The agony of nuclear: sustaining democratic disagreement in the anthropocene

Abstract

Disagreements inevitably arise over the possibilities and policies of sustainability. In contrast to approaches that pursue political consensus this article argues that such disagreement is not a matter of a clash with ignorant or immoral perspectives, but should rather be understood as irreducible political conflict that plays a valuable role in engendering social and technological transformation. Focusing particularly upon the contestation over nuclear energy, it challenges eco-modernist claims that technological innovation can bypass political disagreement and smoothly facilitate the shift to a more sustainable form of life in an era of ecological crisis. The article advocates an “ecological agonistic” approach that refuses to regard such contestation as an impediment to robust and radical transformation. Instead, it suggests that the conflicts over nuclear energy reveal the limitations and lacunae of existing social, economic, and political institutions and thus can be understood as themselves playing a salutary role in their transformation.

Keywords:

• Nuclear
• politics
• sustainability
• agonism
• environmentalism
• eco-modernism

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[T]his type of nuclear reaction may be described in an essentially classical way like the fission of a liquid drop…the fission products must fly apart with the kinetic energies of the order of hundred million electron-volts each.

Meitner and Frisch (1939, 471)

With this bomb we have now added a new and revolutionary increase in destruction to supplement the growing power of our armed forces…It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East…Both science and industry worked under the direction of the United States Army, which achieved a unique success in managing so diverse a problem in the advancement of knowledge in an amazingly short time. It is doubtful if such another combination could be got together in the world. What has been done is the greatest achievement of organized science in history.

Harry S. Truman, President of the United States, August 6, 1945¹

Introduction

5:30am on 16th July, 1945 is said to be an important moment in the history of Planet Earth. Delayed slightly by rain, scientists gathered at the U.S. Air Force base in Alamogordo, New Mexico to detonate a plutonium bomb, part of the scientific research program to develop nuclear power known as “The Manhattan Project.”² The gigantic cloud mushrooming over the desert marked the birth of the nuclear age, an age that has witnessed the spread of artificial radionuclides into every corner of the world, infecting the food chain, inciting fear, transforming geopolitics, and instigating various processes of mutation (Masco 2004).

Nuclear technology has actually transformed the very geology of the planet (Simon, Bouville, and Land 2006). For nuclear fission is one important example of the human activities having such a significant impact that some say future geologists will be able to detect a change in the rock record; enough to warrant the diagnosis of a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000; Chakrabarty 2009; Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016). Some scientists have claimed that the spread of artificial radionuclides by nuclear bomb tests have left a radiological signature in the global chemostratigraphic record ‒ a so-called “golden spike,” constituting a clear geological boundary (Monastersky 2015; Zalasiewicz et al. 2015). Amid much disagreement and debate, both political and scientific (Machin 2017), the Anthropocene Working Group of the Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy³ recently voted that the starting point of the Anthropocene coincided with the first nuclear bomb tests of the mid-twentieth century.⁴

Whether or not the recommendation of the Working Group is accepted, the implications of this claim have called for reflection upon the limits, activity, and technological predilections of human society. As Joseph Masco (2004, 518) explains in his compelling account of the production of “nuclear natures,” “the atomic bomb produces not only new understandings of self, nature and society but also initiates a profound mutation in each of these terms.” It bids us to (re)consider how it might be possible to live sustainably in the unpredictable time of the Anthropocene, and to continually revisit the question of what “sustainability” might mean.

Paradoxically, despite its role in ushering in the Anthropocene, nuclear energy is heralded by some as the key to living in the new epoch. For although nuclear power can be used for war, it can also be peacefully deployed to supply human societies with energy. Decades after the first mushroom cloud dispersed, its legacy remains in the form of various political questions: is nuclear a triumph of science or the nadir of human society? Should nuclear power be pursued as the very solution to the problems it symbolizes? Or are we rather at the cusp of the post-nuclear, a time when we can begin to cope with the permanent consequences of human interference with the planet?

A key insight of the Anthropocene is that the human species, has become “a global geological force in its own right” (Steffen et al. 2011, 843). Some regard humanity as a problematic and disruptive species hell bent on self-destruction and call for humility. From this perspective, the risks of nuclear energy might be feared as a dangerous symptom of a form of life out of control, addicted to oil, habituated by consumption, and too narrowly focused on the economic self interests of the immediate short term to be concerned about the long-term risks of a technology already shown to pose high risks and to yield devastating effects. Indeed, traditional environmentalism is unambiguously opposed to nuclear. But for others this discourse undermines the potential of humans to use their ingenuity to find technological solutions to environmental problems. Proponents of what we might call a Promethean Weltanschauung see human beings as “a genius if unruly species, distinguishing itself from the background of merely-living life” (Crist 2013, 131), provocatively denominating “the God Species” (Lynas 2011). According to “eco-modernists,” nuclear is the ideal replacement for fossil fuels – a clean and sustainable source of energy that will enable the global human population to enter a period of well-being if not abundance.

