The role of the official ceremonies and hidden curriculum on Atatürkism’s socialization and indoctrination in Turkish schools (1980–2002)

ABSTRACT

The 1980 military coup in Turkey enormously impacted state-citizen relations, including in the realm of education. After the coup, all school rituals, ceremonies, classrooms, and after-school activities were re-defined through laws and regulations to indoctrinate the dominant state ideology, Atatürkism (Atatürkçülük). This article attempts to shed light on this socialization strategy. It refers relies on an oral history of student testimonies from different socio-economic, religious, and ethnic backgrounds. The testimonies reveal the weaknesses of the system. In particular, the excessive emphasis on Atatürk’s personality and the denial of the Kurdish identity appeared as the most significant fragilities of the system. In addition, the exclusion of non-Muslim citizens from the definition of Turkishness and their feeling of being singled out may be seen as another deficiency of post-1980 state-society relations.

KEYWORDS:

• Atatürkism
• indoctrination
• Turkey
• education
• socialization
• hidden curriculum

Introduction

With the adoption of national education systems, states began using schools as instruments to create the ‘ideal citizen.’ The formation of European national education systems marks the beginning of schooling on a mass scale within nation-states. The influence of national education permeated every segment of society. The first attempts to create a national education system and mass schooling were pioneered by monarchs of Europe such as Frederick V in Denmark (1753), Frederick the Great in Prussia (1763), Maria Theresa in Austria (1775), and Napoleon Bonaparte in France (1802).¹

The penetration of the French Revolution’s nationalistic ideals into the Balkans pushed the Ottomans to address the secessionism question. After seeing the positive results in the French example, in 1869, under Sultan Abdülaziz (1861–1876), the Ottomans adopted mass schooling to try to unite their society. However, these efforts proved to be insufficient as they could not prevent the empire’s dissolution.

With the establishment of modern Turkey, indoctrination became a core issue in the lives of Turkish people. The Tevhid-i Tedrisat, (The Unification of Education) law of 1924, which placed each educational institution under the Ministry of National Education, served as the primary apparatus for indoctrination of young people. Turkish governments utilized this law to inculcate future generations to achieve their ‘ideal citizen.’ Educational regulations, ceremonies, and classroom activities, which were designed to reflect state ideology, were the tools implemented to shape the hoped-for ‘ideal citizen.’ Over time, every dominant actor in the system sought to influence the spirit of the country by reshaping the national education system. In this regard, the periods of single party government (1923–1950), Menderes’ Democrat Party government (1950–1960), the 1960 coup generals’ and their successors’ governments (1960–1980), Atatürkist² governments (1980–2002) and finally the several Justice and Development Party-led (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) governments (2002–) can be specified different regimes with different emphases in their ideologies.

The Atatürkist period (1980–2002) occupies the focus of this article. Until its removal from the core guidelines of the Turkish education system in 2012 by the AKP,³ Atatürkism was crowned as the official ideology of Turkey by the perpetrators of the 1980 coup. By examining theoretical discourse and education regulations and laws, this article will seek to highlight the creation of Turkish civil religion and the role of the national holiday celebrations, daily and weekly ceremonies, as well as classroom activities that can be considered as hidden curriculum activities. Within this framework, this article attempts to answer the question of whether Atatürkism’s indoctrination through the school ceremonies and in-class activities was indeed a success, a partial success, or a failure.

The term hidden curriculum first appeared in Philip Jackson’s Life in Classrooms (1968), which he defined as the collection of educational material which students need to learn that is outside the official academic curriculum.⁴ To a great extent, Jackson’s hidden curriculum was related to student psychology, which was characterized by the balance between success-reward and failure-punishment.⁵ Earlier, Robert Dreeben (1967) had already underlined the inaccuracy of solely relying on family education, stressing the importance of ‘school culture’ and social norms in shaping a student’s social identity.⁶ Mahmut Tezcan, a Turkish education sociologist, brought another perspective to the discourse, when he argued that the hidden curriculum is not only limited to classroom activities or school culture and discipline, but also related to extracurricular school activities, such as excursions and visits.⁷ While in some cases hidden curriculum activities caused an efficient penetration of the desired learning material into the minds of the students, in other cases it had negative results. Hence it is possible to state that a student’s overall education can be described as the combination of both official and hidden curriculums.

Since these practices can vary from school to school and do not have a uniform character, this article will seek to shed light on this question by relying on student testimonies.⁸ It should be noted that these students have different ethnic, religious, socio-economic, political, and geographic backgrounds – secular Turks, Turkish and Kurdish Islamists, nationalist Kurds, İmam Hatip School graduates, Jews, Armenians, Greeks, Alevis and Circassians living in various cities including Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Şırnak, Gaziantep and Zonguldak. Though these testimonies do not constitute a representative sample, their inclusion in this study does contribute to the understanding of the success or failure to indoctrinate students with Atatürkism. In addition to the expected norms that were conveyed through strict school discipline, family-school relation and student perceptions of religious, ethnic, and national issues will be questioned.

Invention of civil religion and its implementation in Turkey

The term ‘civil religion’ first appeared in Jean Jacques Rousseau's The Social Contract (1762). However, it was Robert Bellah who transformed this term into a sociological concept. In his article, ‘Civil Religion in America,’ Bellah defined it as a set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals that were influenced by religious practices that shaped the nation.⁹ In short, with its national ethos, history narrative, symbols, ceremonies, national days, and sites, civil religion appears as a semi-religious sociological phenomenon that mostly takes place outside the religious sphere without worshiping a divine being. Mausoleums and statues of national leaders, monuments, battlefields, graveyards, schools, stadiums, and town squares garnished with national flags and coats of arms become the ‘temples’ of this secular religion.

The Turkish civil religion was invented and transmitted to the public by the ruling elite. Ziya Gökalp, known as the father of modern Turkish nationalism, is one of the most influential actors that shaped Turkish civil religion. Gökalp, in his famous work Principles of Turkism, regarded the masses as the source of national culture. He did not, however, ignore the indispensability of the elites (güzide) for the public good, and said they ought to bring modernity and civilization to the masses and become one with them.¹⁰ Nevertheless, most of his ideas – if not all – were realized in practice by a very strict, top-down government mechanism presided by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his successors, rather than the masses.

