Thoughts on phronesis

ABSTRACT

This essay explores the concept of phronesis in two contexts: phronesis as a virtue, in fact a meta-virtue because it guides the exercise of other virtues; and phronesis as an element in theories of practice. I argue that these two aspects are closely related, because ethics – especially virtue ethics – is best understood as a kind of practice. The second part of the essay explores some of the consequences of thinking about ethics in this way.

KEYWORDS:

• Phronesis
• practice
• virtue ethics

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. I should say ‘mature’ ethics. There are developmental issues here, and it may well be that for very young people rule-following and oversimplified injunctions may be part of the process by which virtues are first inculcated. The point is how to get people to the stage where rule-following and oversimplified injunctions are (as Wittgenstein said), the ladders that, once you have climbed them, can be thrown away – in fact, need to be thrown away.