As this already indicates, then, nuclear energy is a highly politicized issue, one over which scientists, activists, and citizens disagree. Nuclear has, of course, long been politically contested. As Phil Johnstone puts it, “when the atom is split, so too is the public” (2014, 698). This contention continues over the relatively novel framing of nuclear as environmentally and climate friendly. Accordingly, disagreements abound on the role of nuclear in the shift to a more sustainable way of life and, as such, nuclear is symptomatic of the challenges of democratic sustainability transformation. Instead of seeing political conflict as an obstacle to the transition toward a sustainable future, however, I will suggest that we understand it differently. This contribution aims to show that agonistic disagreement over nuclear energy is crucial in keeping the issue a matter of ongoing democratic discussion and political responsibility in the epoch of the Anthropocene. It does this by juxtaposing what I refer to as the “traditional environmentalist discourse” and the “eco-modernist discourse,” neither of which can foreclose the debate. Discourses are understood here in a broad sense as articulatory practices, which give meaning to objects, people, and events (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 105).

I start by summarizing the specificities of the technological and political dimensions of nuclear energy. I especially focus on energy, not weapons, although I do consider the argument made by opponents of nuclear energy that it is difficult to separate the two. Next, I consider the “traditional environmentalist” discourse of nuclear energy in comparison to the “eco-modernist” discourse of nuclear as a crucial factor in the transition toward sustainability – a technology that sits comfortably alongside geoengineering as a “technological fix” (Ruser and Machin 2016). I argue that this discourse promotes the depoliticization of nuclear energy. Finally, I present the “ecological agonist” perspective that regards the disagreements over nuclear as crucial for enlivening and enhancing democratic participation, encouraging alternative policy options, and emphasizing political responsibility. I intend to illustrate that just as nuclear has mutated nature and geology, it has mutated politics.

Nuclear disagreements: reliable or risk?

If the nuclear age was born in the desert of New Mexico, it was conceived in a laboratory in Berlin. In 1938, physicist Lise Meitner and her chemist colleagues, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann, made a “beautiful discovery” that a neutron could split an atom’s core (Sime 1998, 85). The scientists found that when a uranium nucleus is hit by neutrons it divides into highly radioactive fragments and releases an enormous amount of energy, a process that they called “nuclear fission” (Sime 1998, 85).⁵ While this led to the potential for nuclear weapons, it also created capacity for energy; nuclear power has been used in many countries around the world to support the expanding demands of a growing population using more energy per capita. By 2018, nuclear energy was supplying 10% of global electricity demand (IEA 2019, 7). At the end of August 2020 there were 441 operable civilian nuclear reactors operating around the world (WNA 2020, 60) and the goal of the “Harmony Programme” initiative of the nuclear industry is to supply 25% of the world’s electricity by 2050.⁶ According to the 2020 report of the World Nuclear Association (WNA), “[T]here is an urgent need for the pace of grid connections and new construction starts to increase in order to expand the essential nuclear energy makes to global clean energy provision” (2020, 3). The International Energy Agency (IEA) admits that nuclear is “facing an uncertain future” (2019, 2).⁷ Yet it also points out that various countries “have kept the option” (2019, 5).

For example, after the accident in March 2011 at Fukushima in Japan, 55 of the country’s reactors were taken off line, but nine have been brought back, into operation (IEA 2019, 16). The governments stated aim is for the share of nuclear in Japan’s electricity supply to be 20‒22% by 2030 in order to “achieve stable and affordable energy supply and to combat global warming.”⁸

Likewise, in December 2019, the European Council explicitly endorsed nuclear energy in its strategy for reaching a “climate-neutral EU” by 2050 (European Council 2019), also citing the reason of energy security. “The European Council acknowledges the need to ensure energy security and to respect the right of the Member States to decide on their energy mix and to choose the most appropriate technologies. Some Member States have indicated that they use nuclear energy as part of their national energy mix” (European Council 2019, 2).

As we can see, there is a trio of justifications for nuclear power – economy, security, and environment. But these rationales are not at all straightforward. An economic framing of nuclear energy, for example, produces an ambiguous picture. The fuel used in nuclear energy ‒ uranium ‒ is in abundant supply, is easy to transport and relatively cheap. And according to the WNA, “Each new nuclear build project generates thousands of jobs and boosts the local economy” (WNA 2020, 3). But in comparison to fossil fuel-power stations, a nuclear power plant is expensive to build. The construction of a facility involves enormous upfront investment: a recent estimate for a new reactor in Georgia, for example, is US$23 billion (Lurshina et al. 2019). Some point out that costs vary greatly among countries and the United States may well not be representative (Lovering, Yip, and Nordhaus 2016), but others note that nuclear projects suffer “enhanced financial risk” (Sovacool, Gilbert, and Nugent 2014, 169; Gilbert et al. 2017). Nuclear plants also take a long time to plan, to secure regulatory approval, and to build (Findlay 2010, 15; Gilbert et al. 2017). These circumstances have limited the commercial appeal for some countries (Stulberg and Fuhrmann 2013, 2).