For Gökalp, culture alone was not sufficient to turn the masses into a nation. In his book Turkification Islamization Modernization, he emphasized the importance of a national ideal (mefkure), which he defined as a feeling that emerges on the eve of a national disaster where individuals sacrifice their personal interests for the collective ideal.¹¹ Consequently, he regarded culture¹² and the national ideal as the core elements of civil religion.¹³

In this context, Gökalp regarded education as the main instrument for indoctrinating these components. Due to his increasing emphasis on mefkure, he favored an idealist education system over a pragmatic one. Teaching nationalism and patriotism that would create individuals willing to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the homeland became the core concern rather than learning professional skills.¹⁴ His ideal type of Turkish citizen was the ‘national individual’ (milli fert) who holds public interest superior to that of his own. His famous motto – ‘There is no individual but there is a community, there are no rights but there are obligations’ (Şahıs yok, toplum var, hak yok ödev var) summarizes this worldview very well.¹⁵ For Gökalp, such an individual could only acquire this kind of consciousness when taught Turkey’s religious, ethical, judicial, and esthetic values.¹⁶ To summarize, Gökalp believed in raising future generations upon three important pillars; Turkishness, Islam, and Modernism.

Except for Islam’s role in education and society, Atatürk and his comrades were deeply influenced by Gökalp’s views. Parallel to Gökalp’s collectivist, state-centered approach, Atatürk also adopted the ‘National Education for the State and for the People’ (Devlet için, Millet için eğitim) principle as the core guideline for the country’s education policy. With this approach, Kemalists sought to create their own ‘new man’ who strengthens national unity, culture, independence, and sovereignty.¹⁷

The adoption of Gökalp’s collectivist approach and increasing centralization that was seen during the single-party period became an indispensable part of the Turkish state mechanism. As a result, succeeding governments also adopted these top-down structures, and this was particularly evident during the 1980–2002 period. Indeed, both the Turkish Education Basic Law (Milli Eğitim Temel Kanunu – Number: 1739), which was enacted in 1973, and its 1983 amendment that was designed according to Atatürkist education principles highlight the traces of the same approach. Article 2 of the law set the main purpose of the Turkish national education system as follows:

To raise citizens who are eager to protect, develop and be faithful to Atatürk’s revolutions and principles, and to the Nationalism of Atatürk that was expressed in the constitution; to raise citizens who adopt, protect and develop Turkey’s national, moral, humane, spiritual and cultural values; to raise citizens who love their family, homeland, and nation, and seek to elevate them; to raise citizens who are faithful to human rights and to the democratic, secular, social Turkish Republic, which is run by the rule of law that relies on the fundamental principles mentioned in the preamble of the constitution; to raise citizens who know their obligations and responsibilities vis-à-vis the Turkish Republic and set these as their behaviors.¹⁸

The effort in creating the civil religion can be seen also directly in the textbooks. The 1983 National Security Studies textbook openly defined Atatürkism as a ‘national belief system’ (Milli İnanç Sistemi),¹⁹ though it was softened in the book’s introduction as a ‘worldview’ instead of a belief system:

Atatürkism is not a political doctrine. It is a national and humane worldview that believes in individual honor, dignity and rationality. Atatürkism comprises all fundamental principles and thought system that will lead to the modernization of the Turkish nation.²⁰

As can be seen, the inclusion of Atatürkism in the National Security Studies textbooks openly highlights the militarization of the civil religion, a step which legitimizes the interventionist nature of the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, TSK) in the system. In her book, The Myth of the Military Nation, Ayşe Gül Altınay documented militarization’s penetration into the education system, and highlighted the patriarchal orientation of textbook discourse. She emphasized that the children were ‘normalized’ to think in military terms, and were therefore led to view conscription as another chapter of male adulthood and citizenship.²¹

How post-1980 education differs in handling of Atatürkism?

Unlike the previous coup perpetrators, the 1980 coup generals sought not only to legitimize their intervention in the eyes of the public by inserting short sections in the school textbooks but rather launched a very comprehensive, ambitious social engineering project through school textbooks by putting Atatürk at the forefront. Having seen the deep fragmentation in the Turkish society among the rightists, leftists, Islamists, and the Kurdish nationalists the coup perpetrators attempted to re-unite the society. Consequently, they put an excessive emphasis on Atatürk’s figure and Atatürkism.

Apart from the superficial party programs²² of the 1970s, the term Atatürkism first gained attention in the TSK’s first pronouncement after the military coup.²³ Later the term ‘Atatürkist thought’ (Atatürkçü Düşünce) initially emerged as an official term in Article 134 of the post-coup 1982 constitution.²⁴ It is also very vital to note that no school textbooks published prior to 1980 contained a section called ‘Atatürkism.’²⁵ Instead, the term can be seen only in the post-1980 textbooks.

Certainly, the most prominent point of distinction between pre – and post-1980 textbooks is the indoctrination of ‘Atatürkism.’ Atatürk’s personality, his pictures. and Atatürkism as an official ideology are largely absent in pre-1980 textbooks. Of course, these textbooks did not totally ignore Atatürk. Inevitably, as the leader of the war of independence, Atatürk was at the heart of this discourse. However, neither his system of ideology nor his personality was covered in these textbooks. Instead, the textbooks cover the military history of the Turkish war of independence.²⁶ Pre-1980 textbooks also briefly discuss Atatürk’s revolution. Atatürk’s political,²⁷ religious,²⁸ judicial²⁹ and cultural³⁰ reforms were summarized in only three pages.³¹ In this sense, textbooks’ omission of Atatürk’s ideology and his biography should be underlined.³²

Given the nature of the TSK's absolute control over the Turkish education system, Atatürkism became the main guideline of post-coup Prime Minister Bülent Ulusu’s government (1980–1983). In its program, the Ulusu administration set education as the primary goal of the government. The government sought to ‘raise patriotic youth, loyal to Atatürk principles and his reforms and are aware of their obligations towards the state.’³³ To implement these goals, National Education Minister Hasan Sağlam called on teachers and students in his 1981–1982 academic year welcoming message to adopt Atatürkism as the ultimate guide. Sağlam tasked teachers with the goal to make students feel the state’s authority, strength, and existence. He also addressed the students, calling on them to defend Atatürkist ideals against any other heretical and radical ideologies in the future.³⁴

Sağlam and his administration sought to provide students with the necessary instruments to defend Atatürkism. Therefore the Ministry of National Education initiated a new course, called ‘Republic of Turkey History of its Reforms’ (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi), which later in 1982 was renamed as ‘Republic of Turkey History of its Reforms and Atatürkism’ (T.C İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük, hereafter ‘History of Atatürkism’).³⁵ By installing this course into the curriculum, the post-coup government sought to raise a conscious Atatürkist nation.³⁶

Despite the new course and emphasis on Atatürk’s reforms, Sağlam and his government wanted to deepen further Atatürkist indoctrination in schools. With his official instruction on 19 November 1981 Atatürkism was injected into lessons such as history, religious studies, national security studies, social sciences (civics), Turkish, literature, sociology, philosophy, geography, math, science, gym, music, art, and art history. Not only in textbooks, but Atatürkism was seen in written regulations too. Therefore, Atatürk’s bywords, life, personal characteristics, perception of nationalism, rationality and views on religion began to be transmitted to students through various courses.³⁷

