Re-reading The Indo-Pacific as Aidagara: Watsuji Tetsurō’s Relevance to Japan’s Foreign Relations

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on how space and relationships co-produce one another within the Japanese foreign policy language of the Indo-Pacific. By reframing Agent-Structure dynamics, by which actors and social structures reproduce one another, into Watsuji Tetsurō’s idea of aidagara (“inter-relationships”) consisting of the Agent-Structure relationship being mutually constitutive with space within which the relationship is situated, this article fills a gap in the literature by bringing space back into discussions on international political dynamics. The article analyses Japanese government narratives appearing in official pronouncements and media reports to show that Japan’s foreign relations are apprehended as a function of space, and vice versa. These narratives show that the Indo-Pacific takes on a double-meaning: as a geographical space within which Agent-Structure dynamics play out, and as a concept that denotes what this space means for Japanese diplomacy. By reframing the Agent-Structure relationships into aidagara, scholars can rethink an interpenetrating dynamic involving the Indo-Pacific as a space that reproduces Japan’s evolving political relationships, and as relationships reproducing space.

KEYWORDS:

• Japan
• the Indo-Pacific
• Watsuji Tetsurō
• Aidagara

Introduction

The Indo-Pacific is now central to the Japanese government’s foreign policy language, but the term itself remains ambiguous. On the one hand, it denotes a geographical space at the confluence of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. On the other hand, the “Indo-Pacific” constitutes short-hand for the Japanese government’s threat perception about the Chinese government’s international behavior. Much has been written about the geostrategic and geoeconomic implications of the Indo-Pacific, particularly with respect to Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. Japanese foreign direct investments (FDI)—particularly infrastructure investments—are understood to possess a dual purpose of “[revitalizing] the Japanese economy” and strengthening strategic links with Asian countries vis-à-vis China’s growing international influence,¹ to enhance the US-Japan alliance and help to promote values diplomacy.² In other words, “the Indo-Pacific region is essentially a maritime domain where [Japanese] economic and security interests collide,”³ as well as a signifier of Japanese efforts to address security concerns with the geoeconomic aim of keeping the region open to free trade.⁴ Yet, the existing literature pays insufficient attention to the possibility that the term, “the Indo-Pacific,” refers both to a geographical space and a subjective set of meanings for the international political challenges facing the Japanese government. Such a double-meaning attached to the space of the Indo-Pacific remains under-explored.

I take an innovative approach to reframing Japan’s foreign policy language of the Indo-Pacific by exposing the inherent duality of space in which the geographical space helps to establish a subjective set of meanings such a space has for an actor, and vice versa. Japanese efforts at matching China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) spanning Asia and Africa with its FOIP vision covering an equally wide geographical space beyond the traditional confines of East Asia and the Asia-Pacific, show that the term, “the Indo-Pacific,” has a double-meaning, denoting a geographical space and and a subjective set of meanings alluding to the shifting geopolitical and geoeconomic Agent-Structure (A-S) dynamics within which the Japanese government finds itself. Such a duality poses a conceptual puzzle: what is the relationship between space and Japan’s foreign policy language of the Indo-Pacific with the actual political relationships which the Japanese government is involved? Do we need to understand space to appreciate political relationships, and vice-versa? These questions arise because the Indo-Pacific as a geographical space is meaningless without the political relationships in which Japan, as the main proponent, is involved, while the Japanese government’s efforts to counter China’s rise are meaningless without the geographical space defining who Japan’s relevant interlocutors are.

The significance of this article lies in introducing the philosophy of Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō and his concept of aidagara (“inter-relationships”) to highlight the inherent double-meaning of the Indo-Pacific as a geographical space producing new interstate relationships for Japan, while such relationships reify the Indo-Pacific into a set of meanings denoting political challenges to Japan’s foreign relations. I treat the Japanese government as the agent involved in the A-S dynamics with other states in the Indo-Pacific space. I look for narratives on relationships that are couched in spatial context, such as Japanese recognition of foreign policy challenges and opportunities as necessarily a function of Japan’s geographical location. Furthermore, I pick out pronouncements identifying Japan’s recognition that a space is not only a geographical concept, but also denotes a variety of meanings dependent on who the interlocutors are, and what political dynamics—rivalry or cooperation—are involved. In other words, I look for the language of relationships as a function of space, as well as the language of space as a function of relationships, to show that the language of relationships frequently appears within the context of spatial framing while also space and relationships co-produce one another in an aidagara relationship.

This article is divided into four sections. The first section provides a brief overview of the A-S dynamic in which actors construct social structures through a series of speech act interactions, while social structures influence actors’ behavior. I then introduce Watsuji’s philosophy and argue that his concept of aidagara helps to fill the gap between the A-S dynamics and space. The third section re-reads the Japanese foreign policy narratives of the Indo-Pacific to reveal an aidagara quality to the Japanese government’s attempts at addressing China’s growing international influence. In the fourth section, I emphasize Watsuji’s aidagara as a useful theoretical tool for understanding the complex interplay involving the Japanese government as an agent, international pressure to accommodate the BRI as an international structure, and the Indo-Pacific as a geographical space. Effectively, space produces relationships while relationships redefine space. I conclude by suggesting that Watsuji’s aidagara provides us with a theoretical, one-stop shop that highlights how A-S dynamics and space influence one another. Such an insight is necessary for deciphering the Japanese foreign policy language of the Indo-Pacific.

The absence of space in agent-structure dynamic

Social interaction, whether be it at the individual level or at a macro, collective level, including interstate relations, entails perceptions. Indeed, perceptions drive social interactions such that social realities we encounter on a daily basis are reproduced through our perceptions about other social actors and about the social world within which we live. Perceptions matter in social interactions because society thrives on meanings, such as friendship or enmity. The notion of who “I am” or who “we are,” or our understandings about the environment within which we live—whether hospitable or dangerous—are all borne of actors interacting with one another and reinforced through our repeated interactions. These ideas about who we are and the characteristics of the social world within which we live are of our own making, but they also boomerang back upon us as an obdurate social reality. In short, we reproduce our own social realities.