Increasingly, renewable energy technology is quicker to installer and is also mass producible. As the World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2019 acknowledges, “Stabilizing the climate is urgent, nuclear power is slow. It meets no technical or operational need that these low-carbon competitors cannot meet better, cheaper, and faster” (Schneider et al. 2019, 25).

Approaching nuclear in relation to security also offers blatant contradictions, for although this source reduces reliance on energy imports and vulnerability to supply interruptions such as “oil shocks,” for example, it entails a security risk itself. The same technology, materials, and know-how used to generate nuclear electricity can be used to produce nuclear weapons, therefore the diffusion of nuclear programs undermines international security (Stulberg and Fuhrmann 2013, 2). There also are concerns regarding regulation. Various conventions and regimes exist, such as the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) based in Vienna and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) headquartered in Paris, but these are not necessarily well integrated with each other. Moreover, since each country is ultimately responsible for the safety of its nuclear industry, there is a danger that “new entrants will be unaware of and unprepared for their safety responsibilities, have no safety culture and be too poorly governed to enforce safety regulations” (Findlay 2010, 23). Some also voice the worry that nuclear power plants could be a target for terrorist attacks (Stulberg and Fuhrmann 2013, 3).

Finally, the ecological framing is problematic, too. Commitments to lower carbon emissions by reducing dependency on fossil fuels and concerns regarding energy security have “reopened a policy window” for nuclear (Butler, Parkhill, and Pidgeon 2011; Teräväinen, Lehtonen, and Martiskainen 2011). In particular, nuclear is held up as a clean and secure form of energy (see Stehr and Machin 2019, 152‒154). The Director General of the WNA states that “ensuring the long-term operation of existing nuclear reactors…is the cheapest way to generate low-carbon electricity” (WNA 2020, 59). And yet there remains the critical issue of the treatment of hazardous waste material. A typical nuclear reactor will produce 27 tons of used fuel a year from the fissioning of uranium. This used fuel contains radioactive “high-level waste,” which must be carefully managed if it is not to pose significant environment and health risks. According to epidemiologists exposure to radiation increases the likelihood of cancer in later life, particularly in children, and might also heighten the risk of cardiovascular and other non-cancer diseases (Kamiya 2015; Simon, Bouville, and Land 2006).⁹ The IAEA emphasises the importance of “safe, secure and sustainable fuel cycle management” (International Atomic Energy Agency 2020, 6) for which they describe various strategies and technologies. Used fuel is sometimes reprocessed so that the extracted uranium and resultant plutonium can be recycled and the amount of waste is significantly reduced. Spent fuel is commonly placed in storage ponds, and after 40‒50 years the radioactivity drops by over 99%. There is broad agreement on the idea of “final disposal” of high-level nuclear waste into deep stable geological formations, but not all countries have the geological conditions or financial resources for this (Di Nucci et al. 2015, 27).¹⁰ To date all spent fuel – approximately 250,000 tonnes – sits in interim storage systems, which have to be carefully maintained for long periods of time.¹¹

As can already been seen, then, there is no straightforward “truth” of nuclear. Different discourses, I will show, construct nuclear in strikingly distinct ways, giving it contradictory meanings. Next, I consider two dominant discourses in which the uranium nucleus is articulated with various other elements to create vastly different futures and distinct versions of sustainability.

Nuclear threat: the traditional environmentalist discourse

Green political parties and movements have traditionally been vigorously opposed to nuclear energy. Environmentalism should not be seen as automatically and entirely skeptical about technological progress, yet it has nevertheless been characterized by a suspicion of “high technology” (Carter 2009, 49). Indeed, some green political parties commonly are rooted in anti-nuclear movements. For example, the German Green Party, founded in 1980, began as an anti-nuclear protest during the previous decade and one of its main goals when it entered the federal government in 1998 was to phase out nuclear power (Wiliarty 2013, 284). What can be referred to as the “traditional environmentalist discourse,” therefore expresses a strong anti-nuclear agenda. This discourse has not remained static, although certain themes continue to reappear, three of which I map out with broad-brush strokes here.