Indeed, these practices were also legislatively backed. As it was already mentioned in the government program, the Ulusu administration went one step further and made Atatürkism the national ideology in 1983 when it added ‘Nationalism of Atatürk’ to the 1973 National Education Basic Law’s (law no. 2842) second and tenth articles. The second article states that Turkish national education falls under the guidelines of Atatürk’s reforms and principles. Article 10 states that its curriculum and lessons must be based on the nationalism of Atatürk. Article 11 strictly prohibits any action against such nationalism.³⁸

However, having seen traditional Kemalism’s earlier failures in uniting the society, the coup perpetrators were concerned about Atatürkism’s success. Therefore, they decided to modify this rigid ideology into a vivid, more dynamic one by infusing Islam into it. In this atmosphere, an unspoken alliance was formed between the TSK and the Intellectuals’ Hearth³⁹ (Aydınlar Ocağı). The Hearth’s discontent with the liberal 1960 constitution and its preferred definition of the Turkish nation as a military-nation attracted TSK sympathy. This rapprochement became evident when Hearth did not hesitate to submit a right-wing draft constitution despite a TSK ban on proposing drafts. The draft received support from coup leaders, and 75–80 percent of it was implemented in the 1982 Constitution.⁴⁰

The alliance between the TSK and the Hearth resulted in the adoption of the Hearth sponsored ‘Turkish-Islam Synthesis’ as a part of official state ideology. Heper and Criss defined the Turkish-Islam Synthesis in their Historical Dictionary of Turkey as a thesis combining two traditional parts of the Turkish right: Islamism and Turkism as the basic elements of national culture.⁴¹ Since order, obedience and deference to tradition were characterized as sine qua non concepts of this ideology, the Turkish-Islam Synthesis received TSK approval.⁴² Unlike traditional Kemalism, the Turkish-Islam Synthesis did not regard Turkishness and Islam as mutually exclusive; on the contrary, Turkishness was meaningless without Islam.⁴³ This main perception can also be traced in the Turkish nationalist motto: ‘We are Turks as Tanrı Mountains (Tian Shan – referring to central Asian heritage of Turks) and Muslims as Hira Mountains (Jabel Al-Nur).’⁴⁴

When the Turkish-Islam Synthesis was adapted into an official ideology, Atatürkism underwent a serious restructuring, leading to its redefinition. In this, the role of Hearth’s ideologues was crucial. To facilitate the TSK’s adoption of Turkish-Islam Synthesis and deepen the rapprochement between the Hearth and the TSK, Hearth ideologue Muharrem Ergin sought to bridge an ideological bond between the TSK’s Atatürkism and Hearth’s Turkish-Islam Synthesis. Therefore, he re-defined Atatürkism and divided it into two parts: ‘Right Atatürkism’ (Doğru Atatürkçülük), which does not marginalize Islam, and ‘Wrong Atatürkism’ (Yanlış Atatürkçülük), which interprets Atatürkism incorrectly and abuses the concept of secularism. Thanks to Ergin’s re-conceptualization, the Turkish-Islam Synthesis became interchangeable with ‘Right Atatürkism.’⁴⁵ Ergin’s new ‘Right Atatürkism,’ which econciled Islam and secularism, can be summarized ironically as Islamic secularism.⁴⁶ After removing any traces of conflict between Atatürkism and Islam, Ergin openly called for the adoption of Atatürkism as an official state ideology.⁴⁷ In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, having seen his policy’s adoption, Ergin named the 1980 coup d’etat as the historical junction that will lead Turkey to its renaissance.⁴⁸ Hearth ideologues went one step further and saw no harm to declare their own ideal citizen/’new man’ type as a ‘Muslim-Turk.’⁴⁹ By providing the intellectual and ideological backbone of the 1980 coup, the Hearth made its mark on Turkish political history.

The apparatuses of Turkish civil religion, the question of hidden curriculum and the role of family institution in the education system

Since education was assigned to transmit the national ideal and culture to coming generations, decision-makers and instructors needed instruments to fulfill this mission. National symbols, holidays, and charismatic leaders emerged as the means to indoctrinate civil religion into the masses. Nevertheless, the success of this indoctrination is also bound to a great extent to the harmony between family, teachers, and the school.

Atatürk’s charismatic leadership

Atatürk appeared as the sole charismatic leader in the school curriculum. However, glorifying, his cult was not a new phenomenon for the Turkish public. Atatürk himself contributed to it with the erection of his statues all over Turkey. The first appeared in 1926 in Istanbul’s Sarayburnu district. That same year, another was erected in the city of Konya. Despite the existence of these two statues, the Victory Monument in Ankara’s Ulus Square, which was inaugurated in 1927, constitutes as the most important example for creating his personality cult. Moreover, with the ‘The Law on Crimes against Atatürk’ (Number 5816) that was enacted in 1951, Atatürk statutes, his tomb, and memory were safeguarded from physical and verbal attacks.⁵⁰

In the immediate period after the 1980 coup, the emphasis on Atatürk’s cult in the education system was acknowledged as a reasonable decision by the public. Within years, the emphasis was increased unprecedentedly. This could be seen in the preamble sections of textbooks. The classroom inventory list (demirbaş listesi), designed by the Ministry of National Education, also reflects this. Each classroom had to be equipped with a portrait of Atatürk, a Turkish flag, a frame of Atatürk’s allocution to the Turkish youth, and the lyrics of the national anthem. Additionally, most classrooms and school corridors were also equipped with a supplementary appliance, named ‘Atatürk corners’ (Atatürk köşeleri), that had to have Turkish flags, pictures of Atatürk, symbols of his reforms, poems, and essays.⁵¹ Students were encouraged to take part in forming such a corner in every classroom.

National holidays

National holidays, listed in Table 1, were created as a secular alternative to the religious ones and appear as the second important apparatus for inoculating Atatürkism. As far as the themes and the scopes of these national holidays are examined, one can see that the civil religion was first introduced specifically to children on the April 23 holiday. May 19 expressed similar values for Turkish youth, though Republic and Victory Days can be interpreted as expanding civil religion to other segments of society.⁵² November 10 functioned as the complementary component of the Turkish national calendar where the nation pays its gratitude and respect to Atatürk, the prophet of this civil religion.

Table 1. Secular national holidays celebrating Atatürkism.

