Evolutionary game analysis of stakeholders in Villages-in-City reconstruction: Pazhou village as an example

Abstract

Villages-in-City reconstruction involves many stakeholders, and how to coordinate the interests of participating parties and achieve a balanced and accepted cooperation is the key to successful reconstruction. Previous studies have mainly considered the relationship between stakeholders in urban villages from a static perspective without the irrational behavior of stakeholders. This study’s objective is to construct a three-party evolutionary game model of government, villagers, and developers to address the limited rational behavior of stakeholders’ strategy choices. In this study, the reconstruction of Pazhou village in Guangzhou is used as an empirical analysis example to verify the evolutionary model’s validity in MATLAB. Results show that: the Evolutionary Stable State or Strategy is influenced by the severity of government punishment and subsidies, incentive policies, regulatory costs and the participation of all parties. Thus, the government should strengthen publicity and guidance at the early stage of the project to enhance the willingness of village collectives to participate and cooperate through appropriate interest guarantees. Meanwhile, it can appropriately increase the support for developers to increase their enthusiasm. While the project is launched, the government should regulate and supervise the project and weaken the support until it fades out to achieve a win-win situation. This study provides a theoretical basis for governments to formulate urban renewal and reconstruction policies, in addition to providing decision-making guidance for enterprises.

KEYWORDS:

• Evolutionary game
• Pazhou village
• relevant stakeholders
• Villages-in-City reconstruction

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province (no. 2023A1515011006).