First, early opponents of nuclear were particularly concerned with the connection between the capacity for nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons: “nuclear power” writes Amory Lovins and colleagues, “is both the main driving force behind proliferation and the least effective known way to displace oil” (Lovins, Lovins, and Ross 1980, 1138). As Nelkin and Pollak explain, “Nuclear power is, above all, a symbol associated with death and war…the power of this symbol is the main force maintaining the unity of the anti-nuclear movement” (1980, 4). More recently the European Greens (the coalition of green parties in the European Parliament) strongly voices its belief in “a nuclear-free Europe” explicitly stating that, “nuclear power is expensive and risky [and] increases the danger of spreading of nuclear weapons” (European Green Party 2014). The connection is perhaps most clearly expressed by one of the most well-known anti-nuclear voices, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), a grassroots social movement launched in 1958, with a logo that has become an internationally recognized sign for peace.¹² Primarily opposed to (the military use of) nuclear weapons, it also campaigns against (the civil use of) nuclear energy, precisely because it sees the two as inevitably conjoined. CND claims that, “In Britain, the civil nuclear power programme was deliberately used as cover for military activities” (2018, 1). The environmental nongovernmental organization, Greenpeace, which also has had a long-running campaign against nuclear power, constructs nuclear energy as a threat to peace and asserts that“we must face the truth and declare once and for all that a peaceful use of nuclear energy is nothing more than a mere fantasy” (Suzuki 2019).

A second, and related, theme of this discourse is the construction of nuclear as symbolic of the systemic problems of advanced industrial societies: atomization, urbanization, and the concentration of economic and political power (Nelkin and Pollak 1980). Greenpeace, for example, claims that “nuclear-related risks themselves are exacerbated by a lack of transparency.”¹³ Nuclear energy is constructed in the discourse as an energy culture that reaffirms centralized, nontransparent, and undemocratic decision-making and traditionally greens have preferred renewable energies that could potentially be controlled through decentralized means (Carter 2009, 49). In their policy statement in 2014, the Green Party in the UK states that it is “fundamentally opposed to nuclear energy, which we consider to be expensive and dangerous. The technology is not carbon neutral, and being reliant on uranium it is not renewable. We consider its use, moreover, to be elitist and undemocratic.”¹⁴

This statement continues, “there is so far no safe way of disposing of nuclear waste…the costs and dangers of nuclear energy and its waste will be passed on to future generations long after any benefits have been exhausted.” A third theme, then, is that of risk and injustice to future generations. CND, for example, “calls for an end to the production of nuclear energy – a technology that is dirty, dangerous and economically unsustainable. Nuclear power burdens future generations with a potential human and environmental disaster that is not compensated for by the expensive electricity produced.”¹⁵ The organization demands “a safe, genuinely sustainable, global and green solution to our energy needs, not a dangerous diversion like nuclear power” (CND 2017, 2). For the German Green Party, too, although this issue features less in its domestic political agenda since the country’s announced nuclear phase out, this energy source is “eine unbeherrschbare Hochrisikotechnologie,” (“an uncontrollable high-risk technology”) that imposes burdens for decades;. The Party therefore stands for “eine Welt ohne Atomkraft” (one world without nuclear power”).¹⁶

In whatever ways the traditional environmentalist discourse has transformed over the last decades, its rejection of nuclear energy has not; nuclear is discursively constructed as an ecological threat as well as social danger and an ethical issue. And yet, as we will see in the next section, it is possible to articulate a concern for the environment and a sustainable society alongside a pro-nuclear stance. Here nuclear energy is portrayed not as a threat but conversely as a solution for contemporary ecological concerns such as climate change.

Nuclear optimism: the eco-modernist discourse

Not everyone concerned about the environment is opposed to the nuclear option. A public letter recently penned by environmentally concerned climate and energy scientists states that risk lies not so much with utilizing nuclear energy but rather in failing to exploit its potentials. The statement contends that “continued opposition to nuclear power threatens humanity’s ability to avoid dangerous climate change” and therefore “the time has come for a fresh approach to nuclear power in the 21st century” (CNN 2013). Four senior scientists (James Hansen, Ken Caldeira, Kerry Emanuel, and Tom Wigley) write that although renewable sources of energy are important, they simply cannot deliver enough cheap power at the scale and speed required by the global economy and therefore they demand “the development and deployment of safer nuclear power systems” (CNN 2013). The biggest threat, they argue, is not nuclear energy but global warming, and the burden for future generations is not radioactive waste but air pollution and a changing climate.

It merits noting that the letter asserts the importance of objective assessment of risks and the authors say, “[q]uantitative analyses show that the risks associated with the expanded use of nuclear energy are orders of magnitude smaller than the risks associated with fossil fuels. No energy system is without downsides.” They also juxtapose immovable facts against human emotions and write that “[w]e ask only that energy system decisions be based on facts, and not on emotions and biases that do not apply to 21st century nuclear technology” (CNN 2013). The assumption here is not only that decisions about nuclear can be coolly detached from political passions and irrational thinking, but that the authors of the letter are capable of such detachment, and those who disagree with them are not.