Date	Event	Name of the National Day
19 May 1919	Atatürk’s launch of the War of Independence	Commemoration of Atatürk, Youth and Sports Holiday
23 April 1920	Inauguration of the Turkish Grand National Assembly	National Sovereignty and Children’s Holiday
30 August 1922	Victory against the allies	Victory Holiday
29 October 1923	Proclamation of the Republic	Republic Holiday
10 November 1938	Atatürk’s death	Atatürk Remembrance Day

Even though the invention of Turkish national holidays dates back to the first days of the Republic,⁵³ regulations that standardized the ceremonies were introduced only on 1 October 1981, a year after the 1980 military coup. Celebrating these national holidays in accordance with the holiday’s meaning and enhancing national unity by increasing commitment to Atatürk and his principles were the core objective of the regulations.⁵⁴

When the regulations are examined, one can see that the post-coup government sought to emphasize and indoctrinate Atatürkism through national holidays. The most prominent evidence that distinguished this period from the years before 1980 was the decision on 19 March 1981, to change the official name of the May 19 holiday from ‘Youth and Sports Day’ to ‘Commemoration of Atatürk, Youth and Sports Holiday.’ (Atatürk’ü Anma, Gençlik ve Spor Bayramı).⁵⁵ The growing emphasis on Atatürk’s cult reached its peak when the regulation set Atatürk statues and monuments all over the country as the core ceremony sites for national holiday celebrations. The start and end times of the holidays, desired manners during the ceremonies, such as laying wreaths on statues and reciting poems, representation of senior government officials, celebration customs inside and outside the capital city, including visits to Atatürk’s mausoleum, are explained in detail.⁵⁶ The ceremonies took on a more centralized and militaristic style as a result.

The May 19 Commemoration of Atatürk, Youth and Sports Holiday is the best example to underline this development. It had to start at 7 in the morning all over Turkey to symbolize the exact time of Atatürk’s arrival in Samsun port, where he launched the Turkish War of Independence. As well as schools and public squares, stadiums became the main site for celebrations. According to the instructions of the sub-committees of each province, schools had to dispatch a delegation of students who were well-trained in Turkish literature, acrobatic gymnastics, and choreography. The main task of the ceremonies was to dispatch a message to a wide audience, broadcast live on state channels, which, through discipline, strength, and diligence, the Turkish youth can defend the Atatürkist Republic. This message became even more concrete when students marched in flag parades in stadiums to underline their loyalty to Atatürk. Students who did not participate in sports activities were not forgotten; they would read poems about Atatürk and the republic, as well as form gigantic choreographed formations in the tribunes of the stadium. They were instructed to form huge Atatürk portraits, his signature, and his quotations with different placards that they were given.

Despite this harmonious portrait, Mehmet, a student from Denizli Anadolu High School, who participated in the stadium ceremonies during the May 19 festivities. provided a totally different perspective:

We had to carry those silly placards for the choreography. And despite the hot weather during the summer in Denizli, the May 19 festivities had to be carried out under the sun. Since moving around and drinking water was strictly prohibited during the rehearsals, I do remember that once I fainted due to lack of water. The ceremony was total torture! Due to these kinds of experiences, people were fed up with the national holidays and Atatürk.⁵⁷

Students were not the only participants. With its official band and flag bearers, the TSK also occupied an important place in these ceremonies, where it had to demonstrate a show of force as the acting watchdog of the Atatürkist republic. Notably, these militaristic practices were challenged by the AKP government, which launched a country-wide de-militarization campaign in 2012. As well as removing National Security Studies courses from the official curriculum,⁵⁸ the AKP banned May 19 stadium celebrations.⁵⁹ In the following year, the ban was expanded to all other national holidays that were celebrated in stadiums.⁶⁰

The National Sovereignty Holiday that was adopted in 1921 to mark the inauguration of the Grand National Assembly⁶¹ (turned into Children’s Holiday in 1927) is the second-biggest holiday for students. In addition, the week of April 23–30 was declared ‘Children’s Week’ (Çocuk Haftası).⁶² Similar to the May 19 ceremonies, the most important sites for marking this holiday were the public stadiums, where students gathered for organized parades, as well as schools, Atatürk statues, and mausoleum in the capital. The most important duties of these students were to lay wreaths, sing the national anthem in front of the flag and recite poems on national sovereignty, as well as highlight the importance of children for the future of Atatürkist Turkey.⁶³

The April 23 ceremonies focused on primary school children. As might be expected, they were far more enthusiastic than their elders. For most, taking part in these ceremonies was unforgettable, a favorite memory. Baran from Nizip Anadolu High School in Gaziantep recalled these days as such:

During the April 23 ceremonies, all schools formed cortège to the stadium. We were getting dressed in colorful clothes. Getting out of school and marching toward the stadium was very exciting. Taking part in the school band and playing an instrument was a privilege. The most important thing was carrying the flag in the very front of the cortège.

Unlike the massive indoctrination that took place during these two core national days, students relatively ignored Victory Day (August 30), since it fell during the summer vacation and without ceremony. In this sense, school ceremonies’ importance for creating and promoting the civil religion can be once again highlighted.

Republic Day was attributed a special importance, thanks to its suitable place in the academic calendar. Despite the lack of connection with Turkey’s independence (that was ratified in the Lausanne Treaty of 24 July 1923), Republic Day (29 October 1923) functions as the country’s Independence Day, for it symbolizes the end of the ancien régime and the start of the Republic. Besides garnishing each public building, and particularly classrooms, with a larger number of Turkish flags, the main customs and sites of the ceremonies on Republic Day remained roughly the same as they were in the May 19 and April 23 ceremonies. For some students like Rıza from Zonguldak’s Kozlu High School, Republic Day constituted the most important national day in the Turkish calendar:

For me, the most important national holiday was Republic Day. Prior to my primary school days, I do remember that for the first time on this particular day, I was introduced to Atatürk’s figure by my family. My feelings remained the same also during my school years.

Paying tribute to Atatürk and remembering his legacy reached its peak on November 10 – Atatürk commemoration day. Until 1981, this day was known as ‘National Mourning Day,’ but under the post-coup government, this was changed to ‘Atatürk Commemoration Day,’⁶⁴ seeing Atatürk’s hundredth birthday as an opportunity to boost Atatürkism. Despite this change, Turkey continued to mourn Atatürk, with national flags lowered at half-mast across the country.⁶⁵ At 09:05, sirens rang to commemorate his death, while all Turkish citizens are invited to stand one minute in silence. Moreover, throughout various ceremonies during the week named after Atatürk, students prepared exhibitions, competitions, and homework about him. Students were asked to recite Atatürk’s quotations and read poems and essays that indicated the immortality of his legacy and sacrifices for the homeland.

The famous song ‘Atatürk is Not Dead’ that was taught and sung in every Turkish school each November 10 portrays the spirit of the day and the whole school year:

Atatürk Is Not Dead Atatürk is not dead; he is living in my heart. In the war of civilization, he is carrying the flag. He is overcoming each difficulty.The revolutions that strengthen Turkishness are yours. The illuminated path that you drew in my homeland is yours. Youth is yours, you are youths.You did not die, you cannot die, you did not die, you cannot die.

