Power-Sharing Challenges: From Weak Adoptability to Dysfunction in Iraq

Abstract

A potentially beneficial conflict management tool, post-conflict power-sharing is often marred by political crises and instability. We explore the link between power-sharing ‘adoptability’ and functionality. Focusing on Iraq, we demonstrate that weak adoptability (when one of more groups have grave reservations about the settlement) harms power-sharing in several important ways. First, weak adoptability by the Sunni community led to their exclusion and mobilization against the state. Second, weak adoptability provided political space for Shiites to dominate in politics, undermining the very basis of post-conflict power-sharing. Third, weak adoptability further compounded constitutional contestation, leading to the Kurdish independence referendum in 2017.

Notes

1 The decision to opt for a single constituency system (rather than multiple districts/provinces) was taken by CPA Director L. Paul Bremer in August 2004, reportedly on the advice of the UN’s Electoral Assistance Division (Rubin, 2008). According to the New York Times, officials advised that the decision ‘was driven by an unstable Iraq and the unrelenting pressure to speed the country to a vote’ (See Weisman, 2005).

2 With Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani repeatedly calling for an inclusive process, the Bush administration chose and added the Sunni members. There was some controversy regarding the representativeness of these Sunni members, with some claiming they were too close to the Baath Party interests (see International Crisis Group, 2005, pp. 2–3).

3 The Leadership Council included leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) Ammar al-Hakim and Da’wa party leader Ibrahim al-Jaadari (both Shiite), leader of the Kurdish PUK Jalal Talbani and Kurdish KDP party leader Masoud Barzani. See Morrow (2005).

4 There was considerable inter-elite disagreement on the text and the process, largely owing to the pressure to complete the draft in August 2005. Having failed to meet the deadline of 15 August, Shiite and Kurdish elites agreed on a text on 28 August despite objections from Sunnis who withdrew from the negotiations. Tinkering with the text by Shiite and Kurdish negotiators continued in the following weeks with a ‘final draft’ presented to the TNA on 23 September (see International Crisis Group, 2005).

5 Arato suggests that had the rules allowed for a simple majority in three governorates to reject the constitution, that provision would have been a clear veto for Sunnis. He writes that requiring a two-thirds qualified majority was very difficult for Sunnis to achieve in Nineveh, given the presence of a large Kurdish minority and that part of the province was administered by the Kurdistan Regional Government. See Arato (2009, p. 322), note 129.

6 See map for the demography of each province: http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Iraq_Ethnic_Shift_1947-2017_lg.png; http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-GWoUG_3hfs8/UCeUd-OgHqI/AAAAAAAAAKc/AWeXIyUP1h8/s1600/2005.jpg

7 The Anbar Awakening was a US organized campaign to wipe out al-Qaeda from the Sunni areas in Anbar region, by cooperating with Iraqi Sunni tribes (providing weapons and money).