The “nuclear optimism” manifested in the open letter fits within a discourse that is strikingly dissimilar to traditional environmentalism. In this “ecomodernist discourse,” there is no value placed on reduction of social dependence on technology, but rather the call is for more; the idea is not to give up on technologies but instead to develop them further (Ruser and Machin 2016, 440). This discourse is perhaps most clearly articulated in the publications of the Breakthrough Institute, a research center based in Oakland, California, focused upon identifying and promoting technological solutions to environmental problems. The explicit aim of the institute is to “better understand and articulate a new environmentalism for the 21st century.” Its associates self-consciously refer to themselves as proponents of “ecomodernism,” a “new school of thought,” and “a movement built on decoupling environmental impact from human well being.”¹⁷

This “decoupling” for ecomodernists does not entail radical lifestyle change or reduction in energy demands and emphasis is not placed on strong governmental regulation. Rather it requires the promotion of technological innovation. For ecomodernists, the Promethean celebration of human ingenuity promises to find the pathway to sustainability. In this discourse the inventiveness of humanity inexorably works to smooth over problems through the unfolding of technological advance.

Geographer Erle Ellis writes that “our unprecedented and growing powers…Allow us the opportunity to create a planet that is better for both its human and nonhuman inhabitants. It is an opportunity we should embrace” (2011). Echoing this call, Ellis’s fellow Breakthrough Institute member Steve Fuller strongly advocates the replacement of the precautionary principle with his “proactionary principle.” In a book coauthored with Veronika Lipińska he writes, “To be proactionary is, in the first instance, to identify with this progressive historical narrative, which in the secular West has been known mainly as “Enlightenment” but in our own day is expressed as the drive to ‘human enhancement’” (Fuller and Lipińska 2014, 129). Mark Lynas, author of The God Species, agrees that the ingenuity and technological prowess of humanity should be celebrated rather than lamented by environmentalists.

Until now, environmentalism has been mostly about reducing our interference with nature…My thesis is in reverse: playing God (in the sense of being intelligent designers) at a planetary level is essential if creation is not to be irreparably damaged or even destroyed by humans unwittingly deploying our new found powers in disastrous ways…false humility is a more urgent danger than hubris. (2011, 10)

Ecomodernists advocate the development of alternative technologies that attempt to harness cleaner and renewable sources of energy. They also endorse technologies that enhance energy efficiency, as well as more controversially, geoengineering which has emerged as a serious option in climate-policy discussions (Parker and Geden 2016). But perhaps most of all, the Breakthrough Institute supports the use and development of nuclear energy. In a publication entitled The Ecomodernist Manifesto, a large number of members of the institute argue, “[n]uclear fission today represents the only present-day zero-carbon technology with the demonstrated ability to meet most, if not all, of the energy demands of a modern economy” (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015, 23).

Nuclear then is discursively reframed here as not only “sustainable” (Johnstone 2010) but also as an apparently straightforward solution. Concerns regarding accidents and risks have in contrast been “pushed to the background” (Teräväinen, Lehtonen, and Martiskainen 2011, 3434).

Unsurprisingly, this reframing resonates with the rhetoric of the nuclear industry, which reproduces the discourse and is also of course empowered by it. According to the previously mentioned WNA report, “The global nuclear industry is ready to work with policy-makers to set a greater ambition for meeting climate goals and to create the jobs needed for sustainable economic growth… the essential challenge of our time remains to ensure that no one is forced to live without reliable and affordable energy, whilst also protecting the planet for future generations” (WNA 2020, 59).

The lobbying organization for the European nuclear industry in Brussels makes a similar statement that asserts “[t]he success of the EU industrial strategy and the European Green Deal will depend on the EU’s ability to achieve climate neutrality whilst maintaining its competitiveness, including growth, jobs, and technological leadership. Nuclear energy can contribute to making this a reality.”¹⁸

Nuclear politics: the tendency toward depoliticization

In the ecomodernist discourse, environmental problems can be solved smoothly through technological innovation and implementation. The Ecomodernist Manifesto states unambiguously that “meaningful climate mitigation is fundamentally a technological challenge” (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015, 21, italics added). What is missing from this discourse is any acknowledgement of the inevitability, legitimacy, and value of political disagreements over technological challenges, innovations, and practices.

To agree that technology will play a big part in the shift to more sustainable forms of life is not to hold that technological developments are rational, incontrovertible, and self-evidently good (Stirling 2008, 264). Commentators who acknowledge the potentials of technological innovations do not necessarily believe that such issues should be kept out of the political realm and insulated from rigorous democratic interrogation. For just as technological developments are not always sufficient, nor are they always salutary. All technologies potentially generate their own damaging impact and aggravate in complex and uncertain ways the delicate mechanisms affecting the environment. Different technologies can be evaluated in different ways and so can the challenges that they expect to solve.