G.H. Mead considered perceptions to derive from actors’ “conversation of gestures” through which our sense of who we are as individuals, as well as our collective sense of who we are as a collective, are constantly reproduced.⁵ Furthermore, what we perceive to be “real”—such as the society or the neighbourhood we live in—are borne out of actors exchanging perceptions through communication and then re-interpreting the resultant contexts of interactions.⁶ What we see here is an Agent-Structure (A-S) dynamic in which the agents (actors) are the authors of their social context (structure). However, the structure also boomerangs back onto the agents as social reality, prompting the agents to react in various ways. In other words, an A-S dynamic suggests that agents influence the structure, while the structure influences the agents.⁷

It is tempting to take social reality for granted, as people may think of it as being simply “out there.” Yet, social reality requires actors to repeatedly reproduce meanings as they engage in what John Searle called “institutional facts,” as social reality is contingent upon actors and their perceptions for sustenance.⁸ In addition, actors can forget that they are the authors of social reality and react to its impact as if they have no control over it. This perceiving of social reality as if it has taken on a life of its own while actors are actively reproducing it is very much the core idea behind the A-S dynamic.⁹

This A-S relationship is applicable to macro-level social interaction as well. Just as we consider hostile or amicable relationships to be real, the international political environment (whether it is dangerous or stable) can be construed as a product of state actors engaging in a diplomatic “conversation of gestures.”¹⁰ Perceptions by decision makers play a significant role in influencing foreign policy outcomes as well as the resultant political environment.¹¹ What seems obvious is itself a product of this “conversation of gestures,” as the perception of “friends” or “enemies” attached to states are the product of social interactions at the international level.¹²

However, discussions on the A-S dynamic often focus predominantly on the social interaction involving two factors—the agents and the structures. Consideration that A-S dynamics require space for them to take place seems lost in existing discussions on social reality. Space is important, as A-S dynamics do not exist in a spatial vacuum. In other words, if we are to formulate a fuller understanding of A-S dynamics, we need to incorporate geographical space into our discussions. Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō and his concept of aidagara—“inter-relationships”—provides a useful theoretical tool to do so.

Watsuji on space

Watsuji Tetsurō was a Japanese philosopher influenced by Nishida Kitarō and the Kyoto School of philosophy. He was born in 1889 in Hyōgo prefecture in western Japan and educated at Tokyo Imperial University where he first learned about European philosophy. He eventually made his way to Europe in the 1930s after having won a three year scholarship to study in Germany.¹³ According to Lucy Osler and Joel Krueger, he “was a broad-ranging and original thinker,” having gained:

… insights into cultural theory, ethics, religion, art, embodiment, and the self. He was a skilled phenomenologist. His analysis of topics like intentionality, embodiment, space, and intersubjectivity not only predates insights developed by phenomenologists such as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty but can be used to extend their analysis in productive ways.¹⁴

But Watsuji was not only influenced by European philosophers. According to Christopher Jones, he also had a profound interest in “Buddhism and the philosophy of Nishida … thereby influencing his own philosophy as ‘in-between’ East and the West.”¹⁵ Watsuji’s exposure to a range of philosophes made him well-placed to appreciate the intellectual roots of both philosophical traditions, convincing him that “Japan was in a privileged position between” Europe and Asia—a theme that he frequently emphasized in his work on “Climate” (Fūdo), as well as his life work, “Ethics” (Rinrigaku).¹⁶ It was within such a hybrid philosophical framework that Watsuji realized that “Western philosophy had systemically and persistently misunderstood the fundamental nature of man, hence, produced erroneous ethical and political systems.”¹⁷

Watsuji’s framed his major work, “Ethics,” as a study of “human existence” between and among humans and social structures, delving into the formulation of a variety of social organizations, including the “ethical organization … of family, local community, economics, cultural community, and the state” before reaching his penultimate argument that human existence is about humans and their societies’ interaction with climate [fūdo].”¹⁸ This mixture of European and Asian philosophies, along with his assertion that humans, their societies, and the climate all interact with one another, convinced him that “human relationships are, in truth, the relationship of our carnal interconnections in space.”¹⁹

Watsuji reframed ethics as a philosophy of human existence through which humans, societies, and space (kūkan) all influence one another in a relationship akin to the A-S dynamic, mutually co-producing a relationship with space.²⁰ He viewed human existence as a dialectical construct in which defining an agent required rejecting the social,²¹ while defining the social involved rejecting the agent, both happening in space.²² He considered agent-centric thinking to be problematic because it started with “the determination of the self,” since human existence and its cultural specificity are predicated on spatiality (kūkansei).²³ For Watsuji, the complex inter-relationships between and among agents, social structures, and the space within which they are located constituted the basis of aidagara—an inter-relationship—since one needed to attend to both the spatial and social dimensions of human existence.²⁴ Watsuji claimed that our understanding of the multiple dimensions of our own existence involves our sense of the self and an Other with whom we interacted, the social structure within which we live, and the space in which social interaction happens.²⁵ In short, he argued for the duality of space; it is not just a geographical entity, but also a subjective set of meanings for the actors living within it.

