Character education and the disappearance of the political

Abstract

In this article, I explore some contemporary versions of character education with specific reference to the extent to which they are viewed as constituting a form of citizenship education. I argue that such approaches often end up displacing the idea of political education and, through their language and stated aims, avoid any genuine engagement with the very concept of the political in all but its most superficial sense. In discussing some of the points raised by critics of character education, I defend the need for a more robust and radical conception of the political as a basis for a form of political education.

Keywords::

• character education
• citizenship education
• political education
• political imagination
• resilience

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

^1. In adopting this phrase of Larmore's, I do not want to imply (and neither, I believe, does Larmore himself) that there is an unproblematic sense in which ‘people like us’ can be used in a way that does not exclude others who are ‘not like us’. Rather, I suggest that this idea can be used to open up discussion about what can be considered as basic human needs, which in turn should form the basis for any political system designed to ensure that these needs are met. I would like to thank Sharon Todd for alerting me to this point.

^2. I leave aside the disturbing question of why ‘The Knightly Virtues’ are considered educationally and morally valuable or appropriate in twenty-first-century Britain, and why Rosa Parks' story is included as a supplement to the ‘great stories of knights and heroes’ that form the core of this educational programme.

^3. Of course, one may disagree with the radical suggestions implied here, and may be of the view that the democratic, liberal state is the best and most defensible political system available, and that the primary educational task is to strengthen its institutions and values. This seems, indeed, to be the position behind many of the character education projects described here. Yet if it is, it needs to be explicitly articulated and defended. It is the absence of any such defence that reflects the ‘state fixation’ mentioned earlier. I would like to thank Hanan Alexander for drawing my attention to the importance of this point, the broader implications of which I cannot pursue in full here.