Conflict in Supplier–Retailer Relationships in the Brewery Industry in Cameroon

Abstract

The authors develop a theoretical framework to explain conflict in supplier–retailer relationships. In addition to traditional influence strategy variables, the framework links conflict to retailer dependence and supplier formalization. The framework is empirically tested in the Cameroonian brewery industry. The findings support the view that channel conflict is inversely related to retailer dependence and supplier formalization. Contrary to expectations, the use of noncoercive influence strategies (information exchange and recommendations) has no significant effect on conflict, while, as expected, the use of coercive influence strategies (threats and promises) increases conflict.

Key words:

• Cameroon
• channel conflict
• dependence
• formalization
• influence strategies

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank Drs. Mihail Cocosila, Kofi Dadzie, and Léopold Lessassy for their very helpful comments on the early drafts of this manuscript and Mr. Vince Ambrock for providing copyediting support. This manuscript also benefitted from the comments of the participants at the Athabasca University Research Forum.