Watsuji emphasized that a physical space produces A-S relationships, and A-S relationships, in turn, redefine the subjective set of meanings that this space possesses. To illustrate how Watsuji’s aidagara involves geographical and subjective dimensions of space in co-producing relationships, consider agents A and B, such that A realizes herself in relationship to B as the “Other.” The resultant “conversation of gestures” between A and B produces mutual understandings about the context of their relationship, as well as A’s own understanding of her social position in relation to B. But A also understands her social position through her iterated relationship with B situated in a space of A’s social existence with B. Both A and B are physical entities, but their relationship is primarily based on intersubjective interactions entailing physical interactions spanning geographical space. In short, the space for this encounter (S1) encapsulates both the geographical and subjective dimensions of space.

If B expands her relationship with other agents in another space (S2) and if A likewise feels compelled to extend her relationship with other agents within S2, then S2 becomes an additional space for A’s social existence. Put differently, as B physically interacts with others in S2, and so long as A maintains her physical interaction with B, both S1 and S2 are relevant to A’s existence. This combined physical space (S1 + S2) constitutes a widened geographical space, as well as a broadened set of meanings, for A’s expanded social existence. What sets Watsuji’s aidagara apart from a generic description of an A-S dynamic is that both the geographical space and the subjective set of meanings inherent in that geographical space are afforded discrete existence informing the particular context of the agents’ relationships with one another, as well as the social structure.

Watsuji argued that “our existence is predicated on aidagara,” where the agents and society are mutually reproduced through a dialectic, such that social structures are produced from agents exchanging speech acts with one another.²⁶ Once a social structure is developed, an agent realizes their individual existence in contrast to communal life.²⁷ In short, the self is realized in opposition to a collective “we” in a formulation reminiscent of G. H. Mead’s “conversation of gestures.”²⁸ Watsuji considered this cycle of counter-distinctions the “fundamental structure of human existence” as agents require an awareness of their selves as individuals to realize their social positions, while simultaneously requiring a comprehension of their social positions to realize their individual identities.²⁹

Space constitutes an integral part of Watsuji’s aidagara, as it is within geographic space and its associated set of meanings that the cycle of counter-distinctions takes place. He suggested that agents adapt to space by developing skills to address the geographic constraints of a space while seeking to tame this.³⁰ For Watsuji, the space within which agents and social structures are mutually co-produced is not merely a geographical constraint, but also constitutes a subjective catalyst through which the A-S dynamic is spatially contextualized and acquires characteristics particular to that particular space.³¹ He called this mutual constitution between the A-S dynamic and space “subjective spatiality” (shutai-teki na kūkansei), in which the physical appearance of the space acts as a visual manifestation of the mutual feedback loop between and among the agents, society, and space.³²

Hence, aidagara resembles an A-S relationship mutually constituted with space. To illustrate this, Watsuji invoked the notion of “coldness.”³³ Instead of treating a cold space as determining the way the agents behave, an agent’s understanding of a particular space as physically cold becomes important, as it is only when agents experience being cold that a relationship between and among agents, society, and the cold space is established. Furthermore, the idea of cold is shared by the agents reproducing the social reality of existing within the cold space. The concept of cold is established when a cold space interacts with the agents experiencing a low temperature and exchange speech acts reproducing cultural practices to cope with this. Moreover, agents use coping mechanisms to address coldness in the form of clothes and architectural practices. But because agents need to have collaborated with one another in the development of coping mechanisms, the cultural practices and the associated tools developed over time become representative of the physical manifestation of social practices. Thus, coldness as a concept is a product of an interaction between and among the agents coping with coldness, the social practices and physical tools to combat coldness that have evolved over time, and the physicality of cold space.³⁴ For Watsuji, it is within such constraints of space that agents realize their aidagara.³⁵

Space for Watsuji is both an enabler of intersubjective dynamics through which social norms evolve and a geographical constraint. Space facilitates A-S interactions, enabling an agent to recognize her interlocutors as physically co-existing within a space while also enabling her to see this space as the relevant location for her social existence.³⁶ Moreover, once agents innovate, they are able to expand the geographical boundaries of their social relationships and enlarge their social interactions, thereby enabling them to encounter other agents and their societies in distant locations, which in turn helps develop new webs of inter-relationships and conceptions of relevant space.³⁷

Aidagara captures Japan’s language of the Indo-Pacific as it seeks to cope with China’s rising global influence. For Japan, the Indo-Pacific is a geographical space within which Japan’s international political relationships are currently located, which in turn signifies that the Indo-Pacific holds an increasingly relevant set of political meanings for Japanese foreign policy. The Japanese government is responding to a growing “momentum garnered by China’s BRI promotion.”³⁸ In doing so, Japan has adopted a new geographic boundary in which the Indian Ocean and East Africa are both relevant for Japan’s diplomatic efforts, an instance of subjective spatiality in which the A-S dynamic has prompted a redefinition of the space for Japanese diplomatic initiatives into what is now called the Indo-Pacific. Hence, aidagara as a conceptual lens enables us to see that the geographical boundaries at the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans have nurtured Japan’s foreign relations, while the evolving interstate relationships in which Japan is involved have produced the Indo-Pacific as a newly relevant geographical space for Japan’s diplomatic challenges. In short, the language of the Indo-Pacific represents an international aidagara for Japan in which the space produces relationships and relationships reproduce space.

The agent, structure, and space in the language of the Indo-Pacific

Japan’s foreign relations constitute an aidagara, whereby the geographical spaces of the Far East, East Asia, and the Asia-Pacific have historically defined the A-S dynamics within which Japan has been involved. Such relationships, in turn, have reified the geographic boundaries of Asia and beyond as the relevant spaces for Japanese diplomacy. Put differently, an actor agency is required for the geographical space to take on a subjective set of meanings, and then redefine geographical space in an incessant loop of aidagara. Indeed, the variety of spatial designations—the “Far East,” “East Asia,” and the “Asia-Pacific”—have operated as shorthand for Japanese foreign policy preferences at different junctures.