As Szerszynski and Galarraga (2013) observe, there is a danger in believing that problems and issues pre-exist the ways of approaching them. What is viewed as a problem in the first place depends upon what is held valuable and realistic and how the future is imagined. Our personal and academic backgrounds partly determine the questions we ask and what we tolerate as an answer. What we deem as an appropriate climate policy hinges on the way in which we conceptualize climate change and the societies that we live in. Whether a particular technology is researched, developed, and utilized depends upon which discourses are dominant in a society, just as that technology will shape those discourses (Bijker 1997, 3). Szerszynski and Galarraga (2013) focus on the challenges of emergent geoengineering technology but the same surely holds with nuclear. The pros and cons of nuclear energy cannot be assessed outside of our discursively constituted forms of life. Any technological challenge or solution is situated within a particular historical, social, economic, and cultural context replete with hegemonic discourses, social norms, and power relations. The danger in presenting nuclear as the only “rational” or “obvious” choice is that these power relations are disguised, the specificities of the “challenge” are reified, and alternative ideas are precluded.

What should not be ignored in the debates and decisions regarding the technological aspects of a sustainability transformation is the contingent character of the development of “sociotechnical ensembles” (Bijker 1997, 12) and the “institutional embeddedness” of science and technology (Gould 2015, 144). The presupposition that technological research, practices, and artifacts are untouched by socio-political contexts, norms, and emotional concerns is highly risible. Ecomodernist assumptions of what constitutes a “plausible pathway” (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015, 23), as well as claims about what is and what is not “genuinely sustainable” in the traditional environmentalist discourse (CND 2017, 2018) both merit careful interrogation.

Any arguments for or against a particular technological innovation can be challenged, even (or perhaps especially) those that claim they are based on rational thinking, objective facts, or moral truths. The legitimacy and efficacy of any particular technological scientific policy can be contested but so too can the tendency to construct it as outside or beyond politics. Some scholars have diagnosed a “post-political condition” around nuclear, at least partly due to its discursive reframing as “sustainable” and as the best strategy to tackle climate change (Johnstone 2010, 2014; Swyngedouw 2011). For instance, Johnstone argues that its appearance in the discourse of “sustainable development” has facilitated the reinvention of nuclear power as a “solution” and a matter of a “managerial and technocratic style of governing” (2010, 93).

The consequence of disallowing disagreement around sustainability more generally and nuclear power in particular is that the opportunity to critique and debate the challenges of contemporary energy cultures is narrowed. Szerszynski and Galarraga (2013, 2823) call for reflexivity and “epistemological responsibility” in research that acknowledges, opens, and celebrates the diverse and incommensurable perspectives on various issues. The “ecological agonist” approach that I advocate below acclaims the political disagreements over nuclear energy and underlines the importance of political responsibility in making decisions.

Nuclear agony: the ecological agonist approach

Both the traditional environmentalist and the ecomodernist discourses are powerful, albeit not equally so, and yet neither has become entirely naturalized or “sedimented.” Characterized by clashes between these distinct discourses, the disagreements over nuclear energy illustrate the politics of sustainability in which the stakes are high but the solutions are not straightforward. As we have seen, however, there is a tendency to dismiss disagreements over nuclear as simply the result of ignorance on the one hand or immorality on the other. I suggest that the disagreements over nuclear should be regarded as the outcome of potentially legitimate expressions of difference. In this way, conflict over nuclear is seen as a possible source of a lively agonistic politics in which alternative visions and ideas may be respectfully expressed.

There are various theorists and versions of agonist politics (Connolly 2013; Honig 1993, 2009; Mouffe 2000, 2005, 2013; Tully 2001). What they share is an assertion of both the inevitability, as well as the value, of conflict (Wenman 2013, 5). It is only through political discord that prevailing power structures are reconfigured (Mouffe 2005, 21). What is crucial to agonistic approaches is that those with opposing views do not regard each other antagonistically as enemies to be destroyed but rather as legitimate adversaries (2005, 20).

In line with this approach, it can be argued that there should be acknowledgement of ongoing political disagreement surrounding ecological issues (Machin 2013; Machin and Smith 2014). Take climate change. It is often assumed that this is an issue on which consensus is requisite and disagreement is dangerous. Different scholars have argued that this problematically depoliticizes the issue and have called for its repoliticization (Pepermans and Maeseele 2014). Not only is the aim of reaching consensus on climate change likely to be unsuccessful, it covers up or excludes the extant different perspectives on both the problem and the solution. Rather than necessarily posing an obstacle to robust environmental policy making, political conflict over climate change ‒ as long as it is does not become violent and antagonistic ‒ can underpin a revitalized climate politics (Machin 2013, 89). Agonistic disagreement allows the expression and consolidation of alternatives.

It is this idea that forms the basis of a model of “ecological agonism” or “green agonism” (Machin 2020). This approach heeds the troubling disagreements that are understood to be inevitably provoked by environmental issues and scientific knowledge claims and that come from both inside and outside established conventions and parties. It understands these disagreements as occurring between irreducibly different perspectives that arise from locally situated and embodied experiences and identities. Such disagreements are not seen in this model as a hindrance for democratic sustainability transformation but rather as valuable for it. What might be salutary in the quest for sustainability, in short, is to reverse the assumption that political disagreement over nuclear energy should be transcended or suppressed and rather to call for its repoliticization within an arena of democratic struggle (Johnstone and Stirling 2020).