This song crowned Atatürk as Turkey’s immortal leader who leads the country in its struggle to modernize, even decades after his death. The song’s extensive focus on Atatürk’s figure and his portrayal as an immortal übermensch (super-human), who is capable of overcoming every obstacle, should also be underlined. This discourse remained unchallenged until the late 2000s. Mustafa Akyol’s critical ‘Let's Meet North Korea’ article, written in 2009, made indirect correlations between worshiping the charismatic leadership of Turkey’s Atatürk and North Korea’s Kim Il Sung and serves as a remarkable example of the Turkish public's new critical approach.⁶⁶

The testimony by Nazlı from Istanbul’s Moda İlköğretim Okulu, who defines herself as a secular Turk, also backs the supernatural qualities that were attributed to Atatürk:

I do remember that during the November 10 ceremonies, I felt deep sorrow. During the sirens I cried … For me, Atatürk and his book Nutuk (The Speech) were the equivalent of what God or Prophet Muhammad and the Holy Quran were for others.

In some cases, this excessive idealism backfired. Field research conducted by Mehmet Şişman and Murat Küçük shows that the majority of students found national holiday celebrations boring. Students expressed their desire to move from official ceremonies to festivities.⁶⁷ It should be noted that students did not wish to abolish the national ceremony; they just wanted it adjusted, to emphasize less on Atatürk:

Atatürk is continuously mentioned during the ceremonies. Atatürk, Atatürk, Atatürk again and again and again … Ata (synonym for Atatürk – literally father) is exploited. I don’t hate Atatürk. I respect him. But they are exaggerating. “Great leader Atatürk,” “If Atatürk did not exist this couldn’t happen” “Respect Ata” … I understand that Atatürk did so many important things. But because of this over-explanation people are getting fed up with him. This is not only in school. This happens everywhere.

Ebru, a teacher from Ankara’s Bahçelievler Girls’ School in Ankara, confirms this excessive emphasis on Atatürk:

Atatürk was prioritized in almost every aspect. For instance, if a mathematics teacher had to teach how to calculate four operations, they had to use Atatürk’s birth date as an example. If a physics teacher had to teach something related to physics, they were expected to relate the subject of the course in a way to Atatürk. In my opinion, this exaggeration led to alienation in society.

Like Ebru, who taught in a central province, the majority of students in these regions complained about the excessive usage of Atatürk. However, the situation was far different in some schools in the countryside. In both cases, however, extra-curricular practices designed by teachers and school officials – termed the hidden curriculum – played a crucial role in the indoctrination of Atatürkism.

In contrast to the structure of the official curriculum and its desired educational goals, the hidden curriculum cannot be examined with concrete documents. Thus, student testimonies appear as sine qua non sources to understand the impact of the hidden curriculum. Testimonies by Zeki from Tekirdağ, Şemsettin from Kilis, and Ramiz from Şanlıurfa will attempt to shed light to this, where different teachers and schools led to different experiences.

Zeki, from Hüseyin Köse Elementary School, was raised in the city of Tekirdağ, located in Thrace and considered an Atatürkist province. Hidden curriculum activities strengthened his belief in the system:

In 1999, when I was in primary school, our school took us to the cinema to watch the film named The Republic (Cumhuriyet) (1998). The film covered the Turkish Republic’s first ten years. As someone who studied in the countryside and not in the city center, The Republic was my first cinema experience. I was deeply influenced by the scene where the Turkish soldier Kubilay was killed by the bigots who wanted to eradicate the Republic for establishing the Caliphate in İzmir’s Menemen district.⁶⁸ Another scene was Atatürk’s refusal to trample over the Greek flag. At the end of the film, I felt great admiration for Atatürk and the Republic. This film was a lot more influential than any other course.

Zeki’s experience might be considered the norm, but it differed from Şemsettin’s, who finished his studies at the Kilis Anadolu High School:

During the primary school years, Atatürk was very positively introduced. Even his status was equivalent to the Turkish flag. However, the high school years were totally different. I personally witnessed that our teachers named Atatürk’s mother openly as a prostitute. From that moment on, for me, Atatürk was turned into a figure who had to be defended from these kinds of defamations.

According to Şemsettin, his primary school education and his family’s neutral stance towards the system facilitated the preservation of Atatürk’s reputation in his eyes.

Şemsettin’s case, however, cannot be considered common. Ramiz’s memories, from Şanlıurfa Anadolu High School, constitute a better example to understand the duality in the education system formed by the teachers’ hidden curriculum activities and the impact of family on student thought:

I come from a Kurdish, Islamist family from the Cizre district of the Şırnak province. For generations, my grandfathers and my father were imams. They were raised in a madrassa culture. It is not a secret that Atatürk was an unloved figure at home. This situation was also the same in the Religious Studies classes. The teacher intentionally skipped the sections that dealt with Atatürk. Despite this, History and National Security Studies courses portrayed Atatürk positively. While being pretty confused, I adopted the views of my family. The school could not change my thoughts on Atatürk. In this case, family education was far more dominant than the school.

Annette Lareau wrote about the growing involvement of parents in school-student affairs from a historical perspective.⁶⁹ According to Lareau, this intervention was limited to providing shelter and supplying food for the teacher in the very beginning. But with the rise of mass education, parental support expanded into political and economic spheres. She argued that over the last four decades, their area of influence broadened even more, allowing them to monitor educational and cognitive development. Despite not being present in the classrooms, parents became extremely important actors for the success of indoctrination in schools. This is illustrated by the case of Fethi, a student from Ataköy Atatürk Elementary School, who was raised in an Islamist Kurdish family:

My parents were Islamists. My mother wore an Islamic chador. Due to her physical appearance, she feared that Kemalist teachers could arbitrarily segregate or punish me. Because of this, she never visited the school and did not participate in the School-Family Union activities.

This pessimistic picture remained the same after new regulations were enacted in 1983, which portrayed these Unions as a hub to promote Atatürkism, love of nation, homeland, flag, and humanity.⁷⁰

When Fethi’s and Ramiz’s testimonies are compared, it is possible to underline the dichotomy in the system. Ramiz’s testimony reveals the fact that teachers did not necessarily follow in every school the exact, pro-Atatürkist policies the government desired. While teachers intentionally ignored the textbooks or particular sections, they challenged the official narrative in their classrooms or covered it in a very superficial way so as to not have any serious effect on the students. Atatürkism’s instruction in religiously-oriented İmam Hatip Schools can be considered a prominent example of this phenomenon. Sadettin, a former student of the Bakırköy İmam Hatip School in Istanbul summarized how Atatürk was taught in the classroom:

The instruction on Atatürk in İmam Hatips was like a very fast-scrolling text in a commercial that you see on the screen, but you can’t read it. Teachers covered him only as a mere form.