The current Japanese foreign policy language of the Indo-Pacific exhibits a similar circular reproduction of space and relationships. In a pre-BRI assessment, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s foreign policy advisor, Kanehara Nobukatsu, suggested that Japan’s maritime existence made Japan vulnerable.³⁹ Yet, he also claimed this geographical constraint has enabled Japan to historically absorb both Asian and European values such that Japan has been “equipped to appreciate the basic ethical foundations of Asia and the West,”⁴⁰ comprising the source of values diplomacy inherent within the FOIP vision today. Similarly, Yachi Shōtarō, a former vice-foreign minister and national security advisor, outlined in 2013 how Japan, as a “sea-faring state,” values “a free and open maritime order” in order to “deepen dialogue with states that share mutual interests in pursuing [a] ‘free and open maritime order’ and to foster common understandings.”⁴¹ Such views solidified into Abe’s grand strategy. Abe stated in August 2007 that “as a seafaring state, Japan should not stay solely within the Asia-Pacific, but instead, needs to expand its diplomacy that is mindful of the Indo-Pacific.”⁴² Hence, Japanese worldviews are a function of space—both as a geographical boundary, as well as a set of political meanings—and the interstate relationships that are nurtured in it.

It is within such an aidagara that Asia as a geographical space has helped to construct China as a threat, consequently re-emphasizing Japan’s alliance with the US as a requisite counterbalance. Furthermore, Japanese enthusiasm for values diplomacy and the designation of Australia and India as like-minded partners is a Japanese attempt at collective identity formation. Such A-S dynamics reinforce the centrality of East Asia, the Pacific, and the Indian ocean as central to Japan’s foreign policy thinking.

Furthermore, as the Japanese government’s identification of interlocutors has oscillated between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Island states, the spaces within which the resultant relationships are located have swayed between East Asia and the Asia-Pacific. Hence, Japan’s identification of ASEAN as a partner, as seen with Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō’s January 2002 call to establish an East Asian Community to partner with ASEAN, has reified East Asia as a relevant diplomatic space.⁴³ Moreover, the designation of the geographical space within which Japan interacts with Australia and New Zealand as the “Asia-Pacific” is an example of evolving co-production of diplomatic relationships with space,⁴⁴ leading to the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum as a gathering for Japan to embrace Australia and the Pacific islands, along with ASEAN and the US, in a broader Asia-Pacific community.⁴⁵ Yet, the oscillation between East Asia and the Asia-Pacific is not a linear process, but rather depends on how the Japanese government defines its diplomatic priorities at any given moment.⁴⁶

Such an interplay of geographical boundaries delineating Japan’s interlocutors and the political relationships forged with them highlights the duality of space in the Japanese government’s diplomatic behavior, which has been a constant feature of Japanese foreign policy. For example, the ill-defined “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” (AOFP), announced in 2007, was driven by an urge to enhance the alliance with the US by promoting purportedly “core universal values such as freedom, democracy, market economics, and the rule of law.”⁴⁷ Abe’s foreign policy advisor at the time, Kanehara Nobukatsu, described the AOFP as a Japanese grand strategy to “promote democracy and free market” in order to “enhance stability” in East Asia.⁴⁸ The AOFP reflected the Abe administration’s concern with China’s increased international influence, prompting the government to try to forge a collective, democratic, “we” by reaching out to states in the Baltics, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Abe’s former national security advisor, Yachi Shōtarō, suggested that these interlocutors were delighted that Japan had shown interest in them.⁴⁹

If the concentric circles of East Asia and the Asia-Pacific represent oscillating spaces reproducing Japan’s shifting and overlapping relationships with ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand, the AOFP had the opposite effect. The Japanese intention of forming a collective “we” as a counterweight to China produced a nebulous space spanning Eurasia, from East Asia to the Baltic states. Yet, the AOFP also revealed that balance of power dynamics and a countervailing collective identity formation required a spatial language. Hence, the AOFP entailed an aidagara trajectory, a cycle whereby the imperatives of realizing values-based diplomacy prompted a search for new conceptions of space to emerge and to be reified, particularly once interlocutors beyond the familiar East Asia and the Asia-Pacific were identified. As such, the AOFP was an exercise in values-based diplomacy in search of a relevant space.

The spatial concept of the Indo-Pacific also has followed a similar trajectory. Just as during the Cold War, when the Japanese government focused on ASEAN, East Asia was designated as the spatial signifier, while the focus on the APEC forum and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) lent credence to the spatial language of the Asia-Pacific. But as the Japanese focus shifted onto China’s rising influence, Abe administration shifted its diplomatic imperative to expanding intergovernmental relationships that required a further recalibration of geographical space. On the one hand, Abe emphasized the importance of maintaining a productive relationship with China in which political considerations should be isolated from economic interests (seikei-bunri).⁵⁰ For him, it was “inevitable” that there would be challenges “so long as we are situated next to a large country with a different political system.”⁵¹ On the other hand, Abe identified India as a partner sharing democratic values, and along with Australia and the US, he pushed for the formation of a nascent collective identity in what is to become the “Quad”—a strategic partnership involving the US, Japan, Australia, and India—which he considered crucial for realizing an “open Asia.”⁵²

Even during his first stint as prime minister in 2006 and 2007, Abe was keen on reaching out to India as a partner, combining values diplomacy with a geostrategic mission to address China’s rising influence.⁵³ Abe claimed that the origins of his Indo-Pacific strategy predated China’s BRI, to his time as the chief cabinet secretary under Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō (2001-2006). Having witnessed deteriorating relations with China and South Korea, Abe wrote that with the “history issue as the thorn in the side, … it was here that I started thinking about India,” given “there is no history problem with India” and it is the largest democracy in South Asia. He felt that “India would become an important strategic partner, and started exploring whether we can host a quadrilateral meeting bringing together the US, Australia, India, and Japan.”⁵⁴ While Japan’s values diplomacy covered other parts of the world, enhanced ties between Japan and India “constituted the basics.”⁵⁵

