Refugee Law Project (Citation2014).
7. See Clark (Citation2001) on intervention in Congo, (Branch Citation2011, Tripp Citation2010, Omach Citation2007) on counterinsurgency and the war in the north, Apuuli (Citation2014) on South Sudan intervention, Epstein (Citation2017) on human rights abuses and BBC 3 December Citation2016 on the Rwenzururu palace attack.
8. I am grateful to Joe Oloka-Onyango for drawing my attention to this point.
9. In various interviews with the UPDF leadership and serving senior officers, the consistent position was to talk about civil-military relations only with regard to maintaining good relations with the public and not about how the military relates to political leaders/institutions.
10. Interview with Major (Retired) John Kazoora, former NRA commander and former members of parliament, 2019-13-03, Kampala. However, there were a few NRA commanders like Pecos Kutesa who were professional soldiers and wanted to stay the course of pursuing life-time careers in the military (see Kutesa Citation2006).
11. Interview with Major Kazoora.
12. Multiple interviews with former NRA commanders and current UPDF leadership, 07–2017 and 03–2019, Kampala.
13. Interview with Andrew Mwenda, veteran journalist and Managing Director of The Independent news magazine, 2019-12-03, Kampala.
14. Interview with Lieutenant General Wilson Mbadi, Deputy Chief of Defence Forces, 2017-17-07, Kampala.
15. Interview with Brigadier Henry Matsiko, the UPDF Chief Political Commissar, 2017-17-07, Kampala.
16. Interview with Augustine Ruzindana, former Member of Parliament and former Government Ombudsman, 2019-13-03, Kampala.
17. Interview with Kazoora.
18. Interview with General David Muhoozi, Chief of Defence Forces, 2019-17-07, Kampala.
19. Interview with Kazoora.
20. Interview with Mwenda.
21. Ibid.
22. Interview with Ruzindana.
23. Ibid.
24. Interview with Major General Mugisha Muntu, former Army Commander (before title was changed to CDF), 2017-17-07, Kampala.
25. Interview with Kazoora.
26. Interview with Muntu.
27. Ibid.
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Moses Khisa
Moses Khisa is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at North Carolina State University (with a joint appointment in Africana Studies) and a Research Associate with the Centre for Basic Research in Kampala.