Even if they personally were not subjected to massive indoctrination of Atatürkism, most İmam Hatip graduates are critical of the education system that idolized the leader. Çiçek, a student from an İmam Hatip school, stressed her discontent about Atatürk’s portrayal by the secularists:

They put Atatürk on the same pedestal as our prophet. This is simply wrong

In her book Islamic Schools in Modern Turkey, Iren Özgür argued that most İmam Hatip graduates do not have negative sentiments towards Atatürk’s personality but against those hardline secularists who utilize Atatürk for limiting religion and oppressing religious communities.⁷¹

The Turkish flag

As the core symbol of Turkish nationalism that appears on all national days, the Turkish flag is considered as another important apparatus of Turkish civil religion. The most important visual symbol, the flag functions as the ‘screensaver’ of civil religion reminding citizens of the state’s presence and promoting identification with the state. As far as the flag’s usage in the educational sphere is concerned, school yards and classrooms should be examined.

The ‘flag ceremony’ that took place at the beginning and end of every week and every educational year is paramount. The fundamentals of the ceremony were the singing of the national anthem’s first two stanzas in front of an ironed, clean official-sized Turkish flag (Turkish Flag Law – Number: 2893).⁷² The goal of the ceremony was to promote love and respect for the Turkish flag and anthem. As a direct correlation to the civil religion concept, the related regulation described the Turkish flag as a sacred entity:

Article 45: The flag ceremonies in the schools are conducted in accordance with the sacredness of the national anthem and the flag.⁷³

Despite the regulation’s patriotic desire, students regarded these ceremonies as a routine ritual, due to their excessiveness throughout the curricular year. Baran from Gaziantep does not recall these ceremonies favorably:

Flag ceremonies remind me of the beginning and end of the week. With the joy of reaching the weekend, on Fridays, we sang the national anthem sonorously. However, on Mondays, generally, we did the opposite, with the same spirit. The headmaster always intervened and asked us to re-sing the anthem. Beginning from the age of 16 these practices began to constitute a burden for us … We already grew up! Leave us alone! At that time we were convinced that these practices were very childish.

Primary school students were obligated to attend an oath ceremony each morning. During this ceremony, every primary student had to recite the oath named ‘Our Oath’ (Andımız), written by former Minister of National Education Reşit Galip in 1933 to please Atatürk, under the supervision of their teachers before they went to their classrooms. The oath reads:

I am a Turk. I am trustworthy. I am hard-working. My first principle: is to defend my minors and respect my elders, and to love my homeland and my nation more than myself. My goal is to rise and progress. O Atatürk the great! I swear that I will enduringly walk through the path you opened and to the target you showed. May my personal being, be sacrificed to the being of the Turkish nation. How happy is the one who says I am a Turk.⁷⁴

Notably, the lines to love my homeland and my nation more than myself and sacrificing oneself for the Turkish nation can be acknowledged as additional evidence for the adoption of Gökalpist collectivism instead of individualism.

As was seen in Bozan’s testimony, the end of this daily ceremonial activity might be perceived as a sign of adulthood. In the same spirit, the flag ceremonies might also be perceived as the continuation of this ‘childish’ oath ceremony. Therefore, it will not be wrong to state that the excessive amount of ceremonies might have resulted in the rising annoyance of students towards these practices. Fethi, who was raised in an Islamist Kurdish family, and Rengin, who was raised in a very self-conscious Kurdish nationalist secular family, constitute good examples of this:

Fethi: I think I read the oath like a machine, without thinking. However, I did my best not to read it … There were also some days that I made jokes during reading the oath by reciting it as: I am Kurdish, I am wrong, I am lazy … 

Rengin: I had my fingers crossed or had my foot risen when I had to read the oath. By doing these I was protecting myself from it. When they were shouting “I am a Turk!” silently I was murmuring “I am a Kurd” then continued shouting “I am right! I am hardworking!”

The oath ceremony was annulled in 2013 by former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as part of the government’s ‘Democratization Package.’⁷⁵ This revolutionary act was protested by opposition party circles.⁷⁶

Inconformity in the system: traumas of the disadvantaged groups in public schools

Studying in a language that was not their mother tongue and being forced to express oneself in Turkish was a tough barrier for many students of Kurdish origin. They were seen as the symbol of failure. As a result, some were openly humiliated by their teachers as punishment for their inability to follow the class or speak Turkish. Ciwan, a Kurd whose mother tongue was Turkish and studied in a regular public school in the Bitlis province, explained how his Kurdish friend who was incapable of learning Turkish was constantly humiliated:

We had a friend named Ersin. He was very unsuccessful. He could not learn to speak Turkish properly. Hence, he always fell behind the class. One day our teacher decided to punish him. She stood us in a line. All of us passed in front of him and spit on him one by one. I remember that this happened at least twice.

Not surprisingly this linguistic oppression and the lack of ability to express themselves or ask questions in Turkish led these less successful students like Ersin, to remain silent all day long. According to Vahap Coşkun’s field research, this constant silence caused dramatic negative changes in the personalities of these students which made them more passive and shy who are not capable of taking initiative.⁷⁷

The situation in the metropolis was not that different. Rengin, who due to her name was easily identified in her school in Ankara as a Kurd, explains her trauma in the classroom:

Our history teacher summoned me for an oral exam in the classroom. She asked me about the ‘harmful societies’.⁷⁸ I began to count the name of each society. But I intentionally skipped the Society for the Rise of Kurds (Kurdistan) (Kürt (Kürdistan) Teali Cemiyeti). She shouted at me and asked me to repeat counting the organizations since I did not count each organization. I began to count again while there were tears in my eyes. And again I skipped the Kurdish society. She shouted to me “Count again!” “You did not mention the society for the Rise of Kurds!” Then she turned to the class and asked my friends “Which society didn’t she mention?” All my friends in the class shouted, “The Society for the Rise of the Kurds” and then she asked me again, “Which society you did not mention?” and I said “The Society for the Rise of the Kurds.”

As demonstrated by both Ciwan and Rengin’s testimonies, teachers’ attitudes had a crucial impact on the psychology of the whole class. Thus, the behavior of teachers put social pressure on Kurdish students. This manifested an increased sense of self-awareness in some students and increased self-hatred in others.

Since these kinds of oppressive experiences were well known in society, not all minorities or members of other groups were willing to reveal their identities. Pınar, an Alevi student from Istanbul’s Semiha Şakir School is a good example of this phenomenon.

I was not raised a religious Alevi, but I knew that I belonged to the Alevi faith. I never revealed my identity to my friends. They did not know that I was Alevi. I even attended Religious Studies classes.