It was after an August 2007 speech by Abe in which he referred to the “confluence of the two oceans” that the Indo-Pacific as a space became increasingly relevant in his grand strategy.⁵⁶ Kanehara Nobukatsu’s vision outlined in the AOFP gained the support of Yachi Shōtarō,⁵⁷ and the centralization of foreign policy decision-making in the prime minister’s office (Kantei) situated Abe and his advisors’ pursuit of Japanese foreign policy at the confluence of space and relationships.⁵⁸ Thus, the duality of the Indo-Pacific as both a geographic boundary and as a set of political challenges for Japan encapsulated within the FOIP vision was a combination of Kanehara’s belief in seeking like-minded liberal partners and Yachi’s penchant for countering China’s rise by drawing on classical geopolitical thinking in which power projected over space determines national survival.⁵⁹ In short, Abe’s Indo-Pacific strategy was about establishing aidagara with Japan’s partners in the form of a mixture of balancing and collective identity formation.

The hybridity of Abe’s Indo-Pacific grand strategy meant that the FOIP vision was considered “a response to China’s assertive behavior” as “Japan’s new grand strategy centered on the pursuit of a maritime line of advantage.”⁶⁰ On the other hand, there also was an element of values diplomacy, as the confluence of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans was instrumental in realizing a “broader Asia” to link Japan’s strategic and economic interests with potential partners beyond East Asia and the Asia-Pacific.⁶¹ Indeed, Admiral Takei Tomohisa of the Maritime Self Defence Forces (MSDF) pointed out in July 2015 that the “peace, stability, and freedom” of the Pacific Ocean was “inseparable” from the “peace, stability, and freedom” of the Indian Ocean, “therefore, we need to regard security in each of these two oceans as identical.”⁶² Similarly, Foreign Minster Kishida Fumio stated in June 2015 that, “as the Indo-Pacific region becomes the center of world prosperity … the Japan-India leadership becomes indispensable” in helping to “maintain democratic values, a free economy, and order based on the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region.”⁶³ Abe reiterated this sentiment in 2016, stating that “only when the two oceans are free and open, and the dynamism of [Asian- and African] continents are connected, can we guarantee international stability and prosperity.”⁶⁴ It is within such geostrategic and geoeconomic contexts that the language of the Indo-Pacific gained further salience when the FOIP was institutionalized in 2016.⁶⁵ Since 2016, “the FOIP has transitioned from a largely personal initiative” of Abe into a dominant Japanese aspect of foreign policy.⁶⁶

Thus, we can see an aidagara quality to Japan’s adoption of the Indo-Pacific as both a signifier of space for Japanese diplomacy and as a shorthand for the foreign policy challenges facing Japan. The language of the Indo-Pacific entails A-S dynamics through which a Japanese “self” constructs a threatening Chinese Other, and contrasts this with a law-abiding and free-trading “we” constituted by Japan’s partnership with the US, Australia, and India. Such A-S dynamics are a function of space in a flux, oscillating between and among East Asia, the Asia-Pacific, and now the confluence of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. This oscillating space has redefined Japan’s identity construction and intersubjective relationships, which in turn have reified the Indo-Pacific into a set of subjective meanings for Japanese foreign policy, further reinforcing the Indo-Pacific as a geographical space relevant to Japan’s diplomatic activities. In short, a process of aidagara is evident in the duality of space producing relationships, which in turn reproduce space.

The A-S dimension of aidagara

The agent-agent dimension of aidagara is readily identifiable within the Japanese language of the Indo-Pacific. Alarmed by China’s enhanced military capabilities since the mid-2000s, the Japanese government identified Australia and India as reliable partners for countering this perceived threat. In 2008 Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) described Australia and India as “two nations with which [Japan] shares certain political principles and security interests,”⁶⁷ since “the security of the sea lanes connecting Japan with the Middle East [constitutes] a vital element of national security.”⁶⁸

The Japanese government’s courting of India and Australia highlights two things. First, the agent-agent relationship precipitated an agent-structure dynamic (the Japanese attempt at constructing a democratic “we” that included India and Australia). This reflected the government’s concern that a new institutional framework promoted by the Chinese government and detrimental to Japanese interests was emerging in Asia and beyond. Second, Japanese efforts to enlist Australia and India into a democratic partnership required new spatial contextualization such that the Indo-Pacific became increasingly more salient than East Asia or the Asia-Pacific. Abe argued in 2013 that “Japan must show initiative in leading India, Australia, and the US to nurture democratic values and discuss strategic concerns.”⁶⁹ After he first became Prime Minister in 2006, Abe sought to counter China’s interests in Africa by encouraging more direct foreign investment in the subcontinent, stating in November of that year that Japan and its partners “need to consider how to deal with China,” before adding that “African states have high hopes for Japan.”⁷⁰

Disagreements in Japan over the BRI’s impact also show the mounting international momentum to accommodate China’s rise. While the Japanese government sought to construct a democratic partnership in response to China’s increased military and economic power, there was also international momentum to welcome Chinese foreign investment. Officials at the Ministry of Finance (MOF) were skeptical of both the BRI and its investment arm, the Chinese-funded Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In April and June 2015, then-Finance Minister Asō insinuated that the AIIB lacked technical expertise,⁷¹ and that, “for Japan, high quality infrastructure is the most important.”⁷² In April 2016 he voiced his skepticism about the intentions of the AIIB, warning, "what we do not want is for the AIIB to lend money on top of [other international financial institutions, only for the borrowers to renege on the AIIB debt, then asking other to chip in.”⁷³ A year later, in June 2017, Asō claimed that there was still “no proof that the AIIB is able to assess projects competently.”⁷⁴