From this perspective, we can see the political agonies of nuclear as crucial for enlivening and enhancing democratic participation in energy politics, encouraging alternative policy options, and emphasizing political responsibility. Below I expand on each of these dimensions.

First, disagreement over nuclear politics can enliven political discussion and engage citizens and policy makers in the political realm. Contemporary politics is missing the lively and respectful contestation between clear and sometimes uncompromising alternatives (Ruser and Machin 2016, 43). The existence of partisanship, and strong irresolvable differences may be precisely what engages citizens in politics (Urbinati 2010, 70). Honig (2009, 3) recommends “agonistic contention” as “a generative resource for politics.” Replacing a dismissal of political adversaries as ignorant or emotional on the one hand or unethical on the other is an “agonistic ethos” engendering political respect for both opponents and the political realm itself. The promotion of nuclear energy as a rational solution to the “technological challenge” of climate change marginalizes the relevance or value of concerns arising from ethical, locally situated perspectives. But what has been witnessed over nuclear is the expression of passionate perspectives of those sometimes unfamiliar with formal politics.¹⁹ Debates over nuclear can draw in new participants and enrich the public realm with the perspectives of those who may otherwise be excluded or marginalized. A lively agonistic public sphere potentially allows for the reconfiguring of power relations, the reinvention of political institutions, and the forestalling of the polarization of the nuclear issue as either an evil threat or a simple fix.

Second, by celebrating democratic disagreement rather trying to rationally transcend it, new ideas are more likely to emerge on options regarding sustainability and energy. Agonistic confrontation makes it both more likely and more legitimate to challenge prevailing assumptions, allowing the radical disruption of unsustainable institutions and discourses and the divergence onto a different path. If particular meanings, discourses or practices have become entrenched then their retrenchment is unlikely without robust critique and political realignments. This is why Bonnie Honig (1993, 10) calls upon the “remainders” – those “others” left out from established identities and practices ‒ to “disrupt an otherwise peaceful set of arrangements.” There is no guarantee of the outcome, but disagreement underpins the perpetual possibility for the emergence of alternatives in the search for sustainability. Without a revitalized agonistic politics where can a challenge to the status quo arise? An agonistic approach to nuclear energy politics, then, would not be to demand that political adversaries “see reason.” An agonistic approach would rather be to acknowledge that different political groups and perspectives will always exist and to place emphasis upon the building of strong alliances with clear political and technological alternatives. The anti-nuclear protest at Wyhl in southwestern Germany provides a good example of such an alliance. Wyhl was the proposed site for a nuclear power station and was peacefully occupied for several months in the early 1970s. The occupation encouraged the formation of a “loose coalition” of grassroots and conventional organizations that then became a stronger movement opposed to the conservative state government (Rucht 1990, 204). This anti-nuclear movement has certainly had a significant influence on German energy policy and helped encourage the debate over alternative “energy paths” and the possibility of an economically feasible “non-nuclear future” (Rucht 1990, 205).

Finally, disagreements over nuclear energy are important for highlighting the inescapable responsibility that goes along with pursuing a nuclear energy strategy. As we have seen, there is a long-term commitment that is necessarily introduced here, which means that decisions on nuclear energy cannot be simply rescinded in the next electoral cycle. Conversely, not implementing nuclear technologies at a time when “tipping points” in the climate system are possibly imminent also has implications. A decision over nuclear therefore constitutes an immensely huge and inescapably far-reaching and ethically significant commitment. Making a decision does not put an end to disagreement, but it does make it harder to change path. Under conditions of ecological agonism, then, political responsibility for the decision for or against nuclear is more difficult to shirk. Policy makers and proponents of nuclear energy cannot simply refer to “common sense” or rationality when they make their choices. The nuclear question is ultimately a political one and, as Mouffe (2005, 10) reminds us, “Properly political questions always involve decisions which require us to make a choice between conflicting alternatives.”

I argue then, that nuclear disagreements are significant for any democratic sustainability transformation. Rather than demanding the foreclosure of the nuclear debate this approach suggests that environmental and energy politics will inevitably be disrupted by discursively constructed alternatives. These alternatives are embedded within particular socio-ecological contexts and that offer distinct hopes for the future and distinct conceptions of the very meaning of sustainability. Agonistic conflict over nuclear may enliven politics, encourage the formulation of alternatives and emphasize the responsibility that goes with any political decision.

