ABSTRACT
This paper examines the hitherto unexplored subject of nonstate rebels seeking the status of sole representatives. Why do nonstate armed groups seek the status of sole representatives?, What strategies do they employ to achieve the status of sole representatives?, Is the status merely symbolic, or does it fetch tangible benefits? These research questions are explored by treating Sri Lanka’s LTTE as a case study. Primary and secondary data formed the basis of the analysis. The LTTE used three strategies to achieve a hegemonic disposition within the Tamil community. They are: (1) elimination of rival groups, (2) incorporation of some groups, and (3) battlefield efficacy. The rebels used the claim of sole representation to ensure bilateral talks with the government, get the ban on it lifted, and control the proposed interim administrative structure. The strategy worked to a certain extent, but at least partially contributed to its downfall in 2009.
Disclosure Statement
The author has no conflict of interest
Notes
1. Telephone interview conducted in September 2020.
2. Interview conducted in Colombo in January 2020.
3. Interview conducted in Jaffna in November 2017.
4. Interview conducted in Jaffna in June 2017.
5. Telephone interview, conducted in January 2020.
6. Interview conducted in Batticaloa in October 2017.
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S. I. Keethaponcalan
S. I. Keethaponcalan teaches conflict resolution at Salisbury University, Maryland. He was Chair of the Conflict Resolution Department from 2011 to 2018. His recent publications include: (1) Post-war Dilemmas of Sri Lanka: Democracy and Reconciliation (2019. London: Routledge), and (2) Conflict Resolution: An Introduction to Third Party Intervention (2017. New York: Lexington Books).