However, there were some within the Japanese government who advocated engaging with the BRI. Abe stated in November 2015 that China’s economic rise was an opportunity for Japan, and that “Japan will not hesitate to cooperate.”⁷⁵ Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio stated in May 2017 that “whether the BRI is open to everyone, and whether the projects will be pursued in accordance with the high international standards,” was the Japanese government’s primary concern.⁷⁶ Similarly, the Secretary-General of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Nikai Toshihiro, suggested in May 2017 that “the issue [for Japan] is how early we join” the AIIB now that many other governments had done so, adding that, “from a political perspective, it is important we do not delay.”⁷⁷ The next month Abe said that the BRI “is an initiative with a potential to connect a variety of regions, east and west,” and stated his hope “that the BRI will integrate well into a pan-Pacific free and fair economic region.”⁷⁸ His foreign minister at the time, Kōno Tarō, said that “it is good to see [Chinese projects] pursued in an open manner … in a way that is internationally acceptable.”⁷⁹

A similar disconnect was evident among government advisors. A former national security advisor, Yachi Shōtarō, framed the FOIP as a counterbalance to the BRI, and Abe’s former foreign policy advisor, Kanehara Nobukatsu, added that BRI infrastructure projects are “part of [PRC] military strategy.”⁸⁰ On the other hand, Imai Takaya, special advisor to the cabinet, advocated accommodating the BRI, since for “Japanese businesses investing in China, the connectivity as a result of the BRI is attractive.”⁸¹

The duality of space in the language of the Indo-Pacific

Internal disagreement among government officials about the perceived threat from China nevertheless reflects the aidagara inherent within the FOIP vision. For their part, ASEAN governments conveyed their unease with being compelled to take sides between China’s BRI and Japan’s FOIP. The Abe administration responded in November 2018 by adopting the term “vision” instead of “strategy” in reference to the FOIP to allay these concerns.⁸² This particular combination of domestic Japanese disagreement and ASEAN unease over how Japan characterized the FOIP highlight the familiar A-S dynamics to which Tokyo is exposed in the Indo-Pacific. These involve a particular set of agents (Japan, China, and ASEAN member states) located at the junction of oscillating geographical spaces (East Asia, the Asia-Pacific, and the Indo-Pacific). In other words, this illustrates a Watsuji-esque confluence of A-S dynamics with the duality of space that is at once a geographical entity and a set of meanings—the very ingredients of aidagara.

In promoting the FOIP, Japanese officials reified the term “the Indo-Pacific” into a newly relevant diplomatic arena. At the annual ASEAN summit in November 2017, Abe talked of keeping the space of the “Pacific to Indian Oceans as free and open,” while outlining the international challenges of maintaining law and order in the Indo-Pacific.⁸³ He suggested in December 2017 that Japan was willing to “cooperate [with China’s BRI] in third countries,” referring to potential interlocutors in the Indo-Pacific space.⁸⁴ In August 2018, Foreign Minister Kōno Tarō stated that “it is important that Japan and China cooperate to responsibly solve the problems of global scale,”⁸⁵ and in April 2018, he emphasized the compatibility of the BRI with the FOIP, stating that Japan was willing to explore “cooperation [with China] in third countries.” Kōno again referred to the BRI in August 2018, suggesting that “Japan’s [FOIP], along with the various visions of the Indo-Pacific by other states, share principles,”⁸⁶ adding that the FOIP remained an “international public good.”⁸⁷ In a September 2018 address to the United Nations General Assembly, Abe said that Japan’s intention was to “promote free and fair economic rules fit for the century in a wide area spanning the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean.”⁸⁸ He continued:

… once we are rid of conflicts from Northeast Asia, then the maritime corridor connecting the Arctic Sea, the Sea of Japan, the Pacific and the Indian Oceans will gain importance … Japan is right atop of that, and with its wide Exclusive Economic Zone, we wish the seas and the airspace to be safe and peaceful.⁸⁹

The Abe administration’s promotion of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) further reinforced the importance of the Indian Ocean to Japan’s interests.⁹⁰ TICAD was an effort to win the hearts and minds of African states after the end of the Cold War, a campaign that accelerated as Japan sought to match Chinese influence in Sub-Saharan Africa.⁹¹ At the opening ceremony of TICAD VII in August 2019, Abe stated that Japan hoped to “turn the Indo-Pacific oceans as a link connecting Japan and Africa, and to protect it as an international public good governed by the rule of law.”⁹² Furthermore, he stated that “the Japanese way of doing things is for the Japanese and Africans to develop and prosper together, hand-in-hand,” adding that “China is an important actor in African development,” but Japan was willing to “advise African states to improve their debt management capabilities.”⁹³ Abe suggested that the goal of “Japanese aid is for us to grow together and to move forward together,” as Japan had “supported human-centered development by respecting African ownership” [of projects] since the TICAD’s inception in 1993.⁹⁴

China’s ascent prompted Abe to reframe Japan’s foreign relations from occupying a mere “point” (ten) into spanning a diamond “plane” (men) encompassing India and Australia.⁹⁵ This has required rethinking the space relevant to Japanese diplomacy, which in turn has stretched Japan’s political relationships into the geographical space of the Indo-Pacific. In other words, while East Asia and the Asia-Pacific as geographical spaces used to define Japan’s previous set of interlocutors, the turn towards the Indo-Pacific has meant reaching out to new interlocutors, which in turn has made the Indo-Pacific a space denoting a new set of political relationships the Japanese government is enthusiastically seeking to nurture, making the Indo-Pacific an increasingly more relevant geographical space. Thus, for Japan today the Indo-Pacific denotes the duality of space—the physical, geographic boundaries at the confluence of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans that have produced new relationships, which in turn produce new meanings for what “the Indo-Pacific” implies for Japanese foreign policy. In other words, the FOIP as Abe’s grand strategy based on classical geopolitics needs to be reframed as an aidagara, that is Japan’s involvement in an A-S dynamic mutually constitutive with space.

