Red Tape, Rule Burden, and Legitimate Performance Trade-Offs: Results from a Vignette Experiment

Abstract

Goals in the public sector are complex and managers can face situations in which pursuing one legitimate goal necessitates performance trade-offs in other areas. This study tests how knowledge of legitimate performance trade-offs shapes the perception of red tape. Using a vignette experimental design and a sample of university students, between group t-tests and regression analyses suggest that, when evaluating increased rule burden, individuals that are provided with information about how objectively burdensome rules serve alternative values such as equity and effectiveness associate them with lower levels of red tape. A series of Monte Carlo simulations suggest that this effect is substantial.

Keywords:

• red tape
• rule burden
• performance trade-offs
• experiment
• Monte Carlo simulation

Note

Acknowledgments

I want to thank Dr. Sangmook Kim for providing me with his original, high-quality Korean translations of the PSM survey items.

Notes

1 I here note the relatively large difference in effect size between model 1 (organizational red tape scale) and model 2 (TIRT scale). As noted, the TIRT scale has several advantages over the traditional scale, including that it addresses multiple dimensions of performance and is linguistically simpler. There is also a subtle difference in focus relevant to the present study: whereas the first question asks respondents to “assess the level of red tape in the application process after the changes were made,” the TIRT scale was used to assess “[t]he changes to the application review process” itself – that is, it has a more rules-oriented focus. This said, the reason for the difference between the 2 models is not entirely clear. Importantly, like in Borry’s (2016) original study, answers for both scales were provided by all respondents, and moreover the 2 scales are significantly correlated (0.40, p < 0.001). While it is not possible to provide perfect clarity about this issue here, the relatively large difference does highlight the necessity of using multiple measures of red tape to address questions of interest in future studies.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by an Incheon National University Research Grant in 2018.

Notes on contributors

Jesse W. Campbell

Jesse W. Campbell teaches Public Administration at Incheon National University in South Korea. His research interests include human resource effectiveness, comparative public administration, and issues with specific relevance to the East Asian (and particularly Korean) administrative context.