TRUTH AND OBJECTIVITY IN JOURNALISM

Abstract

Since the nineteenth century, the theory of objectivity has been considered a cornerstone principle of journalism. However, during the last decades of the twentieth century, both communication scholars and practitioners increasingly began to contest the main notions embedded in it. As many authors have shown, no other concept has stimulated as much controversy as the concept of objectivity. But, unfortunately, most debates about it have proved to be, not only endless, but inconclusive. Interestingly enough, despite frequent statements by academics and journalists that the paradigm of objectivity is exhausted, when it comes to setting up professional criteria in public debates, this concept inevitably reappears—sometimes in an implicit way—once and again. This proves that it still remains firmly entrenched. This article delves deep into the philosophical underpinnings of the theory of objectivity, namely its positivist presumptions stemming from the empiricist tradition. More specifically, I have attempted to argue that: (1) objectivity is not only an impossible ideal, but rather an ill-conceived question, based upon the mistaken premises of positivism; (2) the concept of objectivity has partly managed to replace a more fundamental one, that of truth, thus becoming confusing and fallacious.

Keywords:

• fact-value dichotomy
• news-opinion dichotomy
• objectivity
• truth

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Philosophy of Communication section of the European Communication Research and Education Association Conference, held in October 2010 in Hamburg. I would like to thank all the participants for their questions and helpful comments and, particularly, the chairman, Professor Siebert, for his support. I also wish to thank the journal editors and two anonymous reviewers.

Notes

1. This confusion shows in many ways. For instance, in the playful manner of using words, as happens with the funny oxymoron “subjective objectivity” (Donsbach and Klett, 1993).

2. For instance, objectivity is usually related to politics, professional routines, historical evolution, ethical and economic aspects of media, etc.

3. It is obvious to me that sensory data are previous to any rational activity. Therefore, I do not mean to say here that all perceptions need a previous conceptual basis or are a projection of the self, as some forms of constructivism claim.

4. “When uttering that ‘truth is unattainable’, one presupposes eo ipso that this very assertion is itself true, that is to say, that it fully accounts for the human capacity for knowledge. Hence no one can affirm that truth does not exist without deeming this very statement true” (Muñoz-Torres, 2007, p. 236).

5. The term “subjective” has several meanings. From an epistemological perspective, adopted here, “subjective” means related to the person who knows and, therefore, limited, fallible and precarious, but not impossible. But, from another perspective (ontological), it can also mean “arbitrary”, “whimsical”, “unwarranted”, that is, lacking correspondence to reality. I use the term here with the first meaning.

6. For an account on the relationship between truth and objectivity from a realistic standpoint, see Muñoz-Torres (2002); for their bearing upon journalism, see also Muñoz-Torres (1995).

7. It suffices to think that, in ordinary daily life, we do not need any sort of scientific method to deem our knowledge true or false (although this does not mean, of course, that our knowledge is always error-free).

8. Some praiseworthy attempts have been made in the last years, from a pragmatist standpoint, to substitute the traditional concept of objectivity for a more solid one, connected to that of truth (e.g. Ward, 2005). While worth taking seriously, the main trouble with these endeavours lies in that, regrettably, they fail to get rid of the relativism embedded, at bottom, in pragmatism. A cogent argumentation, which I share, against pragmatism and other forms of relativism, in Nagel (1997).