Indeed, this self-censorship combined with the state’s willful ignorance about Alevis that is reflected in the textbooks, such a not listing this faith as a separate religion or recognizing the Cemevi as a separate place of Alevi worship, led Sunni Turkish students to think that there could not be non-Sunni Muslim students in the classroom.⁷⁹

However, Muslim students were aware that there were non-Muslims at school, due to their different names and surnames, particularly in Istanbul and İzmir. Despite being exempt from Religious Studies classes, some of these students were forced to stay in the classroom and even study the same material as others did. Sabi, a Jew from Istanbul’s Erenköy Elementary School:

At the beginning of the Religious Studies class, I explained to the teacher that I am not a Muslim, nor a Turk but I am a Jew. I asked his permission to leave the classroom during the course. He refused. He asked me “What do you think? Am I going to convert you to Islam?” … Despite this, I was asked to memorize and recite the prayer also known as “Kelime-i Şehadet” (Ash-Shahadah - الشهادة) which technically converts a non-Muslim into Islam if it is recited in good faith. I told this to my parents. But they were afraid to issue a complaint against the teacher.

While the Religious Studies courses were most traumatic for Jewish students, the History and National Security Studies classes were the most problematic for the Armenians and Greeks. Siranuş, an Armenian student who studied in one of Istanbul’s leading private schools, underlined her sister’s confrontation with the teacher on the 1915 Armenian Genocide:

Our teacher told us that there was no genocide. I preferred to stay silent. But my sister was the direct opposite of me. Due to the exchange of words in the class, our parents were summoned to the headmaster’s office. After that event, each year I was very afraid and anxious if the teacher would say something wrong against the Armenians or if she would cover the event properly or not. Indeed, for my friends, these classes created a stereotype of Armenians. According to this stereotype, Armenians were acknowledged as traitors, who rebelled against the government during the war, and that’s why they were exiled and frozen to death, etc.

The most complex part for students of Greek origin was that almost the entire Turkish Independence War was fought against Greece and its allies. Unlike Jews or the very few Armenians, the vast majority of the Greeks studied in their own schools. These schools conducted national holiday ceremonies and coverage of these core indoctrinating courses in a very strict discipline in order not to face closure or penalty from the government since all these minority schools were supervised by the Ministry of National Education. Yannis, a student from Istanbul Zoğrafyon Greek School, explains:

Our history teacher emphasized that “the Turkish army had driven the Greek army into the sea” (Türk ordusu Yunan ordusunu denize döktü). It is very interesting. They regarded as us “Rum” (Anatolian Greek) and did not see us as “Yunan” (Greek from Greece) … So we were not driven to the sea … 

Despite the trauma it may have caused students, the textbook content did not become a subject of serious public debate until 2001, when anti-Turkish passages in Greek textbooks were revealed in the Turkish press. In spite of harsh criticisms of the discourse in Greek textbooks, Turkish intellectuals refrained from criticizing their own curricula. In 2006, when Stelyo Berberakis, a Turkish journalist of Greek origin, reported the serious changes in Greek textbooks, the public debate resumed. In this framework, Turkish intellectuals harshly criticized the threat-based teaching method and the building of national identity by demonizing another nation as the enemy of the state.⁸⁰

Conclusion

This article sought to answer the question of whether Atatürkism’s indoctrination through the school ceremonies and in-class activities was indeed a success, a partial success, or a failure? To arrive at an answer, different perspectives from various students who studied in Turkish schools in the 1980–2002 period were brought.

The testimonies of the students who came from different backgrounds showed us that this massive indoctrination partially succeeded only when the families of the students were Atatürkists or remained neutral to the system. When those homes clashed with or challenged the official learning material in school, students aligned with their families. Since the friction areas of each group with the system vary, the overall success rate cannot be generalized. While non-Muslim minorities were disturbed by the dominant Turkish-Islam Synthesis type of nationalist discourse, that in some cases targeted their communities, Islamists, Kurds, Alevis, and others were challenged with insufficient religious instruction, secularism, assimilation, and dominance of Sunni Islam vis-à-vis other faiths, respectively.

The hidden curriculum practices of the teachers, whether pro or against the system, appeared as another important determinant of how indoctrination occurred. In general, the school remained ineffective. Students acted as if they were in an ‘a la carte restaurant’ where they chose what to adopt and what to deny. However, the vast majority of students provided the ‘desired information’ in their examinations, out of fear of the strict school discipline and strong punishment mechanism. Nonetheless, this does not attest to success.

The excessive idolization of Atatürk emerged as another serious problem in the indoctrination process. This disproportionate references to Atatürk and attributing all kinds of successes or positive behaviors to him, repetitively, annoyed many students. For many students, this exaggerated discourse on Atatürk strained his credibility as well as the trustworthiness of the learning material.

In conclusion, considering the removal of Atatürkism as the core guiding principle in the Turkish education system in 2012, this study also facilitates an understanding of some of the societal dynamics that paved the way for the rise of the political Islam and the eroding legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in today’s Turkey.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak

Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak is a Turkey expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) and the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies (MDC) at Tel Aviv University. He received his doctorate from Tel-Aviv University’s School of History and is a lecturer at the same institution as well as the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Ariel University, and the Ben Gurion University of the Negev. He is the editor of Turkeyscope: Insights on Turkish Affairs. In May 2015, he was awarded the Dan David Prize Scholarship in the category of “Past: Retrieving the past, historians and their sources.” He is the author of The Evolution of the Turkish School Textbooks from Atatürk to Erdoğan (Lexington).

Notes

1 Green, Education and State Formation, 1.

2 Often the term Kemalism (Kemalizm) is used interchangeably with Atatürkism. I use the latter in this paper, because, as I develop more below, this was the term used in many post-1980 educational materials.

3 “Atatürk İlkeleri kitaptan çıkarıldı.”

4 Jackson, Life in Classrooms, 33–34.

5 Hansen et.al, A Life in Classrooms, 111.

6 Margolis et al., “Peekabo.” The Hidden Curriculum in Higher Education, 5.

7 Tezcan, Sosyolojik Kuramlarda Eğitim, 175–7.

8 To answer the question of whether Atatürkism’s indoctrination through the school ceremonies and in-class activities can be considered a success, this article relies on oral history as a significant source. Sixteen former students (adults 25–40 years of age at the time of the interview) from different ethnoreligious and socio-economic backgrounds who finished their studies in Turkish high schools between 1995 and 2010 agreed to provide anonymous testimonies. Interviews were conducted, recorded, and transcribed in 2015 in conjunction with another project I was conducting on Turkish textbooks. Instead of their real names, this article uses pseudonyms. Though these testimonies do not constitute a representative sample, their inclusion in this study does contribute to the understanding of the success or failure to indoctrinate students with Atatürkism.