Aidagara as a conversation among the agent, structure, and space

The Japanese language of the Indo-Pacific constitutes an aidagara that is about how Japan’s diplomatic relations require space and how a geographic space acquires a set of subjective meanings through Japan’s foreign relations. This is a process that traditional discussions of A-S dynamics fail to capture. The oscillating geographical spaces of East Asia, the Asia-Pacific, and the Indo-Pacific, as well as the shifting political significance attached to such spaces, define A-S dynamics with overlapping relationships to, and interlocutors with which, Japan is inviolved in balancing against China, as well as in forging a law-abiding and free-trading “we.” Such A-S dynamics in turn reify geographical space into a set of subjective meanings in which different political dynamics (such as the perceived threat of China, strategic partnerships with like-minded governments, and reaching out to African states) codify the political significance that geographical space has for Japan. In turn these political meanings reify the Indo-Pacific as a geographical space that is now the main locus of Japanese diplomacy. In short, the concept of the “Indo-Pacific” reveals an incessant loop of geography producing political meanings, which in turn redefine geographical boundaries.

In the Japanese language of the Indo-Pacific, the agent-agent dimension involves the Japanese government enhancing its relationships with interlocutors located in the Indian Ocean, beyond the traditional boundaries of East Asia and the Asia-Pacific. The agent-structure interaction entails the Japanese government perceiving international pressure to engage with China’s BRI, while also wishing to forge an institutional counterweight. Hence, the momentum of the BRI and the incentive for Japan to both challenge and accommodate China’s growing influence boomerang back as structural constraints encouraging Japan to seek new relationships, which in turn have enhanced Japan’s FOIP as an alternative to the BRI. These webs of inter-relationships parallel the familiar A-S dynamic, but they are also consistent with Watsuji’s assertion that human existence is an incessant dialectic involving the agents and the social structure through which the self (ware) transforms into a collective “we” (wareware) as they interact within space.⁹⁶

Thus, the duality of the Indo-Pacific as a geographical space and as a set of political meanings provides a geographical and social context for Japanese government officials as they seek to simultaneously constrain and engage with China’s global ascendance. Japanese officials realize that Japan’s space for diplomatic activity has expanded physically to the east coast of Africa, as well as politically to include potential partners in the Indian Ocean, Africa, and beyond, particularly now that European governments, such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, have also embraced the language of the Indo-Pacific in their diplomacy.⁹⁷ This is significant, as “the Indo-Pacific” has become a widely accepted shorthand for a web of interstate relationships centered on a shared threat perception about China that is couched in a geographical language. Prime Minister Abe claimed in an interview in 2021 that the Democratic Security Diamond of December 2012, in which he called for like-minded states, namely the US and India, to forge a strategic partnership as a counterweight to China’s rising international influence that eventually led to the FOIP, Quad, and TICAD VI, was a “delightful” [kangai bukai] moment when “the coalition of like-minded countries sharing [common] values came together,” helping him to showcase his “diplomatic philosophy” [gaikō shisō].⁹⁸ Such an inter-relationship in which the geographical space, the political meanings these geographical spaces possess, along with newly forged political relationships, co-produce one another highlights Watsuji’s relevance in re-reading the Indo-Pacific as an aidagara, emphasizing how the duality of space necessarily entails actor agency to transform geographical space into a subjective set of political meanings, and then back into a geographical space once again in an incessant loop of aidagara.

Adopting aidagara as a theoretical tool enables us to reconsider the Indo-Pacific not as mere diplomatic theater for contemporary Sino-Japanese balancing nor as a matter of semantics, but also as a space possessing “subjective spatiality”—an intricate web of inter-relationships between and among agents, social structures, and the space within which Japan’s foreign relations are realized. Watsuji’s concept of aidagara points to a new way of thinking about international politics. While classical geopolitics also acknowledges the importance of space and its interaction with international political dynamics, discussions among theorists have shifted almost exclusively towards relationships. As an alternative, aidagara compels us to recognize that A-S interactions remain a function of space, while simultaneously, the reification of space is informed through A-S relationships. As Watsuji noted, it is through speech acts that aidagara is realized, but the resultant social dynamics are informed by the space within which interactions take place.⁹⁹ It is an opportune moment to reintroduce space back into discussions of international political dynamics. States and the political dynamics that they co-produce are necessarily situated in geographical space, and inter-state relationships are informed by the geographical space within which these relationships unfold. As such, Watsuji prompts us to engage in a long-awaited conversation between discussions on the internal relationships between the Self and the Other, as well as the agents and the structure, on the one hand; and the role of space in physically delineating societies while also precipitating the production of social meanings, on the other. In short, Watsuji urges us to reconsider international politics as A-S dynamics interlaced with the duality of space as simultaneously a geographical and a subjective concept.

Conclusion

Watsuji provides a holistic perspective on how Japan’s foreign relations are spatially bound. The Japanese government’s use of the term, “the Indo-Pacific” is an example of what Watsuji called “subjective spatiality;” it is a geographical space which is the focus of Japanese diplomatic activities, but the meanings attached to it vary—from Japan’s enhanced alliance commitment to the US and the formation of a strategic partnership to emphasizing the rule of law and free trade, all within the context of China’s rise. The result is an interplay of space and relationships in the Indo-Pacific. Put differently, Japan’s Indo-Pacific language requires thinking of relationships—and hence the A-S dynamics—as a function of space and vice versa. And invoking Watsuji enables observers to do so in one go.