Conclusion

I have attempted to show here that nuclear power is simultaneously regarded both as the best means of addressing climate change and as the worst. It can be seen as the demon of the Anthropocene or as its savior. This disagreement is political and unavoidable, for there is no one rational answer or a “best” solution on which all parties can reach consensus. Despite various appeals to “facts” and risk assessments there is not an objectively determined level of the acceptable risk of disaster, accident, or sabotage.

This is perhaps made evident by the political discussions of the European Green Deal – promoted by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and widely embraced across Europe – in which the place of nuclear remains a key point of contention. As we saw above, the European Council explicitly included nuclear within the possible energy mix of the member states. Yet this inclusion is a highly controversial matter in the European Parliament: the European Greens state that nuclear is “the wrong direction”²⁰ and “extremely dangerous”²¹ whereas the European Conservatives and Reformists Party see it as “a very important piece of the energy puzzle.”²² From the perspective of ecological agonism, this illustrates the irreducible differences over nuclear energy and its role in the transformation of societies and economies toward sustainable alternatives. It is disagreement such as that taking place within the European Parliament that prevents the depoliticization of nuclear through its removal from the political arena.

The danger of discourses that promote the depoliticization of nuclear is that they obstruct the articulation and consolidation of legitimate alternatives. Instead of unthinking reliance on technological solutions on the one hand, or the complete rejection of them on the other, an ecological agonistic approach demands an on-going practice of reassessment of the specificities of each type of technology and its particular context and a continual rethinking of the ways in which our technologies condition, augment, and inhibit our interaction within our complex environments. Ecological agonism calls for the ongoing expression of local disagreements in the politics of nuclear rather than their displacement by technocratic governance. This approach promotes the interruption of policy discussions by unconventional methods and values. It suggests that there is no single technology that can magically underpin a transition to a sustainable way of life, and challenges the call for consensus on what that sustainable way of life would look like.

Nuclear energy has left a clear signature in the rock record, in human bodies, and in the political realm, where its meaning morphs from a symbol of modern technological progress and prowess to a pathological symptom of an unsustainable society, and back again. Nuclear has itself mutated the political realm, provoking the transformation of environmental discourses in new directions. I have argued that the contradictory meanings of nuclear should not be ignored but rather brought into contact since sustaining the political disagreements over energy technologies is salutary for socio-ecological transformation as well as democratic politics.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the special issue editors Ariana Goetz, Boris Gotchev and Ina Richter, the three anonymous peer reviewers and the Editor, Maurie Cohen, for their extremely helpful comments on earlier versions of this manuscript.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Transcript of statement announcing the use of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima available at https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/august-6-1945-statement-president-announcing-use-bomb.

2 See https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/trinity-test.

3 The Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy is a constituent body of the International Commission on Stratigraphy.

4 See http://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/working-groups/anthropocene/.

5 For more on the process of nuclear fission, see the website of the MIT Nuclear Reactor Laboratory at https://nrl.mit.edu/reactor/fission-process.

6 The objectives of the Harmony Programme are evinced by a recent statement noting that “[a]n increased share of low-carbon sources, as well as a drastically reduced level of fossil fuels, work together in harmony to secure a reliable, affordable and clean future energy supply 24 hours a day.” See details of the Harmony Programme” at https://www.world-nuclear.org/focus/energy-needs-and-requirements/the-harmony-programme.aspx.

7 See also https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/nuclear-power-continues-its-decline-as-renewable-alternatives-steam-ahead.

8 These claims are taken from the “Nuclear Power in Japan” webpage of the WNA at https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/japan-nuclear-power.aspx. See also Japan's “Strategic Energy Plan 2018” (English translation) at https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2018/pdf/0703_002c.pdf.

9 See the U.S. National Cancer Institute (NCI) website at https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention/risk/radiation/nuclear-accidents-fact-sheet.

10 See further information about radioactive waste management on the WNA website at https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-wastes/radioactive-waste-management.aspx.

11 See the International Atomic Energy Agency website at https://www.iaea.org/topics/spent-fuel-management.

12 See the BBC website at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/7292252.stm

13 See https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/30198/chernobyl-still-burns-forest-fires-ukraine-nuclear-radiation/.

14 See https://policy.greenparty.org.uk/archive/energy-2014.html.

15 See the CND anti-nuclear power campaign at https://cnduk.org/campaigns/no-nuclear-power/.

16 See https://www.gruene-bundestag.de/themen/atomausstieg.

17 See https://thebreakthrough.org/about.

18 See https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/eu-needs-nuclear-energy-to-achieve-its-industrial-goals/.

19 See https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/20/greenham-common-nuclear-silos-women-protest-peace-camp.

20 See https://apnews.com/faae3503fe497af36e8d2e9a4d13b62a.

21 See https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20200217-talking-europe-green-mep-ska-keller-sees-strong-case-for-boris-johnson-to-allow-scottish-independence-referendum.

22 See https://www.neweurope.eu/article/the-european-green-deal-is-missing-the-most-efficient-energy-source-of-all-nuclear/.