Representation in the European Union: Congruence Between Citizens and Elites in the European Parliament's Two-Level Setting

Abstract

Hitherto, the study of representation in the European Union (EU) and its member states focused on either the national or the European level. Yet, in the EU, the representation channels operate via a multi-level institutional and party organisational structure, which is likely to impact upon ideological congruence achieved between represented and their representatives. Here we ask: does congruence vary across levels of representation? To provide a first exploratory answer to this question, we employ two measures of congruence, namely absolute mean congruence and relative congruence, utilizing voter, expert and party manifesto data for Austria and Germany in the context of the 2004 European Parliament (EP) elections. Our findings demonstrate that the exclusion of either level from analyses of congruence may provide an inaccurate picture of representation in the EU.

Key Words:

• Representation
• congruence
• European Parliament
• Austria
• Germany

Acknowledgements

The authors appreciate comments on an earlier version of this article by Sylvia Kritzinger and Gail McElroy as well as by participants of the panel, Europe's double talkers? Determinants of policy congruence at the European level’ in the context of the 2009 ECPR General Conference. The authors are also grateful to the European Science Foundation (ESF) and the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) for supporting and funding our research.

Notes

Not only is the left–right the single most widely available measure of preferences of citizens but it meets reasonably well the need to capture comparably the general stances of citizens and party political orientations that compete for policy-making positions. We assume that all political subjects think in left–right terms and assume that all have the same concept in mind when referring to this dimension.

It should be noted that according to some studies (e.g. Marks & Wilson, 1999) the EU cleavage is absorbed in the left and right.

That said, anti-EU parties (e.g. Austrian FPÖ) might decide to ‘go alone’. By doing so, they can ensure a stable degree of congruence with their voters across levels, avoiding compromising their position on the EU dimension.

Special mention deserves the inclusion of the Austrian FPÖ in this study, which did not integrate a Europarty Federation before or after the EP elections. This ‘going alone’ strategy, however, provides an interesting reading in terms of congruence and representation. Indeed, by doing so, the FPÖ ensured equal representation for its voters across levels – and the purpose of its inclusion is to compare its performance with that of the other Austrian parties, which do join a Federation.

First, there were no Euromanifestos available for the 2004 EP elections for the European United Left – Nordic Green Left (EUL-NGL), where the German PDS belongs. Second, some parties were not covered by either the EES or the Benoit-Laver expert surveys used here, as for example the Austrian Liste Hans-Peter Martin. Finally, some parties did not make it to the EP, for example the Republikaner or the German NPD, hence could not serve the purposes of the present study.

Data for the 2009 EP elections were not included because comparable data to the one of 2004 were unavailable at the time of writing (i.e. an expert survey on party positions similar to Benoit's and Laver's).

This is a more valid approach than using citizens' evaluations of parties (see Mattila & Raunio, 2006).