Sahelistan? Military Intervention and Patronage Politics in Afghanistan and Mali

ABSTRACT

The ‘Sahelistan’ discourse that conflates conflict dynamics in Afghanistan and Mali is widespread in Western media and policy circles. We argue that such representations contribute to the adoption of one-size-fits-all conflict management policies. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in both places, we also argue that these standard templates of intervention shape responses from local non-state armed actors, who manipulate foreign interveners for their own (violent) purposes in similar ways. Yet, we show that this convergence in armed group behaviour still manifests itself in important variations in widely different contexts, furthering strongmen autonomy in Afghanistan, while fostering armed group fragmentation in Mali.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers and the editors of Civil Wars for detailed and constructive feedback, as well as Sean Lee for sound advice. The authors are also particularly grateful to all the participants of the “Politics of Comparing Armed Conflict” workshop, held on 13 October 2017 in Montréal, Canada.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. In this article, all translations from French to English were made by the authors.

2. Interview with former French Defence official for Mali, Bamako, 2017.

3. On the method of focused, structured comparison, see George and Bennett (2005).

4. To remedy a general lack of contextual knowledge of theatres of intervention, governments and military forces have developed an array of educational initiatives and other mechanisms. These include courses to enhance their armed forces’ cultural and linguistic awareness prior to deployment, hiring subject-matter experts, and developing various physical objects like portable ‘smart-cards’ with information on the operational environment, and field manuals. These programmes and methods, however, are widely viewed as extremely limited, insufficient, unhelpful, ad hoc, and often lead to misunderstandings and frustrations (Davis 2010, Fosher 2014, Holmes-Eber 2020).

5. The ‘Sahelistan’ label has been widely echoed by mainstream journalists and pundits – often with different meanings – since Fabius initially coined it. See, for example, Légaré-Tremblay (2012), Heisbourg (2013, pp. 10–11), Laurent (2013), Leymarie (2013), Nougaryède (2013), Berger (2019), Kwasi et al. (2019).

6. On the role of brokers in civil war research, see, for instance, Baaz and Utas (2019).

7. On the importance of context when comparing civil wars, see Reno (2019).

8. Barkhane has a mandate to conduct counter-terrorism operations across five Sahelian countries, meaning that, of the 5,000 troops, not all operate in Mali.

9. For critical perspectives on the different classifications of states based on their governmental capacities, see Call (2011), Grimm (2014), Mazarr (2014).

10. In this, the Taliban differ from both Al-Qaeda and IS-KP.

11. JNIM was officially created in March 2017, bringing together fighters from Al-Mourabitoun, AQIM, and the more or less ethnically-distinct, geographically-anchored brigades of Ansar Dine. For more on these groups, see Raineri and Martini (2017) and Bencherif (2020).

12. Interview with Nigerien trafficker, Niamey, 2013; interview with Malian Arab businessman from Timbuktu, Bamako, 2013; interview with Malian trafficker from Kidal, Niamey, 2016.

13. On the role of opium in the Afghan conflict and state-building process, see Mansfield (2016).

14. Interview with Mauritanian security official, Dakar, 2016; interview with Malian Arab businessman from Timbuktu, Bamako, 2017; interview with Malian Arab businessman from Gao, 2017. See also International Crisis Group (2018).

15. Interview with two European security officials, Bamako, 2013. See also Marchal (2013).

16. Interview with three MINUSMA officials, Bamako, 2018.

17. On armed group fragmentation, see, for instance, Staniland (2014), Seymour et al. (2016), Woldemariam (2018).

18. On side-switching, see, for example, Christia (2012), Seymour (2014), Otto (2018).

19. In November 2016, Dostum was accused of publicly beating up a political rival, Ahmad Ishchi, before ordering his guards to abduct and sexually abuse him. Dostum, under investigation, flew to Turkey. He returned to Afghanistan over a year later, in July 2018.

20. On how such practices incentivise the escalation of violence by armed group leaders, see Tull and Mehler (2005).

21. Interview with MSA official, Bamako, 2017; interview with two Daoussahak notables, Bamako, 2018.

22. Interview with CJA official, Bamako, 2017.

23. Focus group with 14 residents of Gao, Bamako, 2013; interviews with three Arab businessmen from Timbuktu, Bamako, 2017. See also Chebli (2017).

24. Interview with Arab notables, Bamako, 2013.

25. Interview with Kel Ansar notable, Bamako, 2019; interview with MNLA supporter, Bamako, 2020.

26. On warlord-governors, see Mukhopadhyay (2014).

27. Fieldwork observations, Bamako, 2018 and 2019; personal communication with militia leader, 2019; meeting with HCUA official, Brussels, 2019.

28. Interviews with former MNLA and HCUA fighters, Bamako, 2017.

29. Interviews with DDR Commission officials and MINUSMA officials, Bamako, 2017.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Käte Hamburger Kolleg, Centre for Global Cooperation Research [Post-Doctoral Research Fellowship]; Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Notes on contributors

Romain Malejacq

Romain Malejacq is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science and at the Centre for International Conflict Analysis & Management (CICAM), Institute for Management Research, Radboud University Nijmegen.

Adam Sandor

Adam Sandor is a Research Associate with the Centre FrancoPaix in conflict resolution and peace mission, UQAM, Montréal, Canada.