Japan as an agent interacts with Chinese actions while also forging a collective we with interlocutors at the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, while reacting to international peer pressure to accommodate the BRI as a structural constraint. In other words, the Indo-Pacific as a geographical space has produced political dynamics which boomerang back and prompt Japanese officials to construct the Pacific and Indian Oceans as a subjective set of political meanings defining Japan’s foreign relations, which in turn, have reified the Indo-Pacific into a geographical space within which Japanese diplomacy is now conducted. Hence, Abe’s grand strategy can be re-read as a form of aidagara, combining A-S dynamics and space.

Watsuji’s philosophy enables an appreciation of both the agent-agent/society dimensions of international political dynamics and the space-agent/society relationships that are undermined in discussions about international politics. Watsuji’s perspective reincorporates space into discussions of A-S dynamics, providing insight into how agents interact with one another, the structure, and the space within which they find themselves. This way of thinking enables observers to infuse A-S considerations into geopolitics by using the concept of aidagara. This is crucial for deciphering the Japanese foreign policy language of the Indo-Pacific.

Acknowledgements

I thank the editor and the reviewers for their very helpful comments on earlier versions of the article. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Daiwa Anglo-Japanese Foundation Seminar in November 2019.

Funding

None reported.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Taku Tamaki

Taku Tamaki is a lecturer in international relations in the School of Social Sciences and Humanities at Loughborough University, UK. He specializes in the role of identity in Japanese foreign policy, exploring the intersection of international relations and social theories, in particular in regard to Japan and South Korea. He has published articles in The Pacific Review, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, and International Relations, among other journals.

Notes

1 Yoshimatsu 2017, 495.

2 Yoshimatsu 2018, 138.

3 Rossiter 2018, 115.

4 Nagy 2021, 5; Dell’Era 2022.

5 Mead 1934.

6 Berger and Luckmann 1967.

7 Giddens 1984.

8 Searle 1983; 1995.

9 Archer 1995, 1996.

10 Wendt 1992, 1999.

11 Jervis 1976.

12 Wendt 1999.

13 Jones 2003, 139.

14 Osler and Krueger 2022, 77-78.

15 Jones 2003, 140.

16 Jones 2003, 138.

17 Jones 2003, 140.

18 Shuttleworth 2020, 57. According to Bernard Bernier, “Watsuji defined his ethical system by borrowing both from traditional Oriental philosophy and religion and from Western philosophy. His position is indeed constructed in good part by using Buddhism against, or in counterpoint to, various Western philosophical writings.” See Bernier 2006, 85.

19 Krueger 2013, 128.

20 Watsuji 2007a, 22; 34.

21 Watsuji 2007e, 232.

22 Watsuji 2007a, 73.

23 Watsuji 2007a, 128; 2007b, 354.

24 Watsuji 2007a, 80; 2007b, 355.

25 Watsuji 2007b, 396.

26 Watsuji 2007a, 28; 88-89.

27 Watsuji 2007a, 179.

28 Mead 1934.

29 Watsuji 2007a, 179; 249.

30 Watsuji 2007b, 248-249.

31 Watsuji 2007b, 270-271; 442-446; 2007c, 257; 315.

32 Watsuji 2007c, 232.

33 Watsuji 1979, 11.

34 Watsuji 1979, 10.

35 Watsuji 1979, 14.

36 Watsuji 1979, 54.

37 Watsuji 2007a, 244-245; 272-280.

38 Nagy 2021, 15.

39 Kanehara 2011, 68-70.

40 Kanehara 2011, 158.

41 Yachi 2013, 28.

42 Abe 2023, 314.

43 Hosoya 2011, 15.

44 Inoguchi 2011, 236.

45 Inoguchi 2011, 241.

46 Inoguchi 2011, 236

47 Hosoya 2011, 16.

48 Hosoya 2011, 16.

49 Miyagi 2016, 188.

50 Abe 2013, 156.

51 Abe 2013, 157.

52 Abe 2013, 164.

53 Pugliese 2017a.

54 Abe 2023, 94.

55 Abe 2023, 96.

56 MOFA 2018c, 13.

57 Pugliese 2017b, 160-161.

58 Pugliese 2017a, 241-242.

59 Pugliese 2017b, 241-242.

60 Dell’era 2022, 14.

61 Rossiter 2018, 116.

62 Takei 2015, 2; 4.

63 MOFA 2015d.

64 Iwao, Miura and Onaga 2016.

65 According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the FOIP vision materialized in August 2016 when the government outlined how the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific region were an “international public good.” See MOFA 2018c, 13.

66 Rossiter 2018, 117.

67 NIDS 2008, 8-9.

68 NIDS 2008, 219.

69 Abe 2013, 164.

70 Kantei 2006.

71 MOF 2015b.

72 MOF 2015c.

73 MOF 2016.

74 MOF 2017.

75 Kantei 2015.

76 MOFA 2017c.

77 Kuribayashi and Yamagishi 2017.

78 Kantei 2017.

79 MOFA 2017d.

80 Asahi Shimbun 2021.

81 Asahi Shimbun 2021.

82 Ishibashi 2018, 4.

83 Kantei 2017b.

84 Kantei 2017c.

85 MOFA 2018a.

86 MOFA 2018f.

87 MOFA 2018d.

88 MOFA 2018e.

89 MOFA 2018e.

90 TICAD meetings, held since 1993, are co-hosted by Japan, the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the African Union Commission (AUC).

91 Miyagi 2016, 117-118.

92 Kantei 2019a.

93 Kantei 2019b.

94 Kantei 2019b.

95 Asahi Shimbun 2021.

96 Watsuji 2007e, 60; 194.

97 Cabinet Office 2021; Grare 2021

98 Gaikō 2021, 96.

99 Watsuji 2007e, 201; 2007c, 317-318.