9 Bellah, “Religion in America.”

10 Gökalp, Türkçülüğün Esasları, 42–43.

11 Gökalp, Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak, 51–52.

12 Ersanlı, İktidar ve Tarih, 89.

13 Gökalp, Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak, 51–52.

14 Tezcan, Sosyolojik Kuramlarda Eğitim, 190–214.

15 Ersanlı, İktidar ve Tarih, 89.

16 Türer, Türk Eğitim Tarihi, 233.

17 Ibid., 260.

18 National Education Basic Law (Milli Eğitim Temel Kanunu).

19 Milli Güvenlik Bilgisi 2–3, 73.

20 Ibid., 39.

21 Altınay, The Myth of the Military Nation, 131–4.

22 Nihat Erim (1971–1972), Ferit Melen (1972–1973), Naim Talu (1973–1974), Sadi Irmak (1974–1975) Bülent Ecevit (1974–1974), (1977–1977), (1978–1979) and Süleyman Demirel, (1975–1977), (1977–1978), (1979–1980).

23 Ünal, Gizli Atatürkçülük Projesi Ataköy Planı, 32.

24 This provision established the High Institute of Atatürk Culture, Language and History (Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu – AKDTYK) whose main purpose was to promote Atatürkism.

25 See also Çiçekoğlu, Milli Güvenlik Bilgileri III; Eraydın, Din Bilgisi II; Ergun and Öztürk, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi IV; and Şapolyo, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi.

26 For more details, see Çiçekoğlu, Milli Güvenlik Bilgileri III, 105–18.

27 Abolition of the Sultanate.

28 Abolition of the Caliphate.

29 Abolition of the Sharia courts, and Providing equal rights to all citizens regardless of their religion and ethnicity.

30 Alphabet, calendar and dress reforms, and economic reform of the abolition of the capitulations.

31 Çiçekoğlu, Milli Güvenlik Bilgileri III, 119–21.

32 Ibid.

33 “Ulusu Hükümeti Programı.”

34 “İlk ve Orta Dereceli Okulların 1981-1982 Öğretim Yılına Başlaması Nedeniyle Milli Eğitim Bakanı Hasan Sağlam’ın Açılış Konuşması,” 309–10.

35 For more details, see Ünal, Gizli Atatürkçülük Projesi Ataköy Planı, 49.

36 “Yüksek Okullar Türk İnkılap Tarihi ve Orta Öğretim Kurumları "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi Müfredat Programı,” 205.

37 “Temel Eğitim ve Orta Öğretim Kurumlarında Atatürk İnkılap ve İlkelerinin Öğretim Esasları Yönergesi,” 36–39.

38 Açıkgöz, Milli Eğitim Mevzuatı, 58–61.

39 On May 14, 1970, a group of scholars from the Faculty of Humanities at Istanbul University founded the Intellectuals’ Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı). The Hearth, which was later known as the champion of Turkish-Islam Synthesis, was an elitist organization. Its members were strictly from Turkish academia, journalism, and politics. The Hearth’s emphasis on the state’s perpetuity and inclusion of Islam as part of Turkishness was appreciated in various segments of society. The Hearth was widely recognized as the ideological engine of 1980 military coup. Its main aim was to unite the Turkish right and put an end to the societal fragmentation in the face of the emerging Communist threat.

40 Bora and Can, Devlet Ocak Dergah, 156.

41 Heper and Criss, Historical Dictionary, 315–6.

42 Toprak, “Religion and Politics,” 220.

43 Copeaux, Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931-1993) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine (De l’Adriatique a la mer de Chine), 82.

44 Ayvazoğlu, Tanrı Dağı’ndan Hira Dağı’na, 29.

45 Muharrem, Türkiye’nin Bugünkü Meseleleri, 308–9.

46 Kaplan İsmail, Türkiye’de Milli Eğitim İdeolojisi, 306–7.

47 Muharrem, Türkiye’nin Bugünkü Meseleleri, 308–9.

48 Ibid., 213.

49 Tuğ, “Tebliğ’in Tarihi,” 133.

50 The Law on Crimes Against Atatürk (Atatürk aleyhine işlenen suçlar hakkında kanun).

51 Ibid.

52 Şişman and Küçük, Okul Törenleri Ritüel Yeri Olarak Okul, 74.

53 April 23 (ratified in 1921), May 19 (ratified in 1938), October 29 (ratified in 1925).

54 The regulation on the ceremonies that will take place during the official and national holidays (Ulusal ve Resmi bayramlarda yapılacak törenler yönetmeliği).

55 Şişman and Küçük, Okul Törenleri Ritüel Yeri Olarak Okul, 93.

56 The regulation on the ceremonies that will take place during the official and national holidays (Ulusal ve Resmi bayramlarda yapılacak törenler yönetmeliği).

57 Interview with Mehmet. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from former students derive from a 2015 interview with the named (pseudonymed) subject (see note 8).

58 “Milli Güvenlik dersi tarih oldu.”

59 “19 Mayıs artık stadyumlarda kutlanmayacak.”

60 “Stad kutlamaları tamamen kalıdırıldı.”

61 Şişman andKüçük, Okul Törenleri Ritüel Yeri Olarak Okul, 87–89.

62 Aslan, Cumhuriyetin Törensel Meşruiyeti: Ulus-Devlet inşa sürecinde Milli Bayramlar (1923-1938), 59.

63 The regulation on the ceremonies that will take place during the official and national holidays (Ulusal ve Resmi bayramlarda yapılacak törenler yönetmeliği).

64 Şişman and Küçük, Okul Törenleri Ritüel Yeri Olarak Okul , 68.

65 The Turkish Flag Law (Türk Bayrağı Kanunu).

66 Akyol, “Kuzey Kore’yi tanıyalım (I).”

67 Şişman and Küçük, Okul Törenleri Ritüel Yeri Olarak Okul, 124.

68 The Menemen Incident (1930) is considered the symbol of secular Turkey’s struggle against Islamic Reactionism.

69 Lareau, “Social Class Differences in Family-School Relationships: The Influence of Cultural Capital..”

70 Regulation on School Family Unions (Okul-Aile Birliği Yönetmeliği).

71 Özgür, Islamic Schools in Modern Turkey, 87.

72 The Turkish Flag Law (Türk Bayrağı Kanunu).

73 The regulation on Social Activities in Primary and Secondary Schools (İlköğretim ve Orta öğretim Kurumları Sosyal Etkinlikler Yönetmeliği).

74 Kuru, Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion The US, France and Turkey, 166.

75 “Andımız ve kamuda başörtüsü yasağı kaldırıldı.”

76 “CHP-MHP-İP’ten Andımız Protestosu.”

77 Coşkun et al., Dil Yarası, 82.

78 Each History of Atatürkism textbook contains a sub-section called “Harmful Societies” (Zararlı Cemiyetler). This particular section covers all different organizations that were formed by Greeks, Armenians, Kurds, and other anti-republican, pro-Caliphate, and pro-UK mandate organizations that struggled against Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his Ankara government.

79 Altan, “Turkey: Sanctifying a Secular State,” 204.

80 Dilek and Dilek, “Does History Teaching contribute to showing respect and sympathy for others?,” 210–3.